it? The States alone. Their delegates framed it in the Federal convention: their citizens adopted it in the State conventions. The North-West Territory was then in existence, and had been for three years; yet it had no voice, either in the framing, or adopting of the instrument-no delegate at Philadelphia, no submission of it to their will for adoption. The preamble shows it was made by States, and for States. Territories are not alluded to in it. The body of the instrument shows the same thing, every clause, except one, being for States; and Territories, as political entities, never mentioned once; and the word "territory," occurring but once, and that as property, assimilated to other property—as land, in fact; and as a thing to be disposed of—to be sold. Now you never sell a territorial government; but you sell property and in that sense alone does the word territory occur, and that but once in the whole instrument. Tried by the practice under it, and the Territory is a subject, without a political right—no right to vote for President, or Vice President, or Senator, or Representative in Congress; nor even to vote through their delegate, on any question in Congress—all their officers appointable and removable by the federal authority, even their judges-their Territory to be cut up as Congress pleases; even parts of it to be given to Indians: no political rights under it, except as specially granted by Congress: no benefit from any act of Congress, except specially named in it, or the act specially extended to them, like the subject colonies and dependencies of Great Britain. How can the Constitution go to them of itself, when no act of Congress under it can go to them unless specially extended? Far from embracing these Territories, the Constitution ignores them, and even refuses to recognize their existence where it would seem to be necessary --as in the case of fugitives from service, and from labor. Look at the clause. It only applies to States--fugitives from States to States. Why? because the ordinance of '87, the organic law of the Territories, made that provision for the Territories, and about in the same words, and before it was put in the Consti * "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, and escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such service, or labor, may be due."-- Article 4, sec. 2. tution.* In both places it is an organic provision, barren of execution until a law should be passed under it to give it effectwhich was done in the fugitive slave and criminal act of 1793 -that act applying to Territories as well as to States-and so carrying both the Constitution and the ordinance into effect. This view is fundamental and decisive, and requires to be better known by the public than it is. There are two distinct clauses in the Constitution-one applying to fugitives from service, the other to fugitives from justice. They are both limited to States. Under these clauses, a criminal or slave fugitive to or from a Territory, or from one Territory to another, or from one State to a Territory, or from a Territory to a State, cannot be demanded. A felon escaping with a stolen slave into a Territory, cannot be demanded under the Constitution. There are other clauses in the Constitution relating to slaves, not one of which extends to Territories. The fourth Article, section 4, guarantees protection against "domestic violence," (servile insurrection;) but the protection is limited to States. Territories can only receive it from Congress. The acknowledgment of property in a slave, contained in the first Article, (which taxes slaves as property,) is confined to States. Not a clause in the Constitution which relates to slaves, extends to Territoriesneither the fugitive slave clause, nor the protection against domestic violence, nor the acknowledgment of property implied in taxation and if the Constitution was extended to Territories, (which it cannot be,) not a claim could be set up under it for protection to slave property! Not a law could be made under it for the protection of that property. The Constitution does * "Provided, always, that any person escaping into the same, (the North-West Territory,) from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.”—Ordinance of '87, Art. 6. "Any person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."—Article 4, section 2. The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence."-Art. 4, sec. 4. not even grant protection to a Territory against invasion!* nor does it guarantee them a republican † form of government! and that is the reason that they have never been governed on republican principles. And this is the instrument which gives such supreme protection to slave property in Territories! After this, to say that the Constitution extends to Territories, would be about equal to saying that the territorial ordinance of '87 extends to the States. The pretension was driven out of Congress when it presented itself there: judicially decreed by the Supreme Court, it becomes accepted law to one half the Union; and acquiescence from all others who do not consider the difference between judicial and political subjects and is not to be a barren power in the administration of our Government. Mr. Calhoun declared its effect when he proclaimed it, saying: "I deny that the laws of Mexico can have the effect attributed to them, (that of keeping Slavery out of New Mexico and California.) As soon as the treaty between the two countries is ratified, the sovereignty and authority of Mexico in the territory acquired by it becomes x extinct, and that of the United States is substituted in its place, conveying the Constitution with its overriding control over all the laws and institutions of Mexico inconsistent with it."-Oregon Debate, 1848. This is the declared effect of the transmigration of the Constitution to free territory by the author of the doctrine; and great is the extent of country, either acquired or to be acquired, in which the doctrine is to have application. All New Mexico and California at the time it was broached-all the Territories now held, wherever situated, and as much as can be added to them these additions have already been considerable, and vast and varied accessions are still expected. Arizonia has been acquired; fifty millions were offered to Mexico for her northern half, to include Monterey and Saltillo; a vast sum is now offered for Sonora and Sinaloa, down to Guaymas; Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, Panama, Darien, the Spanish part of San Domingo, Cuba! with islands on both sides of the tropical continent. Nor do we stop at the two Americas, their coasts and islands, extensive as they are; but circumvolving the terraqueous globe, we look wistfully at the Sandwich Islands, and on some gem in the Polynesian group; and plunging to the antipodes, pounce down upon Formosa in the Chinese Sea. Such were the schemes of the last Administration, and must continue, if its policy should continue. Over all these provinces, isthmuses, islands, and ports, now free, our Constitution must spread, (if we acquire them, and the decision of the Supreme Court stands,) overriding and overruling all anti-slavery law in their respective limits, and planting African slavery in its place, beyond the power of Congress or the people there to prevent it. I object to the Court's opinion, not only because it was without jurisdiction, and wrong in itself, but because it was political, pertaining to the policy, or civil government of the Unioninterfering with the administration of the affairs of the State. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION ON THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AS PRONOUNCED IN THE DRED SCOTT CASE. This Examination divides itself into three parts: FIRST.-As it concerns the power exercised by Congress over the original Territory of the United States. SECONDLY.As it concerns the new Territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase. THIRDLY.-As it concerns the Missouri Compromise Act. And it will be the point of the whole Examination to show that Congress exercised, and rightfully, supreme authority over these Territories, both original and acquired; that it governed them independently of the Constitution, and incompatibly with it, and by virtue of sovereign and proprietary rights; that it did what it deemed best for the young community, as a father does for his children; and that the question of admitting or prohibiting slavery, either in the new or old Territories, never rose higher than a question of expediency. And that this continued to be the case, without distinction of men or parties, and with the |