CHAN.] THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. THE CAMBRIDGE CONSUMERS' GAS CO. (LIMITED). allow an injury to be inflicted, it does so in cases where the act complained of is one in respect of which there is a legal remedy also, upon two grounds, they being of a totally different character-one, where the injury is irreparable, in the eye of this court, as cutting down a tree, although it might be paid for, and the other, where it is continuous, and so continuous that the court, acting on the same principle as it acted on in olden times, with reference to bills of peace, by restraining actions after repeated trials-so now it will restrain repeated acts, which can only end in incessant actions being brought, at once, on account of the continuous character of the wrong, which continuous character in itself makes the injury to be grievous, and so far, in the eye of this court, irreparable. As an illustration of this I may refer to the bell case (Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133), before Vice-Chancellor Kindersley. No one would dream of coming to this court to restrain his neighbour from tolling a bell once or twice or eight or ten times; but when his neighbour told him that he meant to toll it thus regularly for all time, the court thought it was a case which would justify its interference. The injury was in itself slight, but it was continuous; and so continuous that the court would at once, brevi manu, arrest the nuisance and save the party complaining from all future annoyance. In this case, if it had been made out to the court, which it has not been any more than in the Sheffield case, that there was either on the part of the public traversing the highways, as distinguished from the owners of the property adjoining the streets, a continuous injury, for which the only redress was by means of an injunction in this court, an injunction would be granted. Therefore, we must look anxiously, as the judges seem to have done in the Sheffield case, at the amount of evidence which is brought before us of the continuous injury which is likely to be inflicted by the alleged wrong. The judges in the Sheffield case came to their conclusion, as I stated before, in a much stronger case for an injunction than we have here. They said, although it is very true that you are about to take up no less than seventy miles of streets, you are about to do it at different times; at no one given point will it ever be more than an operation of a couple of days; that may be an indictable offence, but we do not think it an injury of that description, per se, such as to justify the interference of this court. No doubt you might have cases in which this court would interfere if a thing were only going to be done for one day-as for instance, if there was a shop with immense traffic in Regent-street, and it were proposed to interfere with that traffic, and the complainant came to this court and said that by keeping his customers out of his shop for one day his custom would be diverted elsewhere, and so be lost, that might be a ground for interference of the court, although the shopkeeper might say that he could not inform the court of the extent of his damage because it was not calculable. But in this case you see exactly the circumstances which occurred in the Sheffield case, which I think influenced the judgment, that it is not an ex officio information in which the Attorney-General gathers up the complaints, wrongs and injuries of a whole district, and lays them before the court; neither is it an information at the relation of any other person than a rival gas company, which, of course, has reasons of its own for being desirous of putting an end to the operations of the company in question. When we look to the matter, we find that the rival gas company are also plaintiffs. That company has a perfect right to bring itself forward as plaintiff if any damage is inflicted. But the Vice-Chancellor has decided that point, and we agree with him upon [CHAN. the evidence before us, that they have proved noinjury whatever. As far as they are concerned, on the case which is brought forward, they prove no injury to their property. They speak very much of contemplated injury, and they have brought several witnesses to speak to the possibility of injury to their pipes. One witness comes forward and says he has seen the pipes, and watched them as they have been laid side by side with the plaintiffs', and the only injury he has told us of is that they have uncovered the plaintiff's pipes. There is no single witness that comes forward to prove any specific injury done to the pipes. Upon that we are agreed with the Vice-Chancellor, and we can give the plaintiffs no special remedy. Then the question is about the inhabitants. Not a single inhabitant comes forward to say, although five miles of work have been done, that he has suffered any injury whatever. There are a number of learned heads of colleges and others who say they contemplate great inconvenience. That was the case in the Attorney-General v. The Sheffield Company, and of course, as I have stated, with seventy miles it is a much stronger case than when you have only twenty miles. Witnesses came forward in that case to speak of contemplated injury; 'but," said Turner, L. J., "six miles have been opened, and nobody says that injury has been done; you have had every opportunity of bringing that case forward." So here there was every opportunity of doing so if anybody had sustained any injury whatever. No one comes to tell us of anything that has occurred, though they say that when the work gets into narrow parts there will be great inconvenience. We have it, however, upon the evidence that these five miles are to a great extent, no doubt, in the wide streets; but a portion of those five miles comprises the narrower streets, though I do not know that it is said that anything has yet been done in the narrowest lanes. There is nothing brought before us at all to satisfy us that what has been done is such as this court would regard as an injury which it ought to interfere to prevent by granting an injunction. However we were very hardly pressed with this; Sir R. Palmer put it with great power and vigour, as he conducts all his arguments. He said, "You have the Gas Compaies' Act of 1847, which says on the part of the Legislature that no company incorporated by Act of Parliament shall attempt to take up the pavements of any place, or town, and so on, for the purpose of laying down its pipes without being under a vast number of restrictions." That argument did not escape the attention of the court in the Sheffield case; it was an argument pressed by Mr. Rolt. He said, in general terms, "We are under restrictions by Act of Parliament which compel us to perform our works in a certain manner." He asked, "Can it be said that the Legislature, thinking this essential for the protection of the inhabitants of a town when a company is entrusted with large corporate powers, would think it not necessary when persons of their own free will set to work to do these very acts which we are restrained from doing except under the sanction of a certain authority? I think that there is an answer to be given to that question in this respect: The Legislature has entrusted to one set of people large powers, and it says to those persons that they shall not exercise these powers except under immediate control; and having given to them powers beyond any which anyone has as an individual or as a company at law, not incorporated by Act of Parliament, it takes care to secure the due exercise of those larger powers by giving more extensive and more immediate remedies to all concerned. But these other companies ex concessis are lawful, and it has left them to the ordinary an interlocutory application, to look into the motives from which, or under which, the matter is brought forward. Now in the present case, though the Attorney-General's name is used, it is impossible not to see that the suit has been instituted more from regard to private than to public good. If the public interest clearly required the immediate interposition of the court, that might not be immaterial. But we find as a fact that the majority of the town council is in favour of what the defendants are proposing to do, and on a question of discretion it is impossible with reference to a community of this description not to look with some degree of attention at what the governing body of the borough think on the subject. It is said that many of the members of the town council are interested in favour of the defendants' undertaking. I dare say that is so; still they are members of the governing body, and the opinion of the majority is as I have stated." Such a consideration has much greater weight, no doubt, upon an interlocutory application, and that learned judge, upon the subsequent hearing, held that he was justified in differing from the other judges. But they say you must show us an injury of a durable and continuing character. I quite agree in what the learned judges have said at law, namely, that having for a day, we will say, small inconvenience if it does not involve such a case as I have before referred to-loss of custom or the like-the simple fact of that, per se, is not a matter which impresses the mind of the court very strongly, when it finds that not one single inhabitant is brought forward to say, though five miles of work have been done, that there has been any inconvenience. No single passenger along the Queen's highway says he has been impeded. There is existing a body who might take up all these cases on behalf of the town, and effectively come here as representing the town, and insist upon stopping that, if it were going to be a continuous infraction of the law, and they might say they wished to be protected in a manner analogous to protection by a bill of peace against having to bring perpetual actions. But here there exist none of those criteria any more than they existed in the Sheffield Gas Company's case. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to overrule that case, which I should not feel myself disposed to do, regard being had to all the circumstances before us, we cannot concur in the decision of the ViceChancellor. This is a very much weaker case for interference by us than was the Sheffield case. CHAN.] THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. THE CAMBRIDGE CONSUMERS GAS Co. (LIMITED.) [CHAN. operations of law, and that is all that can be said | asserted, it is not wholly immaterial, at least upon on the matter. It assumes that the ordinary operations of law will be sufficient with regard to them. But there is an observation not unworthy of notice made by Lord Cranworth on the subject, and I think Turner, L. J., made the same observation. Where you find a general Act for the purpose of incorporating bodies for certain works, and certain companies are not allowed to avail themselves of that Act (railway companies being amongst the number, whilst gas companies and others are allowed so to do), if any inference is to be drawn about the intention of the Legislature, the Legislature must be assumed to have known that a company could not proceed ex mero motu to dig up the soil of a town in which their works were to be constructed, and they must be taken to know that there would be companies, as happens in the particular case before us, who would find persons competent to authorise them. In other cases they might find a whole town willing that the works should be done. I can conceive a case where A., being the owner of a field, might have a bill of peace and a perpetual injunction to restrain people from making perpetual trespasses upon it, whereas B. might find it convenient to sanction those trespasses; as if he kept a publichouse, or anything of that kind. So here the whole town have it in their power, and every member of the town has it in his power, to proceed by way of indictment; and if such a case had been brought before us, either at the instance of a large number of inhabitants, the AttorneyGeneral proceeding by way of indictment, or we saw that they would have to go on proceeding with perpetual indictments, that might take the case out of the Sheffield case. But here is a point which exists in quite as strong a degree-I should say in even a stronger-that in this town there is a body which seems to have been incorporated from a very early period, 1788, consisting of the heads of all the colleges, persons who are now saying they anticipate great mischief and evil. They are the commissioners entrusted with certain powers by that Act of Parliament. There are, besides, the representatives of the borough in Parliament, the magistrates, and certain other persons incorporated as commissioners. They have powers of the largest description, not only over the soil of the carriageway, but the pathway, which is vested in them. Every stone that is dug out is a trespass committed by those who take it. Every foot of pavement that is taken up is a trespass upon their property. All those injuries are such that, if this body think it proper and right, as representing the whole town, they may take action in the matter. The case is not in that situation. The whole town acquiesces, and nobody takes any part, although, as I have said, there is a body competent to represent the town. We only find that the information is filed at the instigation of a rival gas company. That, beyond all question, weighed in the decision come to by the learned judges to whom I have referred in their judgment upon the interlocutory motion. Then in the subsequent judgment, what Knight Bruce, L. J., says with regard to public questions is a consideration not to be forgotten. He says, "I agree that motives are very often immaterial with reference to the manner of disposing of a suit. It has been said by an eminent judge that, if you were to look into the motives of suitors, courts of justice would not sit above a month in the year, and would have little to do." Of course, there are in numerous instances motives for a litigation which, if they could be looked into, would prevent a court of justice from interfering. But generally I agree that it is not the rule so to regard them. Where, however, the public interest purports to be Therefore, we must hold that the defendants were right in their appeal from the first order, because at that time the information ought to have been dismissed with costs, and the Vice-Chancellor would have dismissed it if he had not thought it right to give leave to amend. But the amendment has not put the case into any better position than that case which the Vice-Chancellor has purposely discharged for the reason that he has assigned; and, therefore, it appears to me that the bill should at that first hearing have been dismissed with costs. The subsequent appeals must follow as a consequence of that. We shall give no costs of the appeal. As we did not hear the plaintiffs on the motions, the costs of the motions will be necessarily costs in the cause. Lord Justice SELWYN said: With respect to that part of the decree which gave the plaintiff liberty to amend, it has been argued that the Vice-Chancellor proceeded in a manner inconsistent with that class of cases of which Pilkington v. Wignall may be treated as an example. There the original bill was filed to redeem a mortgage at a time when the plaintiff had no title to redeem, and it was held that the bill could not properly be amended by stating CHAN.] THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. THE CAMBRIDGE CONSUMERS' GAS Co. (LIMITED.) [CHAN. the subsequent acquisition of title. In all the other | court, which turns out to be, as I think this does, cases which have been cited, there was an original defect in the plaintiff's title, which it was sought to cure by the introduction of statements of facts which occurred after the bill was filed. But in the present case, the title of the Attorney-General does not in any degree depend upon the contract between the commissioners and the defendants. He sues as representing the public by an original independent title, namely as protector of the rights of the public against a nuisance to the public highway. Then it is said that the contract in question is alleged in the information and bill, and that the title of the informant and plaintiff to relief depends upon acts done in pursuance of that contract. If the defendants' case had been that this right to interfere with the streets depended upon the existence of the contract, and that they had never done, or threatened or intended to do, anything except in pursuance of and under that contract, there | would have been more substance in their contention; but it appears from the prospectus which was issued, that their company was formed, as almost all these gas companies are formed, not merely for supplying the lamps in the public streets, but in private houses, and they state in their own affidavits that they desire to do this, and intend to supply private houses, especially the poorer houses in the town, with gas. And they now contend that up to the time of the appeal they were and are entitled to continue their operations for that purpose. The 42nd paragraph of the bill states, that "The Limited Company alleges that a large amount of their nominal capital of 25,000/. has been subscribed upon the terms of their prospectus, and that they have sufficient means and resources to construct and lay down all such build- | ings, gasometers, retorts, main and service pipes, columns, posts, lamps, apparatus, and other works requisite for manufacturing, storing, and supplying the university and town with coal gas." In like manner the 51st paragraph of the bill, before it was amended, was quite general in its terms, and contained no reference at all to the contract. I think, therefore, that the informants' and plaintiffs' title does not, nor does the right, in any way depend upon the contract. But the contract may, I think, with more propriety, be said to constitute a portion of the defendants' case, and although there may be some objection to the precise terms in which the liberty to amend is given by the decree, which terms, I think are, in one sense, very unfavourable to the plaintiff, it is not necessary to consider the effect of those terms. But as so much argument was addressed to us on this part of the case, I think it right to say that in my judgment the case was one in which, according to the principles and rules of this court, an amendment of the bill was properly allowed at the hearing. very much weaker than the case so decided, we should be introducing the greatest uncertainty, and consequently the greatest inconvenience, if we were to come to a different conclusion. That this case is very much weaker than the Sheffield Gas Company's case is apparent, I think, from a consideration of the affidavits upon which the informant | principally relies. Take, for instance, the affidavit of Mr. Hawksley. It will be found that he had the means of observing what had been done; whether five miles, or one mile, or less than a mile had been done, it is the common case of both parties that these operations had been conducted in the town of Cambridge, a town of very considerable extent, and yet there is no evidence of any injury done to any person, nor is there any evidence of nuisance, except a general opinion that if the works are constructed nuisance will accrue. The same observation applies to the affidavit of Mr. Peed; he mentions what has been done, but he brings forward no single specific instance of any injury having been occasioned to any individual. Then there is Dr. Ransom's affidavit; he is a gentleman perfectly familiar with the town; he says he knows what has been done, but in like manner he fails to produce any single instance of any injury. Therefore, although, as has been justly said, the Attorney-General sums up in himself the rights of all these different individuals who constitute the public, so far as the town of Cambridge is concerned, yet, notwithstanding so full an opportunity of proving injury, none has been shown. With respect to that which is the substance of the case, I think we have, in allowing this appeal, merely acted upon the principle which has been so clearly established and so often recognised in former decisions, namely, that this court will not interfere by way of injunction, when the injury is proved to be temporary and passing. As it was expressed by Lord Cottenham in Elmshirst v. Spencer, 2 M. & G. at page 50: "The plaintiff, before he can ask for an injunction, must prove that he has sustained such a substantial injury by the acts of the defendants as would entitle him to a verdict at law in an action for damages." Each case must, of course, depend upon its own circumstances; it may often be very difficult to decide on which side of a dividing line the case falls. But where we find the particular point taken to have been already decided by the Court of Appeal in a case brought before it, and a case is afterwards brought before the same I agree with what the Lord Justice has said as to the existing law and principles as laid down in the Sheffield Gas Company's case; but I entirely dissent from the proposition that that case has established any such result as has been contended for—namely, a general right for every gas company, without the authority of Parliament, to interfere as they think fit with the streets and public ways of a town. I think a gas company that undertakes so to proceed without the authority of Parliament, is exposed to a great number of perils, and I agree that there are many instances in which companies, having tried to proceed without such Parliamentary authority, have afterwards found themselves compelled to apply for and obtain such powers. They are, of course, subject to the rights of the owners of the soil through which their pipes are placed; and although they may obtain the authority of the persons in whom the pavement is vested, still they are at any time subject to the rights of the owners of the soil to interfere with their pipes, unless they have obtained Parliamentary sanction. But although they are exposed to those dangers, they are nevertheless, like all other persons, entitled to insist upon the principle on which this court has always acted, namely, to say that no such serious or permanent injury has been proved as would justify the interference of the court by way of injunction. They are certainly not the less entitled to set up this case if, as in the present case, the informant is set in motion, not by the inhabitants of the town or by any public body representing them, but by a rival company engaged in the same trade or business. In my judgment, no such case as is requisite to establish a case for an injunction has been proved, and, therefore, I think the bill must be dismissed with costs. C. H. Hodgson, agents for E. H. Adcock, Cambridge. Solicitors for the defendants, the Cambridge Gas C. P.] CHORLTON (app.) v. JOHNSON (resp.); BUNTING'S CASE. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Reported by W. GRAHAM and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. REGISTRATION APPEALS. Monday, Nov. 9, 1868. [C. P. said county (now, by the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 46, a separate division of the said county) in respect of any new claim for such a qualification as, before the Representation of the People Act 1867, entitled him to be on the register of voters, inasmuch as by the last-mentioned Act mere occupation and payment of rates, irrespective of any amount in value CHORLTON (app.) v. JOHNSON (resp.); BUNTING's of the house occupied, gives a vote for the borough. CASE. Parliament-Right to vote for county in respect of leasehold property conferring right to vote for borough3031 Vict. ss. 56 and 59-2 Widl. 4, c. 45, s. 25. By the 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 25, it is enacted that no person shall be entitled to vote for a county as lessee of a house which would confer a right to vote for a borough. By the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 59, the provisions of that section are to be deemed to refer to the provisions of the latter Act; and by sect. 56 of the 308 31 Vict. c. 102, it is enacted that the franchises conferred by that Act shall be in addition to any existing franchise. The appellant was on the register for a county in respect of leasehold houses situated in a borough, but not of sufficient value to confer a right to vote for the borough at the time of the passing of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102.. Held, that after the passing of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, as that Act was to be construed with the 2 Will. 4, c. 45, he was disentitled to vote for the county by reason of his tenunt having acquired a right to vo te for the borough in respect of the qualifying property. This was a consolidated appeal from a decision of the revising barrister for the South-Eastern Division of Lancashire. was duly objected to by Thomas Webster. It was admitted that the said Henry Bunting was lessee for a term of 999 years of the messuages or dwelling-houses described in the fourth column of the said list of voters, viz., at Nos. 33 and 35, Hyde-street. The claim is for a county vote. It was objected that by the 25th section of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, the said Henry Bunting was not entitled to have his name retained on the said list of voters for the township of Ardwick, each of the said dwellinghouses referred to in the said column No. 4 being now sufficient according to the provisions of the said 3rd section of the Representation of the People the right of voting for the said borough of ManAct 1867, to confer on the tenant or occupier thereof chester. On behalf of the said Henry Bunting it was contended that inasmuch as his name was upon the register of voters for the said southern division of Lancashire at the time of the passing of the said Representation of the People Act 1867, the rights of the said Henry Bunting to have his name retained on such list of voters for the township of Ardwick in respect of his county vote, was reserved by the said Representation of the People Act 1867 (see sect. 56); that the operation of the said statute was limited and applied only to leaseholders claiming to be placed upon the register after the passing of the said Act. I held and decided that the said Henry Bunting was not entitled to have his name retained on the list of voters for the said township of Ardwick, and the name of the said Henry Bunting was therefore erased from the said list of voters for the township of Ardwick. There was also struck out of the list of voters for the said township of Ardwick. and for the other townships hereinafter set forth, and all being within the said south-eastern division of the county of Lancaster, the names of the persons whose names and qualifications are set forth in the schedule hereunto annexed, and as their right to have their names retained on the said list of voters, depends on the same point of law as that raised in the case of Henry Bunting, the appeals are consolidated. If the court shall be of opinion that the said Henry Bunting was not entitled to have his name retained on the said list of voters for the reasons before given, his name and the said names referred to and set forth in the schedule above mentioned will remain erased. But if the court shall be of opinion that the name of the said Henry Bunting should be retained on the said list, then the name of the said Henry Bunting and the names referred to and set forth in the said schedule are to be restored to the said list. Mellish, Q.C. (Hopwood with him), for the appellant. The question is, if a person who was, at the time of the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, entitled to a vote for a county as a leaseholder of land situated in a borough is The property in respect of which the name of the disentitled to vote for the county, by reason of his said Henry Bunting was upon the register for the tenants having now acquired a right to vote in township of Ardwick is situate within the borough respect of the same property for the borough. As a of Manchester, but inasmuch as the clear yearly general principle, a person whose tenant has a vote value of each of the said dwelling-houses did not for the borough cannot vote in respect of the same amount to 10%. it was admitted that the said Henry property for the county. But the question Bunting was, before the passing of the Represen-here is, if a person who was actually on the tation of the People Act 1867, entitled to be on the register of voters for the said township of Ardwick, in the southern division of the said county. It is also admitted that since the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, the said Henry Bunting would not be now entitled to be put on the list of voters for the south-eastern division of the register at the time of the passing of the Representation of the People Act, is disentitled by that Act. By sect. 56 of the Representation of the People Act it is enacted that "the franchises conferred by this Act shall be in addition to and not in substitution of any existing franchises, but so that no person shall be entitled to vote for the same place in respect of more than one qualification, and subject to the provisions of this Act, all laws, customs, and enactments now in force, conferring any right to vote, or otherwise relating to the representation of the people in England and Wales, and the registration of persons entitled to vote shall remain in full force, and shall apply, as nearly as circumstances admit, to any person hereby authorised to vote, and shall also apply to any constituency hereby authorised to return a member or members to Parliament as if it had heretofore returned such members to Parliament, and to the franchises hereby conferred, and to the register of voters hereby required to be formed." Therefore the franchises conferred by the Representation of the People Act are to be in addition to existing franchises. Then by sect. 59 it is enacted that "this Act, so far as is consistent with the tenor thereof shall be construed as one with the enactments for the time being in force relating to the representation of the people and with the registration acts; and in construing the provisions of the 24th and 25th sections of the Act of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, the expressions "the provisions hereinafter contained" and "as aforesaid " shall be deemed to refer to the provisions of this Act conferring rights to vote, as well as to the provisions of the said Act." By sect. 25 of the 2 Will. 4, c. 45, it is enacted that no person shall be entitled to vote for a county in respect of his interest as lessee in respect of any house, &c., or land occupied with a house, &c., as would, according to "the provisions hereinafter contained," confer on him or any other person the right of voting for any city or borough. Therefore, that section being applied to the new rights, it is admitted that if the property had been newly acquired, the appellant would not be entitled to vote in respect of it for the county; but it is submitted that as this is exclusively an enfranchising Act, and the new franchises are to be in addition to existing franchises, the appellant being on the register at the time of the passing of the Act, is not deprived of his right to vote. [BOVILL, C. J. -If that were so we should be obliged to add to the words "no person "the words "except those now entitled to vote."] [C. P. This was an appeal from a decision of the revising barrister for the borough of Penryn and Falmouth. CASE. At the court held at Falmouth before me, a barrister-at-law, duly appointed to revise the list of voters of the borough of Penryn for the revision of the list of voters for the said borough in the town of Falmouth, the parish of To Mr. William Andrew, of Jorhan-street, in the town of eight hundred and sixty-eight. CHARLES MOON, of St. Thomas-street, Penryn, To Mr. William Langdon, of High-street, in the town of I hereby give you notice that I object to your name being retained on the list, for the town of Falmouth, of persons entitled to vote in the election of members for the borough of Penryn.-Dated this 24th Aug. 1868. THOMAS RICKARD, Of the Praze, Penryn, on the list of voters for the borough of Penryn. The borough of Penryn and Falmouth for Parliamentary purposes consists of six several places having separate overseers and rates and separate lists, namely, the borough of Penryn, the parish of St. Gluvius, the parish of Mylor, the town of Falmouth, the parish of Falmouth, and the parish of Budock. In the first of these places there were two separate lists published by the overseers of the poor one containing the scot and lot voters, and the other the 107. householders and the inhabitant occupiers; the latter list included all the names on the scot and lot list. The names of Charles Moon and Thomas Rickard, the objectors to the several persons mentioned in schedules 1 and 2, appeared on both these lists, and Manisty, Q. C., for the respondent, was not called their residences also appeared thereon as mentioned upon. BOVILL, C. J.-We are all of opinion that our judgment should be for the respondent. It is impossible to draw the distinction contended for by Mr. Mellish on the part of the appellant. Judgment for the respondent. Attorney for the appellant, P. H. Lawrence. Attorneys for the respondent, Milne and Co. Tuesday, Nov. 10, 1868. MOON (app.) v. ANDREW (resp.) Parliament-Borough vote-Notice of objection-Description of list-6 Vict. c. 18, schedule B, No. 10. In the Parliamentary borough of Penryn and Falmouth there are six places having separate overseers, and separate lists of voters are published for each. These places are the borough of Penryn, being the old municipal borough, the parish of St. G., the parish of M., the parish of F., the town of F., and the parish of B. An objector described himself, in his notice of objection, as "on the list of voters for the borough of Penryn.' The barrister held the description bad, because the Parliamentary borough of Penryn and Falmouth was commonly called the borough of Penryn Held, that the notice was good. in the notices. Moon as being of St. Thomas-street, Penryn, on the I held that the description of the objector Charles list of voters for the borough of Penryn, and of Thomas Rickard, as being of the Praze, Penryn, on the list of voters for the borough of Penryn did not sufficiently describe on which of the six lists of the Parliamentary borough of Penryn Charles Moon and Thomas Rickard's names were to be found. I therefore decided that the notices were bad, and retained on the list the names of the persons objected to. The appeals in all these cases depend upon the same decision, and ought to be consolidated." If the Court of Common Pleas shall be of opinion that the notices of objection were invalid, the register will remain without amendment, but if the court shall be of opinion that the notices were not invalid then the names of the persons set forth in the schedule hereto are to be expunged from the register. to the Boundary Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. 46), s. 4, and O'Malley, Q. C. (Horne Payne with him) referred schedule 1, in which the Parliamentary Borough is described as the borough of "Penryn and Falmouth," and contended that as there was no parish of Penryn the objector could not describe the list in any other way than he had done, and that as there was a separate list for the old borough of Penryn, the description was strictly accurate. |