Opinion of the Court. election of 1868 and authorized by the act of 1869. That instrument declares that "no county, city, town, township, or other municipality shall ever become subscribers to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to or loan its credit in aid of such corporation: Provided, however, That the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same have been authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipality prior to such adoption." We are of opinion that the right of the city to make the subscription in question, and to issue bonds in payment thereof, was saved by the proviso of that section. Before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1870, the city, by its corporate authorities, had power to subscribe to the stock of this railroad company. Power to that end was conferred by the act of 1869, which was itself based upon a vote of the people of Jonesboro. The vote, when taken, was, it is true, without legal sanction, but it was made effective as an expression of the popular will by the statute subsequently passed and in force before the Constitution of 1870 was adopted. The phrase "under existing laws," in the section of the Constitution referred to, relates, we think, to the time of the adoption of the Constitution rather than to the time when the vote of the people was in fact taken. Looking at the purpose of the proviso in the Constitution of 1870, we cannot suppose that the framers of that instrument intended to make a difference, in the operation of that proviso, between a subscription authorized by a vote legally taken, and a subscription authorized by a vote taken without legislative authority, but subsequently, and before the Constitution went into operation, legalized by a valid act of assembly. 4. But it is insisted that that part of the act of 1869 legalizing the election of 1868 and conferring authority to issue bonds for the amount voted at that election, was in violation of section 23 of article 3 of the Illinois Constitution of 1848, which provides that "no private or local law which may be Opinion of the Court. passed by the general assembly shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The title of the act is "An Act to amend the charter of the Cairo and St. Louis Railroad Company." The contention is, that the legalization of an election previously held, and at which the people voted in favor of a subscription of stock to that company and the granting of authority to issue bonds in payment of such subscription, is not a subject expressed by the title of the act. In this view we do not concur, and our conclusion is justified by the later decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois construing a similar provision in the State Constitution of 1870. It was held in Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431, that the Constitution "does not require that the subject of the bill must be specifically and exactly expressed in the title; hence we conclude that any expression in the title which calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required." People v. Lowenthal, 93 Ill. 191. The authority of municipalities to make subscriptions in aid of the construction of railroads in Illinois has frequently, if not generally, been given in the charters of the respective railroad corporations. Whether a particular municipality has legislative authority for a subscription to the stock of a particular railroad company can be determined, ordinarily, by referring to the charter of that company. The general subject of municipal subscriptions to the stock of this particular company was, therefore, germane to and fairly embraced by the title of the act of 1869. Upon like grounds a provision in the same act legalizing a previous election at which the people voted in favor of a subscription and giving authority to issue bonds for the amount indicated by the popular vote, was sufficiently covered by a title showing that the act in question was amendatory of the original charter of the company; this, because the validity of bonds so issued would depend upon the existence of legislative authority to issue them, and the existence of such authority would ordinarily be ascertained by reference to the charter and amended charter of the railroad corporation. Our decision in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, expresses substantially the same views, upon this general subject, as those Syllabus. announced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Johnson v. People. We are of opinion that no error was committed in dismissing the bill, so far as it questioned the authority of the State officers to assess, levy, and extend taxes in payment of the bonds held by the appellee Graves. The decree is, consequently, affirmed. It is so ordered. ZANE & Another v. SOFFE. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Argued October 24th, 1883.-Decided January 21st, 1884. Evidence-Patent. 1. A patent was issued June 22d, 1865, to one Jennings (and subsequently assigned to appellants), for an improvement in self-acting cocks and faucets. The first claim was for a "screw follower H in combination with the valve of a self-closing faucet, substantially as set forth, and for the purpose described." This screw follower was a round stem "provided with a coarse screw thread or threads." It projected upward through the faucet, and terminated in a handle for the purpose of turning it downward to let on the water. At its lower end it rested upon a valve, which was supported by a spiral spring, the object of this spring being to keep the valve closed when the pressure was removed. It appearing that for ten or fifteen years before the date of J.'s patent B. had manufactured and sold faucets in which an inclined plane or cam was used as a means of producing the result upon the valve stem which was produced by J.'s screw: Held, That J.'s 1st claim must be limited to a screw follower, and could not be construed to embrace an arrangement for moving the valve. 2. Since the decision in Loom Company v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, it is Held, That under a general denial of the patentee's priority of invention, evidence of prior knowledge and use, taken without objection, is competent at the final hearing, not only as demonstrative of the state of the art, and therefore competent to limit the construction of the patent to the precise form of parts and mechanism described and claimed, but also on the question of the validity of the patent. Bill in equity, setting forth an infringement of a patent for Opinion of the Court. self-closing cocks or faucets, and praying for a perpetual injunction, for an account for the payment of damages, and for a temporary injunction. Answer, denying the infringement and averring in substance that for ten or fifteen years prior to plaintiff's patent, a mechanism similar to that described in it had been in public use in New York and Brooklyn for purposes similar to those set forth in it. Decree below for defendant, from which plaintiffs appealed. Mr. Thomas William Clarke for appellants. Mr. Henry P. Wells for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. This writ was brought by Zane and Roach, as assignees of one Nathaniel Jenkins, against the defendant, Soffe, for infringing (as charged) certain letters patent granted to said Jenkins, June 22d, 1865, for an improvement in self-acting cocks or faucets. The general features of the invention patented, so far as material to be considered, may be described as follows: The valve is situated in a chamber below the valve-seat, where the water is introduced by the induction-pipe and is kept in place against the valve-seat by a spiral spring underneath resting on the bottom of the chamber; on its upper side the valve is connected by a swivel with a stem which projects upward through the top of the faucet, where it is provided with a handle by which it may be turned; a screw is formed on the upper part of the stem, by which, when the stem is turned by the hand, it is forced downward and pushes the valve from its seat, thus permitting the water to flow out of the cock; on letting the handle go, the spiral spring below the valve, aided by the pressure of the water, forces the valve back to its seat, and the flow of water is stopped. In the specification the stem is called a screw follower. The patent has two claims, only the first of which is claimed to be infringed by the defendant, and this is in the following words, to wit: "What I claim as new and desire to secure by letters patent is, Opinion of the Court. first, the screw follower H in combination with the valve of a self-closing faucet, substantially as set forth, and for the purpose described." The defendant answered the bill, denying that Jenkins was the first inventor of the thing patented, denying infringement, and setting up a patent granted to defendant himself on the 10th of May, 1874, under and according to which the faucets manufactured by him were made, and which he alleges are no infringement of the Jenkins patent. The answer specifically refers to only one patent as anticipating the supposed invention of Jenkins, namely, a patent granted to one Frederick H. Bartholomew, in August, 1846, in which (as alleged) all the ́essential elements of the faucet patented to Jenkins are described and exhibited. The answer, however, contains the following general averment : "This defendant, further answering, denies that the patent granted said Nathaniel Jenkins is valid; and alleges that prior to the invention described in said patent, a screw and spring, worked in opposition to each other, had been used to open and close faucets and hydrants, in which faucets and hydrants the screw did all the work of opening the faucets and hydrants, and the spring did all, or most, of the work of closing the valve of the faucets and hydrants. That faucets and hydrants operated in the above manner had been in public and general use and for sale in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and in various other places long prior to, and at least fifteen years before, the date of the alleged invention of Nathaniel Jenkins; and defendant is advised and believes that, by reason of said prior public use and sale, the patent granted to said Jenkins is invalid." This answer was not excepted to, and evidence was given by the defendant, without objection, showing that a large number of faucets and hydrants were made by Bartholomew and publicly used in the city of New York several years before the issuing of the patent sued on, differing in some respects from the specific device described in Bartholomew's patent, referred to in the answer, but relied on as anticipating the alleged in |