Having secured this point, as he imagined, in a way that defied all scrutiny and doubt, he proceeded to erect upon it the whole fabric of human knowledge.

Now, half the evil consists in the magnitude of these pretensions. It is plainly implied in them, that the other argument, which leads only to moral certainty, is insufficient, that mankind must either renounce the belief in a God, or accept the fine-spun reasoning and philosophical systems. with which this doctrine has been connected. A technical distinction in logic between two kinds of evidence is set up, as if it affected our belief of the facts which they tend respectively to support. Practically, this is not true; the two sorts of reasoning differ in kind, but not in degree. Everybody knows, that the highest degree of moral proof produces a conviction, which all the demonstrations ever invented could neither amend nor increase. As the logicians talk, not even death is certain, but what person's hope or fear of that dread event would be quickened by a demonstration, that it must happen. The reader of this page is not, in logical phrase, absolutely certain that the black marks upon it were not produced by mere accident, by upsetting an inkstand, for instance. It cannot be demonstrated, that any human being ever designed to convey any meaning by them, or that, in pursuance of this purpose, a printer was employed to set up the types, and thus produce the requisite symbols of thought. But the reader's conviction of this fact is firm, notwithstanding the alleged defect of evidence, and all the reasoning in Euclid could not increase his faith. In like manner, the sublime dogma of the existence of a God is written all over the face of creation; but some philosophers would fain persuade men to shut their eyes, and not read the characters, because, forsooth, the truth is not demonstrated by them.

An analysis of the celebrated argument of Descartes showed that this philosopher also, as well as Dr. Clarke, had deceived himself in respect to the true character of his reasoning, which really proceeded from the effect to the cause, though he fancied that it was strictly a priori. Having proved, as he thought, that the idea of God in his own mind did not come from the senses, nor from his own imagination and reflection, it followed that the Infinite Being himself must have placed it there, that it might bear evidence to its CreAfter exposing the fallacy of the supposition, that the

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whole idea of Deity, as it exists in an educated and intelligent mind, is intuitive and innate, because some of its elements may possess this character, we remarked, that the argument, at best, was only a proof a posteriori, for it was "the same thing, whether we reason from the anatomy of the body or that of the mind, when the peculiar structure of each is the only ground for affirming, that it is the work of an intelligent Creator." Descartes was guilty of an inconsistency, moreover, in introducing the argument at such an early stage in his inquiries, when he had as yet proved only his own existence, and the presence of ideas to his mind; for, although the reasoning did not appeal to the external world, it took for granted the law of causality, or the legitimacy of arguing from the effect to the cause, a principle which the philosopher had not yet demonstrated, but which, with all other principles, he had expressly called into doubt.

It may be objected to this account, that Descartes proposed his argument in another form, in which, without resting on the law of causality, he argued directly, from the internal characteristics of the idea itself, that God must exist. those who make this objection ought to know, that the form in which we stated the argument was the one originally adopted by the philosopher, and explained at large in his "Third Meditation," where it supplies one link to the chain of principles and reasonings, which form his metaphysical system. Afterwards, when hard pressed by his opponents, and, as it appears to us, with a view of covering his retreat by logical artifice and a cloud of words, he restated the argument in a form, which may be found in his "Answers to Objections." Very brief extracts will suffice to show, that Descartes really proposed the argument which we attributed to him. The following is from his "Third Meditation." "Although the idea of substance is in me from the very reason that I am myself a substance, still, I, who am a finite being, could not have the idea of an infinite substance, if it had not been placed in me by some being, who was truly infinite." And in the "Answers to Objections," he expresses himself still more plainly, thus: "The existence of God is demonstrated by its EFFECTS, - from this fact alone, that his idea is in us." We were guilty, therefore, of no injustice toward this philosopher, in affirming that the argument, which was embodied in his system of philosophy, was wholly

a posteriori. The other statement of the proof, though it excited more discussion at the time, from the skill with which it was worded, which renders it difficult to detect the fallacy, is now admitted to be sophistical, and, as such, is generally abandoned. Precluded by our limits from following Descartes through all his discussions with his opponents, we considered only that form of the proof, which he originally proposed and incorporated into his system, and which is admitted to be sound so far as it goes, although it is not of an a priori character; while we put aside the second statement of it, which was only an after thought, and is now universally acknowledged to possess no weight whatever. Certainly, the omission did no injustice to Descartes.

This second manner of stating the argument may be briefly expressed as follows, very nearly in the author's own words, though sentences are brought together, which are not united in his "Answers to Objections." The existence of God is known from the mere consideration of his nature; for necessary existence is contained in his nature, or in the conception of God, as it is present to our minds. Possible existence is contained in the notion or idea of all things, which we conceive clearly and distinctly; but necessary existence is contained only in the idea of God. Now, it is a greater perfection to be a real existence and to be in the understanding also, than to be only in the understanding. But my idea of God is that of an all-perfect being; therefore he really exists. Or the argument may be still more briefly stated as follows; In the idea of God are contained all the attributes of a perfect being; but necessary existence is one of those attributes; therefore, he necessarily exists.

We presume that any person, when this argument was first proposed to him, would say, that it must be a sophism, or a mere play upon words, though he might not be able at once to detect the fallacy. It forcibly reminds one of the puzzles, that are often inserted in treatises of logic, as exercises for the learner, where the conclusion is at once perceived to be an absurdity, though it seems to rest on perfectly formal and legitimate reasoning. In this case, the whole fallacy consists in substituting the phrase "necessary existence" for the "idea of necessary existence." It is perfectly correct to say, that the idea of necessary existence enters into our complex notion of a God. But the reality VOL. LIV. - NO. 115.

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does not follow from the idea, any more than the reality of a winged horse follows from my conception of such an animal, of Pegasus, for instance; or, still more pertinently, the reality in this case can no more be inferred from the idea, than the actual presence of a perfect circle on the paper before me can be deduced from the mathematical, that is, the perfect, conception of such a circle, which exists in my mind. To say, that "necessary existence" is contained in the idea of God, is to talk nonsense; for real existence is the direct opposite of ideal existence, and it is, therefore, a contradiction in terms to affirm, that the former is contained in the latter. But we are ashamed to offer a serious confutation of such sophistry. Descartes would scarcely have proposed it, if he had not thought to escape from the assaults of his opponents by a logical juggle.

It seems hardly necessary to allude again to Cousin's argument, which that writer himself has reduced to an absurdity, by showing what is the only conception of a God, to which such reasoning can lead. But, as it is possible to modify so vague a statement materially, without losing any of its essence, and, by combining it with the Cartesian proof, to give the whole argument a plausible air, it may be worth while to examine it more closely. The compound argument, made up from the reasoning of Cousin and Descartes, may be explained as follows. Our internal recognition of ourselves as finite, limited, imperfect, and dependent beings, compels us to form the conception of a Being, who is infinite, unlimited, perfect, and independent. The reasoning, thus far explained, shows how the idea of God rises in the soul, but supplies no means of passing over from the idea of him to the conviction of his actual existence. It is said further, then, that the conviction which we have of our own dependent existence as realities, necessitates the belief in a being on whom we depend, as equally a reality, and not a mere idea. Dependence implies one who affords support, just as much as design implies a designer. The author of that support cannot be another dependent being like ourselves, for then the question arises, on what does he depend; and so on, until we arrive at a being, who is the aider and supporter of all.

Now it must be remembered, that we have to do only with the assumed a priori character of this proof,- with the assertion, that it supplies a means whereby we can pass from

the idea of God in the soul to a knowledge of the reality, without having recourse to experience, and with the consequent assertion, that, as the reasoning contains no empirical element, it supplies demonstrative proof of the Divine Existence. Then, the first question which arises, respects the original and intuitive character of these four characteristics of human nature and existence, as they exist in our idea. Does consciousness, previously to all experience, make us known to ourselves under all four of the attributes or qualities here enumerated? Certainly we know, whether by a primitive intuition or not, that we are limited, imperfect, and, in one sense of the word, at least, -finite. But how dependent? This is the attribute, which is added to Cousin's enumeration, and the whole force of the present argument is rested upon it, though, by so doing, the reasoner takes for granted the very point at issue. We wholly deny the possibility of learning from consciousness, by a direct and spontaneous perception, that we are dependent beings. The feeling of dependence must be subsequent to a knowledge of the being or thing, on whom we rely for support, just as the feeling of gratitude is necessarily subsequent to our recognition of a benefactor. Gratitude and dependence are both ideas of relation; both imply a subject and an object; and it is absurd to suppose, that a relative idea can first suggest the knowledge of one of its terms. If I am already aware of the existence of another being besides myself, I can have an idea of the relationship in which he stands to me, as father, brother, or friend; but it is preposterous to suppose, that Í can first have a general idea of relationship, and be guided by that to a knowledge of the person to whom I am related. The argument inverts the order of the two ideas. It is either experience or the knowledge of a God, which teaches us the folly of entire self-reliance, and not the feeling of depending upon something, which teaches us what that something is.

This knowledge of our condition as dependent beings does not come so early in the history of ideas. We soon learn the frailty, weakness, and imperfection of our nature, but only slowly and by degrees are we made aware of the fact, that there is one without and around us, whose constant providence sustains the weak structure, and prevents our frail nature momentarily from sinking into decay and ruin. A stone is a limited and imperfect thing, a dead and power