III.

CHAPTER in the world. People will not stay to examine patiently whether Mr. Arnold makes out his case or not. They will but carry away the general impression, that here is a man of genius and of strong conviction, who speaks of criticism as just now the greatest power upon earth. They will, therefore, expect from it the mightiest effects; and grievous will be their disappointment at the modesty of its actual exploits.

General view of the

of a science

of criticism.

terpretation

Though a science of criticism may not accomadvantage plish all that people expect of it, is it necessary to show that it is to be coveted for its own sake? If men will criticise, it is desirable that their judgments should be based on scientific grounds. This is so obvious, that instead of dwelling on the worth of critical science in and for itself, I would here rather insist on its value from another On the in- point of view-as a historical instrument. Some of history late philosophers, Cousin in particular, have sought for a clue to the world's history in the progress of metaphysical ideas. They believe that the history of philosophy yields the philosophy of history. They may be right, though it is awkward for the facts, or at least for our power of dealing with them, that the philosopher is ever represented as before his age. While he lives his thought is peculiar to himself, and his kingdom is not of this world: it is not till long years after his decease that his thought moves

through

philosophy.

mankind and his worldly reign begins. reign begins.

III.

through

It CHAPTER would seem, however, that if it were possible to establish a critical science, the method which the The interpretation of French and Germans have adopted, of inter- history preting history through the history of philosophy, criticism. might with advantage be varied by the interpretation of history through the history of art. There is this wide difference between philosophy and art, that whereas the former is the result of conscious effort, the latter comes unconsciously, and is the spontaneous growth of the time. Now, supposing we had a critical science, and knew somewhat of the orbits and order of the arts, their times and seasons, we should have a guide to history so much safer than that furnished by the course of philosophy, as a spontaneous growth is less likely to deviate from nature than any conscious effort. It is said that philosophers have in their hands the making of the next age; but at least poets and other artists belong to the age they live in. In their shady retreats they reflect upon the world the light from on high, as I have seen an eclipse of the sun exquisitely pictured on the ground, while the crowds in Hyde Park were painfully looking for it in the heavens with darkened glasses. Through the leaves of the trees the sun shot down his image in myriads of balls of light that danced on the path below; and as his form was altered in the sky, the globes of light underfoot changed also their aspect, waning

III.

CHAPTER into crescents, and the crescents into sickles, and the sickles into nothingness, until once again as he recovered his beams the sickles reappeared, and grew on the gravel walk into crescents, and the crescents into perfect orbs. There were myriads of eclipses on the ground for the one that was passing in the sky.

On the right

of praising

sciences.

Every man lauds his own pursuit. He who the moral is deep in helminthology, or the science of worms, will tell us that it is the most interesting and useful of studies. But I can scarcely imagine that when putting in a word for a science of human nature, and for criticism as part of it, and when claiming for that science the place of honour, I am fairly open to the charge of yielding to private partiality. At all events, in mitigation of such a charge, let it be remembered that man too has the credit of being a worm, and that he may be entitled to some of the regard of science, were it only as belonging to the subject of helminthology. We may give up any claims which the science of human nature has to precedence over all the other knowledges, if we can get it recognised in popular opinion as a science at all, were it but as a science of worms. And for criticism, as a part of the science of human nature, it may be remembered that Sir Walter Scott was pleased to describe the critics as caterpillars, and that, therefore, they Summary may have a special claim to be regarded in this marvellously popular science of worms.

of the argu

ment.

Or if

III.

this way of putting the case may seem to be CHAPTER wanting in seriousness, then in all seriousness, let me insist that the despair of the moral sciences which now prevails, is founded on mistake; that the neglect of them gives a hollowness to our literature; and that all criticism which does not either achieve science, or definitely reach towards it, is mere mirage. As the apostle declared of himself, that though he could speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and had not charity, he was become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal; so we may say of the critic, that though he have all faith, so that he can remove mountains, and have not science, he is nothing. There are men like Iago, who think that they are nothing if not critical, but the critic is nothing if not scientific.

present

Of the following attempt I am not able to Aim of the think so bravely as to challenge for it the work. honours of a science. Any one, indeed, who will read this volume through, will see that it is a fight for the first principles and grounds of the Not a science. I put my work forward, not as a a plea for science, but as a plea for one, and as a rude map map of its Even if it leading of what its leading lines should be.

should fail here, however, it may be at least as useful as the unlucky ship that grounded at the battle of Aboukir, and did for a waymark to them that followed. I have the greater confidence, however, in laying the present theory before the reader, inasmuch as glimpses and

science, but

one, and a

lines.

III.

CHAPTER tokens of it are found in the pages of many of the best writers; and I believe that it will thus stand the test given by Leibnitz to ascertain the soundness of any body of thought that it should gather into one united household, not by heaping and jumbling together, but by reconciling, proving to be kindred, and causing to embrace opinions the most widely sundered and apparently the most hostile.