(3) The presence of an Allied force, and particularly of American troops in that part of Russia, would have a strong moral effect upon the entire population in a territory which so directly affects European Russia; (4) It would have the additional advantage of giving our own forces during the winter an opportunity for more valuable service than any that will present itself at Vladivostok where there is so little direct contact with Russian opinion. The movement suggested is open to the possible objection that it might convey to the Czech commanders and to the Russian people the impression that the United States Government, in cooperation with the Allies, was preparing for much more extended military operations than are in fact contemplated. This objection could be met by a formal reaffirmation of the limitations clearly announced in the statement of August 3. A further possible objection is that this movement of our troops might be interpreted as an indication of our intention to give direct support to the recently organized Siberian government at Omsk. No doubt such an interpretation would be fostered at the outset but I think could be fully corrected by our subsequent action. Admiral Knight, General Graves, and I have carefully weighed these facts. Admiral Knight is convinced that such an expedition, far from antagonizing the Russian people, would be generally welcomed and would form a very effective center for American activities in that part of Siberia. General Graves has studied carefully the strategic situation and feels that there are no serious military difficulties or dangers involved provided that the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are protected and operated to the extent they now are. He is also of the opinion that, with the line of communication thus secured, their maintenance would not constitute a drain upon the resources of the country. In my judgment such movement would be entirely consistent with the policy which has been adopted by our Government in reference to Siberia. In fact it seems to me to offer the only practicable way in which that policy can be applied during the winter, for it will accomplish the two main objects which we have in view: to render assistance to the Czech forces represented along the railway and concentrated at railway centers in the Volga region; and to open up the field for social and economic action. If these centers are not properly guarded, they will revert to a condition of anarchy which will prevent any effective service. Finally, I fear that our failure to come into closer contact with the Czech forces and with the Russian people in western Siberia may have serious results. Already I find that the British and French representatives here, particularly General Knox and General Paris, are influencing the Czech leaders with impracticable plans to create by force a new Russian army and a new eastern front. General Gaida, who is very young, has been impressed by these schemes and misled by unauthorized suggestions of ultimate unlimited American support. I believe that General Graves's presence in western Siberia would steady the Czechs' leaders and make clear to them and to the Russian people our policy and purpose. I would therefore recommend for the consideration of the Department the wisdom of granting to General Graves the privilege of proceeding, in his discretion and with a substantial portion of his forces, to a point in the vicinity of Omsk and wintering there if conditions all justify such action. I further suggest that when General Graves has decided upon the details of such a plan, they be submitted to the Japanese Government with the request that it cooperate by [sending] a portion of its troops to the base selected. In conclusion, I venture to urge that whatever action is decided upon be announced to the Czech commanders at the earliest practicable moment for the reason that, as has been clearly pointed out to me by General Gaida, his plans for the winter are dependent upon the character and extent of the assistance which he can count on receiving from our own and the Allied Governments. MORRIS File No. 861.00/2782 The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PEKING, September 24, 1918, noon. Mr. Golovachev, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the so-called autonomous Siberian government, established at Omsk, called yesterday with the Russian Minister here. While presenting the claim of that organization to recognition by the Allies as a de facto government pending the constitution of a government of all Russia he did not press that point in reply to my intimation that, however much the Omsk organization had accomplished in restoring order [in] Siberia, it might be difficult for our Government to grant recognition to any separate governmental authority in Russia. He thereupon urged that, while such political decisions might be postponed, there is an immediate and urgent necessity for decision by the Allies as to the military exigencies of the situation; that the sentiment of all Siberia is now favorable to the Allied cause and concretely to the proposal to restore Allied front in Russia; that the mobilization now being effected is making available unexpected man power but that the arms at their disposal are adequate for only a fortnight's active fighting and that defeat resulting from shortage of such munitions would have psychological effect which would destroy favorable situation now existing. He therefore urged that, although reserving for further consideration all questions as to the recognition of Omsk government and as to its relationship towards any such national Russian government as may be [formed], the Allies should as a matter of urgent military necessity supply to the Siberian forces small arms and artillery and ammunition therefor. He further expressed a hope that in order to strengthen to the utmost the feeling of mutual interest in the general Allied cause it might be possible to distribute at least as far westward as the Urals contingents of joint Allied forces. In response to an intimation that the Omsk government had not adequately curtailed activities of Austro-German prisoners in Siberia he assured me that his organization was fully aware of the necessity of such action, had already taken steps to control them in most places, and was now putting into effect measures to confine all such prisoners. MACMURRAY File No. 861.00/2783 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, September 25, 1918, 11 a. m. [Received September 25, 10.35 a. m.] 165. Yesterday agreement was made between Siberian government and Horvat, latter to be a member of Siberian government and to act as its general commissioner for Far East with authority of civil governor general. This followed immediately after arrival here of Vologodski, head of Omsk Siberian government. CALDWELL File No. 861.00/2791a The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, September 25, 1918, 1 p. m. You will please ask the Chinese Government if there would be any objection if the American forces now in Siberia under General Graves should be ordered to Harbin or some similar place on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. For your information: The change from Vladivostok to Harbin is considered very desirable by this Government so that the closing of the port at Vladivostok and the severe winter there will not interfere with the shipment of supplies to the American forces. Immediately that you obtain the answer of the Chinese Government, you will communicate it to me. LANSING Declaration Restricting American Operations, September 26, 1918-Formation of the All-Russian Provisional Government at Ufa: Fusion with the Siberian Government at Omsk-Further Increase of Japanese Forces 1 File No. 861.00/2806 The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State' [Telegram] IRKUTSK, September 25, 1918. [Received September 26, 9.12 p. m.] 118. Consul, Omsk, reports on the night of 20th-21st following: Minister Krutovski, Minister of Interior, Omsk government, Shatilov, Minister of Native Affairs, and Yakushev were arrested by armed officers, taken to a house and upon threat of their lives, made to sign resignation papers. After being kept captive twenty-four hours were freed but given twenty hours to leave Omsk which first two did. Whole proceedings put in force by Mikhailov, Minister of Finance, but it is thought that Grishin-Almazov back of it. No Siberian government now exists. Eight Czech regiments going to Omsk to establish order. File No. 861.00/2808 [HARRIS] The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State 2 [Telegram] IRKUTSK, September 25, 1918. [Received September 26, 9.12 p. m.] 121. Vice Consul, Omsk, reports further that Minister of Finance Mikhailov of temporary Siberian government was arrested by order of Czech General Syrovy, and Almazov, former Minister of War, under strict surveillance. File No. 861.00/2772 [HARRIS] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok [Telegram] WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918, 6 p. m. Your September 23, 10 p. m. Your suggestion that General Graves establish himself at Omsk or any other point in the far See also vol. II, pp. 278, 281, and 302. 2 Sent via the Legation in China. interior must be disapproved because, strongly as our sympathies constrain us to make every possible sacrifice to keep the country on the Volga front out of the hands of the merciless Red Guards, it is the unqualified judgment of our military authorities that to attempt military activities west of the Urals is to attempt the impossible. We mean to send all available supplies that we can spare from the western front as fast as possible for the use of the CzechoSlovak forces, but we can not undertake to send them west of the Urals. So far as our cooperation is concerned we must frankly say that the Czech forces should retire to the eastern side of the Urals to some point at which they will be certainly accessible to supplies sent from the east, preferably where they will be in a position to make it impossible for the Germans to draw supplies of any kind from western Siberia, but in any case where they can make themselves secure against attack. With the deepest regret but with perfect realization of compelling facts we must in frankness say that our assistance can not be given in the carrying out of any other program. All that some in authority expected to happen upon the sending of Allied and American troops to the northern ports has failed of realization. This Government can not cooperate in an effort to establish lines of operation and defense through from Siberia to Archangel. However, we are giving General Graves authority to establish his headquarters at some such place as Harbin provided the Chinese Government interposes no objection, so that he can be in touch with an open port during the winter and can make the best use of his force to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the CzechoSlovaks. We have asked the Chinese Government if there would be any objection to this plan. Peking will be directed to advise you of the answer. The foregoing you are at liberty to use in your discretion with the civil and military authorities of other governments at Vladivostok. The following you will treat as strictly confidential:1 The ideas and purposes of the Allies with respect to military operations in Siberia and on the "Volga front" are ideas and purposes with which we have no sympathy. We do not believe them to be practical or based upon sound reason or good military judgment. Consequently, while we have said that we do not desire to set the limits of the actions or to define the policies of our associates, we are 'The following paragraph repeated "for your confidential information," in telegrams of Sept. 26, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, for repetition to the Ambassadors in France and Italy, and to the Chargé in Japan, for repetition to the Minister in China (File No. 861.00/2799b). |