about the only philosophical writer, with whose works he appears to be fully acquainted, though neither the general reputation, nor the completeness of this author's speculations, make him a very safe guide in abstruse and difficult inquiries. Dr. Chalmers does not in himself possess sufficient acuteness and skill in treating metaphysical questions to make up for this lack of information, and the chapters in which he hazards any attempt at subtile and refined reasoning, as, for instance, in answering the objections of Hume, are among the least satisfactory portions of the book. In spite of these defects, there is some valuable matter in these volumes. Dr. Chalmers has a full perception of the true nature of the question, and a clear insight into the principles on which it must be resolved. If he has not added much to the argument for the being of a God, he has not perplexed it with any extraneous matter. Good sense and a vigorous mind may be discerned through the cloudy envelope of words, in which his remarks are enclosed. spirit in which he has conducted the inquiry, and the general tenor of his reasoning, may be inferred from the following remark. The "We hold it with Paley greatly more judicious, instead of groping for the evidence of a Divinity among the transcendental generalities of time, and space, and matter, and spirit, and the grounds of a necessary and eternal existence for the one, while nought but modifications and contingency can be observed of the other, we hold it more judicious, simply to open our eyes on the actual and peopled world around us, or to explore the wondrous economy of our own spirits, and try if we can read, as in a book of palpable and illuminated characters, the traces or the forth-goings of a creative mind anterior to, or at least, distinct from matter, and which both arranged it in its present order and continues to overrule its – Vol. 1. p. 113. processes." - The expression here is a fair sample of that wordy manner, of which we have complained; but the opinions, which are stated, respecting the proper character of the reasoning to be employed in Natural Theology, appear sound and judicious. They agree substantially with the views, which we attempted, in a very imperfect manner, to set forward and defend in the last number of this Journal. * As we propose * See pp. 102 et seq.] to resume the subject, with a view to correct some possible misconceptions of those views, and to consider more at length the inevitable consequences of encumbering the science of Natural Theology with metaphysical speculations, it may be worth while, for the benefit of those who have not perused the former article, to restate, in a very succinct manner, the ground which was therein taken. We endeavoured to show, that the great doctrine of Natural Theology does not belong to that class of abstract and mathematical truths, to which alone demonstrative reasoning is applicable; that the being of a God is a reality, and his existence a fact, to be proved like any other fact in natural science, by arguments of the same kind, though superior in number and force. An examination of all the forms of the a priori argument was intended to prove, not only that the reasoning itself was entirely inconclusive, but that it was founded on a misconception of the nature of the question at issue; that the proposers of it, by overlooking the distinction just mentioned between two classes of truth, which are wholly unlike, had fallen into the grave error of representing the Divine Being as a mere abstraction, and thereby, though unintentionally, had played into the hands of a set of metaphysical atheists of our day, who would fain pull down the Eternal from his throne in the hearts of men, and substitute in his place a principle, an idea, an idea, a nothing, without consciousness, personality, or intelligence. We sought to point out the true character of the argument a posteriori, or the proof from design, and to show its completeness and sufficiency; to prove, that the only objections to it were of a metaphysical character, and proceeded from the misconception noticed above; that, by exhibiting the unfitness and inapplicability of such abstract reasoning in this case, not only would the science of Natural Theology be freed from the rotten supports and profitless speculations, by which it had been encumbered, but also the only sound argument for the vital doctrine at issue would be relieved from all the cavils and objections, by which it has been attacked, and be placed on its true basis, alike unassailed and unassailable. A comparison between the truths which the theist seeks to establish, and the doctrines of all the inductive sciences was meant to prove, that they must stand or fall together; that the reasoning which invalidates the one would be equally conclusive against the others; and that the reasoner had accomplished enough both for faith and practice, when he had shown, that the great fact of religion can be attacked only by arguments, which would subvert the whole fabric of human knowledge, and render all belief and action alike impossible. These views were very inadequately explained in the short space to which the limits of a single article confined us; and much might now be said to elucidate and support them. But we do not intend to go over the same ground again, except for the sake of correcting some misconceptions, and of examining more fully a cognate subject, the propriety of mingling the science of metaphysics with that of theology, or rather of uniting the two in a close and indissoluble union. A full and fair consideration of this question might be serviceable at any time and under all circumstances; but the discussion of it appears particularly seasonable at the present day, when abstract speculation has taken a wider field and a bolder license, than it ever assumed before. And here it may be remarked, once for all, that we are dealing with opinions, and not with persons. This is neither the time nor the place for impugning the motives of individuals, for throwing doubts upon the purity of their faith, or of charging upon them the consequences, that are fairly deducible from their opinions. All abstract speculations may be considered as published anonymously; there is a better chance of weighing them with candor and correctness, when the personal character of their authors or supporters is not allowed to bias the decision. It is possible to expose and reprobate in the plainest terms the sophistical character of an argument, or the degrading and pernicious effects of certain doctrines, and yet not "bate a jot" of the high respect due to men who may have used such reasoning, or entertained such sentiments, without examining with due care their purport and tendency. In showing that the a priori proof leads by necessary consequence to a doctrine, that can hardly be distinguished from atheism, we are not using an argument ad invidiam, nor attempting to cast a reproach on the reputation or the principles of those who adopt and defend such reasoning. The name of the great champion of this argument stands too high in the English church to be tarnished by the slightest breath of suspicion or calumny. But the liability to gross abuse is in itself a consideration of weight against the adoption of any class of speculations; and a false and destructive doctrine, that is fairly deducible from them, constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the whole system. As such, it may properly be pointed out, and held up to public reprobation. In distinguishing the two modes of proving the being of a God, as the a priori and the a posteriori argument, we were fully aware, that there is an ambiguity in the use of the former term. But the usage of English writers has been so uniform in this respect, that a misconception was hardly possible, except by bringing in the different application of the phrase, which has become current among the imitators and disciples of the German philosophers. Yet, to avoid the chance even of this mistake, we stated, that, "if the meaning of the term be restricted to original and intuitive perceptions, which are independent of experience, the distinction implied by the two phrases does not exist. These first principles of belief are implied in every act of ratiocination; they are taken for granted in the argument from experience, and in every other proof." These intuitive perceptions are called "principles of common sense" by Reid; Stewart designates them as fundamental laws of human belief"; Kant calls them "a priori cognitions of pure reason." Now, it is perfectly idle to adopt this Kantian phrase as the only legitimate one, and then to heap up authorities and arguments to show, that such intuitive elements of truth enter into every process of reasoning, and, therefore, we must argue a priori for the existence of a God, or not at all. No one, who is at all acquainted with the subject, ever doubted this fact. But the admission of it makes nothing in favor of what is technically called the a priori argument in Natural Theology; and to allege this fact in such a course of reasoning, and with such a purpose, is mere sophistry. According to its etymology, and its use in treatises of logic, an a priori argument is one in which the reasoning proceeds from cause to effect, and from principles to consequences. And that Dr. Clarke really intended to use it in this sense, appears from a passage in one of his letters to a correspondent, who had brought forward the objection, that such reasoning could not establish the existence of a First Cause. Dr. Clarke replies, by affirming that a First Cause could be deduced from the antecedent principle of necessity, and by reasoning which should be strictly a priori. "For though no thing, no being, can be prior to that Being which is the First Cause and original of all things, yet there must be in nature a ground or reason, a permanent ground or reason, of the existence of the First Cause. Arguments may and must be drawn from the nature and consequences of that necessity, by which the First Cause exists." It was quite pertinent, then, on our part, to restate the objection made by Clarke's correspondent, and to show that the answer to it was not satisfactory, because the reasoner had actually, though unwittingly, assumed an empirical datum, or a fact from experience, in his proof, and thereby had wholly destroyed its a priori character. He promised to lead us up to the great truth of all religion by a new path, to "nobly take the high priori road, and reason downwards"; but, after a little digression, he conducts us back again to the old travelled way, where alone we can obtain firm footing. But, as neither mode of explaining the phrase "a priori” supplies a plain line of demarkation between the two classes of proofs, under all the forms in which they have been proposed, we conceived, that they might be aptly distinguished, by considering the one as a professed demonstration of the object sought, and the other as laying claim only to moral certainty in the conclusion. This distinction is not incidental and unimportant, but it expresses the fundamental difference between the two modes of reasoning, and it covers the whole question, with which we have any thing to do. Dr. Clarke called his book a "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of a God," and repeatedly alludes with satisfaction to his favorite mode of reasoning, as producing absolute certainty, while the argument a posteriori afforded only moral proof."The proof a priori is," he remarks, "as I fully believe, strictly demonstrative"; though he immediately admits, that "it is of use only against learned and metaphysical difficulties." Descartes placed his ontological proof of the Divine Existence at the very foundation of his philosophical system, which was to do away with all doubts and uncertainties in speculation, and supply an immovable basis of truth, as a starting-point for all subsequent inquiries. He sought to establish this great fact next after that of his own existence, at a time when he still professed to doubt the reality of the outward world, the deductions of experience, and the truth of every principle in philosophy and science. |