A treatise on logic, or, The laws of pure thoughtSever & Francis, 1864 |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 37–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
Էջ 34
... false . Logic , as it proceeds from axiomatic principles , and derives none of its materials from experience , but considers only those laws which under- lie all experience and first render it possible , is a purely de- monstrative ...
... false . Logic , as it proceeds from axiomatic principles , and derives none of its materials from experience , but considers only those laws which under- lie all experience and first render it possible , is a purely de- monstrative ...
Էջ 42
... false ; I may reason rightly from wrong premises to a false conclusion . On the other hand , as an error in the Form necessarily vitiates the whole process of Thought , it may certainly be said that Logic furnishes us with a negative ...
... false ; I may reason rightly from wrong premises to a false conclusion . On the other hand , as an error in the Form necessarily vitiates the whole process of Thought , it may certainly be said that Logic furnishes us with a negative ...
Էջ 106
... false , accord- ing as it does , or does not , agree with the mental Judgment . The mere succession or coexistence of two Thoughts in the mind does not constitute a Judgment . I may think - first of man , and then of animal ; 106 THE ...
... false , accord- ing as it does , or does not , agree with the mental Judgment . The mere succession or coexistence of two Thoughts in the mind does not constitute a Judgment . I may think - first of man , and then of animal ; 106 THE ...
Էջ 130
... false . Hence , we do not deny a Hypothetical Judgment by denying either or both of its parts , but only by denying the Consequence of one from the other . This is usually done , in Latin , by placing the negation at the beginning . Non ...
... false . Hence , we do not deny a Hypothetical Judgment by denying either or both of its parts , but only by denying the Consequence of one from the other . This is usually done , in Latin , by placing the negation at the beginning . Non ...
Էջ 134
... false ; but with this fault , as logicians , we have nothing to do . Logic does not guarantee the truth of the premises , but only the validi- ty of the inference from the premises to the conclusion . And that this inference is valid in ...
... false ; but with this fault , as logicians , we have nothing to do . Logic does not guarantee the truth of the premises , but only the validi- ty of the inference from the premises to the conclusion . And that this inference is valid in ...
Այլ խմբագրություններ - View all
A Treatise on Logic, Or, The Laws of Pure Thought: Comprising Both the ... Francis Bowen Ամբողջությամբ դիտվող - 1866 |
Common terms and phrases
absolutely actually affirm the Consequent Affirmative already animal antecedent applied Aristotelic doctrine Aristotle assertion attributes Axiom called Cause class of things classification conceived Concept Conclusion connoted Consequent considered contained Contradictory Contraposition Conversion Copula Definition Demonstrative denote deny determined Disjunctive Disjunctive Syllogism distinct enounced Enthymeme equal event evidence Excluded exists explicated expressed Extension fact faculty Fallacy false Figure former Genus gism Hamilton Hence Immediate Inference individual Induction Inductive Reasoning infinite instance Intension Intuition knowledge language Laws of Thought Logic logicians Major Premise Marks Matter meaning ment merely Middle Term mind mode Modus tollens Moods nature necessary Negative not-X notion objects observed particular peculiar perception Predicate principle properly Proposition proved Pure Thought qualities Quantity rational reasoning reduced relation respect Rules sion Sir William Hamilton sophism Species Subalternation Subject sublating Sumption Syllogism tion tive true truth Universal valid whole words
Սիրված հատվածներ
Էջ 400 - Cause is the sum total of the Conditions, positive and negative, taken together ; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which, being realized, the consequent invariably follows.
Էջ 367 - As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them...
Էջ 392 - It consists in ascribing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of.
Էջ 24 - And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for : in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra...
Էջ 283 - He who calls you a man speaks truly: he who calls you a fool, calls you a man: therefore he who calls you a fool speaks truly.
Էջ 297 - Englishmen or not-Englishmen,' to the exclusion of the third possibility of a mixed force, so it is false to say, ' Every body must move in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not,' to the exclusion of the third possibility of moving partly in the one and partly in the other.
Էջ 337 - ... printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. For these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world; the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes; insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.
Էջ 175 - In as far as two notions (notions proper or individuals), either both agree, or one agreeing, the other does not, with a common third notion ; in so far, these notions do or do not agree with each other.
Էջ 305 - objections" against various parts of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory answer can be given ; and the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger objections against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of human origin ; and that where we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason and in candour to adopt the hypothesis which labours under the least.
Էջ 265 - Axiom, as has been shown (page 54), 13 lirectly explicated into the two Laws, — 1. That to affirm the Reason or the Condition is also to affirm the Consequent ; and, 2. That to deny the Consequent is also to deny the Reason. A. ratione ad rationatum, a negatione rationati ad negationem rationis, valet consequentia. The single Premise affirming that this relation of Reason and Consequent exists between the Judgments which are its two parts, this Axiom compels us to infer immediately, or without...