Opinion of the court. possession, and supposed to have a valid title, the case is thus, in this view of the state of the title, brought again within the letter, and, as we think, within the meaning of the statute. The statute provides expressly that possession for the period of limitation shall vest in the occupant "an absolute right and title to the land." Such a title thus became vested in the defendant, Shererd. This would have been the effect of the bar without such a provision in the statute.* The statute contains no qualification or exception as to issue in tail, and we can interpolate none; nor can we review or reverse the finding of the jury. In Inman v. Barnes, Mr. Justice Story said: "I take it to be well settled that if the time limited has once run against any tenant in tail, it is a good bar, not only against him, but also against all persons claiming in descent per formam doni through him." In Wright v. Scott, this same statute came under the consideration of the court. The case involved entailed property. The court gave the same construction to the statute which we have given. Mr. Justice Washington remarked that if such were not the proper construction the issue in tail could never be barred. In cases of this class, as in all others, when the statute has begun, it continues to run until its effect is complete. It proceeds to throw its protection over the property, and does not stop by the way for any intermediate right which may have arisen during the period of its progress. It allows no immunity beyond the savings which it contains. Such statutes are now favorably regarded in all courts. They are "statutes of repose," and are to be construed and applied in a liberal spirit. Our construction of this statute is sustained by the analo gies of the English and Massachusetts decisions respecting writs of formidon in descender under the statute of the 21 James I, and other statutes containing similar provisions.§ The law presents other analogies which tend strongly in the same direction. As between trustee and cestui que trust-a * Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 605. 4 Washing on Circuit Court, 24. † 2 Gallison, 315. Angel on Limitations, & 360. Syllabus. joint tenant and a tenant in common, and their co-tenants, the bar becomes complete when the period has elapsed, which the statute prescribes, after the commencement of open and notorious adverse possession.* We think the spccial verdict sustains conclusively this defence. The judgment below was properly given for the defendant in error, and it is affirmed. Mr. Justice MILLER. I concur in the judgment of the court, and in its opinion as to the first ground on which the judgment is based. In that part of the opinion which declares the statute of limitation to be a good defence, I cannot concur. The facts conceded by both parties show, that until the death of Thomas Croxall, in 1861, the defendants and those under whom they claimed, had a lawful possession; and were at no time liable to au action to disturb that possession until that event; and I do not believe that the statute of limitations of New Jersey, or of any other country, or any rule of prescription, was ever intended to create a bar in favor of parties in possession, who were not liable to be sued in regard to that possession. It was unnecessary to decide this proposition, as the court were unanimous in the opinion that defendants had a good title, in fee simple, which needed no statute of limitation to protect it. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. CHRISTMAS V. RUSSELL. 1. A State statute which enacts that "no action shall be maintained on any judgment or decree rendered by any court without this State against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this State, in any case where the cause of action would have been barred by any act of limitation of this State, if such suit had been brought therein is unconstitutional and void, as destroying the right of a party to enforce a judgment regularly obtained in another State, and * Angel on Limitations, 425, and 419 to 436. Statement of the case. as conflicting therefore with the provision of the Constitution (Art. IV, 1), which ordains that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State." 2. A plea of fraud in obtaining a judgment sued upon, cannot be demurred to generally because not showing the particulars of the fraud set up. Going to a matter of form, the demurrer should be special. 3. Subject to the qualification that they are open to inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the court which gave them, and as to notice to the defendant, the judgment of a State court, not reversed by a superior court having jurisdiction, nor set aside by a direct proceeding in chancery, is conclusive in the courts of all the other States where the subject-matter of controversy is the same. IN March, 1840, Christmas, being a citizen and resident of Mississippi, made at Vicksburg, in that State, and there delivered to oue Samuel, a promissory note, promising to pay to his order in March, 1841, a sum certain. This note was indorsed by Samuel to Russell, a citizen and resident of Kentucky. By statute of Mississippi, action on this note was barred by limitation, after six years, that is to say, was barred in March, 1847. In 1853, the defendant, who was still, and had continuously been, a resident of Mississippi, having a mansion-house therein, went into Kentucky on a visit, and was there sued in one of the State courts upon the note. Defence was taken on a statute of limitations of Mississippi and otherwise, and the matter having been taken to the Court of Appeal of Kentucky and returned thence, judg ment was entered below in favor of the plaintiff. A transcript being promptly carried into Mississippi, the place of the domicil of Christmas, au action of debt was brought upon it in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; the action which was the subject of the writ of error now before this court. The transcript above referred to, was one duly authenticated under the act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, which provides that records authenticated in a manner which it prescribes, shall "have such faith and credit given to them in every other court in the United States, as they have by law or usage in the court from which they are taken;" an act passed in pursuance of Section 1 of Article IV of the Con Statement of the case. stitution of the United States, declaring that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in every other State;" and that Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such records shall be proved, and the effect thereof." In the action brought as above said, in the Circuit Court of Mississippi, the defendant filed six pleas-of which the second was to this effect: "That at the time the cause of action accrued, and thenceforth until suit was brought in Kentucky, and at the time when said suit was brought, he was a resident of Mississippi, and that the cause of action would have been barred by an act of limitation of that State, if the suit had been brought therein, and so by the law of Mississippi, no action could be maintained in said State upon the said judgment." He also pleaded 4th. "That the judgment set forth was obtained and procured by the plaintiff by fraud of the said plaintiff." And 6th. "That the said suit in which judgment was obtained, was instituted to evade the laws of Mississippi, and in fraud of said laws." The second and sixth pleas were intended to set up a defence under a statute of Mississippi, adopted in February, 1857, and which went into effect on the 1st day of November of that year.* That statute enacted: "No action shall be maintained on any judgment or decree rendered by any court without this State against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this State, in any case where the cause of such action would have been barred by any act of limitation of this State, if such suit had been brought therein." * Revised Code, pp. 43, 400. Argument in support of the pleas. To these pleas the plaintiff below demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and judgment having gone for the plaintiff, the question on error here was, as to the sufficiency of these pleas, or either of them, to bar the action. Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson, for the plaintiff in error: We will, for convenience, discuss the fourth plea first, and then the second and sixth together. I. The fourth plea offered to prove, in bar to the action, that the judgment sued on was obtained and procured by the plaintiff by his fraud. 1. Fraud by the plaintiff in procuring the judgment, if well and sufficiently pleaded and proven, would have barred the action. This is the established rule of law, and was so laid down by this court in the case of Webster v. Reid.* It is also the rule in Kentucky, where the judgment now sued on was rendered.† 2. Fraud was well and sufficiently pleaded.‡ II. As to the 2d and 6th pleas. The manifest policy of the State of Mississippi in passing the statute set up by the defendant in his second plea below was to protect its citizens from unjust and harassing litigation under circumstances such as those under which the present one is brought on. And the question is, whether this statute, having such intent and policy, was within the constitutional competency of the State to enact. It will be maintained on the opposite side that such a power cannot be exercised without violating that clause of the Constitution, respecting the full faith and credit due to the records and judicial proceedings of the several States. Without here examining the authorities on this subject in detail, it is sufficient to observe that on the one hand they clearly establish that "the full faith and credit" which is * 11 Howard, 441, 460. 3 Chitty's Pleading, 1184. Talbott v. Todd, 5 Dana, 194-6. |