Professor Max Müller's collection of extracts, but a new edition. specially adapted, by means of new extracts and other alterations, to be an illustrative companion to Professor W. Scherer's "History of German Literature," recently translated by Professor Müller's daughter. These additions and alterations have been made, under the personal supervision of Professor Scherer, by Professor Lichtenstein, of Breslau, and the work will be found most valuable to all who want an effective introduction to German literature. Sadly enough, Professor Max Müller's three collaborateurs in this work-Professors Scherer and Lichtenstein, and his daughter-have all died during its preparation. In "Famous First Representations" Mr. H. Sutherland Edwards gossips in a very pleasant and entertaining way about a number of the more famous first representations of plays and operas in France and England, from Molière's "Tartufe," "The Beggar's Opera," and the "Messiah," down to Hugo's "Hernani" and Wagner's "Tannhauser."— Henry George's new book on " Protection and Free Trade"† is composed, three parts of it, of one of the most effective polemics against Protection that has ever been written, and one part of it of a very ineffective advocacy of a nostrum which he calls "true free trade," and which is but another name for an old friend he has long made us familiar with-viz., the abolition of all taxation except the taxation of land. He condemns indirect taxation for revenue purposes as much as for protectionist purposes, and harps still as loudly as ever on the string that all the ills of society are to vanish before-or rather afterthe confiscation of rent. The first and longer part of the book, however, has a real and solid value. Mr. George has never written anything abler, and certainly nothing so free from error of any kind. He makes no protensions to having anything new in it to say, but it will well repay perusal. London: Chapman & Hall. + London: Kegan, Paul & Co THE ARMY. THER HE assertion that England is not a military nation has in it much suggestive truth, though it is by no means true that we are not a warlike people. Without speaking of long past achievements, the little wars of our own time have shown the admirable qualities of the British soldier, which never stood out in clearer relief than in the late campaign in the Sondan. His adaptability to circumstances; his virile resistance to climate, fatigue, and thirst; his gallant bearing in face of such rushes of desperate and cruel foes; his spirit, which shone more brightly as the circumstances which surrounded him became blacker; the dogged persistence which carried Sir Herbert Stewart's little force-about one battalion strong-to the Nile; the shout of joy with which that column welcomed the enemy's final attack, when the chief was down, and all the chief officers killed or wounded; the comradeship of officers and men, patricians and plebeians all recalled the best exploits of a warlike nation, and gave manifest proof that the bones, the muscles, the nerves, and the hearts of British soldiers are in no sense less trustworthy than they have ever been. It may be said with assurance, that if there is anything wrong with the army, there is nothing the matter with the stuff of which it is composed. Yet we all know that grave faults were committed, and that, while many of the officers were as conspicuous for talent and knowledge as they were for courage, there were some strange blunders. If we could see every despatch which was sent home, there would be proof enough that, somehow or other, the military system fails to produce with certainty leaders of units who are capable of using in the best manner the splendid material entrusted to their charge. It is possible to go further, and to say that at this very moment the most capable officers are almost in despair at the apparent hopelessness of making the army what it ought to be, and might easily become. It is true that we have a few commanders who have so manifestly come to the front in our little wars that they have won the confidence of the nation. Not to go below the highest ranks, there are Lord Wolseley at home and Sir Frederick Roberts in India; but let any inquirer ask the opinion of those two leading soldiers, and they will say that they have not the confidence in all the commanders of lower rank which ought to be possessed by every general taking the field. It must also be confessed that there is a wide-spread feeling of distrust in our arms and organization; and, in short, a strong belief that those admirable troops of which the country is proud would be heavily handicapped in case of a great struggle, which might be forced upon us at any time. The rumours of approaching war have never been louder in the time of this generation than they are now, and there is the additional and most disquieting feature, that the strife which all expect is not one which can easily be localized. It would be interesting to glance back and mark the various steps which have brought Europe into her present condition, but for present purposes it is enough if we recognize that the nations are in a state of unstable equilibrium, supported by props, some of which are so manifestly rotten that no one dares to touch them or to attempt to put new ones in their place. None can say what the result will be; all hope that their own particular portion of the trembling mass will not come undermost when the grand crash takes place. The Continent is armed and irritable. New tactics are being worked out, to confound rivals by their novelty. Magazine rifles are being introduced with feverish haste; and the latest invention is a shell of such enormous power that those who use it expect that no defensive works can possibly resist its terrible explosion. The fortifications erected round Paris, the frontier fortresses of every nation, are to go down before it as rapidly as the walls of Jericho ; and until some new Archimedes devises a remedy, we have to contemplate the unpleasant fact that the power of the attack over the defence has been multiplied in startling proportions. Germany, as usual, has been first both with magazine rifles and the new shells, but France follows hard after with both, and the scale of preparation may be judged by the fact that General Boulanger has asked for a credit of six million pounds sterling for the purpose of developing the shells alone. The French military papers are full of discussions as to the probable effect of these projectiles on the success of the révanche, or at least give to that subject whatever space is not occupied by denunciations of greedy and faithless England. Meanwhile we English, with admirable stoicism, go on cutting bread and butter, and though in practical contact with great military Powers all over the world, put our trust in the silver streak-now crossed in an hour-and, weary of warnings, fall asleep, muttering in our dreams about Nelson and Waterloo. Yet, if the opinion of the army generally were taken by a sort of plébiscite on the question of our readiness for war, the answer returned would be practically unanimous: "No, we are not." The reason given by the great majority would be that "we have not men enough." The picked minority would agree to that statement, but add: "Nor are what we have in a satisfactorily efficient state for war." Now, in these pages we are not about to descant on the feeble muster-roll of the British army, nor even on the youth of recruits. No doubt we are too weak, but with due use of reserves we could at least put two army corps into the field in Egypt or anywhere else, and keep them full, so far as men alone are concerned; and that is more than we have been able to do before within the memory of living man. Two army corps are a small force—either Servia or Bulgaria could do as much, or more; but this is not our present point. Grant that there is some inscrutable law by which England is to be protected for all time against having to bear the burden of enforced military service; grant that one British soldier is for ever to be expected to do the work of many men; in that case the opinion of the most capable officers in the army has all the more force when they claim that whatever army we have should be trained to the highest attainable point, and be always perfectly ready to act at even shorter notice than continental armies. Seeing that it is so small, its armament with the best weapons must cost but a small proportion of the sums spent by continental nations for the same purpose. It should be before, not behind, the rest of Europe. Again, comparing the insignificant force to be transported with the enormous system of roads and railways, ports and shipping, there ought to be no question for a moment of the most rapid mobilization and conveyance to any part of the world. Lastly, considering that the service of the British soldier is for a longer period in the ranks than any other European service allows-more than twice as long as in Germany-there should be no difficulty in having our little army trained to the highest pitch of perfection. Let us take for available force our two army corps, and see how far they can be said to be ready in armament, in rapidity of mobilization, and in training for war. First, with regard to armament—that is, guns heavy and light, and rifles for the infantry. On this point there have been monstrous exaggerations. It is absurdly untrue to say, as has been said by part of the public Press, that we have no armour-piercing guns in the fleet. Such a deduction can only be arrived at by ignoring altogether the heavy muzzle-loading guns which till lately were the most powerful pieces of ordnance in the world, with the sole exception of the guns mounted in Italian ships, from the Duilio and Daudolo upwards. During all the early period of rifled ordnance, not only England, but even official England, was well in advance of the rest of Europe; the muzzle-loading guns of twenty years ago being superior, calibre for calibre, to the breech-loading ordnance of the Continent. And at that time Woolwich was anxious to go forward with breech-loaders. In 1868 the Ordnance Select Committee was directed by the War Office to report on the question of breech- and muzzle-loading for guns, without reference to any particular existing system. The answer was clear. The Committee were practically unanimous in the opinion that a system of breech-loading guns was most desirable. The highest authorities at the Horse Guards agreed with the Committee, and the first definite opposition came from the Director of Naval Ordnance, who did not think that the substitution of a breech-loading system for that adopted for naval ordnance should be seriously entertained. The War Office was only too glad to avoid the series of costly experiments, and then, or a little later on, began the period of official optimism, which, against the pressure of both Krupp and Armstrong, refused to entertain the idea of breech-loading for heavy guns. But by far the worst feature was that the public was satisfied, and the voices which still called for further experiments in the direction of breech-loading and of steel as a material were lost in the general chorus of approbation. The celebrated year 1870 saw England settling down to heavy muzzle-loaders, and introducing muzzle-loading field artillery; and from that time may be dated the commencement of a blight which fell on progressive ideas as regarded artillery. Guns became bigger, but the War Office was in the wrong groove; and because we are not a military nation, successive Ministers of War were only too glad to save the money which ought to have been spent in experiments. Yet England, as a country, ought to be proud of the fact that Sir W. Armstrong in 1871, and afterwards, continued to press ideas of progress in breech-loading on the Government, and that the greatest practical step in modern times was taken by the Elswick firm, which produced samples of the now fashionable long breech-loaders about two years before Krupp followed suit. If the Government had then taken up the question we should have led the world, as we ought to do. But the blight was on us. The cry was "Rest and be thankful." In the midst of a prosperity advancing by leaps and bounds, we had no money to spare for improving the artillery of the fleet which guards that prosperity. Why? Because we are not a military nation. After long years the country begins to be anxious, angry, and probably unjust. Let us hope that it will not neglect this branch of its military affairs in the future. |