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Hled to subdue him, have alone been generally within the mmon view ; while the peculiar character of the country, d the admirable adroitness with which the Indians avail cmselves of it, have been little comprehended or regarded. er have this impatience and misapprehension been confined the public mind. The government has fully shared in m, having often evinced, by its orders and measures, a afidence of expectation which experience has not war

ted. It is well, therefore, at this late stage of the contest, when h the public and the governınent have become more sober 1 patient in their feelings on the subject, to take a brief iew of its origin and progress. The page of history might marked by much exaggeration and misstatement, if it were

to be blled up by the representations and opinions that e generally prevailed. Ve have selected, for reference, the speech of Mr.

rett of Vermont, as presenting as succinct and fair an ount of the treaty which opened the way to this memor

war, as any document within our reach. Mr. Everett , a leading part in the debates on this treaty, when some

opriation in connexion with it introduced the subject to
gress. No member of that body, probably, became more
pughly acquainted with all the facts of the case. We

therefore, place reliance on the statement of them
a he makes in this speech.
Jonel Gadsden's treaty with the Florida Indians was

in 1832. These Indians were not generally inclined
inge their residence, having always manifested reluct-
o open negotiations which had such a proceeding in view.
were, however, persuaded to meet the United States'
issioner at Payne's Landing,and there consented,
th their principal chiefs, with all the usual sanctions, to
angement which had their einigration for its ultimate

The principal article in this arrangement was, that a
ion from the tribes should visit the country proposed

Thus occupied, and determine upon its eligibility.

* Says Mr. Everett'; “ The Creeks, by a former treaty, concluded when the Seminoles were a separate band of that nation, paid to the State of Georgia $ 250,000 for negroes which the Creeks (including the Seminoles) had taken or retained. Soon after the conclusion of the Seminole treaty, all the negroes in possession of the Seminoles, and even those with whom they had intermarried, and their increase, were claimed by the Creeks as having been paid for by their money; the $ 250,000 having been retained out of the purchase money for land belonging to the Creeks proper. Speculators contemplated purchasing these negroes of the Creeks, and seizing them when the Seminoles should be on the point of emigrating. The Seminoles foresaw, that, if they united with the Creeks as individuals, if they lost their community as a band, they should be at the mercy of the Creeks, who were greatly superior in numbers,”

steps taken appear to have encountered no obstacle. ceedings were in harmony and good faith, though even fficulties were likely to arise. The terms of the cauired that one third of the Indians should remove the following year, that is, in 1833. Now, as the

ally considered the delegation bound to report the result of its examination, and permit a national action upon a measure so important to their future welfare, before emigration became irrevocably settled. Such a course, however, was now precluded, as the act of the delegation had been deemed sufficient to give validity to the treaty, which was presented to the Senate in April, 1834, and ratified by that body.

The treaty thus becoming the “ supreme law of the land,” all its defecis and evils were fixed, and, as it were, irremediable. Its execution became imperative, even with all its contradictory and seemingly impracticable provisions. At the very moment that its ratification was perfected, the time had passed when one of its main stipulations was to have been fulfilled ; and in 1835 no emigration had taken place, when, according to the terms of the treaty, it should have been on the eve of completion. Under such an embarrassment, the President, it is stated by Mr. Everett, asked the opinion of his Attorney-General, who decided that the stipulations in this respect were not vacated by the lapse of time, but only postponed ; that is, that the emigration, instead of taking place at the impossible dates specified in the treaty, inust take place in 1835 and the two following years. Such a decision, even if not most strictly warranted, wore at least the semblance of justice and lenity, and might perhaps have been carried into effect without any serious or openly hostile opposition. But the President, probably under a belief that such a latitude of construction was inadmissible, determined to take the alternative left, which was to crowd the stipulations of three years into one. If the Indians had produced this delay, or any part of it, by their own acts, their ground of complaint would have been narrowed in proportion ; and no doubt their dilatoriness in sending off the delegation was the first step that led to it. Nevertheless, as this propensity to procrastinale is an infirmity well known in the Indians, it would seem that prudence required of the Senate, which could not but see the incongruity it was sanctioning in such a solemn manner, to provide some guard against its effects. A very slight acquaintance with the Indians would have suggested a strong doubt, whether these tribes would submit to such a violent compression of the privileges of three years into one ; especially when they are wont to linger to ihe last moment, in all cases of emigration, upon dear and

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considered the delegation bound to report the result of examination, and permit a national action upon a measure important to their future welfare, before emigration beHe irrevocably settled. Such a course, however, was now

Juded, as the act of the delegation had been deemed scient to give validity to the treaty, which was presented he Senate in April, 1834, and ratified by that body. C'he treaty thus becoming the supreme law of the land," its defecis and evils were fixed, and, as it were, irediable. Its execution became imperative, even with s contradictory and seemingly impracticable provisions. he very moment that its ratification was perfected, the

had passed when one of its main stipulations was to have - fulfilled; and in 1835 no emigration had taken place, i, according to the terms of the treaty, it should have on the eve of completion. Under such an embarrass

the President, it is stated by Mr. Everett, asked the on of his Attorney-General, who decided that the stipus in this respect were not vacated by the lapse of time,

the Phis Attorne were not beat the fred in the ir

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nly postponed; that is, that the emigration, instead of

place at the impossible dates specified in the treaty, must
blace in 1835 and the two following years. Such a de-

even if not most strictly warranted, wore at least the
ance of justice and lenity, and might perhaps have been
| into effect without any serious or openly hostile
rion. But the President, probably under a belief that
Latitude of construction was inadmissible, determined
the alternative left, which was to crowd the stipula-
: three years into one. If the Indians had produced
av, or any part of it, by their own acts, their ground
plaint would have been narrowed in proportion; and

their dilatoriness in sending off the delegation was
1 step that led to it. Nevertheless, as this propensity
castinale is an infirmity well known in the Indians, it
seem that prudence required of the Senate, which
ot but see the incongruity it was sanctioning in

solemn manner, to provide some guard against its

A very slight acquaintance with the Indians would gested a strong doubt, whether these tribes would

such a violent compression of the privileges of three 10 one ; especially when they are wont to linger to moment, in all cases of emigration, upon dear and

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chief led to no retaliation. Such forbearance bespoke the overwhelming ascendency of the anti-emigrating party. Another far more audacious demonstration of hostility to emigration, and to all who were concerned in promoting it, or appointed to conduct it, appeared in the slaughter of General Thompson, the United States' Indian agent for these tribes, then stationed at Fort King. While walking in the very shadow of the fort, he was riddled by a volley of rifle-balls, which a covert party of Indians, said to have been headed by this same Oceola, concentrated upon him. There were, at the same time, other victims of less note to the same daring spirit of hostility to emigration.

These acts were sufficiently significant of the aspect which affairs had assumed in that quarter, and afforded the most unequivocal proof that nothing but the strong arm of power could enforce the treaty ; that persuasion was unavailing ; that peaceful submission was at an end. Was this power provided ? Mr. Everett says it was not. General Clinch, who was the army officer then in command in Florida, has said the same; has publicly and in the most formal manner asserted, that his call for troops was but imperfectly answered, that the force with which he was furnished sell much short of his demands, and equally short of the urgent necessities of the case. We are well aware that the then Secretary of War has met this statement with a counterstatement, and we believe that there was an intention on the part of the War Department to meet, in the fullest manner, the wishes and views of the officer in command, and that the deficiency arose from a misapprehension of the strength of companies ordered to report to him. At the same time we have little doubt that the President, while he was willing that all required reinforcement of the Florida troops should be made, entertained an opinion of the tribes which were to emigrate, that almost excluded any apprehension of a serious and general resistance to the execution of the treaty. He had once, while commanding in the field, easily broken the power of a part of these very Indians ; and rating their numbers very low,* probably could not persuade himself that they medi

* Mr. Everett says; “ I have means of being assured, by the best authority, that the President rated the Seminole warriors at not exceeding 400. "The then Secretary of War rated them at 750.”

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rief led to no retaliation. Such forbearance bespoke the 'erwhelming ascendency of the anti-emigrating party. Anher far more audacious demonstration of hostility to emiration, and to all who were concerned in promoting it, or pointed to conduct it, appeared in the slaughter of General hompson, the United States' Indian agent for these tribes, en stationed at Fort King. While walking in the very adow of the fort, he was riddled by a volley of rifle-balls, nich a covert party of Indians, said to have been headed by s same Oceola, concentrated upon him. There were, the same time, other victims of less note to the same ing spirit of hostility to emigration. These acts were sufficiently significant of the aspect which Firs bad assumed in that quarter, and afforded the most quivocal proof that nothing but the strong arm of power ld enforce the treaty ; that persuasion was unavailing;

peaceful submission was at an end. Was this power ided ? Mr. Everett says it was not. General Clinch,

was the army officer then in command in Florida, has the same; has publicly and in the niost formal manner rted, that bis call for troops was but imperfectly answered, the force with which he was furnished sell much short is demands, and equally short of the urgent necessities e case. We are well aware that the then Secretary of has met this statement with a counterstatement, and we e that there was an intention on the part of the War rtment to meet, in the fullest manner, the wishes and of the officer in command, and that the deficiency arose misapprehension of the strength of companies ordered ort to him. At the same time we have little doubt he President, while he was willing that all required cement of the Florida troops should be made, enteran opinion of the tribes which were to emigrate, that excluded any apprehension of a serious and general ce to the execution of the treaty. He had once,

ommanding in the field, easily broken the power of a

these very Indians; and rating their numbers very vrobably could not persuade himself that they medi

Everett savs ; " I have means of being assured, by the best auhat the President rated the Seminole warriors at not exceeding , then Secretary of War rated them at 750."

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