Statement of the case. ccted with the purchases and loyalty of the region where made and through which the property passed. During the progress of the case the claimant made a motion to dismiss the proceedings in prize, and transfer the case to the instance side of the court. This motion was disregarded; but, on final hearing, the District Court dismissed the libel and ordered restitution of the property. From that decree the United States appealed to this court. The vessel on which the goods were seized was the property of the government of the United States, in the employment and control of the quartermaster's department of General Banks's army at the time of the seizure, the government receiving $3000 for the use of the vessel. An officer of this department accompanied the expedition, which went from Brashear City for the goods, and was on board when she was overhauled by the gunboat. The vessel was manned by officers and men in the service of the government. There was also on board a file of United States soldiers, under the command of a captain of the army, who were detailed for the expedition by order of the colonel in command. The only person known to be on board not in the service of the government was the person who acted as agent for the claimant of the goods. Brashear City was in possession of our forces, and had been for several months, and the vessel was only returning to her proper place when she was captured in the first instance, and was lying there when boarded, in the second. Her voyage did not, in either case, extend beyond the region of country which was under the control of the military authorities of the government at that time. As to the cargoes. Weed's had been brought from the parish of St. Mary. Blydenburgh's came from the parish of St. Martin, on the shore of the Grand River, a little below a place called Butte la Rose. The Grand River was apparently the boundary between the two parishes. The district is on the Gulf of Mexico, and is indented on the Gulf side by several bays, with numerous islands, creeks, &c., divided by two or three Argument for the United States. navigable rivers, broken by swamps and lakes, and traversed in every direction by numberless bayous and watercourses; facts which rendered the absence of a public enemy a fact not so easy to be ascertained. It appeared, however, in this case that the district was in the control of the United States; that the President had designated by proclamation, on the 1st of January previous, the parish of St. Mary and apparently the whole region through which that cargo was to pass, as not in rebellion. Various places in the parish of St. Mary had been named by the commanding general as the places where delegates from the State were to assemble on the 22d February, 1864, to appoint State officers, and on the first Monday of April following, to make a State constitution. The licenses, which were produced in court, and had all usual indicia of regularity, were to purchase within "the country known as the parish of St. Mary, Louisiana," and both had at the top of them the words, "This permit will accompany the shipment, and be surrendered at the customhouse." No papers were found with the goods. Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States, appellants: Conceding, for the sake of argument simply, that the property was not enemy property, and so liable to confiscation as prize of war, it is yet so for violation of municipal law, and the court below should not have ordered restitution. Licenses of this character are strictly construed. The rule against constructive license is probably the sternest principle known to the law.* Even where the licensee was deceived by the course of the captor's government, a persuasive equity could not relieve him.† The party who uses a license "engages not only for fair intentions, but for an accurate interpretation of the permit." The claimant in a prize court is * The Hoop, 1 Robinson, 216. VOL V. The Charlotta, 1 Dodson, 387–393. Lord Stowell, The Cosmopolite, 4 Robinson, 13. Opinion of the court. an actor, and must make out his case.* During the late rebellion, for the best of reasons, the doubt seems to have gone in this court against the individual, in deference to controlling public objects.† Now in this case there are various difficulties. 1. The first words of the documents are these: "This permit will accompany the shipment and be surrendered at the customhouse." The case shows that the license did not accompany the merchandise; nor did any other papers. This was a violation of the conditions of the license, which, by its own terms, was thus avoided. 2. The merchandise in suit is not identified with the alleged permits, or as the property of the claimant. The onus of an intervenor is nowhere more pressing than on this point Quantity is one of the elements of identity where a lot of merchandise is in question. In this case the property claimed here by Weed is of a quantity precisely stated in the libels. 3. As respects Blydenburgh's license. The permit was to purchase in and transport from "St. Mary's parish." Blydenburgh's own statement in his'claim shows that the whole transaction was in "St. Martin's parish." For this he does not pretend to have had any license Mr. Coffey, contra, for the claimant. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. If this case is to be disposed of here, upon the answer to be given to the question of prize or no prize, there can be no doubt that the decree of the District Court must be affirmed. There can on the facts be no pretence that there was any attempt to break a blockade, nor can it be held that the cargoes were enemy property. No person hostile to the United States is mentioned in argument or otherwise as probable owner of any part of them. Can the places from The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheaton, 77. †The Reform, 3 Wallace, 628. Opinion of the court. which the goods were brought impress upon them the character of enemy property? They were the products of those islands of Louisiana found in the bayous of that region, and were undoubtedly taken by the vessel from near the places of their production. These places, as we have seen, were under the military control of our authorities; and the parishes of St. Mary and St. Martin were then represented in a convention of loyal citizens, called to frame a constitution under which a government was organized for the State, hostile to the rebellion, and acceptable to the military commander of that department. The regularly authorized agents of the Treasury Department were also issuing licenses to trade in these parishes, under the act of July 13th, 1861, and the regulations of the Treasury Department made under that act and other acts of Congress. It is not possible to hold, therefore, that property arriving from these parishes was, for that reason alone, to be treated as enemy property, in the sense of a prize court. Whether it is liable to forfeiture for an illegal traffic, as being in violation of those regulations and acts of Congress, will be considered hereafter; but the question must be determined upon other considerations than those which govern a prize court. The question of prize or no prize must therefore be answered in the negative. But it is said, in behalf of the government, that if the property in controversy is not subject to condemnation as prize of war, it is liable to confiscation as having been purchased in violation of the acts of Congress, and the trade regulations established in pursuance of those acts. Before entering upon this inquiry a preliminary question of some importance presents itself, which must be first dis posed of. The pleadings, the testimony, and the conduct of the case have been governed exclusively, from its commencement, upon the idea of prize proceedings. The libel is a very general allegation of property captured as prize. Not a word is found in the pleadings of the case which alleges any Opinion of the court. fact rendering the property liable to confiscation under the acts of Congress. A large part of the testimony consists of depositions taken in preparatorio, where the mants had no opportunity of cross-examination. If, under these circumstances, there is found in the testimony sufficient evidence to convince us that the property is liable to statutory confiscation, can we condemn it in this proceeding? Or, if we cannot condemn, must we, on the other hand, restore it to the claimants? It would seem to violate all rules of pleading, as well as all the rules of evidence applicable to penal forfeitures, to hold that in such circumstances we can proceed to condemnation. The right of the claimant to be informed by the libel of the specific act by which he or his property has violated the law, and to have an opportunity to produce witnesses, and to cross-examine those produced against him, are as fully recognized in the admiralty courts, in all except prize cases, as they are in the courts of common law. In the case of The Schooner Heppet,* the vessel was proceeded against for a forfeiture under the act to interdict commercial intercourse with France, and this court, by C. J. Marshall, says, that the first question made for its consideration is whether the information will support a sentence of condemnation. After stating the substance of the pleading, and the rule which governs the common law courts, he proceeds: "Does this rule apply to informations in a court of admiralty? It is not contended that all those technical niceties, which are unimportant in themselves, and standing only on precedents of which the reason cannot be discerned, should be transplanted from the courts of common law in a court of admiralty. But a rule so essential to justice and fair proceeding, as that which requires a substantial statement of the offence upon which the prosecution is founded, must be the rule of every court where justice is its object, and cannot be satisfied by a general reference to the provisions of the statute." He then asks if this defect of the *7 Cranch, 389. |