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status quo, the balance of power and the question of "the freedom of the seas." His attitude may be fairly gathered from the following detached excerpts: "He who has been well off or is well off is no friend to innovations" (p. 157). "What on the whole has been the attitude of the Americans towards the status quo? Did we accept the status quo when we dispossessed the Indians? Did we bow down before the principle when we published our Declaration of Independence in 1776?" (p. 158). "The rise of Germany has been as natural and as inevitable as that of our own country" (p. 159). "Such a development-it is a development wholly in the interests of civilization-has unavoidably disturbed the balance of power in Europe" (p. 160).

"The status quo makes for peace, but, if conditions change beyond a certain point, the peace may reveal itself as a frozen immobility which nations with life in them will reject as intolerable" (pp. 161-162). The author then discusses the growth of England's colonial empire and naval supremacy by conquest and forcible annexation, and the question of the "freedom of the seas," reaching the conclusion that "so long as the seas are under the dominant control of any one nation" the other strong nations "must feel that the great public highways of the world may at any time be closed to them." This, he says, "by weaker nations, will be felt to be intolerable, and, by strong nations, will not, in the long run, be tolerated" (pp. 169-70). The author insists that it is not a question of "substituting a dominant control by one nation for that. exercised before by another. It is a question of genuine internationalization" (p. 170). Besides the freedom of the seas, Professor Fullerton looks forward in the future, perhaps the remote future, to "a new conception of colonies in general" (p. 174).

The author does not go into detail as to the causes of the war except to reject as trivial and inadequate those ordinarily suggested. He evidently regards the war as the result of the readjustment of national values consequent upon the tremendous development of the German nation in the last half century; such a readjustment as it ought to be possible to make peaceably but which in any event must be made. That Germany "can be permanently relegated to the position of a second class Power, under the dictation of some other nation or group of nations," he regards, "as wholly inconceivable."

"Something else will have to be done with Germany. If the ancient privileges of some other nation stand in the way of the natural and wholesome growth of the German nation such ancient privileges will

have to be curtailed and some compromise arrived at" (p. 177). In other words, if England insists on retaining her naval supremacy and her colonial empire as they exist to-day, she must fight for them. While pointing the way to the new dispensation the author evidently thinks that until there has been a redress of grievances the law of the jungle must obtain "the good old plan, that they shall keep who have the power and they shall take who can"; and although the author appeals to Germany not to use the victory, which he evidently anticipates for her, either in the present war or later, like a giant but to use it for the benefit of mankind, the reader cannot but reflect that that is not the way that victories won under the law of the jungle have ordinarily been used in the past.

Although the author does not say so, the reflection naturally suggests itself, that the Monroe Doctrine is another "ancient privilege" which if Germany is victorious must either be "curtailed" or fought for. Let us hope that before the day comes when this question must be thrashed out, some such cosmopolitan basis of adjustment, as Professor Fullerton hopes for, may have been found, for, as he truly says in concluding his book, "The civilized world should be one and united. It is now not one and united. In bringing about the union of the future upon a reasonable basis the lead will have to be taken by the strong."

Every page shows Professor Fullerton's effort to be scrupulously fair and he has done a real service at a time like the present in drawing a concise and illuminating picture of German institutions which, it is believed, will be generally accepted as to its facts both by those who admire. and those who distrust them. For those who feel the need of an antidote as to certain matters of interpretation, the writer ventures to recommend Owen Wister's "The Pentecost of Calamity."

WILLIAM CULLEN DENNIS.

El Derecho Publico Internacional y La Guerra. By Dr. Fed. Henriquez y Carvajal. 1915. pp. 40.

This is an address delivered by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Dominican Republic before the Professional Institute of Santo Domingo. The author speaks particularly on the subjects of blockade, bombardment, and neutral states. He discusses England's action not only in blockading German ports, but, also, her domination to a considerable extent of the Baltic, the declaration of a maritime zone of war by Germany and Great Britain, as well as submarine warfare.

The author says that the rights and guaranties of neutrals have suffered to, such an extent that they are almost annulled. Transatlantic ships, messengers of peace and progress, have been torpedoed, without their having time to know from whence death came. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany is considered to be one of the greatest crimes committed.

The booklet is written in an attractive style, and is especially interesting reading on account of its showing the views of a distinguished Dominican jurist on some of the legal aspects of the present war.

WALTER SCOTT PENFIELD.

The Prisoners of War Information Bureau in London. By Ronald F. Roxburgh. With an introduction by L. Oppenheim. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1915. pp. xv, 64. 90 cents net.

In preparing this study of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, established by the British Government in pursuance of the provisions. of the Geneva Convention of 1906 and the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the laws and customs of war on land, the author has performed a useful service to those who are interested more particularly in the humanitarian side of war. Sections III to XI, inclusive, deal with the constitution and actual work of the bureau in performing the various duties with reference to prisoners of war now imposed upon belligerents by international convention. Appended to these sections are reproductions of the blank cards and forms used by the bureau in keeping its records and making its returns.

Section I states the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and Section II contains a summary of the former barbarous practices and of the growth of the present humanitarian practice with reference to the treatment of prisoners of war. It is interesting to note that bureaux of information concerning prisoners of war were voluntarily established by belligerents in most of the wars since the Geneva Convention of 1864, the principal exceptions being the Boer War and the Spanish-American War.

The introduction by Professor Oppenheim, of the University of Cambridge, at whose suggestion the brochure was prepared, calls attention to the enlargement in the present war of the class of persons considered prisoners of war to include enemy civilians in the territory of belligerents, which, he states, is an entirely novel departure. He justifies the practice of interning enemy civilians who are reservists or are of a military

age, on the ground that all able-bodied men within certain ages are now potential members of the armed forces, and a belligerent cannot be expected to allow such enemies to withdraw to join the armed forces. If the number of such aliens is so great that the belligerent's safety is endangered, he may, for military reasons, be compelled to intern them. Professor Oppenheim holds that "if a person is interned at all, his treatment as a prisoner of war is the mildest treatment possible," and he attaches a memorandum from Sir Edward Grey to the American Ambassador, outlining in detail the treatment of interned civilians and prisoners of war in Great Britain.

In concluding his work, Mr. Roxburgh states that "it is perhaps not too much to hope that if the humane endeavors of the British Government were better known to the world and to the people of Germany, they would out of gratitude urge their own Government to take more pains to see that inquiries from England were answered, and to send complete, regular, and accurate lists of British and Belgian prisoners of war in Germany, and of soldiers buried by the German armies." Our readers who are interested in pursuing the subject of the treatment of interned British subjects in Germany are referred to the reports of the American officials communicated to the British Government and laid before Parliament, listed in the "Public Documents relating to International Law," in this JOURNAL for July and October, 1915.

GEO. A. FINCH.

Nationalism and War in the Near East. "By a Diplomatist." Edited by Lord Courtney of Penwith. (Published under the direction of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History, John Bates Clark, Director.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1915. pp. xxvi, 428+6. $4.15 net.

Lord Courtney of Penwith in his editorial preface to this most interesting book well says:

This is an original, thoughtful, and a thought-provoking book. It invites to inquiry and reflection. The real student will be thankful for the lead he gets, but he will examine and re-examine the statements of facts and arguments submitted for his consideration. The book will thus prove its value, and it may be recommended to those who wish to learn, few perhaps rather than many, with the counsel long since given: "Try all things. Hold fast to that which is good."

This word of appreciation constitutes a discriminating criticism of a general character which may properly serve as the basis of a review of the book in question.

It should be noted that this book was written before the outbreak of the present war at the request of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in pursuance of a recommendation made by the Conference of foreign representatives held at Berne in 1911 under the auspices of the Endowment. This recommendation called for research on the topic "Historical presentation of the causes of war in modern times, tracing especially the influence exercised by the striving for political power, by the growth of the national idea, by the political aspirations of races and by economic interests." No more vitally interesting field of research could have been chosen than that of the Near East where the question of nationalism has been so prominently and vigorously to the foreground in recent years.

The person chosen for this great task, judging by intrinsic evidence, was evidently well qualified by reason of his intellectual capacity as well as by reason of his training as a journalist and diplomatist. His very anonymity lends interest to his book. In fact it leads one to ask whether the cause of truth would not be better served if we could concentrate our interest on ideas rather than on the character and prestige of the one who speaks.

Whether one assents or not, the ideas presented in this volume are extraordinarily interesting. It must be confessed that the author would seem to be laboring under something of a disadvantage in endeavoring for the first time perhaps in his experience to find the philosophical explanation for political phenomena which he has previously considered rather from the journalistic and diplomatic points of view. In this respect he is not always convincing. He frequently interjects theories concerning the militaristic causes of war, the "democratization of diplomacy "and other matters, in an incomplete manner that cannot convince. His conclusions frequently seem tentative rather than final. In some places his inferences are obviously without justification. For example, he attributes to President Wilson the deliberate intention to restore the balance of power in the Aegean by recommending the sale of two battleships to Greece by the United States Government! It is to be hoped that the Turkish Government did not also interpret this action of the United States as does the author:

The policy of the United States President, both in its inspiration and method, should cause some searchings of heart to those who reflect what might have been the history of the Balkan Wars had the democracies of Western Europe been represented by such elevated inspiration and by such effective intervention (p. 291).

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