This important subject having been referred to, and considered by, the Duke of Wellington, his Memorandum accompanies this Minute. His Grace does not hesitate, upon his intimate experience of Spanish affairs, to pronounce, that the Spanish Nation is, of all the European People, that, which will least brook any interference from Abroad: he states the many instances in which, during the last War, this distinguishing trait of national character rendered them obstinately blind to the most pressing considerations of public safety: he states the imminent danger in which the suspicion of Foreign interference, and more especially of interference on the part of France, is likely to involve the King; and he further describes the difficulties which would oppose themselves to any military operations in Spain, undertaken for the purpose of reducing, by force, the Nation to submit themselves to an order of things, to be either suggested or prescribed to them from without.

Sir Henry Wellesley has, in coincidence with this opinion, reported the alarm which the intended Mission of M. de La Tour du Pin had excited at Madrid, the prejudice which, in the opinion of all the Foreign Ministers at Madrid, it was calculated to occasion to the King's interests and possible safety. He also reports the steps which it was in contemplation to have adopted, on the part of the King, to endeavour to prevent the French Minister from prosecuting his journey to Madrid, when the intelligence of the abandonment of the Mission was received from Paris.

At all events, therefore, until some Central Authority shall establish itself in Spain, all notion of operating upon her Councils seems utterly impracticable; and calculated to lead to no other possible result, than that of compromising either the King or the Allies, or probably both.

The present state of Spain, no doubt, seriously extends the range of political agitation in Europe, but it must nevertheless be admitted, that there is no portion of Europe of equal magnitude, in which such a Revolution could have happened, less likely to menace other States, with that direct and imminent danger, which has always been regarded, at least in this Country, as alone constituting the Case which would justify external interference. If the case is not such as to warrant such an interference ;-if we do not feel that we have at this moment either the right or the means to interfere with effect by force;-if the semblance of such an Interference is more likely to irritate than to overawe, and if we have proved, by experience, how little a Spanish Government, whether of King or Cortes, is disposed to listen to advice from Foreign States, is it not prudent at least to pause, before we assume an attitude which would seem to pledge us in the eyes of Europe to some decisive proceeding? Before we embark in such a Measure, is it not expedient at least to ascertain with some degree of pre

cision, what we really mean to do? This course of temperate and cautious policy, so befitting the occasion and the critical position in which the King is personally placed, will in no degree fetter our action, when, if ever, the case for acting shall arise.

In the mean time, as Independent States, the Allied Powers may awaken, through their respective Missions at Madrid, with not less effect than would attend any joint representation, a salutary apprehension of the consequences that might be produced by any violence offered to the King's Person or Family, or by any hostile Measures directed against the Portuguese Dominions in Europe, for the protection of which Great Britain is bound by specifick Treaty.

In conveying any such intimation, however, the utmost delicacy should be observed; and though it is to be presumed that the views and wishes of all the Allied Powers must be essentially the same, and that the sentiments they are likely to express cannot materially differ, it does not follow that they should speak either in their Corporate Character, or through any Common Organ,-both which expedients would be calculated rather to offend, than to conciliate or persuade.

There can be no doubt of the general danger which menaces more or less the stability of all existing Governments, from the Principles which are afloat, and from the circumstances that so many States of Europe are now employed in the difficult task of casting anew their Governments upon the Representative Principle ;-but the notion of revising, limiting, or regulating the course of such experiments, either by Foreign Council or by Foreign Force, would be as dangerous to avow, as it would be impossible to execute; and the illusion too prevalent on this subject, should not be encouraged in our intercourse with the Allies.-That circumstances might arise out of such experiments in any Country directly menacing to the safety of other States, cannot be denied, and against such a danger, well ascertained, the Allies may justifiably, and must in all prudence, be on their guard: but such is not the present case.-Fearful as is the example which is furnished by Spain, of an Army in revolt, and a Monarch swearing to a Constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a Monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish Arms.

In this Alliance, as in all other human Arrangements, nothing is more likely to impair, or even to destroy its real utility, than any attempt to push its duties and its obligations beyond the Sphere which its original conception and understood Principles will warrant.-It was an Union for the re-conquest and liberation of a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of France; and having subdued the Conqueror, it took the State of Possession, as established by the Peace, under the protection of the Alliance.-It never

was, however, intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.

We shall be found in our Place when actual danger menaces the System of Europe; but this Country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formation.— It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it; and it would now be a breach of faith, were the Ministers of the Crown to acquiesce in a construction being put upon it, or were they to suffer themselves to be betrayed into a course of Measures, inconsistent with those Principles which they avowed at the time, and which they have since uniformly maintained both at Home and Abroad.

No. 2.-Instructions drawn up by The Marquess of Londonderry; and transferred to The Duke of Wellington, September 14, 1822.

(Extract.)

WITH respect to Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued:-Solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family;-Observance of our Engagements with Portugal,—and a rigid abstinence from any Interference in the Internal Affairs of that Country,-must be considered as forming the Basis of His Majesty's Policy.

No. 3.-The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.-
(Received November 7.)

(Extract.)

Verona, October 29, 1822. I SHALL object to every thing, excepting that the Allies should call upon France to explain Herself; and then that they should recommend to Her, if Peace be her object, as it must be that of the other Powers, that She should ask for the Good Offices of one of her Allies, to explain to Spain her desire to remain at Peace.

If the Allies should agree to recommend this Line, and should enter into no Treaty, nor make any Declaration, hostile to Spain, and France should then desire the Good Offices of England, I shall consent to give them. But if there should be any Defensive Treaty, or even Declaration against Spain, on the part of the Allies, I shall consider it my duty to decline to become a Party to either, and shall endeavour to make them feel, collectively, that the Treaty or Declaration will only render useless the efforts of the Power which is to use its Good Offices to maintain Peace; and I shall also decline to consent, on the part of my Government, to use such Good Offices: but if pressed to do so, I shall take the demand ad referendum.

No. 4.-Mr. Secretary Canning to The Duke of Wellington. (Extract.) Foreign Office, November 8, 1822. I AM to signify to your Grace His Majesty's entire approbation of your conduct and language in respect to the Affairs of Spain;-and particularly of the determination not to promise the Good Offices of His Majesty between that Country and France, in any other case than that of a simple and specifick request to that effect on the part of France, unaccompanied by "any Treaty or any Declaration of the Allies hostile to Spain."

No. 5.-Memorandum relative to the Conduct of Spain, communicated by M. de Jabat to Mr. Secretary Canning, 18th February 1823.

Si l'on veut des preuves de la moderation de l'Espagne, et du peu de fondement avec lequel on l'accuse de poursuivre le Systême de Propagande Politique, voici trois faits irrecusables: La Junta d'Oporto démande en 1820, des Troupes Espagnoles,-refusé. Le Gouvernement de Naples au commencement de 1821 fait la même pétition, refusé. En 1822 on fait retirer jusqu'à 30 lieues dans l'intérieur du Pays, sur la démande de La France, les Refugiés François, Capitaine Nantil, &c. tandis que les Généraux Eguia, Abreu, &c. et la soi-disant Régence, organisoient à Bayonne et à Perpignan les Bandes de la Foi.

En 1822 nous avons refusé les services de trois Regimens François de l'Armée d'Observation. Jusqu'aujourd'hui on ne pourra citer aucun Soldat ou Paysan François que nous avons séduit, armé, soldé et lancé dans le sein de sa patrie pour la déchirer. Nous n'avons pas arboré le Pavillon Tricolore; nous n'avons pas refusé de publier une Amnistie généreuse et salutaire; nous n'avons pas invité à des soirées d'étiquette les François expatriés et conspirateurs; nous n'avons pas toléré qu'un individu à Madrid s'affublât publiquement du titre de Chargé d'Affaires de la Régence de France, tandis que S. E. M. de Lagarde étoit Ambassadeur de S. M. Très Chrétienne près S. M. Catholique: enfin nous n'avons rien fait (car ces Preuves négatives pourroient former un Catalogue trop diffus,)-Nous n'avons rien fait contre les François de ce que les François (c'est à dire le Gouvernement François,) a fait contre nous, et nous avons fait pour les Gouvernemens qui nous excommunient, ce qu'aucun d'eux n'a fait pour nous.

S'il s'agit de désaveux verbaux ou écrits, L'Angleterre en a reçu les plus solennels au sujet du Portugal; L'Autriche au sujet de L'Italie; et l'Europe, surtout dans la Séance mémorable du 11 Janvier, 1823, a entendu les Réprésentants de L'Espagne déclarer à la fois, en appelant à l'histoire de ce qui s'est passé depuis 1808, jusqu'à 1814, et depuis 1820, jusqu'à 1823,—1°. que leur Patrie ne se mêlera jamais des affaires intérieures d'autres Puissances, et 2do, qu'Elle ne consentira non plus à la dictature scandaleuse qu'on veut Lui imposer.

FRANCE.

No. 1.-Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart. (Extract.) Foreign Office, March 31, 1823. THE Article, of which I enclose a Copy, is contained in the Treaty between His Majesty and the King of Spain of 1814, but has never been published. It was originally a Secret Article, but His Majesty having declined agreeing to it as such (from the opinion that it ought to be communicated to His Majesty's Allies), its title was changed from that of a Secret to a Separate Article. It formed part of the Treaty communicated to the Court of France in 1814, by the Duke of Wellington, then His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris; but it was omitted in the Copy of the Treaty laid before Parliament, at the express desire of the French Government, signified by the Prince de Talleyrand, then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. de Chateaubriand will, I have no doubt, at once acknowledge that such an act of compliance with the wishes of the French Government, enhances His Majesty's claim upon France, to respect the solemn obligation of this Article.

Your Excellency will particularly remark to M. de Chateaubriand, that the Treaty of 1814, was not negotiated till after our army had been withdrawn from Spain.

(Inclosure.)-SEPARATE ARTICLE to the Treaty between Great

Britain and Spain.-Signed at Madrid, 5th. July 1814.

His Catholic Majesty engages not to enter into any Treaty or Engagement with France, of the nature of that known under the denomination of the Family Compact, nor any other which may affect the Independence of Spain, which may be injurious to the interests of His Britannick Majesty, or may be contrary to the strict Alliance which is stipulated by the present Treaty.

The present Separate Article shall form an integral part of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed on the fifth day of July, and shall have the same force and validity as if it was inserted, word for word, and shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged within forty days, or sooner if possible.

In Witness whereof, We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed, in virtue of our respective Full Powers, the present Separate Article, and sealed it with the Seals of our Arms.

Done at Madrid, this fifth day of July, 1814.

(L.S.) M. EL DUQUE DE SAN CARLOS. (L.S.) H. WELLESLEY.