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United States are to be considered States in view of this provision. In the second section of the act of 1804, Congress has construed this clause as extending to such District and Territories by declaring that that act and the act to which it is a supplement shall apply as well to the public acts, &c., of the respective Territories of the United States and countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as to the public acts, &c., of the several States.
In Haggin v. Squires (1811), 2 Bibb's Ky. 334, it was held, that a judgment in one of the courts for the Territory of Louisiana was not such a judgment as became conclusive under the Constitution.'
In Seton v. Hanham (1832), R. M. Charlton, 374. By Law, Judge:-"After the most careful examination of this subject which I am capable of giving to it, I have come to the conviction that the term State, when used in the Constitution of the United States, is confined to a member of the American compact; that it does not embrace a Territory of the United States; and that, consequently, Congress had no authority under the Constitution to pass the act of March, 1804, extending the provisions of the act of 1790 to the Territories of the United States, so as to prescribe the mode of proof, or the effect to be given to a judgment of a court of a Territory in the courts of a State of the Union. So much of the act of March, 1804, is, therefore, held to be unconstitutional and inoperative upon the courts of a State. The States possess the right to legislate upon this subject."
In Hughes v. Davis (1855), 8 Maryland, 271, on demurrer to nil debet, pleaded in suit on a judgment from the District of Columbia, Le Grand, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said:" The necessity of such an enactment as that of 1804 must be conceded by all; and inasmuch as it has, so far as we are informed, been treated ever since its passage as a constitutional exercise of the powers of Congress, we do not feel at liberty to declare it to be otherwise. In the writings of Justice Story and Chancellor Kent on the Constitution, as
The doctrine of Haggin v. Squires was noted, merely, in Price v. Higgins (1822), 1 Littel, 273. These writers do not notice the question of the meaning of the term State in
well as in a great number of decided cases, the act of 1804 is referred to and has been acted upon without the slightest suggestion from any quarter of its unconstitutionality."
The extent of the word State in this provision will hereinafter be further considered, in connection with inquiries into the meaning of the same word in other clauses of the Fourth Article.
§ 625. In this provision a power is expressly given to Congress' whereby, at least after Congress has exercised the power, the provision becomes private law, or acts on private persons, determining the rights and obligations of such persons (so far at least as it determines the adjective or remedial rights of such persons), and thereby becomes identified in authority with national municipal private law. Therefore, though quasi-international in its effect, it cannot be open to that question of construction which, in the last chapter, was stated as being material in reference to the international provisions of the Constitution, when the question is of the power of Congress to legislate in view of making them effectual. It is even doubtful whether the States, in the juridical exercise of their reserved powers, are bound to regulate themselves by it,' as they are by other grants of power to Congress which are held to involve a corresponding limitation of State powers. But neither legislative action on their part nor any judicial reference to the unwritten law of the States is necessary, in order that this provision should have its intended consequences in affecting the rights and obligations of private persons.
this provision, while they cite, without dispute, the authorities holding that citi zens of Territories are not citizens of a State in view of the clause in the third Article defining the extent of the judicial power of the U. S. 1 Kent, p. 384. Story's Comm., § 1694. See ante, vol. I., p. 433.
In order to sustain the implied power of Congress to legislate in reference to the objects of other international provisions in this Article, it may be necessary to distinguish a reason for the specific grant of legislative power in respect to the object of this. See, post, in Ch. xxvII.
For it is held that the method of proof prescribed by the law of Congress does not exclude other methods, derived from the local law of the State. See 9 Mass., 466; Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R., 208; Elmore v. Mills, 1 Haywood, 359; State v. Stade, 1 Chipman, 303; Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick., 296; Ex parte Povall, 3 Leigh, 816. But the records of judicial proceedings so proved will not have that conclusiveness which they would have if proved according to the national statute, provided such conclusiveness is the effect of the statute. Baker v. Field, 2 Yeates, 532; and see cases noted ante, p. 247, n. 4.
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SUB-
OF THE SECOND SECTION OF THE FOURTH ARTICLE OF THE
§ 626. The first paragraph of the second section of the Fourth Article is in these words:
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
The legal effect of this provision depends
1. On the personal application of the words, "the citizens of each State," and
2. On the rights intended by the phrase, "all privileges and immunities of citizens."
A distinct inquiry is presented by each phrase, but they both involve a determination of the force of the term citizen, as descriptive of a private person, or of his legal condition. In the first part of the clause it is denominative of a class of persons; in the latter part it is descriptive of a class of rights.
The Constitution does not itself furnish any definition of the term citizen, nor indicate its personal extent.' It has been shown that the terms employed in these clauses must be interpreted by their previous juridical use in enunciating that international and quasi-international law which had been sanctioned by the constituting people, or those to whose political and juridical power and place they had succeeded. In each of these branches of law those constant relations must have been recognized which are expressed in those definitions or axiomatic principles which have been called "the natural or necessary law of nations." Before citing any authorities on this provi
Rawle on Const. p. 85; Taney, C. J., 19 How. 411; Curtis, ib. 577.
sion, or attempting an independent examination of either of the two points above specified, it is necessary to analyze the nature of either inquiry, by discriminating the various senses of the word citizen in the English, and of the cognate term in other European languages, as it may be used in describing these constant relations.
§ 627. We do not find the term citizen juridically employed in the English language to designate a relation or condition existing peculiarly under the law of England. All European languages derived from the Latin possess a term of the same origin, and in all it has, as popularly used, nearly the same variety of meanings, all expressive of the condition of a legal person in respect either to civil or to political privilege, or to both. But in designating the status of a private person with reference to the public law, it has, in some of the countries in whose vernacular the term is found, a very restricted signification compared with some of its meanings in other countries where the equivalent word is also popularly used with the same limited signification. In some juridical systems it may only be equivalent to subject, a word found in the same languages under analogous changes of form, and of like origin, expressing only that relation which every person within the limits of a political state holds towards the possessors of supreme power. From the very nature of civil society, organized in distinct states, the relation of subjection is every where the same.'
The term originally referred to the existence of municipal corporations and the local privileges of its members, which might be either civil (social) or political. It was a term of European internal laws, public and private, as distinguished from international law, indicative of a condition of the inhab
'There may be many in this country who would question these propositions. Chief Justice Jay, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 470, said:" At the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be so called), and have none to govern but themselves. The citizens of America are equal as fellow-citizens, and joint tenants of the sovereignty." And Wilson, J., ib. 458:-" Under that Constitution, there are citizens, but no subjects." And see the opinions in Dred Scott's case, cited in this chapter. The idea that in republics the subject and the sovereign become identified, and the idea of the two existing together, as united opposites, in the idea of citizen, is probably derived from Rousseau.
itants of certain localities, or of some distinct class, as discriminated by the supreme power. It was a term of limited personal application, implying peculiar personal franchises in the individuals of a class, and differences of condition among the subjects of the state resulting from personal laws.' When the possession of these privileges ceased to be distinctive of any one portion of the inhabitants, the rights of the citizen would be synonymous with those of each subject of the state, and in the internal law of such state they would be convertible terms. Wherever the terms have been used to distinguish persons under the internal law, the condition of citizen includes, of necessity, whatever is expressed by subject; all rights and duties attributable to the subject are equally attributable to the citizen; while the condition of subject expresses only a limited portion of the relations indicated by the term citizen.
§ 628. All within the territory of a nation are subjects of its dominion to the extent of owing obedience to its laws; and where no reference is had to any external relation of the state, the term citizen is often applied to all actually present within the territorial jurisdiction. But, even in expressing relations under the internal law, reference is often had to the co-existence of other nations; and hence distinctions arise between the persons actually subject to the same jurisdiction, founded on the natural circumstance of birth, the legal circumstance of naturalization, and the facts constituting what is technically called domicil. These facts and circumstances form the basis of private international law ; and when reference is had to the condition of private persons as connected with one or another of several co-existent states, it is only native or natural born subjects domiciled within the jurisdiction of a state, and those of foreign birth, likewise having a domicil therein, whom the supreme power may choose to put in the same relation towards itself as the native subject (i. e., naturalize), who can be called citizens. Whether the word is then taken in the limited sense, equivalent to subject, or refers to a distinctive condition of personal privilege, it can apply only to native or naturalized persons having a domicil.
2 Ante, § 273.
'Ante, § 121.