there is no adequate remedy at law. In Wood v. Sutcliffe, which was a case for injunction against corrupting water, it is stated among other conditions that, "if the injury complained of is of such a nature that damages will not be an adequate compensation, that is, such a compensation as will in effect, though not in specie, place them in the position in which they previously stood," equity will interfere."

§ 509. Same-Same.-The court is not governed by questions of pecuniary value, but will remedy and prevent an injury which it may be reasonably supposed would materially lessen the enjoyment of property by its owner. Where the damage is inconsiderable, or accurately ascertainable, and capable of adequate compensation at law, equity will not usually interfere, unless the injury resulting from each act is trifling as compared with the expense of prosecuting actions at law."

1 Shields v. Arndt, 3 Green Ch. 234; Holsman v. Boiling Spring Co., 1 McCarter, 335; Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls, 1 Saxt. (N. J.) 694; Lamborn v. Covington Co., 2 Md. Ch. 409; Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 529; Coe v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 37 N. H. 254, 264; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 2 Black, 545; Legg v. Horn, 45 Conn. 409; Crown v. Leonard, 32 Ga. 241; Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593; Laney v. Jasper, 39 Ill. 46; Welton v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307; Hoxsie v. Hoxsie, 38 Mich. 77 Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433; Fairhaven Marble Co. v. Adams, 46 Vt. 496; Heiskell v. Gross, 7 Phila. 317; Mason v. Cotton, 2 McCrary, 82; Schneider v. Brown, 85 Cal. 205; Hahn v. Thornberry, 7 Bush, 403.

2 Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N. s. 163. White v. Forbes, Walker (Mich.), 112; Troe v. Larson, 84 Iowa, 649; Duesler v. Johnstown, 48 N. Y. S. 683; Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468; Learned v. Castle, 78 Cal. 454. In New York, by statute, interference by equity was formerly limited to injuries amounting to $100, and in case of diversion causing recurring

damage to cases where the annual injury equalled the interest on $100. Smith v. Adams, 6 Paige, 435. Under a similar statute in Michigan, it is held that equity will take jurisdiction of suits involving land worth in itself less than $100, if the riparian right annexed makes it worth more. Blodgett v. Dwight, 38 Mich. 596. See 1 Dan. Ch. Prac. (6th Am. ed.), 329n.

4 Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N. S. 163; Att. Gen. v. Gee, L. R. 10 Eq. 131; Lillywhite v Trimmer, 36 L. J. Ch. 525; Wing v. Fairhaven, 8 Cush. 363; Tracy v. Le Blanc, 89 Maine, 304; Shreve v. Voorhees, 2 Green Ch. 25; Quackenbush v. Van Riper, id. 350; Van Winkle v. Curtis, id. 422; Stevens v. Ryerson, 2 Hal. Ch. 477; Morris Canal Co. v. Central R. Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 419; Smith v. Adams, 6 Paige, 435; Heiskell v. Gross, 7 Phila. 317; Eason v. Perkins, 2 Dev. Eq. 38; Wilder v. Strickland, 2 Jones Eq. 386; Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 529; Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494; Stone v. Peckham, 12 R. I. 27; Thornton v. Grant, 10 id. 477. See Wright v. Turner, 10 Ch. (Can.) 67.

5 Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336.

The recovery of nominal damages at law, establishing a riparian proprietor's legal right, does not necessarily entitle him to an injunction, but the exercise of this jurisdiction is discretionary, depending much upon the reality and irreparable nature of the injury complained of, and, when no mala fides is shown, upon the balance of convenience.1 And even when an injunction is issued, the defendant is only liable in proceedings for contempt for acts enjoined or commanded by the decree and such as are within his power to perform.

§ 510. Same-Same.-A mere trespass and entry, as for the enlargement of a course for the discharge of water, is not such an injury. The pollution of a stream causing serious and continuous, or frequently recurring obstruction of the plaintiff's use of the water, is ground for injunction. A diversion impairing the plaintiff's use of a stream is such an injury, and it is said that a disturbance or deprivation of one's riparian right is in itself an irreparable injury. So the habit, continued in the past and threatened as to the future, of discharging freight from a steamboat at a private wharf, against the protest of its owner, whose business of sawing, receiving, and delivering lumber and ties is thereby seriously interfered with, is properly restrained by injunction. The erection of a raceway which would involve cutting down a river-bank, destroying trees, and exposing ground to be washed away is a clear case of waste, in which equity will interfere. But the overflowing of land, causing the destruction of timber and other damages, has been held not a sufficient injury to justify interference;o

1 Graham v. Northern Ry. Co. 10 Ch. (Can.) 259; William v. Heath, 1 L. T. N. s. 267; Lazzell v. Garlow, 44 W. Va. 466; Williams v. Harter, 121 Cal. 47; Wharton v. Stevens, 84 Iowa, 107; 35 Am. St. Rep. 296, 303 n.; Peterson v. Santa Rosa, 119 Cal 387. 2 Dewey v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. 64; Indianapolis W. Co. v. American S. Co., 75 Fed. Rep. 972; 57 id. 1000.

3 Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 529. See Crown v. Leonard, 32 Ga. 241; Savannah & O. Canal Co. v. Suburban, etc. Ry. Co. 93 id. 240.

4 Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N. S. 163. 5 Dayton v. Rutherford, 128 Ill. 271; Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551.

6 Holsman v. Boiling Spring Co., 1 McCarter (N. J.), 335; see Bateman v. Hollinger (N. J. Eq.), 30 Atl. Rep. 1107; Mendenhall v. Harrisburgh W. Co., 27 Oregon, 38; Caldwell v. East Broad Top R. Co., 169 Penn. St. 99. 7 Turner v. Stewart, 78 Mo. 480. 8 Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls, 1 Saxt. (N. J.) 694.

9 Lawes v. Turner, 8 T. R. 584; Coe v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 37 N. H. 254, 264; Smith v. King, 61 Conn. 511.

at least, if irreparable injury, or danger of multiplicity of suits, is not shown. Where the diversion of a stream will cause the stoppage of the plaintiff's mill and throw a number of servants out of employment, the injury is plainly irreparable.2 Depriving the plaintiff of his right to a supply of water for his house from a spring, and the cutting and destruction of his pipes laid for conducting the water, are also grounds for interference.3 So the threatened discontinuance of a water supply by a city water-works company, to settle a dispute as to the water rate, is an injury sufficiently irreparable to support an injunction.*

§ 511. Same-Same.-If a statute authorizing the taking of property, or flowage of land, or use of a stream, provides an adequate remedy by special proceeding to parties injured thereby, equity will not take jurisdiction. The mere existence of a legal remedy will not bar equitable jurisdiction where the remedy in equity is more adequate, comprehensive, and effectual. So, where a Mill Act gave the court power to abate and remove a dam, without having a prospective effect, it was held that equity would take jurisdiction to determine the proper height of the dam, fix terms upon which it could be

1 See Davis v. Frankenlust Tp., 118 Mich. 494; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136; 42 L. R. A. 157; supra, § 210; infra, §§ 520, 540. 2 Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593; Proprietors v. Braintree W. S. Co., 149 Mass. 478; Parry v. Citizens' W. W. Co., 13 N. Y. S. 471; Fuller v. Swan River Placer M. Co., 12 Cal. 12; Crescent City Mill Co. v. Hayes (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 319; Ball v. Kehl, 87 Cal. 505; Walker v. Emerson, 89 Cal. 456;, Shields v. Orr E. D. Co. 23 Nev. 349. The remedy for breach of the defendant's promise, made at the hearing of a bill for a preliminary injunction to restrain him from preventing the flow of water in a stream, and for damages, that if the hearing was postponed, the water would be permitted to flow during the postpone ment, is to be sought only in the suit in equity. Howe v. Salisbury, 145 Mass. 279.

Hayward v. East London W. Co., 28 Ch. D. 138; Gilchrist v. Van Dyke, 63 Vt. 75.

4 Legg v. Horn, 45 Conn. 409; Diffendal v. Virginia M. Ry. Co., 86 Va. 459.

Bull v. Valley Falls Co.. 8 R. I. 42; Spangler's Appeal, 64 Penn. St. 387; Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. Co. (Ala.), 24 S. Rep. 368. See Lexington Print Works v. Canton, 171 Mass. 414; Davis v. Port Arthur Channel Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 512; ante, § 250.

Bemis v. Upham, 13 Pick. 169; Boston W. P. Co. v. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 16 Pick. 512; Ballou v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 324; Rockland v. Rockland W. Co., 86 Maine, 55; Lawson v. Menasha Wooden-ware Co., 59 Wis. 393; Salem Capital F. M. Co. v. Stayton W. D. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 146; Dittmar v. New Braunfels (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. Rep. 1114.

maintained, and perpetually enjoin the nuisance.1 An injunction will not be granted merely as a means of compelling a defendant to make compensation; as if having had the lease of a water-right, he holds over and refuses to pay for the use and occupation. But where the defendant is insolvent and unable to respond in damages, this is itself a ground upon which equity will take jurisdiction, even though the wrong may be indictable,' as a recovery at law would necessarily be an adequate remedy; and in such case, as an incident to the relief by injunction, it will consider and adjust the question of damages.

§ 512. Same-Present and prospective injury.The remedy being preventive, past injuries are not in themselves

grounds for equitable interference. But where some degree of injury is shown, the court will consider its probable continuance;2 and if the injury seems likely to continue, equity will not refuse to interfere because the damage is slight. The fact that the act complained of is completed will not prevent an injunction from issuing against the continuance of a trespass or nuisance. An uncertain future injury will not be ground for exerting the extraordinary power of equity.5 Thus a city cannot maintain a bill to enjoin the erection of a permanent building upon a wharf extending into navigable water upon the ground that the city may, in the future, condemn the premises for a bridge. It has sometimes been said that some degree of present injury is necessary before equity will interfere.

6

1 Coalter v. Hunter, 4 Rand. (Va.) 58; Coe v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 37 N. H. 254, 266; Burnham v. Kemp ton, 44 id. 78, 101; United States v. Compagnie Francaise, 77 Fed. Rep. 495; Society v. Morris Canal Co., 1 Saxt. Ch. 157; Cobb v. Smith, 16 Wis. 661; Loker v. Simpson, 7 Cal. 340; Tuolumne Water Co. v. Chapman, 8 Cal. 392.

2 Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells, L. R. 1 Ch. 349; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 2 Sim. N. s. 78; Att. Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 De Gex, M. & G. 304; Att. Gen. v. Leeds, L. R. 5 Ch. 583; Att. Gen. v. Luton, 2 Jur. N. S. 180; Bemis v. Upham, 13 Pick. 169; Ballou v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 324; ante, § 346.

3 Ibid.; Att. Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 De Gex, M. & G. 304; Agnew v. McDowell, L. R. 14 Ir. 445.

4 Goodson v. Richardson, L. R. 9 Ch. 221. In this case a mandatory injunction was granted, directing the defendant to remove waterpipes which he had laid under the surface of the complainant's land. In Ballantine v. Harrison, 37 N. J. Eq. 560, 563, Beasley, C. J., said, that unless the circumstance in that case that the pipes were laid under a public road (so that, as the court said, the

defendant, by removing them, might subject himself to indictment) constituted a proper discrimination, the decision could not be harmonized with the current of authority. In some States the plaintiff is allowed to join an action at law for past dam- . ages with a bill for an injunction. Akin v. Davis, 11 Kansas, 580; Phœnix Water Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 481; Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Nev. 217; Columbia Mining Co. v. Holter, 1 Mont. 296.

5 Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Myl. & K. 169; Att. Gen. v. Kingston, 13 W. R. 888; S. c. 11 Jur. N. s. 596; Mayor v. Pemberton, 1 Swanst. 244, 251; Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells, L. R. 1 Ch. 349; St. Louis v. Knapp Co., 104 U. S. 658; 2 McCrary, 224; Kimberly Co. v. Hewitt, 75 Wis. 371; 79 Wis. 334; Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288; Rochester v. Erickson, 46 Barb. 92; Hough v. Doylestown, 4 Brewst. 333; Walton v. Mills, 86 N. C. 280; Shreve v. Voorhees, 2 Green Ch. 25; Ellison v. Commissioners, 5 Jones Eq 57; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica R. Co., 6 Paige, 54; Lytton v. Stewart, 2 Tenn. Ch. 586; Society v. Morris Canal Co., 30 N. J. Eq. 145, note.

Chicago v. Reed, 27 Ill. App. 482. See Bond v. Wool, 107 N. C. 139.