inflicted upon foreigners within their dominions; they have the right, that is to say, to exact reparation for maltreatment of their subjects by the administrative agents of a foreign government, if no means of obtaining legal redress through the tribunals of the country exist, or if such means as exist have been exhausted in vain; and they have the right to require that, as between their subjects and other private individuals, the protection of the state and the justice of the courts shall be afforded equally, and that compensation shall be made if the courts from corruption or prejudice or other like cause are guilty of serious acts of injustice. Broadly, all persons entering a foreign country must submit to the laws of that country; provided that the laws are fairly administered they cannot as a rule complain of the effects upon themselves, however great may be the practical injustice which may result to them; it is only when those laws are not fairly administered, or when they provide no remedy for wrongs, or when they are such, as might happen in very exceptionable cases, as to constitute grievous oppression in themselves, that the state to which the individual belongs has the right to interfere in his behalf."

1

The famous case of Martin Koszta referred to in all the late authorities may be thus summed up in substance. The facts are somewhat voluminous and space forbids anything more than a brief reference thereto. Koszta was a Hungarian. He was engaged in the insurrection of 1848-9. He came to the United States, and in the city of New York about 1851 he declared his intention to become a citizen. In less than two years he went to Turkey and was there arrested by some means and delivered to the commander of the Austrian manof-war "Hussar." The representative of our government at Constantinople requested Commodore Ingraham, commanding U. S. warship "St. Louis," to demand the release of Koszta. This demand was made and refused. To avoid actual conflict between these two warships the French consul at Smyrna intervened, and Koszta was left in his custody, by agreement, pending the adjustment of the matter between the United States and Austria.

1 See this case fully stated, Snow on International Law, pp. 51, 52.

Our State Department, through Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, ruled in substance that Koszta was entitled to the protection of this government on the ground principally that he had obtained a domicile in the United States and had declared his intention to become a citizen-that "domicile conferred national character." This ruling was acquiesced in by Austria and Koszta was returned to the United States. Austria did reserve, in the final adjustment of the matter, the right to proceed against Kosztá should he ever return to that country.

The case of Simon Tousig, cited in Snow at page 52, I may say was ruled differently by our State Department. He had declared his intention to become a citizen, but had not taken the final step to clothe him with all the attributes of citizenship. He had been domiciled in the United States. He had no passport. He returned to Austria voluntarily. He was charged with the violation of the laws of that country. In that case Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State,1 decided that:

"Every nation, when its laws are violated by anyone owing obedience to them, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, has a right to inflict the penalties incurred upon the transgressor if found within its jurisdiction."

The celebrated Cutting case was brought about by complaint of abuse of judicial process. The facts of that case, in brief, were as follows: Cutting was a citizen of the United States. He had been domiciled in Mexico, engaged in business there, had business troubles with his co-partner-he published in El Paso, Texas, certain strictures on the character of his business associate. After that, being again in Mexico, he was arrested and imprisoned. He appealed to this government for protection. It appears that both the executive and judicial departments of that republic held that he was amenable to its laws, although the offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of the Mexican republic.

1 Snow on International Law, pp. 51, 52..

In 1886 Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, ruled as follows:1

"The government is still compelled to deny what it denied on the 19th of July, 1886, and what the Mexican government has executively and judicially maintained, that a citizen of the United States can be held under the rules of international law to answer in Mexico for an offense committed in the United States simply because the object of that offense happened to be a citizen of Mexico."

The following cases serve to illustrate a situation where a citizen receives injury at the hands of a mob in a foreign country which the government by due diligence could have suppressed:

In 1878 Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, ruled in a controversy with Peru2 that "a government is liable internationally for damages done to alien residents by a mob which by due diligence it could have repressed." Likewise, our State Department still further affirmed the principle of liability when speaking through Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, in a controversy with Brazil 3:

"It is the duty of Brazil, when it receives the citizens of a friendly state, to protect the property which they carry with them or may acquire there. If persons in the service of the government connive at or instigate a riot for the purpose of depriving a citizen of his property, the imperial government must be held accountable therefor."

On complaint of discrimination by the government of Spain. against colored citizens of the United States, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, wrote as follows:+

"The government will regard the imposition of taxes or charges discriminating against colored citizens of the United States on account of color as the subject of international complaint."

1 Snow on International Law, p. 31.

2 Wharton's Dig., International Law, sec. 226.

3 Mss. Brazil, 1875, Wharton's Dig., sec. 226.

4 Wharton's Dig., sec. 204.

The foregoing is a brief synopsis of a few of the cases arising on different statements of fact in which our government has said that protection would be extended.

II. PROTECTION DENIED.

I will now refer to instances which illustrate a situation where the government will not extend its aid to any of its citizens who have practically expatriated themselves by taking up their abode in a foreign country.

In 1851 Mr. Webster, Secretary of State,' in Thrasher's case ruled as follows:

"Our citizens who resort to countries where trial by jury is unknown, and who may be charged with crime, frequently imagine when the laws of those countries are administered in forms customary there, that they are deprived of rights to which they are entitled, and therefore may expect the interference of their government, but it must be remembered in all such cases that they have, of their own free will, elected a residence out of their own native land, and preferred to live elsewhere and under another government, and in a country in which different laws prevail. They have chosen to settle themselves where jury trials are not known, where representative government does not exist, where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unheard of, and where judicial proceedings in criminal cases are brief and summary. Having made this election, they must necessarily abide its consequences. No man can carry the ægis of his national American liberty into a foreign country, and expect to hold it up for his exemption from the dominion and authority of the laws and the sovereign power of that country, unless he is authorized to do so by treaty stipulation."

Likewise in 1855 Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, ruled

that:

"Persons, emigrating from the their residence in a foreign land, United States, and can have after

United States to take up cease to be citizens of the such change of allegiance

no claim to protection as such citizens from our government."

16 Webster's Works, p. 527.

2 Wharton's Dig., sec. 190.

The same eminent statesman in a communication to Mr. Clay in 1855,' concerning certain alleged wrongs on one who claimed to be a citizen of the United States, but domiciled in Peru, still further affirmed the principle. That citizen who went to the Fiji Islands for his health in 1866 presents a case which strikingly illustrates how a citizen of the United States can divest himself of national character. That was a case of regaining his health, as we may infer, at the loss of his national character.2

Mr. Porter, Acting Secretary of State, in 1885, disposed of the claim of that citizen to the protection of this government by saying that he was not entitled to it; that his recourse should be on Great Britain, inasmuch as his domicile was British, so constituted by reason of the fact that he resided in Fiji at the time of the annexation of the islands to Great Britain, and so continued to reside there after annexation.

3

In 1851 Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, commenting on the fact that many citizens of the United States had taken up their abode in the Sandwich Islands, in a communication to Mr. Severance, said in substance, that all such who had gone to take up their abode in the Sandwich Islands thereby ceased to be American citizens and that "they would have no right to further demand the protection of this government." Further on he says: "You will therefore not encourage in them, nor indeed in any others, any idea or expectation that the island would become a part of the United States." this prophecy Mr. Webster spoke as a mere man and not as a seer as to the country's expansion.

NON-LIABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

I will now briefly refer to some instances in which this government has decided, that it is not liable internationally for

1 Wharton's Dig., sec. 190.

2 Wharton's Dig., sec. 190.

3 Mss. Hawaii, Wharton's Dig., sec. 190.