the Peshwa. But this very act of guarantee has always been considered important in India, particularly by the Native politicians, as it afforded complete evidence of the division of the Mahratta power.

The hopes of the continuance of peace, then, were founded as well upon the right of the Peshwa to conclude the treaty of Bassein, as upon the circumstances which attended its negotiation and its execution.

x. Threatening Combination of the Mahratta Chiefs.

A new party, however, came forward upon this occasion, through whose means and by whose exertions a peace was patched up between Sindhia and Holkar, on which was founded a confederacy against the British government.

The Raja of Berar had not been engaged in hostilities since the year 1780, when he had marched to the British frontier of Bengal, and had received a sum of money to desist from his hostilities, excepting during the short campaign of 1795, in which he had co-operated with the other Mahrattas against the Nizam. He was the oldest of the chiefs of the present day, and was renowned among them for his wisdom and political knowledge and skill. He had claims upon the power of the state of Poona, from his relationship to the Rajas of Sattara; and he was known to have entertained serious designs of forming a union of all the Mahratta powers against the British government.

When he perceived the advantages which the British government had taken of the existence of the disputes among the Mahratta chiefs, he saw that he must become the victim of the arrangement. Holkar would have been unwilling to discharge his army; he could not remain in the Peshwa's territories, or invade those of the Nizam; and his only resource to provide for their subsistence would have been to enter Berar.

The Raja, who clearly perceived this consequence (and who has since acknowledged this motive for his conduct), determined to endeavour to organise a confederacy of the Mahrattas against the British government.

Whatever might have been the claim of Sindhia to the possession of the power of the Peshwa's government, and the degree of encouragement he gave to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, there is no doubt that he lost solid power by the arrangement, which he could not hope to recover. He had

nothing to gain by the continuance of hostilities against Holkar; . . . Holkar could hope nothing from the continuance of his hostilities with Sindhia.

A combination of all the Mahratta chiefs, with their forces, had long been an object with the Mahratta politicians; and the plan flattered the national vanity, although it was impracticable, unless attended by great and important military successes at the outset. The Raja of Berar, therefore, succeeded in patching up a peace between Sindhia and Holkar, none of the important articles of which were performed by either party.

xi. Defence of Wellesley's Mahratta Policy.

Before I proceed to the relation of the events which followed the treaty of Bassein, it will be proper to discuss the justice and policy of the British government in entering into the treaty of Bassein, on the ground that they must have expected the event which followed it.

I have already pointed out the objects of the treaty, the favourable circumstances under which it was negotiated, and the probability which existed that its arrangements would be carried into execution without a war, and that it would secure the permanent peace of India. But the faithless nature of the Mahratta character, and the habits of the councils of all the chiefs, are so well known, that it may be admitted that the British government ought to have contemplated the chance of a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs to oppose the arrangement.

Considering the nature of the materials of which that confederacy was to be formed; that the two most powerful of the chiefs entertained the most rooted and inveterate animosity against each other; that after they had signed their treaty of peace their hostilities continued, and they could not trust each other so far as to place their armies within reach of attack; that none of the chiefs trusted the other; and that the pride of all prevented them from placing the management of the affairs and the command of the armies of the confederacy in the hands of one; the British government had but little to apprehend from this confederacy, provided vigorous measures were adopted at an early period of time to oppose it effectually, and to prevent it from acquiring strength and consistency by

success.

The arrangements which had been made by Lord Wellesley,

viz. the treaty with the Nawab of Oudh, the treaty with the Gaekwar, the arrangements at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty with the Nizam, of October 1800, and above all, the treaty of Bassein, afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success. If the troops did their duty with their usual bravery, its early dissolution became certain; and by the advanced position in which the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein placed the British troops,2 the evils of the war would be removed to a distance from the British territories, the seat of the resources of the government.

But it is not clear that the omission to conclude the treaty of Bassein would not have led equally to a war with all the powers of the confederated Mahratta states, under circumstances of increased disadvantage. The removal of Holkar from Poona was absolutely necessary on every ground of justice, policy, and good faith; and if the treaty of Bassein had not been made, the British government must have aided Sindhia in effecting that object. Holkar's armies would have been defeated, and the power of his rival, Sindhia, would have been established in full vigour at Poona. He would thus again have been in possession of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges and the Indus to the Tumbadra; and his situation would have been so far more advantageous, as in the course of the years 1801 and 1802 he had overcome the rebellion which had till then prevailed in his northern dominions, and had completely established the authority of his own government in those rich countries. His first demand would have been upon the Nizam; and here at once the Company would have come in contact with a Mahratta confederacy, but under very different circumstances of strength from that with which they were engaged in 1803. In this contest Sindhia would have been really, as well as nominally, at the head of the confederacy; he would have had no rival, or rather actual enemy, in Jeswant Rao Holkar, and would have been able to direct all his forces against the British government. He would have had on his side, instead of against him, all the strength of the Peshwa, including, what is of no small importance, all the strength of the southern chiefs situated on the frontier of Mysore. Company, on the other hand, would have been obliged to engage with this more formidable confederacy with diminished

The

1 The passage of the narrative explaining this treaty with the least important of the Mahratta chiefs has been omitted for lack of space.

2 I.e. the subsidiary contingents, located respectively in the territories of the Nizam and the Peshwa.

means and resources, as they would not have had the Peshwa and the southern chiefs on their side. But their principal loss would have been the position for their armies which the treaty of Bassein gave them. By adopting this position in the Deccan in 1803, the armies were enabled immediately to render offensive the operations of a war which had been undertaken solely for defence. In the war which must have been expected if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded, the operations must have been defensive upon a frontier extending above a thousand miles, assailable in all of its parts; and the seat of the war would have been either the heart of the territories of the Nizam, or those of the Raja of Mysore.

Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was a wise, just, and politic measure; that none of the chiefs had any right to interfere in it or question its stipulations; and that it was concluded under circumstances and at a time which promised that it would be followed by lasting tranquillity. If it should be contended that the British government ought to have expected, as a consequence of the treaty, the confederacy and war which happened in 1803, I answer that, with the military and political advantages they acquired by the treaty of Bassein, they had nothing to fear from that confederacy; and that if they had not concluded the treaty of Bassein they would in a few months afterwards have been involved in a war with the same power, much increased in strength and resources, and possessing superior advantages, while those of the Company, in every point of view, would have been diminished.

xii. The Mahratta War and its Causes.

As soon as the British government was made acquainted with the measures which had been adopted by the Raja of Berar to arrange a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs against the Company, the Governor-General directed that measures should be taken to make the Raja of Berar and Holkar acquainted with the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to all the chiefs the innocent and defensive nature of the treaty, and the arrangement contained in the article which provided for the security of all their rights. They were at the same time called upon to declare the nature and object of their negotiations, and their views in marching to join each other. . . . In answer to these representations, Sindhia

declared that he would not say whether there would be peace or war till he should meet the Raja of Berar. After Sindhia and the Raja of Berar had joined their troops in a position which enabled them in one march to enter the Nizam's territories, letters were presented to them from the GovernorGeneral, in which the nature and objects of the treaty of Bassein were fully discussed and explained. Sindhia and the Raja of Berar wrote the following answers to these letters.1 In the meantime the peace between Sindhia and Holkar had been signed, although but one article of it had been carried into execution, viz. that which stipulated that Hindu Rao Holkar, the infant and posthumous son of Mulhar Rao Holkar, should be delivered over by Sindhia to Jeswant Rao Holkar. The object of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar in writing these answers to the Governor-General's letter was to gain time, to allow the season of the rains to pass over, to conciliate the confidence and receive the co-operation of Jeswant Rao Holkar, and to complete their preparations for attack on all parts of the frontier of the Company and the allies. Early measures, however, had been adopted by the British government to resist their hostilities, and their armies were completely prepared in the middle of July 1803. It was an object of importance to bring the confederates to a decision whether there should be peace or war before the season of the rains should pass over, before they should have time to complete their preparations, and to conciliate the confidence of Holkar. Accordingly the following letter was written to them by the commanding officer in the Deccan, in answer to their letters to the Governor-General.2 They refused to comply with the reasonable demand contained in this letter, and the British Resident quitted the camp of Daulat Rao Sindhia on the 3rd Aug. and hostilities immediately commenced.

It is useless to follow the operations of the British armies.3 It is sufficient to state, that owing to the preparations which were made, the positions which they had taken, and t favourable season in which the military operations were commenced, they were uniformly successful; the result was, the early dissolution of the confederacy, in which Holkar never joined, and that in less than two months the confederates sued for peace.

Treaties were concluded with Sindhia and the Raja of 1 The answers are omitted in the original.

2 This document is also omitted in the original.

3 They included the Duke's own brilliant campaign of Assaye.