Georgia-the last of the effective ceding States, and in her deed of cession made it also an irrevocable article of compact, the same as North Carolina had done, that the ordinance should be extended to her ceded territory-now the States of Alabama and Mississippi. The stipulation was in these words: (and that of North Carolina was the same :)—

"That the territory thus ceded shall form a State, and be admitted as such into the Union as soon as it shall contain 60,000 free inhabitants, or at an earlier period, if Congress shall think expedient, on the same conditions and restrictions, with the same privileges, and in the same manner provided in the ordinance of Congress of the 13th of July, 1787, for the government of the Western Territory of the United States, which ordinance shall, in all its parts, extend to the territory contained in the present act of session, that article only excepted which forbids slavery.”

This was in the year 1802; and thus we have, in a period of fourteen years, the sanctions of the three great ceding Statesand they Southern States-to this ordinance; Virginia, as a question of expediency, accepting the abolition of slavery on the part she ceded; North Carolina and Georgia, as a like question of expediency, retaining slavery in the parts ceded by them. It is needless to add that all the other nominally ceding States, (South Carolina inclusive,) gave in their sanction to the ordinance-after it was made, as well through their delegates in the old Congress when it was made-and through their representatives in the first Federal Congress when it was adopted.

I return to the Congress-the Federal Congress, and give two strong instances of action on slavery in that body-South-western Territory, and original United States Territory; one in 1798, the other in 1806. The first was in organizing the Mississippi Territory, which was done by spreading the ordinance of '87 over it; the whole, with the exception of the anti-slavery clause, and that clause having been proposed to be applied to it also, it was resisted solely upon expedient grounds-not a word being uttered against the power of Congress to do so.* But a provi

* Mr. Harper, of South Carolina: "In the Northwestern Territory the regulation forbidding slavery was a very proper one, as the people inhabiting that part of the country were from parts where slavery did not prevail, and they had, of course, no slaves among them; but in the Mississippi Territory it would be very improper to make such a regulation, as that species of property already exists, and persons emigrat

sion in restraint of the growth of slavery there was adopted, (on the motion of Mr. Robert Goodloe Harper, of South Carolina,) in forbidding the importation of slaves from any port or place without the limits of the United States, and making such importation a penal offence, punishable by fine, and giving freedom to the slave. This was a strong measure, especially in its penalty, and marks the difference between States and Territories, being ten years before Congress would have the constitutional right to prohibit such importation into one of the old States.

The other instance was in the year 1806, when Mr. David R. Williams, then, and for six years afterwards, a leading member from South Carolina, moved, (Feby. 7,) that a committee be

ing there from the Southern States would carry with them property of this kind. To agree to such a proposition would, therefore, be a decree of banishment to all the persons settled there, and of exclusion to all those intending to go there. He believed it could not, therefore, be carried into effect, as it struck at the habits and customs of the people." Mr. Giles, of Virginia: "Did not know whether the tendency of the proposed measure was calculated to ameliorate the condition of the class of men alluded to: he believed not. On the contrary, it was his opinion that, if the slaves of the Southern States were permitted to go into the Southern country, by lessening the number in these States, and spreading them over a large surface of country there would be, a greater probability of ameliorating their condition." Mr. John Nicholas, of Virginia, and Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, spoke against the expediency of the measure; and also some members from the free States-among them Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, of Massachusetts, who was glad to have it in his power to show his indisposition to interfere with the Southern States in their management of this species of property. "He thought it was not the business of those who had nothing to do with that kind of property to interfere with that right; and he really wished that the gentlemen who held slaves might not be deprived of the means of keeping them in order. If the amendment prevailed, it would declare that no slavery should exist in the Natchez country. This would not only be a sentence of banishment, but of war. An immediate insurrection would take place, and the inhabitants would not be suffered to retire in peace, but would be massacred on the spot." None of these speakers, nor anybody else at that time, saw any thing unconstitutional in Congress legislating upon slavery in Territories, and abolishing it in such districts if it thought proper.

*Section 7. "That from and after the establishment of the aforesaid government, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons, to import or bring into the said Mississippi Territory, from any port or place without the limits of the United States, or to cause to be so imported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or slaves; and that every person so offending, and being thereof convicted before any court within the said Territory, having competent jurisdiction, shall forfeit and pay for each and every slave so imported or brought, the sum of three hundred dollars; one moiety for the use of the United States, and the other moiety for the use of any person or persons who shall sue for the same; and that every slave, so imported or brought, shall thereupon become entitled to, and receive his or her freedom." [Act of April 7, 1798.]

appointed, "to inquire wither any, and if any, what additional provisions were necessary to prevent the importation of slaves into the Territories of the United States." The committee was granted, and the members consisted almost exclusively of slave State representatives, to wit: Mr. David R. Williams, of South Carolina; Mr. John G. Jackson, of Virginia; Mr. Thomas Spalding, of Georgia; Mr. James Kelly, of Pennsylvania; and Mr. William Blackledge, of North Carolina: Mr. Macon, of North Carolina, the speaker, making the appointments. On the 27th of March, the committee reported, and brought forward a bill, “to prohibit the introduction of slaves into the Mississippi Territory, and the Territory of Orleans; " which was read a first, and a second time, and committed to a Committee of the whole House; but was not reached during the brief remainder of the season. The proceedings upon it, however, as far as they went, are pregnant with pertinent reflection. The motion was made by a Southern member; the committee, appointed by a Southern speaker, were four to one from the slave States: the bill seems to have been unanimously reported; it applied both to the original and the newly acquired territory, and in all the steps in relation to it-raising the committee, reading the bill, referring it to the Committee of the whole House; it was treated as a mere ordinary piece of legislation, to the consideration of which there was no objection. Though a silent mode of showing an opinion, there could not have been a clearer one in favor of the constitutionality of the proceeding, nor a stronger declaration that the House saw no difference in the power of Congress over the old and the new territory.*

In addition to these States, and the Congress, there was another authority which acknowledged this ordinance, and sanctioned it, and provided for it--and with power to do so; and that in the critical moment of its existence in the government's transition from the confederate to the Union State. That

* I have caused search to be made in the files of the House for this bill, but without effect-it belonging to the period when the capital was burnt by the British, and the records before 1814 in great part destroyed. But the precision of the journal shows the character of the bill,—" to prohibit the introduction of slaves into the Mississippi Territory, and Territory of Orleans." This was a universal prohibition, and evidently intended to restrain the great increase of slaves in those two Territories-the considerate and thinking men of that day looking forward to the time, when, in that extreme south, the black population might become too numerous for the tranquillity and safety of the white race.

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authority is the Constitution itself; a very competent authority, and which provided for the ordinance co-incidently with its creation, and in terms clear in themselves, and well understood at the time, though I believe forgotten now-although they stand in the Constitution, and nothing else has been found for them to attach to. It is in that clause of Article VI. which says:

"All debts contracted, and all engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation."

Here are two classes of obligations provided for-" debts contracted, and engagements entered into;"-and the framers of our Constitution were not the men to provide for two things when they only knew of one; nor even then to use two words when one was enough; nor to use any word which had not an object of its own to attach to. The first class of obligations here referred to the debts-readily commanded their appropriate attention, and were long enough a weight upon the country to be understood and remembered: but what of the other—“ engagements entered into,"-hardly remembered, or understood at all, and nothing to call attention to it, or any use for it since the 7th day of August, Anno Domini, 1789-the day on which the first Congress of the Constitution provided for the engagements which the Congress of the Confederation had entered into with the land-ceding States. The adoption of the ordinance of '87, on that day, was the performance of that engagement. The parties to it were the Congress of the Confederation and the land-ceding States-all of them; for it was known at the time that North Carolina and Georgia would follow the example of Virginia in ceding theirs. The engagement itself was,-first, to dispose of the ceded land, secondly, to build up political communities upon it. And the Constitution provided for the fulfilment of both branches of the engagement, and the adoption of the ordinance fulfilled the political part of the engagement, building up political communities on the Territory; and the clause in the Constitution for disposing of the Territory, and other property of the United States, followed by acts of Congress to sell the public land, fulfilled the other. This latter clause, with its authority to make needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, &c., has been, in latter times, generally under

stood as authorizing the political action of Congress over the Territories. The history of the times shows this to be an error, so far as giving a government to the Territory is to be understood. The clause, as first proposed by Mr. Madison, included temporary governments for the new States arising on this ter ritory. Referred to the Committee of Detail, of which Gouverneur Morris was chairman, it was returned with "governments" struck out, and adopted by the Convention as it now stands,* the "temporary governments" omitted, and "unappropriated lands" substituted by "territory or other property," and rules and regulations added-significant alterations, and which go to repulse the government power, and to identify "territory" as meaning land. This makes it clear that this needful rule and regulation clause did not include government, and that it was struck out, and properly because the ordinance had provided for these governments-both Territorial and State. I know it has been much, and most respectably relied on, that this clause gave to Congress both the right to govern these Territories, and to dispose of the lands within them. I think not, with respect to the government. As to the disposition of the territory, and the rules and regulations respecting it, I think Congress would have as much power in making this disposition and establishing these rules and regulations as any other land-holder; and that would certainly include, not merely its sale, but the choice of labor, free or slave, and the entrance of persons upon it.

It is remarkable that this ordinance of an expiring Government was its last act, and its adoption the first act (nearly) of the nascent Government, born out of its ruins; the former, a circumstance which has been dwelt upon (of late) to the disadvantage of the expiring Government, as an act of authority when

* The entries in relation to this clause, stand thus in Mr. Madison's debates in the Federal Convention:

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"Mr Madison submitted, in order to be referred to the Committee of Detail, the following powers, as proper to be added to those of the general legislature.

"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States.

"To institute temporary governments in the new States arising therein."

These propositions were referred to the Committee of Detail, August 18, 1787.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to take up the following:

"The legislature shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution contained shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims, either of the United States, or any particular States." [August 30.]