Panama Canal by securing an exclusive right to the Nicaragua route so far as the Republic of Nicaragua can grant it, and to have the right to a naval station in Fonseca Bay. I was not in favor of the more extensive provisions originally proposed similar to those in the Platt Amendment, because I considered that they went far beyond the Platt Amendment and unduly interfered with the independence of Nicaragua. I was unwilling to have our government accept from any Nicaraguan Government a grant of power which I felt certain the people of Nicaragua would not and ought not to approve. With those provisions out, however, and nothing left but the grant which I have described, I voted for a favorable report on the treaty.

If, according to Mr. Root, the Nicaraguan Government proposed to that of the United States certain alienations of sovereign rights which no civilized country would part with and which are improper for the government which proposed them, would not such alienations be still more improper in respect to third parties who may be prejudiced in their rights and even in their independence by such concessions? Disregarding many instances to be found in diplomatic history, such as those involving Egypt and the Far East, how can the Nicaraguan Government claim to be ignorant of the danger which the naval base within the Gulf would mean against our autonomy? The fear which the granting of a naval base causes to the other states, is more than sufficient, without considering the duties which Central American solidarity imposes, for Nicaragua to abstain from committing any act which might give rise to fears for the security of her neighbors.

The right of self-preservation is so dominant and strong in nations, that it has always imposed serious restrictions upon the freedom of action of other states. It would be idle to cite the innumerable cases which have enriched the history of international law in which the right of security of one country has imposed very marked limitations upon the right of international liberty of the other nations.

But, without going any further, the soundest and only real foundation of the Monroe Doctrine is the right of security and of self-protection which the United States owe to themselves as an independent nation. In the remarkable paper read by the eminent statesman, Mr. Elihu Root, before the American Society of International Law, entitled "The Real Monroe Doctrine," it was said by him in regard to the foundation of the Doctrine:

The doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law. The right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilization of an army by another Power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state's own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime advantage, or the indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic arrangement. For example, the objection of England in 1911 to the occupation of a naval station by Germany on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; the objection of the European Powers generally to the vast force of Russia extending its territory to the Mediterranean; the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin; the establishment of buffer states; the objection to the succession of a German prince to the throne of Spain; the many forms of the eastern question; the centuries of struggle to preserve the balance of power in Europe; all depend upon the very same principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine; that is to say, upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself. Of course, each state must judge for itself when a threatened act will create such a situation. If any state objects to a threatened act and the reasonableness of its objection is not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the power behind it.2

The right of self-defense, then, justifies the riparian states in opposing the establishment of a station within the Gulf of Fonseca, just as England and France opposed the naval base which Germany proposed to establish at Agadir, even although that place is quite distant from the French and British Moroccan possessions, while the coasts and islands possessed by Salvador and Honduras within the Gulf of Fonseca are within the range of artillery from the Nicaraguan shores where the naval base sought by the United States would be established.

The Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, like the Sultan of Morocco, do not seem to have seriously regarded the establishment in their vicinity of a naval base by one of the most powerful nations which

2 Proceedings of the Society for 1914, pp. 11-12. ED.

will be equivalent to the creation of a military force so powerful that in time of peace it will restrict the rights of police and free navigation of the riparian and even foreign countries, and, in time of war, it must necessarily infringe upon the freedom of action of both natives and foreigners within the extensive zone in controversy, as far as the military power and the menace of the naval establishment proposed by the Government of the United States will reach. It is to be observed that the Government of Salvador is, as shown by Mr. Root and in accordance with all authorities on international law, the only competent judge to decide upon alleged danger which threatens the Salvadorean Government in consequence of the permanent occupation of the Gulf by the military forces which the United States would maintain within the naval base in question.

From this juridical solidarity the doctrines of the community of maritime rights of riparian states receives its greatest support and its complete political and juridical justification. In proof of this, neither the American Government has specifically denied the rights of Salvador within the juridical community of the Gulf, nor have its most noted statesmen failed to recognize those rights. Secretary Bryan proposed pecuniary compensations to the Salvadorean Minister at Washington, for such rights, a proposition which was flatly rejected by the Salvadorean Minister, not only because the Government of Salvador does not speculate in rights of national sovereignty, but because such a thing is prohibited by the political constitution of the Republic.

The eminent statesman, Mr. Root, in the letter published by the Century, expresses himself on this point as follows: 3

The proposed treaty is acceptable in substance, as it will benefit the country, but it should be negotiated with a new, freely elected govern

ment.

Moreover, Costa Rica must be first consulted, in so far as the granting by Nicaragua of the canal rights is concerned, in accordance with existing treaties and the Cleveland award. As to the naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, a joint treaty, or simultaneous treaties, should be made with Honduras and Salvador.

The author has fallen into error in attributing this statement to Mr. Root. The language he quotes is that of Mr. Lincoln G. Valentine, the author of the article entitled "Meddling with our Neighbors," printed in the Century, ib., see p. 807.-Ed.

The diplomatic task undertaken by Salvador to induce the Government of the United States to recognize its maritime community property rights with Honduras and Nicaragua within the Gulf is very meritorious; and this triumph of a weak country, while it suggests the great developments in this continent in the future, signally shows the high-minded spirit of equity and justice which animates the government and statesmen of the country of Washington and Jefferson.

In view of the foregoing considerations, there can be no doubt that the suit which must be undertaken against Nicaragua will have all of the characteristics of a legal dispute. It would besides have the exceeding novelty of being a process in which arbitration would solve a question of American international policy. In this way and through this channel it is firmly believed that the important question of the Gulf of Fonseca involving the neutrality of Honduras must be solved. Then the world would see that, not only disputes of a juridical nature, but even the most difficult and delicate controversies of policy and diplomacy, may find a peaceful and equitable solution in the arbitral award of an international court of justice. That, indeed, would undoubtedly be a great triumph of peace over war.1

SALVADOR RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ.

See the editorial comment on this question which appeared in this JOURNAL for April, 1916, p. 344, giving the status of the matter as it existed at that time. ED.

NEUTRALITY AND THE SALE OF ARMS

The extent to which belligerents may interfere with the commerce of neutrals, on sea or land, has been in all wars a question of warm and continued dispute. A powerful belligerent is apt to proceed lawlessly, and a powerful neutral is apt to claim more rights than the authorities concede. It could not be expected that the present state of war, involving every first class Power in the world, except the United States, and many of the lesser states as well, would be free from such complications, and this expectation has certainly been realized.

It would be improvident to undertake the discussion of so broad a topic as the whole of this controversy. This writer has several times, before considerable assemblies and in various publications, ventured to express his opinion on one limited portion of this dispute, namely, as to the right of neutrals to export munitions of war to belligerents and the extent to which the other belligerents are entitled to complain of or interrupt such trade.

He presented them orally at Philadelphia before the American Academy of Political and Social Science,1 before the National Convention of the Navy League of the United States at Washington, April 1916, and more briefly before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law for 1916. He has expressed them in the publications of the societies named above, and also in The Outlook, March 3, 1915, and in the New York Herald, May 6, 1915, and these expressions have been somewhat quoted and made the text of editorial remark. The writer has been asked to restate his facts and arguments for this Journal for convenience of access, and complies with the request.

The suggestion that such export is illegal, immoral and impolitic proceeds from many respectable sources and especially from those, including clergymen and women, who desire to promote peace and incautiously endorse any expedient claiming that result. Senator La

1 See The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, July, 1915, Publication No. 913.