a landscape, a statue, or a painting, brought to his mind, before he determined, whether it was beautiful or not. He experienced the pleasure first, and afterwards labored to find its sources. Moreover, if there be an original idea of beauty in the mind, the judgment of the child must be more correct than that of the critical student of asthetics, for the idea in his case is nearer its fountain; it is less perverted and dimmed by experience.

This discussion, introduced only to illustrate our main argument, has already carried us too far, though a multitude of other considerations might be adduced against the theory, which assigns to the idea of beauty a place among the primitive intuitions of reason. But enough has been said, perhaps, to leave no doubt in an unprejudiced mind. We come then to examine a perfectly similar instance, the nature of the religious principle in the soul. We believe, that man was created with a capacity and inclination for worship, with a deep feeling of reverence and veneration, which finds no appropriate object on which to expend itself among the persons and things, with which it is associated on earth, but constantly seeks for such an object, and usually obtains it in the conception of some spiritual existence, higher and holier than itself. Benjamin Constant properly designates this principle. as the religious sentiment, and with great learning and ingenuity has traced the history of its developement under all the religious forms and systems, which have obtained at different times among the inhabitants of the globe. The feeling itself, however powerful, is blind and instinctive; its object is not given along with it, but is left to be traced out by the active intellect, questioning and interpreting the operations of nature. In this respect, it agrees with the feeling of moral approbation and the sentiment of taste, which are respectively a capacity of being deeply moved and affected by a view of right actions and beautiful scenes, but which remain dormant, until a perception of such objects calls them forth. The idea is not given along with them, for if it were, they would remain constantly in exercise. It is even a sign of a morbid, though excited state of the moral sentiment, when its energies are spent on the contemplation of some ideal and abstract pattern of virtue, instead of being applied practically in determining right actions, and directing conduct. So the religious emotion is unprofitably wasted, when it is turned from the conVOL. LIV. —No. 115.

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templation of an infinite Being, and diffused over vague and abstract principles, with which it can hold no communion. Its proper object is a person; its proper expression is worship. And, unless prayer is a mockery, and the devout affection itself a feverish delusion, such a Person exists, and, by instilling this sentiment, has erected his own altar in the hearts of men.

If we seek to go further, and to find by the side of this feeling, or beneath it, an innate idea of the object to which it relates, we are either drawn into the heated region of mysticism, or engage in a vain contest against accredited facts in psychology and history. The idea cannot be found in the undisciplined mind, and, if it could, it would not prove the existence of its object. Every person would frame his own unreal and fantastic conception, to usurp the name and prerogative of this idea, and, resting on the fidelity of this assumed intuitive notion, he would not allow it to be corrected by the light of nature or the deductions of reason. The conception of the Divine nature would thus be corrupted by the crude and debasing notions of the illiterate understanding, or by the insane fancies of the mystagogue. But the doctrine, that the proper object of the religious feeling is to be sought in study and contemplation of the material and intellectual universe, which, if such a being exists, is his work, leaves our idea of his nature to be corrected and purified by the increasing fruits of such study and the natural growth of the intellect. It does not oblige us to shut our eyes on all ulterior sources of information, on all indications of his character afforded by his works, for fear of tarnishing or falsifying his primitive image in the soul. This doctrine creates the science of Natural Theology, the study of which, according to the other hypothesis, is a needless and unprofitable task. The existence of the religious feeling does not afford a direct argument for the reality of its proper object, but it creates an antecedent presumption, which is of no small weight and importance in the inquiry, which it first excited and stimulated.

But the metaphysical theologians of our day are not content with the undoubted fact, that a religious sentiment exists, as a part of the original constitution of our nature, unless they can add to it an a priori conception of pure reason. Compelled by a multitude of unanswerable facts and argu

ments, for a plain summary of which we may refer to the first book of Locke's "Essay," to relinquish the position, that there is an innate and distinct idea of God in the soul, they have recourse to the vague and inappreciable conception of the Infinite, sometimes boldly identifying it, as Cousin does, with the Divine nature, and hereby reducing the Deity to an abstract idea, and sometimes avoiding this conclusion only by generalities and unmeaning phrases. Were this theory introduced, not in connexion with the theological argument, as a resting-point for religious faith, but as a part of a metaphysical system, as pure speculation, its vagueness and uncertainty might be pardoned, in view of the necessary imperfection of philosophical language. But in such a connexion as this, bearing on the most momentous of all facts to the human race, we feel constrained to ask for an explicit account of the idea, on which the whole religious fabric is made to rest. What is this conception of the Infinite? Is it of a person, or thing, which can be made an object of worship? Or is it merely an attribute of being, like intelligence, justice, or holiness? Or is it rather an attribute of an attribute, a word expressive of the degree, in which certain qualities exist, as when we speak of "infinite goodness, mercy, and truth"? Does it exist as a clear conception in the mind, or is it a word that merely expresses the incapacity of the human intellect to comprehend the extent of certain attributes? Does it merely teach, that certain qualities go beyond the reach of human understanding, but how much beyond we cannot tell? Natural Theology is a practical science, as it is wholly occupied with truths which are intended to exert a direct influence over the conduct of men, and we have a right, therefore, to demand that the terms used in it should be clearly defined.

This predetermination to find an instinctive religious idea in every human soul has led to much profitless discussion of the question, whether any real atheist ever existed. At least, apart from this theory, we see no good cause for disputing, whether one philosopher or another can properly be called by this name or not. The appellation implies reproach; it is a contumelious one, and some may desire to relieve a favorite author from the opprobrium, which it conveys. There is some Quixotism, perhaps, in contending with great earnestness to free from this accusation a writer

who has long since passed off the stage, and has left none behind him, that have an immediate interest in his reputation. With his memory, be it good or bad, we have nothing to do. The real question is, whether certain writings have an atheistical tendency; whether certain opinions lead to atheism, or constitute atheism itself. And this question can be very easily resolved, if we do not allow ourselves to be blinded by a most arbitrary abuse of terms. The doctrine that only one substance exists, and that this substance is material, has existed from all eternity, and is governed only by necessary laws inherent in itself, we suppose all will admit to be atheism. The common name given to this substance and its inherent attributes is Nature. But let a writer strenuously uphold this same doctrine, only changing the name of the substance, and calling it God instead of Nature, and great offence is given, if he is pronounced an atheist. In like manner, some of the ancients, denying the existence of any other gods, believed in one infinite and omnipresent principle, which, though without foresight, intelligence, or personality, directed all events by its irresistible agency; and this opinion, if not atheism, is admitted to be something very like it. But some modern metaphysicians propound the same theory, only naming this principle God instead of Fate, and they, forsooth, are good theists.

Again we say, Do not let these remarks be misconstrued, or tortured into a charge against the good name of any particular writer. Our only purpose is, to illustrate the mischief and folly of introducing metaphysical theories into the domain of natural or revealed religion. Nor do we seek, in any manner, to depreciate the study of that science, which, as in some sense the head and fountain of most other sciences, assumes to itself, par excellence, the name of Philosophy. We attempt only to ascertain its proper limits, and to maintain its authority within those limits. And here we do but follow the admirable precept of Bacon, whose authority in this question, both as a philosopher and a believer, is surely entitled to respect. "Tantoque magis hæc vanitas inhibenda venit, et coërcenda, quia ex divinorum et humanorum malesanâ admixtione, non solùm educitur philosophia phantastica, sed etiam religio hæretica."

To return for a moment to the hypothesis of an innate idea, on which religion is founded, we observe, that it is con

tradicted by the endless variety of religious systems, which have obtained in the world, and which still exist among men. This variety is precisely what might be expected, if the human race, feeling an irresistible impulse to reverence and adoration of something higher and holier than themselves, but having no primitive and common idea of the object of universal worship, should proceed to search for it with that degree of the light of nature and reason, which can be attained in different stages of refinement and mental cultivation. The savage makes his idol of a block or stone, and in many cases worships it with a fervor and self-sacrifice, that shame the colder homage offered by a civilized race to a nobler God. The half-enlightened barbarian finds a Divinity all around him, and peoples the mountains, the streams, and the forests with their attendant deities. More cultivated still, his thirst for knowledge leads him to study the heavens, and the sun, moon, and stars become the gods of a religious system, which seems by comparison almost spiritual. Finally, whether by the last triumph of the unaided intellect, or by special revelation, the sublime doctrine of monotheism is preached to the world, and calls for the purest form and highest degree of reverence, of which the human heart is capable. How comprehensive and vague must be that universal idea, which is realized alike in the Fetish of the savage, the Olympic council of Grecian deities, the heavenly bodies, and the God of Christianity. No wonder, that the philosophers have chosen the most vague and ill-defined word in the language, the "Infinite," to express this common idea.

We have discussed nearly all the forms, in which the a priori or demonstrative argument has presented itself, and our readers can decide for themselves on the justice of the extravagant pretensions, that have been advanced in its favor. The question about its amounting to a perfect demonstration of the point at issue is too idle to be entertained for a moment. If there be any truth in logic, no question about real existence, nothing but general truths and pure abstractions, can be established by demonstrative reasoning. And with respect to these, the moment that the problem is solved, of finding the proper media of proof, and the chain of argument is complete, no doubt can be entertained for a moment of the reasoner's success. The mere existence of the question, therefore, is sufficient proof, that in this case he has failed.