it did other than assume jurisdiction and control over all property and property rights therein, including the submarine cable. and telegraph lines of the claimant, using the latter for its governmental and other purposes, for which it made compensation.

There is no averment that the rights of the claimant in and to the ownership and control of its cable and telegraph lines were in any way interrupted or interfered with by the officers of the Government other than for the transmission of messages, for which compensation was made; and if they were, such acts would constitute a tort, over which this court would have no jurisdiction.

The obligation of Spain to the claimant was not the obligation of the Philippine Archipelago, though the Spanish Government saw fit to pay the subsidy out of the revenues of the islands; but if we were to assume that it was, the United States, in the absence of treaty stipulation, such as is referred to in Hall's International Law, sec. 28, p. 104, would not be liable therefor. If we were to assume that the obligations of Spain to the claimant was a general debt of the Spanish Government, it would be a personal one, as laid down in Hall's International Law, p. 99, note; and being a personal obligation would not in the absence of a treaty stipulation therefor, attach to the United States.

The court is without jurisdiction and therefore the demurrer must be sustained, . . and the petition dismissed.

NOTE.-The authorities are in much confusion as to the effect which a transfer of jurisdiction produces upon the rights and obligations of the ceded territory, the ceding state and the receiving state. This is partly because the facts of each case are likely to present some peculiar features which make it difficult to deduce a general rule. A principle which is often invoked was well expressed by General Botha when he said to the British upon the surrender of the Boer armies, "Our view is that having taken the assets of our Government, you may fairly be expected to meet their liabilities, not in part, but in full." As a result of a transfer of jurisdiction a state may be extinguished, as were Texas and Hawaii when annexed by the United States, and the Boer republics when annexed by Great Britain, and Korea when annexed by Japan, and Austria-Hungary when it was dismembered at the close of the Great War; or a district may be transferred the revenues of which have been pledged to the payment of a particular debt, as in the case of parts of Peru annexed by Chili. If public debts are involved they may have been contracted by a gov ernment which the new sovereign does not consider to have been duly authorized thereto, as in the case of certain debts contracted by the Fiji Islands shortly before their annexation by Great Britain;

or the debt may have been contracted for a purpose which the new sovereign does not approve, as in the case of the Cuban debt, much of which had been contracted by Spain for the purpose of subjugating Cuba.

The changes produced by the Great War in the territorial arrangements and political organization of Europe have greatly enhanced the importance of the principal of state succession. Germany has lost much territory and has changed its form of government. Russia likewise has changed its form of government and within its former boundaries several new states, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania-sometimes called the Russian succession states-have been formed. Similar changes have been made in the Turkish dominions. In all these cases, however, the political entity known as Germany, Russia or Turkey still remains and the governmental and territorial changes have not altered the state's identity. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the other hand has disintegrated. Portions of its dominions have been ceded to Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and Italy, while the remainder has been dismembered and organized as independent units known as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Free State of Fiume. None of these new organizations stands in such a relation to the old Austria-Hungary that it can be regarded as its successor. The situation is analogous to that which would arise if the American Union should dissolve and each of the forty-eight States should establish itself as an independent nation. In such a case no one of them could be said to be the successor of the United States. In connection with the Austrian succession states questions analogous to the following may arise:

1. If Austria-Hungary in 1910 had made a treaty with Spain giving to Spanish merchant vessels certain rights in the harbor of Fiume, would the Free State of Fiume be under obligation to observe the terms of the treaty?

2. If bonds were issued by Austria-Hungary in 1910, what state, if any, is now bound to pay them?

3. If Austria-Hungary in 1910 borrowed money for the construction of docks in Trieste, which now belongs to Italy, is the loan an obligation on either Trieste or Italy?

4. If Austria-Hungary in 1910 borrowed money for the construction of war-vessels and pledged the revenue from state property in Bohemia to the repayment of the loan, is there now any obligation on Czechoslovakia?

For an account of the numerous economic problems growing out of the distintegration of Austria-Hungary, see "The Pontorose Conference," The American Association for International Conciliation, Bulletin No. 176 (July, 1922).

The temporary military occupant of a country does not succeed to the political or proprietary rights of the power which it has dispossessed, and therefore it does not succeed to the obligations created by that power with reference to the occupied territory. Replying to an inquiry concerning concessions made by Spain to a British company for the construction of cables in Cuba, Attorney-General Griggs

said, March 17, 1899:

American control of Cuba is essentially, and merely, that of a temporary military occupant. Our obligations, therefore, are those which arise from that fact. Benefits to the island and obligations local to the island, so far as becoming obligations of the United States, would seem from their very nature obligations of the island or its people, and not of a military occupant entering for a single and temporary purpose. Our Government is merely an intervening power arranging the succession.

Opinions of the Attorney-General, XXII, 385. For general discussions of the principle of state succession see Borchard, sec. 83; Huber, Die Staatensuccession; Appleton, Des Effets des Annexions de Territoires sur les Dettes de l'Etat démembré ou annexé; Westlake, I, 74; Keith, The Theory of State Succession; Sir H. Erle Richards, "The Liabilities of a Conqueror," Law Magazine and Review, XXVIII, 129; Cobbett, Cases and Opinions I, 73; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 214.

As to the Fijian debt, see Moore, Digest, I, 347. As to the Cuban debt and the argument for and against its assumption, see Moore, Digest, I, 351. As to the debts of Hawaii, see 22 Opinions of the Attorney-General, 584. For the effect of a transfer of jurisdiction on treaties, see Crandall, 425; Moore, Digest, V, 341. As to the effect of the annexation of Algiers by France on treaties between Algiers and the United States, see Mahoney v. United States (1869), 10 Wallace, 62. When a man was arrested in the United States and held for extradition to Great Britain for an offense committed in the South African Republic before its annexation by Great Britain, it was held the treaty of extradition between Great Britain and the United States could not apply to offenses committed in places which were not under British jurisdiction at the time of their commission, and as there had been no extradition treaty between the United States and the South African Republic, the prisoner was released, In re Taylor (1902), 118 Fed. 196. For various questions arising out of the conquest of the Boer republics by Great Britain, see Keith, "Colonial Cases Relating to the Succession of States," Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht, III, 618.

On the question as to whether a state is bound to recognize the contracts and concessions made by its predecessor in title, see Gidel, Des Effets de l'Annexion sur les Concessions; Sayre, "Change of Sovereignty and Concessions," Am. Jour. Int. Law, XII, 705; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1887), 36 Ch. D. 489; Report of the Transvaal Concession Commission, Blue Book, South Africa, June, 1901, parts of which are given in Moore, Digest, I, 411. As to Spanish concessions in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, see Magoon, Reports, and the opinions of Attorney-General Griggs in 22 Opinions of the Attorney-General, 384, 408, 520, 546, 551, 654, and 23 Ib. 181, 195, 425, 451. Some of these may also be found in Moore, Digest, I, 390 seq. As to the effect of the extinction of a state upon corporations formed under its laws, see Pennant, "The International Status of Modern Corporations," Law Magazine and Review, XXVIII, 161.

CHAPTER V.

JURISDICTION.

SECTION 1. THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE.

CHAE CHAN PING v. UNITED STATES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1889.
130 U. S. 581.

[The appellant, a subject of the Emperor of China, had resided in the United States from 1875 to 1887, when he went to China, having in his possession a certificate which under the treaties and statutes then in force entitled him to return to the United States. Upon his arrival in San Francisco in 1888, the Collector of the Port refused to allow him to land on the ground that his certificate had been annulled by the act of Congress of October 1, 1888. The appellant argued that the act was invalid (1) because it contravened the provisions of the treaty between the United States and China and (2) because it violated rights vested in citizens of China by earlier statutes. Only so much of the opinion as relates to the second point is here given.]

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. There being nothing in the treaties between China and the United States to impair the validity of the act of Congress of October 1, 1888, was it on any other ground beyond the competency of Congress to pass it? If so, it must be because it was not within the power of Congress to prohibit Chinese laborers who had at the time departed from the United States, or should subsequently depart, from returning to the United States. Those laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the government of the United States through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an

incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power. As said by this court in the case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 136, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."

While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations. As said by this court in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413, speaking by the same great Chief Justice: "That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers given for