APRIL, 1808.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. MONDAY, April 11. Amendment of the Constitution. Resolved, That the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, be authorized to adjourn their respective Houses on Monday the twenty-fifth day of April instant. Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives accordingly. TUESDAY, April 12. [SENATE. Federalists and Republicans never divided проп the elementary principles of government. There are very few Americans who are not in principle attached to a free republican government; though they may differ on minor points, and about the best mode of organizing it. Persons attached to monarchy or aristocracy are few indeed; they are but as the dust in the balance. No one in his sober senses can believe it practicable, or politic if practicable, to intro Removal of Federal Judges upon Address from duce either. If ever introduced, which God for Congress. Mr. ADAMS stated that he, together with his colleague, were instructed by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, to use their best endeavors to procure such an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as will empower the President of the United States to remove from office any of the judges of the courts of the United States, upon an address to him made for that purpose, by a majority of the House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senate, in Congress assembled. On motion, by Mr. ADAMS, Ordered, That the instructions be referred to the committee appointed the 25th of January last, on the subject of amendments to the constitution, to consider and report thereon. Amendment of the Constitution-President by lot from among the Senators. Mr. HILLHOUSE.-The situation of the United States at the time of the meeting of the Convention for forming the constitution, I well remember, and it will be recollected by every member of this Senate, to have been such as to excite the anxious solicitude of every considerate man in our country. External pressure being removed, the recommendations of Congress had ceased to have effect on the States. We were a nation without credit and without resources; or rather without the means of drawing them forth. Local policy began to operate in a manner that tended to excite jealousy and discontent among the States; and there was reason to fear that we were exposed, and at no remote period, to all Under these cirthe calamities of civil war. cumstances, the present constitution was promulgated, and was eagerly seized on by the great body of the people, as the palladium of our liberties, and the bond of our Union. I was of the number of those who approved it, though some parts of it appeared to me mere theories in the science of Government, which I hoped in the experiment would prove salutary; but my expectations were not sanguine. Before I proceed with my explanatory remarks, I must take the liberty of stating, that in using the terms monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, I do not use them as the cant words of party; I use them in their fair, genuine sense. The terms Federalist and Republican, I do not use by way of commendation or reproach; but merely by way of description, as the first names of individuals, to distinguish them from others of the same family name. bid, it must be done at the point of the bayonet. 'man, you must look to his homespun, everyday dress; if you do this, will you not find a full proportion of good Republicans, as they are called, who exhibit no more of that virtue called humility than their neighbors, and who manifest no greater regard for equal rights? The supposed differences are more imaginary than real. Names may, and sometimes do, deceive ignorant, uninformed individuals; but these names now scarcely do that. Some of the important features of our constitution were borrowed from a model which did not very well suit our condition: I mean the Constitution and Government of England, a mixed monarchy, in which monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, are so combined as to form a check on each other. One important and indispensable requisite of such a Government is, that the two first branches should be hereditary, and that the Monarch should be the fountain of honor and source of power. In the United States, the people are the source of all power. Placing in the hands of the Chief Magistrate, who depends on a popular election, prerogatives and powers in many respects equal, in some, exceeding in practice those exercised by the King of Great Britain, is one of the errors of the constitution. This error can be corrected only in one of two ways; either the office must be stripped of those high prerogatives and powers, and the term of holding the office shortened, or some other mode devised, than a popular election, for appointing a President: otherwise, our country must perpetually groan under the scourge of party rage and violence, and be continually exposed to that worst of all calamities, civil war. SENATE.] Amendment of the Constitution. [APRIL, 1808. I am aware I have engaged in a difficult un-1 sumed, fairly express such sentiments and will. dertaking. I have to oppose deep-rooted pre- And if, in an interval from one session of Conjudices and long-established opinions, which gress to another, there be a real change of pubwill be abandoned with reluctance. I have to lic sentiment, why should not that change be contradict favorite theories, long ago adopted, expressed? Will an attempt in their Repreand still strenuously maintained. It is there- sentatives to resist it, tend to tranquillize the fore to be expected that arguments which go to public mind? or will it not, like persecution in destroy the former, or contradict the latter, will religion, tend to make proselytes to their sentibe admitted with caution, and listened to with ments? a reluctant ear. Some of the amendments, when first presented to my mind, made but a slight impression, and I was disposed to pass them by as impracticable or ineffectual; but experience and mature reflection have satisfied me both of their correctness and importance. I am aware that the amendments will not be approved by many individuals in this nation, under an apprehension of their tending to lower the tone and energy of the Government. They will be denounced by all office hunters, demagogues, and men of inordinate ambition, more anxious for their own elevation to office than for the public good. All artful men, who rely more on their dexterity and skill in intrigue, than upon honest merit, to secure an election, will raise their voices and cry aloud against them. They will describe them as utopian and visionary; as departing from the elective principle; and as lowering the dignity and character of the Government. But the great body of the people, who compose that portion of the community which can have no views or interests incompatible with the general welfare, which can have no other wish or desire than to see the nation prosper, and which the feelings of nature would stimulate to do what would advance the prosperity and happiness of future generations, will, I flatter myself, lend a listening ear, and grant me a candid and patient hearing. I must also be permitted to indulge the hope, that, in this honorable body, the amendments will not be hastily rejected; nor until they shall have undergone an attentive and critical examination. A prominent feature of the amendments is, to shorten the term of service of the President, Senators, and Representatives; observation and experience having convinced me, that in an elective Government, long terms of office and high compensations do not tend to make independent public servants, while they produce an anxious solicitude in the incumbents to keep their places; and render seekers of office more eager to obtain them, and more regardless of the means. My first amendment goes to reduce the term of service of the members of the House of Representatives to one year. No inconvenience can arise from this arrangement; because there is a constitutional provision that Congress shall assemble once in every year. That body, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, ought to exhibit a fair representation of their sentiments and will; and, coming fresh from the people to the Congress of each year, will, it may be pre Constitutions, except so far as they are necessary to organize the several departments of Government, and bring the public functionaries into a situation to deliberate and act; and, in the General Government, to draw the line of demarcation between that and the State governments, to prevent interference and collision, are of little avail; and present but feeble barriers against the public will. Whenever a measure is understood and believed to be necessary to promote the general welfare, the people will not fail to effect it. If they cannot, by construction, get round the constitution, they will, by an amendment, go directly to their object. the truth of this, experience has furnished ample proof. The danger is, that by attempting to extend constitutional restrictions too far, unnatural and mischievous exertions of power may be produced. Of By the second amendment, the term of service of the Senators is to be reduced to three years; one-third to be chosen each year. The Senate, I am aware, may be surprised, and perhaps feel some displeasure, that one of their own body should propose an amendment, which, in the estimation of some, may tend to lessen their dignity, and destroy their independence. Did I believe this, I should be the last to offer it. If the Senate will hear me patiently, I think I can show that it will produce no such effect. Senators represent the rights and interests of States in respect to their sovereignty. In them, therefore, the States ought to feel a confidence. And this confidence will rather be increased than lessened by shortening the term of service to three years. Shall I be told that the Legislatures of the States are not to be relied on for their stability and patriotism? that it would be unsafe, every third year, to trust them with the appointment of their Senators? No, surely. The several States are the pillars on which the Constitution of the United States rests, and must rest. If these pillars are not sound, if they are composed of feeble, frail materials, then must the General Government moulder into ruin. This, however, is not my belief. I have confidence in the State Governments. I am for keeping them in their full vigor and strength. For if any disaster befalls the General Government, the States, having within their respective spheres all the power of independent Governments, will be the arks of safety to which the citizens can flee for protection from anarchy, and the horrid evils which follow its train. I have therefore uniformly been opposed to measures which had the remotest tendency to their consolidation. APRIL, 1808.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. Amendment of the Constitution. [SENATH And those States whose members shall be equally divided, will have no vote. These circumstances considered, the present constitutional mode of choosing a President by the House of Representatives, when tested by the pure elective principle, may be deemed, as to the mode of choosing, and the object of the choice, as exceptionable as the appointment by lot; while it remains liable to all the evils of a contested election, from which the appointment by lot is wholly free. When I shall have stated the next amend- | more weight than a State having only a single ment, it will be found that my plan, instead of member. lessening the dignity and importance of Senators, will magnify their office, and make it the object of desire and laudable ambition to the best characters and greatest talents of our country; for, from the Senate I propose that the President of the United States shall always be taken; and in a manner that will exclude all cabal and undue influence in obtaining that high office-a mode in which the man of modest merit shall have an equal chance of success with the most daring and artful intriguer. The third amendment provides for the appointment of a President. He is to be taken by lot from the Senate, and is to hold his office for one year. This mode promises many advantages, and only two objections against it present themselves to my mind; one, that it is a departure from the elective principle; the other, that it will not always ensure the best talents. I should not have proposed this mode, if any other could have been devised, which would not convulse the whole body politic, set wide open the door to intrigue and cabal, and bring upon the nation incalculable evils; evils already felt, and growing more and more serious. Upon mature examination, those objections appear less formidable than at first view. When Senators shall be chosen with an eye to this provision, every State will be anxious to make such a selection of persons as will not disgrace it in the eventual elevation of one of them to the Presidential chair. Every State Legislature would, in the choice of the Senator, consider itself as nominating a candidate for the Presidency. The effect of this arrangement would be, in reality, that, instead of the States appointing Electors to choose a President, the Legislatures themselves would become the Electors; with this advantage, that the nomination would be made when not under the influence of a Presidential electioneering fever. In the regular course of appointing Senators, only one nomination would be made at one time in each State; and in most cases, three years would elapse before he could be designated for the Presidency. The great caution in the selection of Senators, with a reference to that high office, would produce another excellent effect: it would ensure the continuance, in that body, of men of the most respectable talents and character-an object of the highest importance to the general welfare. In the mode directed by the constitution for choosing a President by the House of Representatives, there is almost as great a departure as in what I propose, from the pure elective principle; which requires perfect freedom of choice among all who are eligible; and that the ballot of each qualified voter shall have equal weight in making such choice. Whereas, by the constitution, the House are confined to three candidates, and must vote by States; so that a State having twenty-two members, has but one; and, consequently, no VOL. III-39 In answer to the second objection, it may be fairly presumed that the Senate will always be composed of men possessed at least of decent experience, and the aid of the Heads of Departtalents. And such men, with honest views, long ments and other officers, would be able to do the public business correctly. It is not necessary, it is not desirable, that the President should command the armies in person; and all our foreign relations may be managed through the agency of able Ministers, whose appointments are to be approved both by the Senate and House of Representatives. The several Executives, ever since the adoption of the constitution, have been in the habit of calling to their aid a Cabinet Council, composed of the Heads of Deably will, of men of talents, integrity, and expartments; who ought to consist, as they probperience; and who, upon the plan proposed, being likely to continue long in office, will thereby give stability and system to the measures of Government. If the appointment by lot will not always insure a President of the first rate talents, neither will the present mode of electing; for when party spirit runs high, and parties are nearly balanced, candidates will be set up, not for their talents, but because they are popular and can A command votes. And there may be a possibility of having a President for four years, distinguished neither for talents nor integrity. President appointed by lot will possess the advantage, and in practice it will be found a very great advantage, of coming into office free from party influence; which, under the present mode of electing, is seldom if ever to be expected; and it is to be feared that it will be too powerful to suffer even an honest man to do right. Appointing a President by lot from the Senate, will give every State an equal and fair chance of participating in the dignity of that high office; will prevent the possibility of bargaining among the large States to the total exclusion of the middling and small States; and will thus remove one ground of State jealousy, which must inevitably grow out of our present mode. As it regards the sovereignty of the respective States, the appointment by lot is in exact conformity to the principles of the constitution; for in the event of an election of a President by the House of Representatives, each State has an equal vote, conformably with its equal rights as sovereign and independent; SENATE.] Amendment of the Constitution. so that, in respect to peace and union, this mode of appointing a President would produce effects of great and lasting importance. As the President is to be taken from the Senate, and, if worthy of the Senatorial office, must have experience, and be well informed of the affairs of the nation-and can also avail himself of the information and talents of every member of the Government-there can be no solid objection to reducing his term of service to one year. The President will always enter on his office at the close of the session of Congress; and during the recess have time to make himself more fully acquainted with the state of the nation, so as to present a proper view of it to the next Congress, as well as to conduct successfully the public business at the end of his term. No serious embarrassment or inconvenience, in conducting the public business, has been felt from the change of a President or the Head of a Department. There are and always must be subordinate officers around the Government, well acquainted with the routine of business; which will and must proceed in its usual course. If any example were necessary to show that no injury would arise to the nation from an annual appointment of a President, I might instance the ancient Republic of Rome --where, in the days of her greatest virtue, prosperity, and glory, her chief magistrates, or consuls, were chosen every year. But, being taken from the Senate, a body conversant with the management of their public affairs, as is our Senate, no evil accrued to the public. The office of President is the only one in our Government clothed with such powers as might endanger liberty; and I am not without apprehension that, at some future period, they may be exerted to overthrow the liberties of our country. The change from four to ten years is small; the next step would be from ten years to life, and then to the nomination of a successor; from which the transition to an hereditary monarchy would almost follow of course. The exigencies of the country, the public safety, and the means of defence against foreign invasion, may place in the hands of an ambitious, daring President, an army, of which he would be the legitimate commander, and with which he might enforce his claim. This may not happen in my day; it probably will not; but I have children whom I love, and whom Í expect to leave behind me, to share in the destinies of our common country. I cannot therefore feel indifferent to what may befall them and generations yet unborn. I do not desire in the smallest degree to lessen the President's power to do good; I only wish to place such salutary checks upon his power, as to prevent his doing harm. His power of nominating and appointing to office, and removing from office, will still be continued; with only the additional check of requir- | ing the consent of the House of Representatives, in one case, and of the Senate and House in the other. All his other powers will remain the [APRIL, 1808. same as at present, and there will be but little danger of an abuse of those powers, if the term of Presidential office be reduced to one year, and the appointment be by lot: which will render it impossible to bring the high prerogatives of this office to aid in procuring it. An artful intriguer cannot then point to the various lucrative offices in the gift of the President, for the purpose of stimulating exertion in favor of his election: than which a more powerful engine could not have been devised. In Of the impropriety and impolicy of the present mode of electing a President, can there be stronger proof, can there be a more convincing evidence, than is now exhibiting in the United States? In whatever direction we turn our eyes, we behold the people arranging themselves under the banners of different candidates, for the purpose of commencing the electioneering campaign for the next President and Vice President. All the passions and feelings of the human heart are brought into the most active operation. The electioneering spirit finds its way to every fireside; pervades our domestic circles; and threatens to destroy the enjoyment of social harmony. The seeds of discord will be sown in families, among friends, and throughout the whole community. saying this, I do not mean any thing to the disadvantage of either of the candidates. They may have no agency in the business; they may be the involuntary objects of such competition, without the power of directing or controlling the storm. The fault is in the mode of election; in setting the people to choose a King. In fact, a popular election, and the exercise of such powers and prerogatives as are by the constitution vested in the President, are incompatible. The evil is increasing, and will increase, until it shall terminate in civil war and despotism. The people, suffering under the scourge of party feuds and factions, and finding no refuge under the State, any more than in the General Government, from party persecttion and oppression, may become impatient, and submit to the first tyrant who can protect them against the thousand tyrants. I have dwelt so long on this amendment, because of the novelty, in this country, of appointing a Chief Magistrate by lot. The facility of appointing by lot was obvious; but it seemed necessary to exhibit, and to demonstrate the many and highly important advantages which will arise from this mode of appointing a Presi dent of the United States. The principal of these I will now present in one short view: 1st. It will make the Senate more respectable. 2d. It is prompt and certain. 3d. It will avoid the evils of a disputed election, now unprovided for in the constitution. 4th. It will exclude intrigue and cabal. 5th. It gives talent and modest merit an equal chance. 6th. It is economical. 7th. It gives to the people a President of the United States, and not the chief a party. APRIL, 1808.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. Adjournment. 8th. It removes temptation to use power otherwise than for public good. 9th. It will annihilate a general party pervading the whole United States. 10th. It will remove a direct, powerful, and dangerous influence of the General Government on the individual States. 11th. It will prevent the influence of a Presidential election on our domestic concerns and foreign relations. And, 12th. It will secure the United States against the usurpation of power, and every attempt, through fear, interest, or corruption, to sacrifice their interest, honor, or independence; for one year is too short a time in which to contrive and execute any extensive and dangerous plan of unprincipled ambition; and the same person cannot be President during two successive terms. Reducing the Presidential term of service to one year, will remove the necessity of attaching to the office the splendor of a palace. The simplicity of ancient Republics would better suit the nature of our Government. The instances of persons called from the plough to command armies, or to preside over the public councils, show that in a Republic pomp and splendor are Cincinnatus, not necessary to real dignity. who was content with the scanty support derived from tilling, with his own hands, his fouracre farm, has been as celebrated in history as By these rethe most splendid monarchs. marks I would not be understood to object against giving adequate salaries to all public functionaries. In the case of subordinate officers, it may be left to Legislative discretion. But the President having such great power and extensive influence, his compensation ought to have a constitutional limit, and not exceed fifteen thousand dollars. FRIDAY, April 15. Death of the Representative, Jacob Crowninshield. A message from the House of Representatives notified the Senate of the death of JACOB CROWNINSHIELD, Esq., late a member of that House, and that his funeral will take place to morrow morning, at 10 o'clock. On motion, by Mr. GILMAN, Resolved, That the Senate will attend the funeral of Mr. CROWNINSHIELD to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. SATURDAY, April 16. The Senate adjourned to twelve o'clock, and attended the funeral of the honorable JACOB After which they returned CROWNINSHIELD. [SENATE. ing retired for the remainder of the session, the to their Chamber, and the VICE PRESIDENT havSenate proceeded by ballot to the choice of a PRESIDENT pro tempore, as the constitution provides; and the honorable SAMUEL SMITH was elected. Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint Vice President, elected the honorable SAMUEL him that the Senate have, in the absence of the SMITH their President pro tempore; and that the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives. WEDNESDAY, April 20. Bank of the United States. Mr. GREGG presented the memorial of the stockholders of the Bank of the United States, signed Samuel Breck, chairman, representing that, by an act of Congress, passed on the 25th of February, 1791, the subscribers to the capital stock of the said Bank, their successors and assigns, were incorporated for a term of years, which act will expire on the 4th day of March, 1811; and praying a renewal of their charter, for reasons stated at large in their memorial; which was read, and referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, to consider and report thereon at the next session of Congress. MONDAY, 5 o'clock, P. M., April 25. Adjournment. Resolved, That Messrs. MITOHILL and CRAWFORD be a committee on the part of the Senate, with such as the House of Representatives may join, to wait on the President of the United any further communications to make to the States, and notify him that, unless he may have two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn. Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives therewith, and request the appointment of a committee on their part. A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House concur in of a joint committee to wait on the President of the resolution of the Senate for the appointment the United States and notify him of the intended recess, and have appointed a committee on their part. Mr. Mitchill, from the committee, reported that they had waited on the President of the United States, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress; whereupon, the President adjourned the Senate until the first Monday in November next. |