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sons held as slaves not to be brought into this State. 2. Last section not to discharge fugitives from other States. 3. Emigrants from other States may bring their slaves with them, if born after July 4th, 1796, and before July 4th, 1827. 4. Such slaves brought in since March 31, 1817, shall be free, but remain servants, males until twenty-eight, females until twentyfive years of age. 5. Such persons brought after passage of this law to serve only until the age of twenty-one. 6. Permits nonresidents traveling in the State to bring with them their slaves. 7. Privilege of persons resident part of the year. (Sec. 3-7 are repealed by 1841.) 8, 9. Against selling any person as a slave 10. Forbidding transfer of service of certain persons. 11. Certain contracts for service void. 12, 13. Against sending slaves or servants out of the State. 14. Inhabitants journeying may take servants, on certain conditions. 15. Persons of color owing service or labor in other States secreting themselves in vessels may be returned.' (These provisions are mostly re-enactments. See laws of 1801, 1810, 1817, 1819.) 16. "Every person born within this State, whether white or colored, is free; every person who shall hereafter be born within this State shall be free; and every person brought into this State as a slave, except as authorized by this title, shall be free."

Part. IV. c. 1, Tit. 2, art. 2, sec. 28-32. Declaring punishment of kidnapping, includes kidnapping to sell as a slave, or in any way to hold to service against the will.

1834, c. 88. Amending the above. Persons claimed as fugitives are to be supported by claimants, and the latter may be held to bail. R. S., Part III., ch. 9, t. 1, art. 1, §§ 12, 13.'

1 This provision held to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, in Kirk's case, 1 Parker's Crim. R. 67, on the ground that Congress had legislated on the subject of fugitive slaves, and on the doctrine of Prigg's case.

The act passed 1822, c. 148, An act to provide for delivering up fugitives from justice, was repealed 1828, and its provisions re-enacted in R. S. Part I., ch. 8, Tit. 1, sec. 8-11, which authorize the governor to deliver any person charged with murder, &c., or crime, treason excepted, committed without the jurisdiction of the United States, which in New York would be punishable with death or imprisonment; but the governor shall require such evidence "as would be necessary to justify his apprehension and commitment for trial had the crime charged been committed within this State." An act of 1839, c. 350 (R. S., Part IV., ch. 2, t. 2, SS 40-47), authorizes the commitment by magistrates of persons charged with commission of crimes in other States; the governor is there referred to as already empowered. As to the practice, see Hayward's case, 1 Sandford, 701.

1840, c. 225. An act to extend the right of trial by jury. Sec. 1. "Instead of the hearing provided by" the Revised Statutes last cited, on habeas corpus, "the claim to the service of such alleged fugitive, his identity, and the fact of his having escaped from another State of the United States into this State shall be determined by a jury." 7. If the finding of the jury be in favor of the claimant upon all the matters submitted, the court or officer before whom, &c., shall grant a certificate to take such fugitive and convey him to the State from which he fled; which certificate shall authorize, &c., as by sec. 12 of the law in the R. S. 8. If the finding of the jury be against the claimant on any of the matters submitted to them, "the person so claimed as a fugitive shall be forthwith set at liberty and shall never thereafter be molested upon the same claim; and any person who shall thereafter arrest, detain, or proceed in any manner to retake such alleged fugitive upon the same claim, or shall by virtue of the same claim remove such alleged fugitive out of this State under any process or proceeding whatever, shall be deemed guilty of kidnapping, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding ten years." 9. The district attorney shall render his services to such alleged fugitive, or counsel shall be appointed by the court. 10, 11. Incidental provisions. 12. Requires a bond to be given by a claimant suing out habeas corpus for an alleged fugitive. 13. Repeals sections 15, 16, 17 of the title of the R. S. before given under the year 1828. 14. Who to preside at jury trial. 15. Commission to take testimony may issue. 16. "No judge or other officer of this State shall grant or issue any certificate or other process for the removal from this State of any fugitive, &c., otherwise than in pursuance of the provi

1 In a note to this section in the 4th ed. of R. S., vol. I., p. 793, the editors cite Prigg's case as establishing that all State laws calculated to interfere with Art. 4, sec. 2, 3, of the Const. of the United States, are unconstitutional, adding:Since that decision the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 has been passed by Congress, "containing provisions repugnant to the whole of this act. It is therefore of no force; but as it never has been repealed, it is here inserted." It would be curious, indeed, should private persons undertake to decide on the possession of a power in dispute between those in one of whom it must be a power of sovereignty, and expunge from its code a rule which the State claimed to be within the scope of its "reserved" powers.

sions of this act;" penalty in such case. 17. Punishment for removing fugitives.' 18. The act is not to "apply to the relation of master and apprentice which may exist in any other State."


c. 375. An act more effectually to protect the free citizens of this State from being kidnapped or reduced to slavery. The governor is required "to take such measures as he shall deem necessary to procure" that any person kidnapped, &c., be restored to his liberty, and returned; is to employ agents. Their duty to take legal proceedings, &c.

In the trial of Allen, United States Deputy Marshal, at Syracuse, June 21, 1852, Judge Marvin charged, Pamphlet Report, p. 87: "The indictment is founded on the 17th sec. of the act relating to fugitives from service or labor, passed in 1840. In that section it is declared that 'every person who shall, without the authority of law, forcibly remove or attempt to remove from this State any fugitive from service or labor or any person who is claimed as such fugitive, shall forfeit, &c., and shall be deemed guilty of kidnapping.' He has interposed a special plea justifying his acts under the law of the United States, passed in 1850, known as the Fugitive Slave Act. He has set forth the proceedings by the Commissioner, the warrant issued by the Commissioner, and the arrest under the warrant. On the part of the defence, the validity of the State law under which the indictment is framed is questioned. It is insisted that it is in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Judge Marvin charged that the law of Congress was constitutional, and that the prisoner was not guilty of violating the State law, which he held was likewise in harmony with the Constitution of the United States. On page 97," Now as to the State law under which the defendant is indicted, I think the particular section upon which this indictment is founded is clearly constitutional. The act relates generally to proceedings before State magistrates and officers, when fugitives from service or labor are claimed. The act of Congress of 1793, confided the execution of the law to State magistrates as well as United States. Now as the State, by statute, has power to regulate and control the action of its own officers and agents (when this power is not limited by the State Constitution), it may entirely prohibit the State judge or court from using the judicial powers derived from the State, in execution of the law of Congress, and that leaves the execution of the law to the judicial power of the United States. It may also regulate the exercise of the State judicial power, when employed in executing the United States laws, being, however, careful not to provide or require anything conflicting with any of the provisions of the United States law. That, if the State court takes jurisdiction of the case, must be strictly followed.

"The section of the statute under which this indictment is found, provides that 'every person who shall, without authority of law, forcibly remove or attempt to remove from this State any fugitive from service or labor, or any person claimed as such fugitive, shall forfeit, &c., and shall be deemed guilty of the crime of kidnapping,' &c. This provision is not only constitutional, in my judgment, but is extremely proper, whatever may be said of other provisions of the act, upon which I am not called to express an opinion, and which I have not examined with sufficient care. This section makes it a criminal offence to attempt the forcible removal without authority of law. This is certainly constitutional and a very proper provision. It does not affect those who act under authority of law. This will include the Constitution and laws of the United States, as they are the supreme law of the land. The State should protect all its people, and every person in it, from unlawful seizure and removal."

1841, c. 247. An act to amend the Revised Statutes in relation to persons held in slavery. Repeals sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Title 7, ch. 20 of the 1st Part of the Revised Statutes." 1846.—A new Constitution. Art. I, sec. 1; Art. II, sec. 1, like the provisions of the court of 1822, already cited.'


1776.—In the first Constitution of the State, dated July 2,3 there are no formulated provisions in the nature of a Bill of Rights, nor any attribution of natural rights to all persons. The elective franchise is not limited to whites.

1781, c. 15. An act respecting enlistments, &c. In sec. 9 the enlistment of slaves, among others, is prohibited. Wilson's compilation, p. 205.

1786.—Mar. 2. An act to prevent the importation of slaves, and for the manumission of slaves, under certain restrictions, and to prevent abuse. 1788, Nov. 24, an act supplemental to the last. See law of 1798.

'Laws of New York 1842, p. 419.-Concurrent Resolution, April 11, 1842: "Whereas the Governor of this State has refused to deliver up, upon the demand of the executive authority of Virginia, alleged fugitives from justice, charged with the crime of theft, viz.: Stealing a slave within the jurisdiction and against the laws of Virginia. And whereas the Governor has assigned as the reason for such refusal, that the stealing of a slave within the jurisdiction and against the laws of Virginia, is not a felony, or other crime within the meaning of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States. Resolved, That in the opinion of this legislature, stealing a slave within the jurisdiction and against the laws of Virginia, is a crime within the meaning of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States."

2 Laws of 1857, 2d vol. p. 797.-Concurrent Resolution, Ap. 16: "That this State will not allow slavery within her borders, in any form, or under any pretence, or for any time however short. That the Supreme Court of the United States, by reason of a majority of the judges thereof having identified it with a sectional and aggressive party, has impaired the confidence and respect of the people of this State."

* See Vol. I, p. 286. This recited that "all the constitutional authority ever possessed by the kings of Great Britain over these colonies was by compact, derived from the people," that all civil authority under the present king is necessarily at an end; recites the recommendation of Congress to the colonies to form governments (May 15, 1776), that "We, the representatives of the Colony of New Jersey, having been elected by all the counties in the freest manner, and in Congress assembled, have, after mature deliberation, agreed upon a set of Charter Rights, and the form of a Constitution in manner following, viz. Art. 1. That the government of this Province shall be vested in a Governor, Legislative Council, and General Assembly.' The final clause declares that this Charter shall be null and void, if a reconciliation between Great Britain and these colonies shall take place," &c.

1796-7.—A law to prevent the importation of convicts, also repeals the colonial law of 1730.

1796.-An act for the punishment of crimes. Patterson's Laws, p. 208. Sec. 69, empowers courts, on conviction of any slave for offences not punishable with death, to impose corporal punishment not extending to life or limb, instead of the punishment provided in other cases. Rev. L. of 1821, p. 262. Crimes act, 1829, § 69.

1798.-An act respecting apprentices and servants. Patterson's L. 305. Rev. L. of 1821, 366.

March 14. An act respecting slaves. Patterson's Laws, p. 307. Rev. L. 369. Sec. 1. That every negro, Indian,' mulatto or mustee, within this State, who at the time of passing this act is a slave for his or her life, shall continue such during his or her life, unless he or she shall be manumitted or set free in the manner prescribed by law.' 2. Slaves not to be witnesses, except against each other. 3, 4, 5. Against trading with, or harboring slaves. 6. Arrest of negroes without passes. 7. Slaves belonging to inhabitants of the other States, coming without license of their owners, may be taken up by any person in this State and be carried before the next justice of the peace, who is hereby authorized and required to commit such slave to the county jail, there to remain until the charges are paid. 8, 9. Against disorderly acts of slaves. 10, 11. Against allowing them to beg; selling them to such as cannot maintain them. 12. Penalty for bringing slaves into the State. Proviso. That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to prevent any person who shall remove into this

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1 State v. Waggoner (1797), 1 Halstead, 375, that Indians may, as well as negroes, be slaves in N. J., but this is by statute.

2 There is a volume of reports of this State entitled, Joseph Bloomfield's Cases, relative to manumission of negroes, A. D. 1775–1793.

Gibbons v. Morse (1821), 2 Halstead, 254, under this act. Against master of ferry-boat for removing slave. Held, that in New Jersey all black men are presumed to be slaves until the contrary appears, followed in Fox v. Lambson (1826), 3 Halstead, 275. But in Stoutenborough v. Haviland (1836), 3 Green, 266, held, that this "presumption ought no longer to be admitted, both from the notorious fact that the generality of persons in this State are not in truth held as slaves now, as well as from the natural consequence which must be supposed to follow our statute for the gradual abolition of slavery."

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