A treatise on logic, or, The laws of pure thoughtSever & Francis, 1864 |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 66–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
Էջ 20
... deny one Intuition or Concept of another . Hence , we may either consider Judgments as the elements of Concepts , or Concepts as the elements of Judgments . Logicians generally have treated of the functions of Conception or Simple Appre ...
... deny one Intuition or Concept of another . Hence , we may either consider Judgments as the elements of Concepts , or Concepts as the elements of Judgments . Logicians generally have treated of the functions of Conception or Simple Appre ...
Էջ 40
... denying that Logic has any claims to be con- sidered as a distinct science , or that a thorough and sys- tematic evolution of its principles would be of any practical benefit . The ground of these misapprehensions is entirely re- moved ...
... denying that Logic has any claims to be con- sidered as a distinct science , or that a thorough and sys- tematic evolution of its principles would be of any practical benefit . The ground of these misapprehensions is entirely re- moved ...
Էջ 49
... denial , as these are the only two possible forms of Judgment . Having com- pared any two Concepts with each other , we ... deny one of the other , there being no third form of Judgment conceivable , we have the Axiom which is usually ...
... denial , as these are the only two possible forms of Judgment . Having com- pared any two Concepts with each other , we ... deny one of the other , there being no third form of Judgment conceivable , we have the Axiom which is usually ...
Էջ 51
... denial . The mutual dependence and correlation of these three Axioms may be further illus- trated thus . I can think any object only by placing it under a Con- cept , or Class - notion expressed by a General Term ; and I can do this ...
... denial . The mutual dependence and correlation of these three Axioms may be further illus- trated thus . I can think any object only by placing it under a Con- cept , or Class - notion expressed by a General Term ; and I can do this ...
Էջ 53
... deny a union of two Concepts without any ground for such affirmation or denial . The sufficiency of this ground or reason is a material question , with which the logician , as such , has nothing to do . Leib- nitz was wrong , then , in ...
... deny a union of two Concepts without any ground for such affirmation or denial . The sufficiency of this ground or reason is a material question , with which the logician , as such , has nothing to do . Leib- nitz was wrong , then , in ...
Այլ խմբագրություններ - View all
A Treatise on Logic, Or, The Laws of Pure Thought: Comprising Both the ... Francis Bowen Ամբողջությամբ դիտվող - 1866 |
Common terms and phrases
absolutely actually affirm the Consequent Affirmative already animal antecedent applied Aristotelic doctrine Aristotle assertion attributes Axiom called Cause class of things classification conceived Concept Conclusion connoted Consequent considered contained Contradictory Contraposition Conversion Copula Definition Demonstrative denote deny determined Disjunctive Disjunctive Syllogism distinct enounced Enthymeme equal event evidence Excluded exists explicated expressed Extension fact faculty Fallacy false Figure former Genus gism Hamilton Hence Immediate Inference individual Induction Inductive Reasoning infinite instance Intension Intuition knowledge language Laws of Thought Logic logicians Major Premise Marks Matter meaning ment merely Middle Term mind mode Modus tollens Moods nature necessary Negative not-X notion objects observed particular peculiar perception Predicate principle properly Proposition proved Pure Thought qualities Quantity rational reasoning reduced relation respect Rules sion Sir William Hamilton sophism Species Subalternation Subject sublating Sumption Syllogism tion tive true truth Universal valid whole words
Սիրված հատվածներ
Էջ 400 - Cause is the sum total of the Conditions, positive and negative, taken together ; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which, being realized, the consequent invariably follows.
Էջ 367 - As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them...
Էջ 392 - It consists in ascribing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of.
Էջ 24 - And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for : in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra...
Էջ 283 - He who calls you a man speaks truly: he who calls you a fool, calls you a man: therefore he who calls you a fool speaks truly.
Էջ 297 - Englishmen or not-Englishmen,' to the exclusion of the third possibility of a mixed force, so it is false to say, ' Every body must move in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not,' to the exclusion of the third possibility of moving partly in the one and partly in the other.
Էջ 337 - ... printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. For these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world; the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes; insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.
Էջ 175 - In as far as two notions (notions proper or individuals), either both agree, or one agreeing, the other does not, with a common third notion ; in so far, these notions do or do not agree with each other.
Էջ 305 - objections" against various parts of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory answer can be given ; and the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger objections against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of human origin ; and that where we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason and in candour to adopt the hypothesis which labours under the least.
Էջ 265 - Axiom, as has been shown (page 54), 13 lirectly explicated into the two Laws, — 1. That to affirm the Reason or the Condition is also to affirm the Consequent ; and, 2. That to deny the Consequent is also to deny the Reason. A. ratione ad rationatum, a negatione rationati ad negationem rationis, valet consequentia. The single Premise affirming that this relation of Reason and Consequent exists between the Judgments which are its two parts, this Axiom compels us to infer immediately, or without...