outpost at our back door, we can never have peace; sooner or later we must drive her out." If Russia is in Bulgaria, who is to keep her out of Macedonia? who is to defend Roumania? who is to block the way to Constantinople? If any such agreement has been made, it has been made with a full knowledge on the part of all that it is temporary and deceptive.

Another theory, not complimentary to Bismarck, is that he has determined to sacrifice the future to the present, that he will yield everything to Russia to prevent a Russo-French alliance against Germany, that he will keep the peace and save German unity while he lives: aprés moi le deluge. Bismarck is no doubt something of a cynic, but there is little in his past life to justify such a theory as this. It is not a theory which is believed in Russia. It is rather an Austrian idea, where he is always suspected of sacrificing Austrian interests to his All statesmen are to a certain extent opportunists, and all diplo macy is a system of compromises and temporary expedients, without much regard to the future; but no great statesman ever deliberately sacrifices the future of his country to his present convenience. He may draw back, he may temporarily sacrifice certain interests; but it is with the full purpose of striking a more vigorous blow when his time comes.

own.

I suspect that this is the true explanation of the action of Germany and Austria in Bulgaria. They have sacrificed Prince Alexander and the Bulgarians for the moment; they have yielded to Russia for the hour; but with a full appreciation of the fact that this only postpones for a little the inevitable conflict which is at hand. If Russia wins in this great struggle which is just before us, she will go to the Adriatic and rule the old Eastern Empire; if she is beaten, her influence in the Balkan Peninsula will be at an end-she will have neither Bulgaria nor Constantinople. This war must come: it cannot be much longer postponed by Bismarck or any other statesman. It is expected in Russia, in Austria, in Germany, and in Turkey. Six weeks ago, before the conference at Gastein, it was believed by some of the best-informed men in Vienna that it would come within two months. Now they look forward to the coming spring.

The real question is, whether, in view of this impending and inevitable conflict, it was wise for Austria and Germany to sacrifice Bulgaria to Russia for the moment. Had there been no counter-revolution, had the Prince refused to return, I can see that there would have been an apparent advantage to Austria in allowing events to take their course for the moment. But when the question took its present form it was a mistake to yield to Russia. Had Austria and Germany supported the Prince, England would have joined them, Turkey would have taken courage and thrown off the yoke of Russia. If war had followed, Austria would have had nothing to fear on this side. Roumania and Bulgaria would have been neutral, if not allies.

If Russia has her way, as now seems probable, all these advantages are lost. The war may be postponed, but when it comes the Bulgarians will form the advance-guard of the Russian army, and it is probable that Turkey will remain neutral. The whole East will stand in awe of Russia as never before. The Turks have of late been inclined to look to Germany as a defence against Russia; they think now that Germany and Austria together are too weak even to defend their own interests.

For us here this is not a question of Prince Alexander, but of Russian supremacy. If England cannot, and Austria and Germany cannot or will not, do anything to limit it, what can we or the Bulgarians do but submit to it with the best grace possible, until our fate is finally settled in a great European war. I do not mean that the Turks will not fight if Russia invades their territory; they will fight to the death; but in the light of present events, up to that hour of actual invasion they will yield everything.

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF BULGARIA.

I do not anticipate a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, or any serious and immediate change in the government of the country. It will no doubt be the aim of Russia simply to restore the state of things which existed four years ago, when the army was officered by Russians and counted as a division of the Russian army, when the leading Ministers were Russians, and the Russian Consul at Sofia was a practical dictator, the alter ego of the Czar, from whom the Prince received his orders. The union of Eastern Roumelia will be consummated, and the propaganda in Macedonia pushed with new vigour and zeal. Bulgaria will also become the basis of Russian intrigues in Servia, and all possible preparation will be made for the coming war with Austria.

The Bulgarians themselves will be made to realize that they are under Russian rule again. Their army officers will be sent to Russia, and anti-Russians expelled from the country. There will be no attempt made for any length of time to conciliate the people. They will be ruled by force, and be taught by Russian agents to forget the remnants of their gratitude, and to hate Russia as the Poles do. This may not be the plan of the Czar, but it will be simply a continuation of the work of the Bulgarian Commission at St. Petersburg, which is a branch of the Asiatic section, and controls Bulgarian affairs in its own way. The history of Russian influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia is worthy of the attention of the Czar himself. At the close of the RussoTurkish war every Bulgarian was enthusiastically pro-Russian and full of gratitude. The portrait of the Czar was in every house. No foreign influence has been exerted to modify this state of feeling, but little by little it has disappeared, and Russia has come to be regarded as an enemy. The people regret it. They still desire to be in sympathy with Russia. They are naturally grateful, and although Russian writers and Russian agents have told them a thousand times that Russia fought the last war for her own interests and not for theirs, they are loth to believe it.

But the Russian agents in Bulgaria, civil and military, with some honourable exceptions, have treated the Government and the people as if they were Turkomans. They have taken no pains to understand or conciliate them. They have trampled on their rights and outraged their feelings. They have encouraged anarchy and done what they could to hinder the progress of the nation. They have descended to every kind. of petty intrigue and annoyance. It is not the fault of Prince Alexander or of England, but of the Russians themselves, that they no longer rule the hearts of the people. Possibly they might still be won back to their old allegiance; but there is no chance of it. The Russians will not trouble themselves to attempt it. They will quietly submit to their fate; but

they will not be Russianized. Five hundred years of Turkish rule did not destroy their love of their own nationality, and even if they are annexed to Russia, they will remain Bulgarians still.

I do not envy the man who may be chosen to fill the place of Prince Alexander: he will have a hard and thankless task. If he attempts to rule in the interest of Bulgaria, he will be subjected to every insult and thwarted at every step. If he is simply a Russian satrap, he will be hated by the people, and forced to make war upon the national life. But whatever he may be, it is to be hoped that he will not delay his coming. Any Government is better than none, and the overthrow of Prince Alexander has developed an amount of bitter feeling which will make it difficult for any Bulgarian to keep the peace in the country.

If Russia is defeated in the coming war, Bulgaria may still become a nation, and fulfil the destiny for which she is fitted by the character of her people, and Prince Alexander may again return to his place at Sofia. When that day comes it is to be hoped that the Bulgarians will remember that if they had been patient, united, and loyal-if they had all loved their country better than office and rank-they would have escaped the calamities of the past year. It was Russia which inspired the revolution, but it was Bulgarian party spirit, disloyalty, and treason that overthrew the Prince. The people have nobly repudiated it, but it was too late.

ENGLISH POLICY IN THE EAST.

I dismiss as absurd the idea that England can ever desire to see Russia in possession of Constantinople. It is true that she does not want it herself. I can understand the truth of what the late Mr. Forster once said to me: "If it were a question of giving Constantinople and Asia Minor to Russia, or of our taking it ourselves, I would give it to Russia." But Mr. Forster did not mean that he could see with equanimity any such enormous aggrandizement of Russia, or that he would not resist it. He simply meant to state in the strongest terms the impossibility of England's desiring any such extension of her responsibility.

Russia has chosen to be the enemy of England, and although there is no necessary antagonism between these two countries, England could never tolerate such an extension of Russia in Europe as would make her an irresistible foe; she is quite strong enough already, and when the time comes England will certainly fight for Constantinople. Her present policy is to maintain the Turks here until it can be transferred to some other hands than those of Russia. The policy of England is in full accord with the sympathies of her people. It is to encourage and develop the various nationalities of what was once European Turkey as friendly and allied independent States. She can do this only by opposing the progress of Russia, and maintaining the Turks at Constantinople until something better can be done. This policy does not grow out of any desire to attack Russia, or any wish to control this part of the world. It is purely a defensive policy, but it is none the less essential to the safety of England and of Europe. We may hate Austria historically as much as Mr. Freeman does, but England cannot afford to see that empire subjected to the Czar. It would be better to fight for it.

It will not be easy to win back a controlling influence at Constantinople, to induce the Turks to govern wisely and justly, or to persuade them to resist the demands of Russia; they have seen too much of the power of Russia during the last few weeks; but the effort must be made and pressed with firmness and wisdom.

In regard to the immediate questions raised by events in Bulgaria, England will wish to act in the interest of the Bulgarians without passion or prejudice. I believe it will be her true policy to continue to favour the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and not to throw any obstacles in the way of the choice of a new Prince. It is expected here that the opposite course will be taken, but I can see no advantage in it either for England, Bulgaria, or Turkey. The sooner Bulgaria is quiet the better it will be for all concerned. If England had maintained her position here, and induced Turkey to allow the union to be consummated quietly, Prince Alexander might have been saved. It is too late now to do anything for him, and a united Russian Bulgaria is not what England desired; but the union will still be an advantage to the Bulgarians, and less open to dangerous intrigues than under the present arrangement. If Russia, Austria, and Germany agree upon a Prince, there can be no possible advantage in any opposition on the part of England.

There will be no English intrigues in Bulgaria itself against Russian influence. This is a business to which Englishmen are not adapted, and they would fail if they attempted it. They will not attempt it. Russia has now the game in Bulgaria, and there is nothing for England to do but to hold her hand until the blunders of Russia or a European war reopen this question. Then England may even fight for Bulgaria. We are just now in the midst of the great feast of Courban Beiram. It was at the time of this feast last year that we were startled by the news of the revolution at Philippopolis. It has been a year of constant excitement and as trying to the Turkish Government as a year of actual

war.

We look forward to the new year as likely to be more trying still. The crisis for which we have been waiting for almost two hundred years seems to be approaching. The people anticipate it, fear it, and think of but little else. It need not be said that under these circumstances Constantinople is no longer a very bright and cheerful place to live in. The Courban Beiram this year is but a melancholy feast.

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 11, 1886.

AN OLD RESIDENT.

CONTEMPORARY RECORDS.

"DAS

I.-OLD TESTAMENT LITERATURE.

AS Buch des Propheten Ezechiel, herausgegeben von Lic. Dr. Carl Heinrich Cornill" (Professor at Marburg), is a singularly thorough and masterly work. The editor prints a revised Hebrew text, together with a complete synopsis of various readings from MSS. and Ancient Versions, a German translation, and prolegomena. The latter (pp. 1-175), consisting of a practically exhaustive account of the principal Ancient Versions, form perhaps the most remarkable part of the volume. The Septuagint, with the versions more or less dependent upon it (the Itala, Ethiopic, Arabic, &c.), the versions of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Targum, Peshitto, and Vulgate, are successively reviewed, the principal manuscripts containing them described (in important cases collated), their characteristics noted, their value for the criticism of the text estimated. So high is the standard which the author sets himself, that nothing, however subordinate it may seem to be, is neglected by him. Thus, from the Arabic version printed in Le Jay's polyglott (Paris, 1629-45) a few verses were missing; in the reprint of the Paris text published by Walton (1657) these were supplied from a MS. at Oxford. Prof. Cornill is careful to point out that they are derived from a different source; that while the Paris MS., namely, is a translation from the Septuagint, that of the Oxford MS. is translated from the Peshitto. The author's investigations are always fruitful, and lead not unfrequently to interesting results. Naturally he has collated throughout (p. 8) the Hebrew MS., the oldest known (916 A.D.), exhibiting the Oriental recension of the text, and now at St. Petersburg (published in facsimile by Strack). The result of his collation was to confirm what was already known of the character of the MS.: "in a book containing forty-eight long chapters, the text of which is notoriously in a bad condition, it exhibits but sixteen variations affecting the sense (and that but slightly) from the text printed in an ordinary Bible!" Clearly a restoration of the prophets' autographs is not to be looked for from a comparison of existing Hebrew MSS. We have not space to follow Prof. Cornill in all that he says about the Septuagint and its recensions. He has devoted much attention to the Ethiopic version, and speaking of the older recension of this (the later has been corrected from the Hebrew*), he shows that it rests upon a text of the LXX. belonging to the best extant, and ranking for excellence and originality with the oldest and choicest MSS." (p. 42). He has also a word to say on certain celebrated MSS. Thus he confirms the opinion (which had been expressed

"

* Comp. Dillmann in Herzog (ed. 2), i. p. 205.