Q. B.] shall pay the same to the treasurer of the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for which such justice or justices shall have acted." That is here to the treasurer of the county of Surrey. That being done, the clerk is to keep an account of all moneys so received by him, and "send or deliver every return so made by him a, aforesaid to the clerk of the peace for the county riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place within which such division shall be situate, at such time as the quarter sessions for the same shall order in that behalf." The only quarter sessions in the present case is that for the county; and the clerk is consequenty to pay over the moneys to the treasurer of the county. That makes the whole section harmonious, and free from ambiguity. And the provision is an exceedingly fair and reasonable one; for otherwise a man might choose to spend in gaol a fortnight out of a month's imprisonment, and then pay the fine, which would go to the borough fund, which paid no part of the expenses of the prosecution. [Q. B. THE MAYOR, Aldermen, &c., OF OLDHAM v. OVERSEERS OF OLDHAM, &c. Attorneys for the plaintiffs, Nicol and Son. Wednesday, April 22, 1868. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, &C., OF OLDHAM (apps.) s. 1-Exemption from liability to be rated. Held, also, that the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, does not affect the exemption. This was a special case stated by the Quarter Sessions for the county of Lancaster, upon an appeal by the appellants, against a rate for the relief of the poor, upon which appeal the Sessions confirmed the rate. The appellants were rated for and in respect of certain property occupied by them in the township of Oldham, and consisted of a police-station, waterworks and mains, gasworks and mains, cemetery, police-station and telegraph, gas-meter and mains, market-house, baths, wash-houses, &c., towns-yard, fire engine-house, town hall. The case stated that a charter of incorporation was granted to the said borough of Oldham in the year 1849 under the provisions of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, e. 76, and that by an Act of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 42, and passed in the year 1850, the said charter was confirmed. That the borough of Oldham is coextensive with and includes the whole of the township of Oldham. That before the passing of the Union Chargeability Act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 79), one By the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, s. 1, after reciting that the municipal corporations of cities and boroughs named in the schedules (A.) and (B.) annexed to the Act passed in the sixth year of the reign of King William the Fourth, to provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in England and Wales, have been held not to be liable by law to be rated to the relief the poor in respect of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments being the properties and in the occupation of such municipal corporation, by reason public purposes only, and that it is expedient that that the income arising therefom is applicable to such municipal corporation should nevertheless in some cases be rateable, and be rated to the relief of the poor in respect of such property, it is enacted That the said municipal corporations named in the said schedules shall from and after the passing of this Act be rateable and be rated to the relief of the poor in respect of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, being the property and in the occupation of such municipal corporations, as if such lands, tenements, and hereditaments were not corporate property, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding; provided always that where such property lies in any parish which is situate wholly within the boundaries and limits of a city or borough named in the said schedules and in which city or borough the poor are relieved by one entire poor-rate, or in which citty or borough the poor within the boundaries or of the passing of the said Act were then relieved by one limits thereof as existing for municipal purposes at the time entire poor-rate, the exemption of such property from rateability shall continue as if this Act had not passed. F. M. White now appeared in support of the order of sessions, and contended that the property in question was properly rated, inasmuch as the proviso at the end of sect. 1 of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, has no application, the Act itself having passed Q. B.] REG. v. THOMAS QUIGLEY. [NISI PRIUS. to remedy this the Legislature passed the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 79, which, I think, entirely cures the defect. Then as regards the operation of the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, it certainly appears to me that that statute does not touch the question. It certainly was never intended to impose a burthen upon property which was exempt from it before. before the decision of the House of Lords in Jones | Act, is not mentioned in any of the schedules. But v. The Mersey Dock Company, 11 H. of L. Cas. 443; 35 L. J. 1, M. C.; 12 L. T. Rep. N.S. 643, and being founded upon the then supposed non-liability of municipal corporation property to be rated, as then established by R. v. Liverpool, 9 Ad. & Ell. 435, and R. v. Exminster, 12 Ad. & Ell. 2, and that such exemption having been declared by the recent case of Jones v. The Mersey Dock Company to have no legal existence, it must be taken that the proviso which speaks only of the exemption of such property from rateability as if the Act had not passed, cannot have any operation, for that if the Act had not passed the property would now be rateable by virtue of the last-mentioned decision. [MELLOR, J.-The statute corrects the bad state of the law, and declares that certain property shall be rateable, but also provides that certain property shall not be rateable.] The words are," As if this Act had not passed," which mean, to leave the rating as it would be without the operation of the statute. He contended, also, that as Oldham is not a city or borough named in schedules (A.) and (B.) the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, has no operation. He further contended that as the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, s. 1, establishes union rating, as the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, for this reason also has no application. Quain, Q. C. (Kemplay and Edwards with him) appeared for the appellants, and argued, first, that the proviso at the end of sect. 1 of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, was a Legislative enactment exempting the property from being rated; secondly, that although the section only applies in terms to cities and boroughs named in schedules (A) and (B) in the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, yet by the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 79, 8. 2, it is enacted that In every case in which an existing or future Act passed after the Act of the sixth year of William the Fourth, chapter 76, for the regulation of municipal corporations, or any provision of any such Act, applies generally to the municipal corporations specifled in the schedules to that Act, or applies generally to municipal corporations in England, every such Act and every such provision shall (except only so far as by any Act hereafter passed is otherwise expressly provided) | extend and apply, not only to every municipal corporation in England specified in those schedules, but also to every municipal corporation in England erected after the passing of that Act of the Sixth of William the Fourth, and whether erected by charter under that Act or otherwise. Thirdly, that the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 89, s. 1, does not affect the question. MELLOR, J.-I am of opinion that this property is improperly rated, and that the order of sessions should be quashed. The statute of 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48 was passed to remedy the decisions of the court that corporation property was not assessable to the relief of the poor, and the Legislature, thinking that such an exemption was not right, enacted that for the future no such exemption should be permitted. But although this was its general enactment, it thought fit to exempt certain corporate property under specified conditions. It is argued, however, that the Legislature were in error as to what were the legal exemptions, and that a recent decision in the House of Lords shows that the property which before was deemed to be legally exempt, was not so, and that the Legislature in the proviso in question, must be taken as referring only to such property as was really legally exempt, as shown by the recent case. But the Legislature having passed this statute, we cannot say that it is inoperative, and we ought to read it as a declaration that the property referred to is for the future to remain exempt from being rated. But it is argued that the statute has no application, because Oldham is not one of the cities or boroughs named in the schedules of the Municipal Corporation Act, and no doubt Oldham, which had a charter of incorporation granted to it, subsequently to the passing of this LUSH, J.-I am of opinion that the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 79, s. 2, brings the borough of Oldham within all the powers of the Municipal Corporation Act.. Then that brings us to the consideration of the proper construction to be put upon the 4 & 5 Vict. intended as an expression of the will of the Legislature that the property referred to in the proviso should continue to be exempt, and the reason is obvious, for as the rate would have to be paid out of the borough fund it would be paid by and to the same parties, I look upon the proviso as an affirmative enactment that such property shall not be assessed. The other objection I consider to be equally untenable. c. 48. I cannot but think that that enactment was HANNEN, J. concurred. (a) Order of sessions to be quashed. Attorney for the appellants, Ponsonby, Oldham. NISI PRIUS. NORTHERN CIRCUIT-LIVERPOOL. (Before MELLOR, J. and a Common Jury.) Indictment for murder-Statement of deceased taken in the absence of the prisoner-Admissibility of statement in evidence under the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 6— Notice to prisoner of intention to take the statementOperation of Act in the absence of notice-Dying declaration. Q. was charged on an indictment with the wilful murder of D. his wife. The injuries which resulted in the death of D. were inflicted by the prisoner or the 18th Dec. 1867; D. (his wife) died on the 23rd Dec.; but Q. (the prisoner) was not taken into custody till the 3rd Jan. 1868. On the 22nd Dec. 1867 (the day before D., the wife, died) D. being then in the hospital, and having been told by the medical attendant that "he thought there were little hopes of her living, and that he thought she was going to die," and she herself saying, "I know I shall never get better; what will become of my poor children;" made a statement which was taken down in writing in the presence of the magis trate. At the trial it was proposed on behalf of the prosecution to give this statement in evidence under Russell Gurney's Act, the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 6, which section provides that whenever it is made to appear to the satisfaction of a magistrate that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of a registered medical man not likely to recover, is able to give material information, and it shall not be practicable to take the examination in accordance with the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17, it shall be lawful for the justice to take in writing the statement on oath of such person, &c., and if on the trial such person be dead, it may be read, provided it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that notice of the intention to take such statement has been served upon the person against whom it is proposed to be read in evidence, and he had, or might have had, an opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made the statement: Held, by Mellor, J. (Lush, J. agreeing with him) that statement could not be read in evidence without proof] of notice having been given to the accused, before it was taken; and that the statute could have no operation in the case of a deposition taken while the accused person was keeping out of the way, as the notice was required to be given to the accused before the taking of the statement, and not simply before the reading of it. Semble, that statements made under the circumstances mentioned above (when no notice has been given to the accused are only admissible in evidence as dying declarations. Thomas Quigley was charged on an indictment with the wilful murder of his wife, Dinah Quigley, at Liverpool, 18th Dec. 1867. A. Peel and L. Williams appeared for the prosecution. Torr for the prisoner. It appeared that the prisoner was a labourer, living in No. 5, Court, Vernon-street, Liverpool, with his wife and two little girls. In the same court lived a man named Matthews. The prisoner came home on the evening of the 18th Dec. somewhat in liquor, and found his wife out, but one of his little girls at home. He told her to get the tea ready, and having gone out to buy a loaf, there being no bread in the house, he had his tea, and the effects of the liquor in a great measure passed off. He asked the child whether her mother was at Matthews's, and she, although knowing she was there, denied it, but the prisoner went at about eight o'clock to Matthews's house, and found his wife sitting in the room. She had gone there about six with her two children, but Matthews had been out most of the time she was there, and had returned just about the time the prisoner went. On seeing her husband, the deceased woman sprang into the coal-hole under the stairs. The prisoner, however, seized her by the hair, and dragged her by it out of the house towards his own, but Matthews interfered to prevent his striking her more than one blow that time and in his house. He did not follow them, however, into the prisoner's house, into which she was dragged, and left her to the violence of her husband. The latter came out and closed the shutters and the door, but some women in the court pushed the shutters open again, and they saw that the prisoner had lighted a candle and was kicking and beating the deceased, chiefly on the hips, with a piece of firewood and a poker. It appeared from the evidence of these women that at first the deceased was very drunk, so drunk that she lay on her back when first dragged into the house. After beating her for some time the prisoner came out and went down the court, where one of the women followed him, and said to him, "Have patience with her, as you always have had," to which he said, "How can I have patience. She was drinking yesterday with Lawler and to-day with Andrew Matthews. She is worse than a common prostitute on the streets." She was taken ultimately to the hospital on a stretcher. An examination was made that night as far as her condition permitted, and a more minute one the next day, and the deceased was told by the medical attendant at the hospital that he "thought there were little hopes of her living, that he thought she was going to die," and she, saying she "knew she should not get better, and what would become of her children," made a statement which was taken down in writing. Subsequently, on the 22nd, almost the same words having passed between herself and her doctor on more than one occasion in the interval, and been repeated just before the taking of the deposition, a deposition was taken in the presence of a magistrate. She died on the 23rd, as the doctor stated, of the shock and exhaustion produced by the injuries, [NISI PRIUS. but he stated in cross-examination to Mr. Torr, that it was a fact that persons made statements to their medical attendants when suffering from a shock which, when they in a degree recovered, they entirely forgot. The prisoner disappeared, and was sought for in every direction, but was not heard of until the 3rd Jan. 1868, when, from information, a constable was sent with a warrant to Helvoethuis, in Holland, where he received him into his custody. Upon the medical testimony, and the proof of other formalities required by the statute, but with tion to take the deposition of the deceased, as he the omission of notice to the prisoner of the intenwas then at large, and had not been found, it was proposed, on the part of the prosecution, to put in evidence the statement made by the wife on the 22nd Dec. 1867, and which had been taken in the presence of a magistrate under the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 6 (Russell Gurney's Act), which section provides as follows: And whereas by the 17th section of the Act 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, it is permitted, under certain circumstances, to read in evidence on the trial of an accused person the deposition taken in accordance with the provisions of the said Act of a witness who is dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel; and whereas it may happen that a person dangerously ill, and unable to travel, may be able to give material and important information relating to an indictable offence, or to a person accused thereof, and it may not be practicable or permissible to take, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, the examination or deposition of the person so being ill, so as to make the same available as evidence in the event of his or her death before the trial of the accused person, and it is desirable in the interests of truth and justice that means should be provided for perpetuating such testimony, and for rendering the same available in the event of the death of the person giving the same: Therefore, whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of any justice of the peace that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of some registered medical practitioner not likely to recover from such illness, is able and willing to give material information relating to any indictable offence, or relating to any person accused of any such offence, and it shall not be practicable for any justice or justices of the peace to take an examination or deposition in accordance with the provisions of the said Act of the person so being ill, it shall be lawful for the said justice to take in writing the statement on oath or affirmation of such person so being ill, and such justice shall thereupon subscribe the same, and shall add thereto, by way of caption, a stateplace when and where the same was taken, and of the names ment of his reason for taking the same, and of the day and of the persons (if any) present at the taking threof, and if the same shall relate to any indictable offence for which any trial, shall transmit the same with the said addition to the accused person is already committed or bailed to appear for proper officer of the court for trial at which such accused person shall have been so committed or bailed; and in all other cases he shall transmit the same to the clerk of the peace of the county, division, city, or borough in which he shall have taken the same, who is hereby required to preserve the same and file it of record; and if afterwards, upon the trial of any offender or any offence to which the same may relate, the person who made the same statement shall be proved to be dead, or if it shall be proved that there is no reasonable probability that such person shall ever be able to travel or to give evidence, it shall be lawful to read such statement in evidence, either for or against the accused, without further proof thereof, if the same purport to be signed by the justice by or before whom it purports to be taken, and provided it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable notice of the intention to take such statement has been served upon the person (whether prosecutor or accused) against whom it is proposed to be read in evidence, and that such person, or his counsel or attorney, had or might have had, if he had chosen to be present, full opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made the same. The reception of the statement in evidence was objected to on the grounds that the provisions of the section had not been complied with; first, because no notice had been served upon the prisoner of an intention to take the deposition, before the taking of it; and, secondly, that the caption containing the magistrate's reason for taking the deposition had not been added till some days had elapsed from the time of taking it (which was admitted to be the fact), instead of being done at the time as required by the section. The learned counsel for the prosecution urged in opposition that the proviso should be read as applying to only part of the section, and not to the whole of it, otherwise the operation of the statute would be completely frustrated. The object of the statute was to perpetuate testimony, and the section ought to be read in the way best calculated to carry out that intention, as it might be in this case by reading the proviso along with that part of the section only which referred to the case of the accused person being in custody at the time. By reading it as applying to the whole section, the Act would be rendered a mere nullity, and it could not be applied at all, because here the prisoner was still at large, not being taken into custody till the 3rd Jan. 1868, and it was therefore quite impossible to serve any notice upon him when they did not know where he was at the time. He submitted that the reading of the proviso in the way he had suggested would be perfectly consistent, and would carry out the object of the statute, viz., to perpetuate testimony; while, if read in the other way, its object would be frustrated. MELLOR, J. (after consulting LUSH, J.), said that 'both his learned brother and himself were of opinion that the proviso overrode the whole section, and that the deposition could not be read without proof of notice to the accused of the intention to take the statement. This appeared in a great degree to nullify the benefit supposed to be derived from the statute; but whether it arose from the Bill being altered in committee, or from whatever cause, still it was undoubted that the proviso applied to the whole section, and it was observable that the notice was required to be given before the taking, and not simply before the reading, of the deposition, thus rendering it impossible for the statute to have operation in the case of an accused person keeping out of the way. The medical attendant was then examined to lay a foundation for the admission of the deposition in evidence as a dying declaration, and he proved having had certain conversations with the deceased while she was in the hospital, in which he had told her that he had little hopes of her recovery, and she had said, "I know I shall never get better, what will become of my poor children?" Peel, for the prosecution, then tendered both the statements made by the deceased, i.e., that made before the 22nd Dec., and which was not taken by the magistrate, as well as that made on the 22nd Dec. before the magistrate-as dying declarations, coming within the principle laid down in the following cases: Woodcock's case, 1 Leach, 503; Reg. v. Reaney and Reddish, 7 Cox C. C. 209; MELLOR, J. (after again consulting LUSH, J.) said he had come to the determination to admit the latter deposition (that of the 22nd Dec.) on the authority of Woodcock's case, and Reg. v. Reaney and Reddish, cited by Mr. Peel, quite agreeing with his learned brother that the reference made by the deceased to her children showed she was contemplating what would happen after death. The cases ran very fine on this matter, and the present one was very near the line, which he was unwilling to extend, but the above observation seemed to turn the scale. The statement made by the deceased was thereupon read, and at the close of the case the prisoner was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Attorney for the prosecution, Rayner, Town-hall, Liverpool. Attorney for the prisoner, Cobb, Dale-street, Liverpool. [NISI PRIUS. Monday, March 30, 1868. (Before MELLOR, J. and a Common Jury.) REG. v. CHARLES J. GRAHAM. (a) Bankruptcy-Indictment for misdemeanor under-Criminal proceedings pending examinations of bankrupt -Competency of-Costs. G., a bankrupt, was indicted for a misdemeanor under the 221st section of the B. A. 1861. The bankrupt had come up for examination before the Court of Bankruptcy, and a day had been fixed for him to pass his final examination and obtain his discharge; but before the arrival of the day appointed, the proceedings were taken by the creditors' assignees which formed the subject of the present indictment. It did not appear, however, from the proceedings in the Court of Bankruptcy, that the bankrupt had ever passed his final examination. It was objected that the criminal proceedings were premature, and that it was intended by the Bankruptcy Act that no such proceedings should be taken till the bankrupt had passed his final examination; and also that the proceedings must be ordered to be taken by the court; but Held, by Mellor J., that as criminal proceedings were no part of the proceedings in the bankruptcy, an indictment might be preferred at any time when the offence charged was complete, whenever that might be : Also, that it was not necessary for the Court of Bankruptcy to order the prosecution, and that the only effect of its not being so ordered was as to the question of costs under the Bankruptcy Act. Indictment for misdemeanor under the 221st section of the B. A. 1861. The first count alleged that Charles J. Graham, within sixty days prior to his being adjudicated a bankrupt, to wit, on the 9th day of Dec. 1867, &c., value of 101. or upwards, with intent to defraud the did remove a certain part of his property of the creditors of him, the said C. J. Graham, &c. The second, third, and fourth counts were similar to the first. The fifth count alleged that C. J. Graham, being within three months next before the filing of the a trader within the meaning of the B. A. 1861, did petition for his adjudication in bankruptcy, to wit, on the 7th Dec. 1867, under the false colour and pretence of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, unlawfully obtain on credit from T. Quinsey certain goods, with intent to defraud the said T. Quinsey. Counts six to seventeen were similar to the fifth. The eighteenth count alleged that C. J. Graham, being a trader, &c., unlawfully, with intent to defraud his creditors, and within three months before the filing of the petition for his adjudication in bankruptcy, to wit, on the 9th Dec. 1867, did dispose, otherwise than by bonâ fide transaction in the ordinary course of which said goods and chattels had been obtained on his trade, certain of his goods and chattels, &c. &c., credit, and remained unpaid for. The 19th count was similar to the eighteenth. Potter and Wheeler appeared for the prosecution. L. Temple appeared for the prisoner. The prosecutors in this case were Messrs. T. Leicester and T. Quinsey, the creditors' assignees of the estate of the prisoner, Charles Joseph Graham, who had carried on business at 8, Walnut-street, Liverpool, as a baker, flour-dealer, grocer and tobacconist; and the information was laid for offences committed by the prisoner under the 221st section of the B. A. 1861. That section provides that any bankrupt who shall do any of (among other things) the acts or things following, with (a) Reported by J. KINGHORN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. intent to defraud or defeat the rights of his creditors, | shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: If he shall, after adjudication, or within sixty days prior to adjudication, with intent to defraud his creditors, remove, conceal, or embezzle any part of his property to the value of 104. or upwards. If, being a trader, he shall, within three months next before the filling of the petition for adjudication, under the false colour and pretence of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, have obtained on credit from any person any goods or chattels with intent to defraud. If, being a trader, he shall, with intent to defraud his creditors, within three months next before the filing of the petition for adjudication, pawn, pledge, or dispose of (otherwise than by bona fide transactions in the ordinary way of his trade, any of his goods and chattels which have been obtained on credit and remained unpaid for. It appeared that the prisoner had formerly acted as shopman to a Mr. Boote, a wholesale grocer in Liverpool, and that he was afterwards employed in a similar capacity by a Mr. Guilt, in the same town. About the end of the year 1866, however, he began business on his own account, and shortly afterwards he married a widow named Rose Maguire. Rose Maguire's maiden name was Murray, and at the time of her marriage with the prisoner Graham she took her sister, Mary Murray, to live with her as a servant, and it seemed that she (the sister) had remained with her from the month of January up to Dec. 1867. [NISI PRIUS. untrue, and that she never had been possessed of such a sum of money as she alleged. They thereupon took the proceedings which had resulted in the prisoner's being committed for trial. Mr. Bolland produced the proceedings in the bankruptcy, and from these it appeared that the bankrupt had come up for his first examination on the 25th Jan., that the examination was adjourned till the 31st Jan., and that there was then an adjournment till the 12th Feb. 1868, for the bankrupt to come up for his final examination and discharge; but it did not appear that he had ever come up for, or passed, his final examination, nor had the present prosecution been ordered by the Court of Bankruptcy. A number of witnesses were called who proved that they had supplied goods to the prisoner, and that shortly before the time of his bankruptcy he gave them larger orders for goods, although he was doing less business. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, L. Temple, on behalf of the prisioner, submitted that there was no case, and directed his Lordship's attention to the 140th section of B. A. 1861, which provides that, "The court shall, forthwith after the meeting for the choice of an assignee by the creditors, appoint a public sitting on a day not later than sixty days from the date of such meeting, and shall give notice of such sitting in the London Gazette, and in such newspapers as the court shall direct, for the bankrupt to pass his last examination, and also, unless the court shall in any case otherwise direct, to make application for his discharge, &c." In this case the prosecution was premature; the evidence was that the examination of the bankrupt on the 25th Jan. was adjourned to the 31st Jan., and that the final examination was fixed for the 12th Feb. The prosecution, however, was commenced before that, and, for all that appeared, on the 31st Jan. or the 12th Feb. he might have given up all that property which now formed the subject of this indictment. He then referred to the case of Ex parte Dobson, re Wilson, 32 L. J. 1, Bank.; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 444, where a bankrupt had been guilty of acts which amounted to a misdemeanor within the 221st section, and one of the commissioners under, sect. 159, granted him an order of discharge with a suspension of twelve months. On appeal the Lords Justices considered that the commissioners had jurisdiction to direct a prosecution before a criminal court, and they discharged the order and directed a prosecution by the assignees at the next assizes. Lord Justice Knight Bruce said he "was of opinion that that was the course which ought to have been adopted in this instance;" "placing themselves in the position of the learned commissioner their Lordships would direct a prosecution accordingly." He also referred to the case of Ex parte W. and G. Still, re Still, 32 L. J. 12, Bank.; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 406. That case showed that it was intended by the Bankruptcy Act that no prosecution should take place before the final examination. Up to the latter part of the year 1867 the prisoner carried on what was considered a very good business, and it was thought carried it on in a very straightforward way. His original stock-in-trade was valued at from 80% to 100%, and this the prisoner from time to time renewed, generally once or twice in the course of a month. Towards the end of Nov. 1867 he had in stock goods to the amount of from 80% to 100%, and during that time his trade had fallen off considerably, and was not so brisk as usual. Up to the months of November and Decem ber the prisoner had paid his accounts regularly. On the 2nd Dec. 1867 he took a house and shop at 125, Crown-street, Liverpool, in the name of his sister-in-law Mary Murray, and to this shop the prisoner removed a quantity of property from his own premises in Walnut-street, where he still continued to carry on his own business. During that month of Dec., from the 2nd to the 21st, the prisoner obtained an unusually large quantity of goods, the value of which amounted to 400., from tea merchants, provision dealers, and tobacconists, for which he did not pay. On the 9th Dec. carts were brought to his shop in Walnut-street at four o'clock in the morning, and goods taken away to Crown-street, he stating that he wished the property removed at such an early hour in order that the business in Crown street might not be interfered with. On the 19th Dec. other property, consisting of flour, was removed; and again on the 25th Dec. more property was taken from the premises in Walnut-street to the shop in Crown-street. On the 26th Dec. the prisoner filed his own petition in the Court of Bankruptcy, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on the same day; and the estate given up to his creditors amounted in value to only 35l. 38. 9d. On the 13th Jan. 1868 the prosecutors were chosen creditors' assignees, and they subsequently ascertained that the prisoner, MELLOR, J.-You may prosecute as soon as the before his bankruptcy, removed nearly all the goods offence is complete, whenever it is not an act that he obtained from his creditors during the months of can be purged by the final examination. The quesNovember and December, and his furniture and tion in each case is what is the intent with which other effects from Walnut-street to the shop at 125, the act complained of has been done? The proseCrown-street, and that immediately after his bank-cution may be undertaken at any time when the act ruptcy he removed himself and family there also. The sister-in-law, Mary Murray, was examined in the Bankruptcy Court, and there she alleged that the property removed to Crown-street belonged to her, she having advanced a sum of 500l. to the prisoner; but from inquiries that were instituted by the assignees circumstances came to their knowledge that satisfied them that her statement was is done, and does not depend on his final examination at all. It is no part of the bankruptcy proceedings, but is quite a distinct matter. L. Temple.-No prosecution has been directed by the Court of Bankruptcy, and in the case quoted the Justices of Appeal seemed to consider it necessary that it should be so ordered, and also that the |