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that of Great Britain and France against German East Africa, that of Japan against Kiao-Chau, that of Italy against Austria and Albania, that of Great Britain and France against Bulgaria and Greece, and a few others, the blockade, as that term was understood prior to 1914, was not used. The war zone established by Germany about Great Britain in 1915, which was directed especially against enemy vessels, and the war zone established in January, 1917, which was directed against both enemy and neutral vessels and within which "all sea traffic was to be forthwith opposed by means of mines and submarines" were not in accordance with the pre-war law of blockade. On the other hand, an effective blockade of Germany under the rules which obtained in previous wars was made impossible by its geographical situation. So long as transit through the Scandinavian countries and Holland was open, the blockade of the German coast was of little value. Great Britain therefore undertook to prevent all commerce with Germany whether through German ports or through the territories of her neutral neighbors. The measure was not described as a blockade and was not carried on in accordance with the rules of blockade. It provoked sharp protests from neutrals whose trade was interrupted. The chief protestant was the United States, which, however, when it became a belligerent, assisted in the attainment of the end in view by forbidding any exports to neutral countries which it had not licensed. There is a clear legal distinction between the British exclusion from neutral countries of neutral goods which were destined to Germany and the refusal of the United States to permit the export to neutral countries of goods with an enemy destination. In substance, however, and in their actual relation to both the enemy and the neutral countries, the two measures are identical. Furthermore, in assisting in the exclusion of the goods of other neutral countries from the neutral countries adjacent to Germany, the United States took the same position as Great Britain. On the German war zone, see Garner, I, ch. xiv. The discussion between the American and British Governments as to British interference with neutral trade is well summarized in Hyde, II, 627 and in Garner, II, ch. xxxiii.

On the law of blockade see Atherley-Jones, ch. ii; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 1606; Fauchille, Du Blocus Maritime; J. A. Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare, ch. vi; Int. Law Situations, 1901, 139; Ib. 1907, 109; Ib. 1908, 9, 98; Ib. 1912, 114; Int. Law Topics, 1914, 100; Cobbett, Cases and Opinions, II, 394; Hyde, II, 647; Moore, Digest, VII, ch. xvii.

SECTION 2. NOTIFIED AND DE FACTO BLOCKADES.

THE ADULA.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1900.

176 U. S. 361.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.

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The rectitude of the decree of the District Court condemning the Adula as prize of war depends upon the existence of a lawful and effective blockade at Guantanamo, the knowledge of such blockade by those in charge of the vessel, and their intent in making the voyage from Kingston.

1. No blockade of Guantanamo was ever proclaimed by the President. A proclamation had been issued June 27, establishing a blockade of all ports on the southern coast of Cuba between Cape Frances on the west and Cape Cruz on the east, but as both Santiago and Guantanamo are to the eastward of Cape Cruz, they were not included. It appears, however, that blockades of Santiago and Guantanamo were established in the early part of June by order of Admiral Sampson, commander of the naval forces then investing the ports on the southern coast of Cuba, and were maintained as actual and effective blockades until after the capture of the Adula.

The legality of a simple or actual blockade as distinguished from a public or presidential blockade is noticed by writers upon international law, and is said by Halleck to be "constituted merely by the fact of an investment, and without any necessity of a public notification. As it arises solely from facts it ceases when they terminate; its existence must, therefore, in all cases, be established by clear and decisive evidence." Halleck, Int. L. ch. 23, sec. 10.) A de facto blockade was also recognized as legal by this court in the case of The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135, 150, in which the question arose as to the blockade of New Orleans during the civil war. In delivering the opinion of the court, the Chief Justice observed: "There is a distinction between simple and public blockades which supports this conclusion. A simple blockade may be established by a naval officer, acting upon his own discretion or under direction of superiors, without governmental notification; while a public blockade is not only established in fact, but is notified, by the government directing it, to other governments. In the case of a simple blockade, the captors are bound to prove its existence at the time of capture; while in the case of a public blockade, the claimants are held to proof of discontinuance in order to protect themselves from the penalties of attempted violation." A like ruling was made by Sir William Scott in the case of The Rolla, 6 C. Rob. 364, which was the case of an American ship and cargo, proceeded against for the

breach of a blockade at Montevideo, imposed by the British commander. It was argued, apparently upon the authority of The Henrick and Maria, 1 C. Rob. 123, that the power of imposing a blockade is altogether an act of sovereignty which cannot be assumed or exercised by a commander without special authority. But says the learned judge: "The court then expressed its opinion that this was a position not maintainable to that extent; because a commander going out to a distant station may reasonably be supposed to carry with him such a portion of sovereign authority, delegated to him, as may be necessary to provide for the exigencies of the service upon which he is employed. On stations in Europe, where government is almost at hand to superintend and direct the course of operations, under which it may be expedient that particular hostilities should be carried on, it may be different. But in distant ports of the world it cannot be disputed, I conceive, that a commander must be held to carry with him sufficient authority to act, as well against the commerce of the enemy, as against the enemy himself, for the immediate purpose of reduction." See also The Johanna Maria, Deane on Blockades, 86.

In view of the operations then being carried on for the purpose of destroying or capturing the Spanish fleet and reducing Santiago, we think it was competent for Admiral Sampson to establish a blockade there and at Guantanamo as an adjunct to such operations. Indeed, it would seem to have been a necessity that restrictions should be placed upon the power of neutrals to carry supplies and intelligence to the enemy as they would be quite sure to do if their ships were given free ingress and egress from these harbors. While there could be no objections to vessels carrying provisions to the starving insurgents, if their destination could be made certain, the probabilities were that such provisions carried to a beleaguered port, would be immediately seized by the enemy and used for the sustenance of its soldiers. The exigency was one which rendered it entirely prudent for the commander of the fleet to act, without awaiting instructions from Washington.

But it is contended that at the time of the capture, the port of Guantanamo was completely in the possession and control of the United States, and therefore that the blockade had been terminated. It appears, however, that Guantanamo is eighteen miles from the mouth of Guantanamo Bay. Access to it is obtained either by a small river emptying into the upper bay, or

by rail from Caimanera, a town on the west side of the upper bay. It seems that the Marblehead and the Yankee were sent to Guantanamo on June 7; entered the harbor and took possession of the lower bay for the use of American vessels; that the Panther and Yosemite were sent there on the 10th, and on the 12th the torpedo boat Porter arrived from Guantanamo with news of a land battle, and from that time the harbor was occupied by naval vessels, and by a party of marines who held the crest of a hill on the west side of the harbor near its entrance, and the side of the hill facing the harbor. But the town of Guantanamo, near the head of the bay, was still held by the Spanish forces, as were several other positions in the neighborhood. The campaign in the vicinity was in active progress, and encounters between the United States and Spanish troops were of frequent occurrence.

In view of these facts we are of opinion that, as the city of Guantanamo was still held by the Spaniards, and as our troops occupied only the mouth of the bay, the blockade was still operative as against vessels bound for the city of Guantanamo. [The court also finds that both the charterer and officers of the Adula knew of the blockade and intended to violate it.] The decree of the District Court was correct and it is therefore Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE GRAY, MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, dissenting.

The cor

NOTE.-Accord: The Circassian (1865), 2 Wallace, 135. rectness of the decision in both The Circassian and The Adula may well be doubted. The defeated claimants in The Circassian appealed to the British and American Claims Commission provided for by the Treaty of Washington which allowed their claims. The opinion of the dissenting commissioner in favor of sustaining the Supreme Court went upon the ground that there was a distinction between the city of New Orleans and the port of New Orleans; that the blockade had extended to the whole port while the military occupation comprised only the city which, in point of area, was but a small part of the port. See Moore, Int. Arb. IV, 3911, and an able discussion by Everett P. Wheeler in "The Law of Prize as affected by Decisions upon Captures made during the Late War between Spain and the United States," in Col. Law Rev. I, 141, 150.

For discussions of the distinction between notified and de facto blockades see The Vrouw Judith (1798), 1 C. Robinson, 150; The Mercurious (1798), 1 Ib. 80; The Neptunus (1799), 1 Ib. 170; The Betsey (1799), 1 Ib. 332; The Vrow Johanna (1799), 2 Ib. 109;

The Neptunus (1799), 2 Ib. 110; The Welvaart Van Pillaw (1799), 2 Ib. 128; The Adelaide (1799), 2 Ib. 111 n.; The Christina Margaretha (1805), 6 Ib. 62; The Franciska (1855), Spinks, III; The Circassian (1865), 2 Wallace, 135; The Adula (1900), 176 U. S. 361; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 1639; Hyde, II, 669; Moore, Digest, VII, 783.

SECTION 3. A BLOCKADE MUST BE EFFECTIVE.

THE OLINDE RODRIGUES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1899.
174 U. S. 510.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.

[The Olinde Rodrigues, a steamship belonging to a French corporation, sailed from France for the West Indies June 16, 1898. On June 27, the President of the United States proclaimed a blockade of San Juan, Porto Rico. On July 4, the steamer entered the harbor of San Juan and on coming out the next day was boarded by the American cruiser Yosemite. She disclaimed any knowledge that San Juan was blockaded, whereupon the boarding officer entered an official warning on her log and she was allowed to proceed. On July 17 she was captured by the American cruiser New Orleans, then blockading San Juan, for attempting to enter that port, taken to Charleston, South Carolina, and libelled. The District Court held that there was no effective blockade of the port of San Juan. The United States appealed.]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER the court.

delivered the opinion of

We are unable to concur with the learned District Judge in the conclusion that the blockade of the port of San Juan at the time this steamship was captured was not an effective blockade.

To be binding, the blockade must be known, and the blockading force must be present; but is there any rule of law determining that the presence of a particular force is essential in order to render a blockade effective? We do not think so, but on the contrary, that the test is whether the blockade is prac

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