Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

statement of intent by Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, at 230; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977); English, 496 U. S., at 79. Though most statutes creating express pre-emption contain an explicit statement to that effect, a statement admittedly lacking in § 18(b), we have never required any particular magic words in our express pre-emption cases. Our task in all pre-emption cases is to enforce the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, at 230. We have held, in express pre-emption cases, that Congress' intent must be divined from the language, structure, and purposes of the statute as a whole. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 138 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987). The language of the OSH statute sets forth a scheme in light of which the provisions of § 18 must be interpreted, and from which the express preemption that displaces state law follows.

As the plurality's analysis amply demonstrates, ante, at 98-103, Congress has addressed the issue of pre-emption in the OSH Act. The dissent's position that the Act does not pre-empt supplementary state regulation becomes most implausible when the language of § 18(b) is considered in conjunction with the other provisions of § 18. Section 18(b) provides as follows:

"Any State which... desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated... shall submit a State plan...." 29 U. S. C. § 667(b) (emphasis added). The statute is clear: When a State desires to assume responsibility for an occupational safety and health issue already addressed by the Federal Government, it must submit a state plan. The most reasonable inference from this language is that when a State does not submit and secure ap

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

proval of a state plan, it may not enforce occupational safety and health standards in that area. Any doubt that this is what Congress intended disappears when subsection (b) is considered in conjunction with subsections (a), (c), and (f). Ante, at 100-101. I will not reiterate the plurality's persuasive discussion on this point. Unartful though the language of § 18(b) may be, the structure and language of § 18 leave little doubt that in the OSH statute Congress intended to pre-empt supplementary state regulation of an occupational safety and health issue with respect to which a federal standard exists.

In this regard I disagree with the dissent, see post, p. 114, and find unconvincing its conclusion that Congress intended to allow concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over occupational safety and health issues. The dissent would give the States, rather than the Federal Government, the power to decide whether as to any particular occupational safety and health issue there will exist a single or dual regulatory scheme. Under this theory the State may choose exclusive federal jurisdiction by not regulating; or exclusive state jurisdiction by submitting a state plan; or dual regulation by adopting supplementary rules, as Illinois did here. That position undermines the authority of OSHA in many respects. For example, §18(c)(2) of the OSH Act allows OSHA to disapprove state plans which "unduly burden interstate commerce." The dissent would eviscerate this important administrative mechanism by allowing the States to sidestep OSHA's authority through the mechanism of supplementary regulation. See post, at 118-121. Furthermore, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction might interfere with the enforcement of the federal regulations without creating a situation where compliance with both schemes is a physical impossibility, which the dissent would require for pre-emption. Post, at 121; see also Brief for Respondent 32-33. I would not attribute to Congress the intent to create such a hodgepodge scheme of authority. My views in

SOUTER, J., dissenting

this regard are confirmed by the fact that OSHA has as a consistent matter, since the enactment of the OSH Act, viewed §18 as providing it with exclusive jurisdiction in areas where it issues a standard. 29 CFR § 1901.2 (1991); 36 Fed. Reg. 7006 (1971); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-21. Therefore, while the dissent may be correct that as a theoretical matter the separate provisions of § 18 may be reconciled with allowing concurrent jurisdiction, it is neither a natural nor a sound reading of the statutory scheme.

The necessary implication of finding express pre-emption in this case is that the pre-emptive scope of the OSH Act is defined by the language of § 18(b). Because this provision requires federal approval of state occupational safety and health standards alone, only state laws fitting within that description are pre-empted. For that reason I agree with the Court that state laws of general applicability are not preempted. Ante, at 107. I also agree that "a state law requirement that directly, substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and health is an occupational safety and health standard within the meaning of the Act,” ibid., and therefore falls within the scope of pre-emption. Socalled "dual impact" state regulations which meet this standard are pre-empted by the OSH Act, regardless of any additional purpose the law may serve, or effect the law may have, outside the workplace. As a final matter, I agree that the Illinois Acts are not saved because they operate through a licensing mechanism rather than through direct regulation of the workplace. I therefore join all but Part II of the Court's opinion, and concur in the judgment of the Court.

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

The Court holds today that § 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act), 29 U. S. C. §667, pre-empts state regulation of any occupational safety or health issue as

SOUTER, J., dissenting

to which there is a federal standard, whether or not the state regulation conflicts with the federal standard in the sense that enforcement of one would preclude application of the other. With respect, I dissent. In light of our rule that federal pre-emption of state law is only to be found in a clear congressional purpose to supplant exercises of the States' traditional police powers, the text of the Act fails to support the Court's conclusion.

I

Our cases recognize federal pre-emption of state law in three variants: express pre-emption, field pre-emption, and conflict pre-emption. Express pre-emption requires "explicit pre-emptive language." See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 203 (1983), citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Field pre-emption is wrought by a manifestation of congressional intent to occupy an entire field such that even without a federal rule on some particular matter within the field, state regulation on that matter is pre-empted, leaving it untouched by either state or federal law. 461 U. S., at 204. Finally, there is conflict preemption in either of two senses. The first is found when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, ibid., the second when a state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).

The plurality today finds pre-emption of this last sort, discerning a conflict between any state legislation on a given issue as to which a federal standard is in effect, and a congressional purpose "to subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations." Ante, at 99. Thus, under the plurality's reading, any regulation on an issue as to which a federal standard has been promulgated has been pre-empted. As one commentator has observed, this kind of purposeconflict pre-emption, which occurs when state law is held to

SOUTER, J., dissenting

"undermin[e] a congressional decision in favor of national uniformity of standards," presents "a situation similar in practical effect to that of federal occupation of a field." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 486 (2d ed. 1988). Still, whether the pre-emption at issue is described as occupation of each narrow field in which a federal standard has been promulgated, as pre-emption of those regulations that conflict with the federal objective of single regulation, or, as JUSTICE KENNEDY describes it, as express pre-emption, see ante, at 111 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the key is congressional intent, and I find the language of the statute insufficient to demonstrate an intent to pre-empt state law in this way.

II

Analysis begins with the presumption that "Congress did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981). "Where, as here, the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States, see, e. g., U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 358 (1898), 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). This assumption provides assurance that the 'federal-state balance,' United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971), will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts. But when Congress has 'unmistakably... ordained,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963), that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall." Jones, supra, at 525. Subject to this principle, the enquiry into the possibly pre-emptive effect of federal legislation is an exercise of statutory construction. If the statute's terms can be read sensi