very different) for the only proof of a Deity." The objection is here rather hinted at, than openly propounded, but it is a fatal one. Locke's tolerant and liberal disposition forbade him to reject entirely an argument, which might have some weight with minds peculiarly constituted, even while he showed the weakness of its claims as a demonstration.

We are far from denying any utility to this or the other socalled arguments a priori. Dugald Stewart long since remarked, that there is something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of Immensity and Eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own existence; and that when we have once established, from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful Creator, we are unavoidably led to apply these conceptions, and to conceive him as filling the infinite extent of space and duration with his presence and his power. So, too, the notion of necessary existence, which is, perhaps, first derived from this source, becomes more easy of apprehension when applied to the Supreme Being. Whatever lifts the mind by such powerful means from contemplating the finite and contingent things of this world, cannot fail to predispose it towards receiving the sublime doctrines of natural theology. It is only when the claims of such reasoning are injudiciously urged, when it is set forth as a perfect demonstration, that it becomes necessary to examine its validity, and to guard against arguments of the same class that are retorted against those proofs of the being of a God, which are open to every capacity, and which constitute to most minds the sole ground of belief. If such speculations are viewed only in their proper light, as abstract theories falling within the province of the metaphysician, or if they are brought in only as subsidiary to the real argument, by which great practical truths are established, much good may be the result. But these fine-spun reveries of an ingenious and philosophical mind form weapons, that may be wielded on either side with nearly equal effect. If their use is allowed to be unexceptionable in such a cause, if even the whole weight of proof is rested upon them, then the objections of Hume and other skeptical metaphysicians must be admitted

• Essay on Human Understanding; Book IV., Ch. x. § 7.

to be fairly and appropriately urged, and must be refuted by arguments of the same class. But let the nature of the subject be properly considered, and the reasoning confined to the ordinary channel for the proof of facts, and these cobweb difficulties may be dispersed by a breath, though they would otherwise be powerful enough to shake the whole fabric of religious faith.

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The argument of Descartes, when closely scrutinized, will be found to differ very little from those which we have already examined. The great fallacy in it consists in supposing, that the enlarged and grand conception of Deity, which the mind gradually forms by precept and reflection, is wholly original and spontaneous in its growth, because some of its elements undoubtedly possess this character. Descartes did not consider how difficult of execution was his plan to revoke all his past opinions into doubt, and to present his mind as a tabula rasa for the reception of pure and well-accredited truth. The thoughts and impressions of a whole lifetime could not be wiped away by a single effort of the will. They had left indelible traces on his intellect, and with all his acuteness he could not distinguish between them and the original characters, in which he would fain recognise the handwriting of his Maker. The ideas of infinitude and perfection are the only ones, the spontaneous origin of which can be affirmed with the least shade of probability; and how far are these abstract and general notions from constituting our whole conception of the Supreme Being. Personality, real existence, unity, and activity must all be joined to these two abstract notions, before the idea is complete, and he must be a bold theorist, indeed, who will maintain the primitive character, the origin a priori, of all these elements. Thus the proof by Descartes appears nearly the same with that by Clarke, the only difference being, that the former argues from the innate and spontaneous character of the two ideas up to the Being who implanted them in the mind, while the latter lays the foundation of his reasoning upon their necessary existence as attributes. Of course, Clarke's argument is the only one, which has any pretensions to the title of reasoning a priori. It is the same thing, whether we reason from the anatomy of the body or that of the mind, when the peculiar structure of each is the only ground for affirming, that it is the work of an intelligent Creator.

The same remark applies to the other form of Clarke's argument, of which we have, as yet, taken no notice. It is nothing but reasoning a posteriori in disguise. He begins with the proposition, that "something has existed from all eternity "; from which it follows, that "either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent Being, from which all other beings, that are or ever were in the universe, have received their original; or else there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings, produced one from another in an endless progression, without any original cause at all." It is evident that the word something, afterwards explained as an "infinite succession of being," is here skilfully used as the most vague and general expression for the universe of animate and inanimate things, in order to cover up the fact, that this pretended demonstration a priori actually rests upon an empirical datum, a truth made known only by experience. The reasoning proceeds by inference from the world to the world's Creator; and, though not so clear and satisfactory to most minds as the argument from design, it belongs to the same class of proofs, and, when fairly stated, is perhaps equally decisive. We admit its cogency, and are certainly very far from charging Clarke with any indirection designed to deceive, when he presented it under such phraseology. His mind had a strong bias towards metaphysical reasoning, and the vagueness of the terms, which he was compelled to adopt, often blinded him as to the true character of his arguments.

If this examination has shown any reason to believe that metaphysical arguments are inapplicable and inconclusive in proving the existence of a God, we may hope to show also, that they are equally sophistical and out of place, when brought forward as objections to this great doctrine. Hume and other writers of his class are only formidable on their own ground. Many passages in his writings indicate, that he was himself aware of the true character of his fine-spun skepticism, and that he proposed his doubts as mere philosophical diversions and exercises in dialectics, without any expectation of influencing the conduct of men, or of changing their opinions on practical subjects. Many theists have attempted to answer him on his own principles, and have met with all the success, perhaps, which is possible in such an enterprise. But it is characteristic of such engagements, that the victory should remain doubtful. We reach firm ground for the discussion,

and gain some hope of terminating it successfully, only when we have fairly determined the point that is to be proved; for then the proper mode of arriving at it will be manifest. It is impossible to tell by what road we are to travel, till we know what is to be the end of our journey.

We understand the question to relate to the being of a personal God, the Creator of heaven and earth, really distinct from nature though pervading it with his presence, the infinitely wise and active Cause and Ruler of all things. We have seen, that strict demonstrative reasoning, or the argument a priori, so called, is powerless for establishing the fact of such an Existence; that it can only prove an abstract proposition, such as the necessary character of an idea, or the immutability of a principle. Descartes, Clarke, and others, who first reduced this argument to shape, did not see that it led only to such a barren conclusion. Otherwise, they would have rejected the reasoning at once, as insufficient, for they held to the common notion respecting the nature of Deity. But in our own days, this lame and impotent result has been avowedly held forth as the only proper conception of a God. His existence is reasoned away into an abstraction. His nature is identified with a universal idea. Without any taste for denunciation, or any wish to throw odium on the persons entertaining such views, many of whom have pure minds and excellent characters, we must still consider such doctrines as amounting to downright atheism. The first dogma of natural religion affirms the distinct existence of an individual Being, whose unity and personality are not mere attributes, that may be affirmed or denied at pleasure, the great fact itself still remaining; but they are definitions of his nature, necessary parts of our conception of him, and, as such, cannot be denied without rejecting the whole doctrine. This proposition is so obvious, that it is hardly susceptible of comment or explanation. A general idea, a law, a principle, is a fantastic thing of man's device, a mere word, which has neither substance nor reality, and which was invented with no object beyond the convenience of thought and the uses of language. Take all the great laws of ethics, for instance. The emotion excited by the bare mention of moral principle, the reverence which we express for truth and justice, were first excited by the manifestation of these qualities in particular acts. It is the individual man, whose estimable conduct draws forth that glow of

moral approbation, which is subsequently transferred by the association of ideas to the principles of that conduct considered in the abstract. If those who would put reverence for moral law in the place of religious feeling, who would direct adoration only to purity and holiness in the abstract, and not to the one Being of whom they are the attributes, were consistent in their belief, or saw the reach and application of their own principles, they would worship only their brother man, and him only in particular cases, and to that extent which his conduct merited.

We may appear to labor this point too much; but the tone which speculation has recently assumed on these subjects, justifies and requires a full exposition of this absurd and noxious doctrine. The infidelity with which the present age is menaced is not the coarse and sneering unbelief, the dogmatical and blasphemous expression of which revolts us in the writings of the free-thinking philosophers of the last century. Good taste, if not sound reason, rejects such indecencies, and at the present day we are too refined, if not too wise, to tolerate them. The errors which now threaten to obtain some prevalence, belong to the same class with the sentimental deism of Rousseau, and the mystical atheism of Shelley. The garb is more seductive, but the doctrine is not less pernicious. Fervid but unmeaning expressions of reverence for the principles of right conduct and the abstract conceptions of ethics, are substituted, not merely for the language of piety, but for the belief in a Supreme Being. Good sense is outraged, and all right feeling profaned, by an absurd transposition of the actual and the ideal; all reality being denied to former distinct objects of religious faith, while it is affirmed of shadows and abstractions. Thus, the natural fountain of awe and adoration in the human heart, deep-seated and perennial, which should flow forth only at the name of the Infinite One, finds vent in an unmeaning rant about mere words,shades and semblances of things, too unsubstantial for language to describe, or intellect to comprehend.

We return to the consideration of the argument a posteriori. The great merit of Lord Brougham's "Preliminary Discourse "consists in the clear perception and statement of this truth; that the first branch of Natural Theology is strictly an inductive science, formed and supported by the same kind of reasoning on which Physics and Natural Philosophy are built.