1

must now be yours. Their wars and politicks in the Telinga country 1 should keep you waking. On pretence of private contests between their kings they have seized and divided the country of the King 2 and the goods of his people between them. Think not to weaken all three together.3 The power of the English is great; . . . reduce them first; the others will give you little trouble, when you have reduced them. Suffer them not, my son, to have fortifications or soldiers: if you do, the country is not yours."

(Hill, Bengal in 1756-7, ii. 15.)

5. SIRAJ-UDDAULA CAPTURES CALCUTTA

From the French Council at Chandernagore to the Superior Council in the Isle of France, December 16, 1756.

(Chandernagore was, and is, the principal French factory in Bengal, a few miles north of Calcutta. It should be remembered that at the date of this letter the outbreak of war between the French and English was imminent.)

We think, gentlemen, you will be astonished to learn the principal circumstances of the revolution which has just driven the English from all their Settlements in Bengal. We will give you a very brief account of them.

The Nawab, Siraj-uddaula, having, contrary to every one's expectation, succeeded his grandfather Aliverdi Khan, in the month of April, as Suba of Bengal, the English had speedily a most terrible experience of the violent and passionate nature of this young Prince, whom they had irritated by their arrogance and the shelter they had given to one of his enemies. Driven to extremities by their bravados, he first treacherously seized a little fort which they had near the capital, and then came with a formidable army to besiege them in Calcutta, which was their chief settlement on the Ganges.

The vanity of the English having persuaded them the Moors would never dare to venture so far, they were so surprised and terrified that they lost their heads and could not profit by any of those advantages which Europeans have over such contemptible troops. Though numbering 600 whites, well provided with all sorts of munitions and sheltered

66

1 Here means Southern India.

I.e. English, French, and Dutch.

2 The Mogul.

4 The Europeans in India at this period habitually used the word Moors" for "Mahomedans."

in a regular fort, they made scarcely any resistance at all after the Nawab's arrival. The Governor himself, Mr. Drake, with the Commandant of the troops, the greater part of the Council, officers and inhabitants, and all the women took refuge on board the ships which were in the port. The few soldiers who had remained in the fort, refusing to recognise any authority, disorder prevailed to such an extent that the white flag was displayed on the afternoon of the 20th, i.e. after three days' siege. But the Moors, before the capitulation was arranged, crowded to the gates and, as no one fired on them, easily burst them in and entered, killing all who tried to resist. The plunder in the Settlement and fort was immense as the English had not taken the precaution to embark their wealth.

That was, so to say, only the beginning of their ills. The prisoners to the number of 200 having been hurriedly shut up in a warehouse were almost all suffocated in one night. Those who survived, especially the chief men, after having suffered all kinds of misery and after having been dragged in chains to Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal, were sent back (to us) by the Nawab in the most deplorable condition, which we tried to alleviate in every possible way.

The lot of those saved in the ships has been hardly less wretched. Having with difficulty gained the mouth of the river, they have since endured all the bad weather of the Rainy Season, and at the same time been embarrassed by the numbers of women and children with whom their ships were crowded. This, joined to the bad provisions which were all they could obtain, quickly caused a kind of pestilential sickness which carried off many of them.

The capture of Calcutta drew with it the ruin of all the small factories which they possessed scattered over Bengal, and now they do not retain a single establishment in this kingdom. Since this sad revolution only one vessel has arrived from Europe. It brought them 250 men from Madras, but this reinforcement not being large enough, they have planned no enterprise so far. They expect every moment the arrival of a squadron of six ships of war and five of the Company's, which left the Coast1 on October 14, and which brings them 1000 Europeans and 3000 sepoys. There is no doubt that with these forces they will be strong enough to retake Calcutta, which is now defended by only a small

1 I.e. of the Carnatic.

number of Moors. But besides the fact that its capture will not recoup them . . . the colony being entirely ruined and plundered, it is not certain that they will be able to maintain themselves in it against all the forces of the Nawab. . .

(Hill, Bengal in 1756-7, ii. 57.)

6. THE SIEGE OF CALCUTTA

Letter from Mr. J. Z. Holwell to the Councils of Bombay and Fort Saint George, Murshidabad, July 17, 1756.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS-Little capable as I am in my distressed situation of executing a task of this kind it yet cannot be neglected, consistent with my duty to my Honourable Employers, and the trust last devolved on me at their Settlement of Fort William, now theirs no more.

Our factory at Kasimbazar being given up to the Nawab the 4th of June last (by the most unhappy and unaccountable infatuation in our Chief and Council there) the foundation of our ruin was laid; the accession was too great to the Nawab to be relinquished, and he was sensible he must relinquish it, as well as restore our money and goods seized at the different aurangs,1 or entirely extirpate us from the provinces. The cannon, ammunition, and military stores he became possessed of at Kasimbazar determined him to the latter, and as he expected some succours might reach us from the Coast, he marched against us with the whole force of his provinces, consisting by the best accounts we have since acquired of 30,000 horse and 35,000 foot with about 400 elephants of war. . . . On the earliest notice of his real intentions, we made all the dispositions in our power for his reception,though I believe never was fortress less defensible, encumbered with houses close round us, and not a proper esplanade for our guns, no time possibly to pull the houses down to remedy this evil; advanced posts were appointed, ditches sunk, breastwork thrown up and (advanced) batteries raised at three principal posts. . . . We had flattered ourselves that we should have mustered between 5 (or) 600 effective men Europeans, blacks, and militia, inhabitants and those belonging to the shipping, but to our utter astonishment when our military roll was returned in Council it consisted only of 45 of the Train 2 and 145 infantry and in both only 60 Europeans;

1 Collecting stations for goods.

2 I.e. Artillery.

in the militia were about 100 Armenians who were entirely useless, and more than that number amongst the black militia boys and slaves, who were not capable of holding a musket; so that in fact when the seafaring people, who most of them appeared only at the first muster, were draughted off on board the vessels (of which we had in port about 30 sail of every craft at least) our garrison did not consist of 250 fighting men, officers included. (A detailed account follows of the fighting between the 7th and 18th June, showing how the Nawab's troops gradually overpowered the outposts and drew near to the fort.) This evening (18 June) at a council of war it was resolved to embark the Company's treasure, books and the European ladies and further agreed that the ships should remain under the guns of the fort. Messrs. Manningham and Frankland, the first Colonel and the other Lieutenant Colonel of the militia, conducted the ladies on board and I understood were to return, when they had reconciled the ladies to their situation; but they never returned again, no more did . . . (five) officers of the militia, besides about 15 of the volunteers and many of the militia who deserted the fort this day and the succeeding morning. On the 18th more advanced in the night, we held another council of war and the Captain of the Train being ordered to make a return of the ammunition, we were thunderstruck when he reported there was not full three days' ammunition in the garrison. The debate then turned on the question whether a retreat with the garrison and all the Company's effects could be attempted that night, but so much of it elapsed in debate that it became impracticable untill the next, when myself, and I believe every body else present, judged the retreat was determined to be carried into execution. In the morning of the 19th . . our President Mr. Drake, (and several others) privately withdrew out of the back gate, deserted the factory and embarked on board the shipping, which immediately weighed and stood down the river without leaving us a single boat at the ghat1 or possibility of making a general retreat and this before any one attack had been actually made on the fort. On the Governour etc.'s desertion being known the garrison fell into the utmost confusion and tumults, when the gentlemen remaining of the Council, officers, and others, entreated I would immediately take upon me the government of the fort, as the only means of quieting the present tumults which must have ended in the

1 Landing-place.

destruction of the whole. A council was directly called and we suspended the President and the gentlemen of the Council and officers with him from the Company's service, it being the only just piece of resentment in our power, for the cruel piece of treachery they had been guilty of to the whole garrison as well as breach of trust to their Employers. We like wise sent an order to Captain Hague, Commander of the Company's ship Saint George stationed at Bhag Bazar to weigh and immediately drop down opposite the lane between the new godowns1 of the factory and the Company's House:

...

but the pilot neither that day nor the next would undertake to bring her lower than opposite to Mr. Watt's house where she was useless to us. To return to our situation, the 19th, after the President's desertion from Council, I had hardly gone round the ramparts before the enemy attacked the fort incessantly the whole remainder of the day from their batteries and small arms. . . . The 20th in the morning the enemy formed three assaults at once. From each of these assaults they were beat off with great loss to them before noon and a general cessation in a manner ensued for some hours, when finding we had 25 killed and 70 more of our best men wounded and our Train killed, wounded and deserted to all but 14, and not two hours' ammunition left, we threw out a flag of truce towards the evening, intending to amuse the enemy and make the best retreat we could in the night to the Saint George, not then knowing that she was on a sand.

During the parley our back gate was betrayed to the enemy in concert-I judge-with some that had deserted the preceeding night from the walls and those who had the guard of that gate, who were obliged to wrench off the locks and bolts, the key being in my possession. In this situation we had nothing left to resolve on but a surrender at discretion.

Thus I have transmitted to your Honour etc. as circumstantial an account of this melancholy event as my state of body and mind will at present permit me. . . . Of the enemy we killed first and last by their own confession 5000 of their troops and 80 jamadars 2 and officers of consequence exclusive of the wounded. The resistance we made and the loss they suffered so irritated the Nawab that he3 ordered myself and

1 Warehouses.

2 Indian officers.

3 In charging Siraj-uddaula with personal responsibility for the outrage of the Black Hole Holwell does him an injustice. The Nawab was sixteen miles away when the order was given.