row, the artillery being ready at Nieuburg, for the siege of Ingoldstadt. Prince Louis, he says, "has made me the compliment either of commanding or covering the siege; I believe I shall choose the latter." He adds, “We have nothing new of M. Tallard, which makes us apprehensive that he may be halted at Ulm, in order to repass the Danube, by which he may be more uneasy to us than if he joined with the elector." Tallard, however, did join the elector, and their united forces were encamped at Biberach, on the 8th of August. Marlborough had weakened his main army by despatch. ing Prince Louis to carry on the siege of Ingoldstadt. Prince Eu gene was encamped at Donawert. On the 9th, Eugene hastily rode into Marlborough's camp, to announce that the united Gallo-Bava. rian army had advanced from Biberach towards Lauingen, with the supposed intention of passing the Danube. It was agreed that the prince should be immediately reinforced, and that the whole army should advance nearer the Danube, in order to join him. * Tallard and the elector passed the Danube on the 10th, and encamped at Dillingen. On that day Marlborough was encamped at Schonefeldt. It was a crisis of extreme danger; for if Tallard had at tacked either army before their junction, his superiority in numbers would have assured him a victory. Eugene commanded a force of twenty thousand men, composed of Prussians, Danes, Austrians, and troops of the empire. Marlborough commanded a force of thirty-six thousand men, composed of English, Dutch, Hessians, Hanoverians, and Danes. Tallard, and his fellow-general Marsin, commanded forty-eight thousand Frenchmen, and the Bavarians numbered twelve thousand. On the 11th, Marlborough marched from Schonefeldt, and crossing the Lech at Rain, joined Eugene that night, having passed the Danube at Donawert. They intended to advance and encamp at Hochstet, "in order whereto," says Marlborough, "we went out on Tuesday [the 12th] early in the morning to view the ground, but found the enemy had already possessed themselves of it, whereupon we resolved to attack them." † It was no rash resolve, which dispensed with the necessary precautions to insure success. Marlborough and Eugene went up into the steeple of the church of Dapfheim; saw a camp being marked out upon a hill where the enemy's cavalry were stationed, and the infantry in full march towards it; carefully noted all the practicable ways from their own camp to that which they saw forming; and, to facilitate the movements of the next day, ordered a ravine to be levelled by the pioneers. The allied army was encamped to the Dispatches, vol. i. p. 387. ↑ Ibid., p. 391 BATTLE OF BLENHEIM. 141 north-west of the river Kessel. The French and Bavarian army was encamped beyond the river Nebel, in the broadest part of the valley of the Danube, their right resting upon the great stream to which the Kessel, the Nebel, and two intervening rivulets are tributaries. The distance between the Kessel and the Nebel is four or five miles, with the wooded heights of the Schellenberg shutting in the valley, till it opens into the wide and fertile plain of Blenheim. On the night of the 12th orders were given that the allied army should move before break of day. In the plain to the north-west of the Nebel there are three villages,- Kremheim, close upon the Danube; Unterglaugh, in the centre of the valley; Berghausen, at its eastern extremity. At three o'clock in the morning of the 13th of August, the army of Eugene, filing by the right, in four columns, and the army of Marlborough, also in four columns, were passing the Kessel, over bridges which had been constructed on the previous day. Two brigades, which had taken position in advance at Dapfheim the evening before, formed a ninth column. This column had a considerable accession of strength given to it, and under the command of the gallant lord Cutts, marched along the Danube, upon the extreme left, by Kremheim, with orders to attack the village of Blenheim. Marlborough and Eugene, with the advanced guard, were sufficiently near by seven o'clock to take a view of the positions of the Gallo Bavarian army. Their right was at the village of Blenheim, where Marshal Tallard had his heal quarters. Their left was at the village of Lutzingen, covered by a wood. The space occupied by their lines was in length about four miles, upon rising ground which commanded the whole plain to the Nebel, in front. The morning was hazy, and Tallard was somewhat unaccountably deceived as to the intentions of Marlborough and Eugene. In a postscript to a letter which he wrote at a very early hour, he says, "This thirteenth, the enemy beat la générale' at two o'clock, and at three 'l'assemblée' * Accord ing to all appearance they will march to day, and the report of the country is that they are going to Nordlingen." Tallard found his mistake when the sun cleared away the mist, and the columns of Eugene were seen coming out from the hill-side behind Berghausen. His first operation was to call in his foragers, and to set fire to the villages on that side of the Nebel on which the Allies were advancing. At eight o'clock the French began to cannonade, and the batteries of Marlborough and Eugene soon replied. Eugene, however, had found considerable difficulty in taking up his ground. His march upon the edge of the wooded hills had been rough and circuitous. He had rivulets to cross running through swampy ground. His wing had been necessarily extended. It was past noon when he had placed his troops, upon the extreme right, in front of the elector of Bavaria; and it had been agreed between the two commanders that the battle should not commence till both were ready. The announcement from Eugene was made; and then Marlborough mounted his horse, and gave the command that the lines should move forward to cross the Nebel, and that Cutts should commence the attack upon Blenheim. The village of Plentheim, or Blenheim, had been converted by Tallard into a strong post. It appeared to him that the Nebel was impassable in the centre of the plain, and he therefore concentrated his chief strength on the right, leaving his left equally strong under the elector. The military critics of the time of Tallard severely blamed him for this disposition of his force. St. Simon says, that by a blindness without example, he had placed twentysix battalions of infantry, six regiments of dragoons, and a brigade of cavalry-an entire army-merely for the purpose of holding a village, and supporting his right, which would have been better supported by the Danube. An English marshal, who viewed the ground seventy years afterwards, writes, "As far as the disposition was concerned, the neglect of the centre, and the crowding of so many battalions into Blenheim, whilst the flank of the village was not proportionally sustained, seem to me among the principal faults of M. Tallard."* The French Marshal took extraordinary pains in the defence of Blenheim, and by forming barricades between the village and the Danube, by making every house and garden a little fortress. As far as regarded the attack upon this spot the means of defence were wholly successful. At one o'clock the allied troops under Cutts descended to the Nebel, and crossed by two watermills which had been set on fire. Brigadier-general Rowe led the English to the attack, supported by a brigade of Hessians. When they were within thirty yards of the palisades which surrounded the village, a heavy fire of grape swept away their ranks. Rowe led his men to the barriers, determined to enter sword in hand. He fell, mortally wounded, and the irresistible fire of the enemy compelled a speedy retreat. Squadron after squadron crossed the rivulet, at other points, and advanced in front of the village. Three times were the assailants repulsed; but at last they held their ground, and were enabled to occupy the attention of the great body of troops within Blenheim, by keeping up a feigned attack, MS. Letter of Marshal Conway. The "Memoirs of St. Simon" were not published when this letter was written. THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM. 143 whilst the main body of Marlborough's army was crossing the Nebel. It was a difficult and dangerous operation, which occupied several hours. The stream in one part had two branches, with soft and marshy ground between each branch. "There was very great difficulty and danger," says the duke's chaplain, "in defiling over the rivulet in the face of an enemy already formed, and supported by several batteries of cannon; yet by the brave examples given, and great diligence used, by the commanding officers, and by the eagerness of the men, all passed over by degrees, and kept their ground."* The reliance of Tallard upon the difficulty of passing the marshes would appear to have been the reason that he of fered no opposition to the passage of the allied army,but that of a continual discharge of cannon. St. Simon severely blames him that he left a large space between his own troops and the brook, that his enemies might pass at their ease, "to be overthrown afterwards, as was said." The English, according to the same authority, speaking the opinions of French officers, had plenty of ground at their disposal while Tallard, by a different arrangement, might have been master of a vast plain. Nevertheless, as the columns of the Allies passed the stream, volleys of musquetry were poured upon them; and the charges of French cavalry were incessant. The conflict gradually extended from the left to the centre, as English, Dutch, Danes, and Hanoverians came into position. Marsin, who commanded the French at the west of the valley, near the village of Oberglaugh, repulsed the Danish and Hanoverian horse. The prince of Holstein Beck then led eleven battalions from the heights on the opposite side of the Nebel, and began to cross. His columns were immediately charged by nine battalions, including the Irish brigade in the French service, and the foremost battalions of Holstein Beck were cut to pieces. Marlborough then led a body of cavalry and infantry to the rescue, and compelled the enemy to retire. During the passage of the left wing of the Allies, prince Eugene had been fighting the elector on the right, with indifferent success. Three times had he attacked, and three times he had been compelled to retire to the wood, and re-form his broken ranks. As the sun was westering the issue of the battle might appear doubtful. The French, on the extreme left of the line of the Allies, held Blenheim securely. The French and Bavarians on the right, had repulsed all the spirited attacks of Eugene, and the combatants faced each other, exhausted and irresolute. The main bodies under Tallard and Marlborough had not yet come to a general encounter. Marlborough has formed his cavalry in two lines in the centre of Dispatches, vol. i. p. 403. the plain, with his infantry in their rear towards the left. At five o'clock the trumpets sound a charge, and the horse and foot mount the acclivity. The French receive the charge firmly, and the Allies fall back, but still keep the brow of the hill. Their cannon are brought up, and the fire on each side is close and incessant. It is the weak part of the French line, and they cannot stand against the storm of musquetry. Another charge, and now the French horse are scattered. Nine battalions of French infantry that had been intermingled with their cavalry, are cut to pieces. Marsin has fallen back to avoid a flank attack; and the centre of the French line is more and more in danger. Tallard dispatches orders to the little army shut up in Blenheim to come to his aid. It is too late. He sends for a re-inforcement to the elector. Eugene has given the elector enough to do in his own position. A third charge of Marlborough's horse, and the battle is won. The centre of the French lines is broken by these terrible charges, and now Tallard's cavalry endeavour to rally behind the tents of their camp. The Allies close upon them. The rout is now general. Some fly toward Hochstet, about two miles in the rear. Others crowd to the nearer village of Sonderheim, upon the bank of the Danube. General Hompesch pursues those who had gone in the direction of Hochstet. Marlborough himself, with his victorious cavalry, charges upon those who fled towards Sonderheim. Down the steep banks of the Danube rush the fugitives. Many attempt to swim the river, and are drowned. Others file towards Hochstet under the banks, and prepare to rally. The victorious squadrons appear, and again they flee. Marshal Tallard has reached Sonderheim, but he finds retreat impossible, and surrenders himself to an aide-de-camp of the prince of Hesse. One extraordinary document still in existence, exhibits the wonderful self-possession of the con queror in this agony of his triumph. The great duke pauses a minute in his pursuit of the flying enemy to write this note, in pencil, to his duchess, upon a slip of paper, torn from a memorandum-book: "August 13th, 1704. I have not time to say more, but to beg you will give my Duty to the Queen, and let her know her Army has had a Glorious Victery. Mons Tallard and two other Generals are in my Coach, and I am following the rest, the bearer my Aid de Camp Coll Parke will give Her and account of what has passed, I shal doe it in a day or two by another more at large Marlborough." The fighting was over. And there was a large body of Bava |