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themselves in him. Thirdly, there is the study of criminals inter se, withdrawn from social relationships, and under the special discipline of prison life. Although these have all an evident bearing one upon the other, they yet form distinct standpoints from which modes of mind in criminals may be viewed and investigated. It is mainly from the last-named standpoint that these chapters have been penned as a contribution to the study of criminal psychology.

The accompanying pictures in heliotype, taken from original photographs, are sufficiently well-marked to form typical illustrations of the physiognomy in weak-minded criminals:

1.-An Irish pig-driver. Crime-Rape and Manslaughter, with one previous conviction for theft. Remarkable baboon-like expression-a veritable "missing link." Simple mental weakness, with animal propensities.

2.-A habitual criminal. Crime-wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm: : twenty-seven previous convictions, mostly for robbery. Gross, violent and brutish. Hopelessly intractable. Emotional exaltation of mind.

3.-Crime-Arson: after seven summary convictions for theft and misdemeanour. Cunning, treacherous and violent. Mental exaltation.

4.-Crime-Larceny: two previous convictions. Fanciful, destructive, and vicious. Ugly, weak countenance: has high notions of his personal attractions; numerous delusive ideas. Delusional exaltation.

5.-Crime-Rape: nine summary convictions for drunkenness and assault. Low-minded, sullen, obstinate, and determined: prison delusions about food and injustice of sentence; violent and threatening in manner. Delusional exalta

tion.

6. One of the "worst of men." Habitual criminal: thief from boyhood. Cunning, quarrelsome, irritating and mischievous, full of cowardly threats. Mental irritability. Emotional exaltation.

7.-Respectable, a casual criminal, a post-letter carrier, convicted of breach of trust. Mind a "prey to black despair." Melancholia with home sickness. 8.-Crime-Burglary, with three previous convictions: most likely the tool of others. A wretched, scrofulous creature; poverty of intellect, and some tendency to irritability and even extravagant fancies. Simple mental weakness. 9.-A boy, almost idiotic: convicted of an unnatural offence. Generally well-behaved in prison. Simple mental weakness.

10.-Crime-Manslaughter: agricultural labourer. Almost a mental "automaton." Lamentably weak, but behaves well usually. Simple mental

weakness.

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Moral Responsibility. By S. MESSENGER BRADLEY, F.R.C.S.

Moral Responsibility, although often treated from a metaphysical point of view, has seldom been regarded from a physical or physiological side, and yet it is from this source alone that we are at present able to gain any accurate information respecting the working of the mind, and it is chiefly from this basis that I purpose here regarding it. The means of observation which metaphysicians employ have been known to, and employed by, philosophers for the last two thousand years, and yet it must be admitted with but a poor result. Until physiology came to their aid, they had not arrived at a knowledge of the fact that the grey cortical matter of the brain is the seat of the mind, and that intellectual action involves definite physico-chemical changes which we are to some extent capable of estimating. The psychologists, indeed, fixing their attention solely upon subjective phenomena, resemble those fatuous fakirs, who, intent upon a particular point in their own bodies, come to believe that the umbilicus is the seat of wisdom; or, rather, they resemble the horse in a threshing floor, which, however rapidly it may seem to advance, only retraces its steps in one small unending circle. It is a simple fact that, whatever positive knowledge we possess of the mental process has been obtained by the aid of physiology, and it is equally certain that all the knowledge we are likely to attain for a long time, if not always, must be derived from the same source.

The statement of Carl Vogt, and others, that thought is secreted by the brain as bile is secreted by the liver, is inaccurate, inasmuch as the circulation of a healthy blood through the latter organ is all that is required to set the secreting machine a-going, whereas something besides pure blood is needed to put the cortical cells of the brain, or the thinking machine, in action. This additional factor is the very subject matter of thought itself-it consists of something external to the body, and, with the important exception of ideas which are the direct offspring of memory, this external is conveyed to the brain along the avenue of the senses; thus some ideas result from vibrations carried to the brain cells by the auditory nerve, others arise from molecular changes in the optic, olfactory, or glossopharyngeal nerves; while other groups of ideas are prompted by messages carried along the path of the spinal sensory nerves in general. But after all

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the brain does not widely differ from some other organs in thus requiring an external stimulus to rouse it into activity, e.g., a rough analogy may be traced between its action and that of the stomach, whose peptic glands secrete the gastric juice from the circulating blood, but need the stimulus of food to excite the process. An apparent exception to this mode of stimulation is afforded by the action of the brain when it responds to an effort of memory, but although in this case there is no tangible external, yet the fact that memory is the recollection of foregone ideas which have had in their creation a tangible external, and which are set in motion in every instance by more or less clearly traced suggestions from without, entitles us to place even memory in the category of external stimuli. When, for example, "a poet puts together some piece of imagery, or describes some fanciful object, such as a castle of indolence or a haunted house, he begins with a mind already imbued with whatever has been written upon the subject before, i.e., he has the external before him of another's description, who in his turn described some natural object and gave it a fanciful name." Thus every act of cerebration, conscious or unconscious, is the result of something existing outside the brain acting on the brain, something which is pre-existent; which is only stating in other terms that no such thing as entirely original thought is possible to the human mind. This statement may appear to open up the whole question in dispute between the two rival schools of moralists, the Utilitarian and the Intuitional, the former holding the opinion that no innate thought or principle exists in the mind, the latter arguing that we do possess innate principles, of which the "illative sense" of Newman may be taken as the highest example. For two hundred years the battle has raged between the two sects, and the victory cannot yet be claimed by either side. The present argument is not, however, at all affected by this contest, as I will briefly try to show, by quoting the doctrines of the rival schools. "It is an established opinion," says one of the greatest of Utilitarian philosophers, "among some men that there are in the human understanding certain innate principles, some primary notions, Kowai evvocat characters, as it were, stamped in upon the mind of man, which the soul receives at its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show how men barely, by the use of their natural faculties,

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