which make the whole world kin, or without obtaining wonderful glimpses into his own mental being, and thus, day by day, acquiring fresh knowledge. Nor will his observations and sympathies be limited to Animals; for as the mind evolves the ideas, which naturally flow from so suggestive a principle, it passes from one gradation of life to another, ever descending by imperceptible steps until at last the evervaried phenomena of vegetable life are brought into the same category, and the identity with his own of Mind in Creation, as well as in animal life, is made manifest, ..... The fact is, that no man is properly qualified to observe, compare, even estimate these mental phenomena in the organised beings below him, until he has. descended from that lofty pedestal upon which his Pride of Place has exalted him. That pride hinders the operation of his powers, whether of observation or of reflection, by restricting them to the narrow sphere of his own life. His prejudices blind him, or pervert his judgment; they harden his heart by contracting his sympathies; and so the hidden chords of his nature, which are in unison with those of the creatures below, rarely vibrate to the awakening of new ideas, or vibrate but imperfectly."* And again, he remarks :-" Vegetable life is so universally assumed to be, as a matter of course, unconscious, that it appears a mere folly to express a doubt of the assumption. But let a close observer and admirer of Flowers watch carefully their proceedings on the opposite assumption—namely, that they not only feel, but enjoy life, and he will be struck with the immense array of facts which may be adduced in support of it. Endow them hypothetically with consciousness, and they appear to the observer in an aspect altogether different. Their Instincts seem, indeed, mutatis mutandis, to be easily compared with those of the higher Animals. Unquestionably they are in the same category in this respect with the lower forms of animal life, respecting which it is impossible to determine whether they have Consciousness or not." + 66 Many other writers-botanical and psychological-speak of the instinct or instincts of plants; sometimes correlating them with the instincts of animals; in other cases regarding them as something sui generis-simply because of their occurrence in Plants, and of that curious bias or prejudice which leads even the most highly educated men to differentiate, * Review of "Psychological Inquiries," p. 481. + Ibid, p. 494. so far as they possibly can-evidence to the contrary, notwithstanding-Plants from Animals. A work entitled "Indications of Instinct," by the late Dr. Lindley Kemp,* contains a chapter on the "Instincts of Plants," as well as of all classes of animals. Remarks on the "Instinct of Plants," are also contained in the " Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons," by the late Rev. Dr. Duncan, of Ruthwell.† Professor Laycock describes in Plants, as in animals, "new Instincts and special hereditary adaptations to new conditions ;" and he speaks of "the atavistic transmission of Instinct, and of other capabilities, whether in Plants or animals."§ De la Mettrie, who has been introduced to English readers by Carlyle, as one of the boon companions of Frederick the Great in the early part of his reign, wrote a book having the title "Man a Plant."|| There can be no doubt that, at present, the Terminology of mental philosophy is most defective, and perplexing; and that it gives rise to much of the difficulty connected with comparisons-as to mental aptitudes, real or supposedbetween Man, the Lower Animals, and Plants. The same terms are frequently applied to these three groups of living beings in very different senses. Thus, the irritability of the Dionaea or Drosera is something very different from that of the caged baboon or ape. In the one case, the designation is applied to an action supposed to be purely reflex or excitomotor-unassociated with Consciousness; while, in the other, expression and action are said to result from a morbid Consciousness, and to be directed by disordered Reason or Feeling. Contractility under the influence of a stimulus, and irascibility, or irritability of temper, are very different things. Such terms as sensibility and sensitiveness are also very vaguely and very variously employed by physiologists, metaphysicians, and the general public; sometimes as denoting mere physical-muscular or nervousexcitability, sometimes in reference to keenness of moral feeling. In order to apply appropriately such terms as Mind, Consciousness, Intention, Design, Desire, to plants, it is obvious we must change, or, at least enlarge, our conceptions of their character, and our Definitions. The only alternative is a complete revolution in the terminology of A vol. of the "Traveller's Library," 8vo., London, 1854. § Ibid, p. 156. mental and pseudo-mental phenomena in man, the lower animals, and plants. For myself, I am not prepared to inaugurate any such revolution, being content to adopt the terms currently in use in their vague and comprehensive significations; applying them to all classes of organised beings; in other words, to regard mind, and all its essential or concomitant phenomena, as common in various senses or degrees to plants, the lower animals, and man. Skae's Classification of Mental Diseases. By T. S. CLOUSTON, M.D., F.R.C.P.E., F.R.S.E., Physician-Superintendent Royal Edinburgh Asylum. When I saw in the last number of this journal that Dr. Crichton Browne had essayed the task of criticising the system of classification of insanity devised by the late Dr. Skae, I knew the fact could not but be gratifying to Skae's friends. To have any system or theory subjected to independent criticism is very good for it. Then I could not forget that some of those who had advocated most earnestly Skae's classification had been pupils, assistants, and friends of his during life; and I was conscious, from my own experience, how much anyone in that position was inclined to look partially on his work. I felt sure that Dr. Browne, while seeing this, would not, in those circumstances, consider it a mortal sin, and would pass it gently and generously by. Indeed, I was a little afraid that he himself, as an old pupil of Skae, might be tempted to soften the stern tone befitting a critic, by something of the same pardonable feeling. He has striven to resist this impulse, and with much success. Another reason why I rejoiced that the merits of this system should be canvassed was, that I thought with, perhaps, natural partiality, that everyone must necessarily see something good in it; and that the fact of its being looked closely into by a competent and unbiased mind would produce a better understanding of Skae's point of view, and a more thorough sifting of the tares from the wheat. Not that such criticism had been wanting either at home or abroad. The system had been before the world for twelve years. The authors of all the standard books on psychological medicine and papers on classification published since that time had discussed its merits; and it did seem as if it were growing in favour. Maudsley, in each successive edition, had seemed to make more and more account of it; Blandford had assigned it a good place amongst other systems; Hack Tuke had given high praise to all the "somato-etiological" systems of looking at and classifying mental disease, and to Skae's in particular; Mitchell had declared it had taken hold of the medical mind; Thompson Dickson had said there was some good in it; and finally, that Nestor of alienists, whom Dr. Browne fitly describes as "the most illustrious representative of English medical psychology now living," Bucknill, had given it the truest flattery of all by incorporating its nomenclature in the orders, genera, and species of that classification which is the final result of his vast experience, the generalised sum of all his thinking. All these, and more, had found it had faults; but they all speak of it and its author with much respect. Then it is a mere matter of fact that its terminology had become a part-and an essential part-of recent writings on nervous and mental disease. When, in addition to all this array of criticism, I observed that Dr. Browne had entered the field, I was surely justified in the expectation that here was a critic who would combine the modesty of youth with the judgment of experience, the calmness and dignity of science with the sense of responsibility of a physician. I regret that I am obliged to take exception both to the matter and the manner of Dr. Browne's critique. I shall first endeavour to deal with its matter. To do this properly is no easy task. I do not mean that the arguments appear to me unanswerable, or the objections overwhelming; but that Dr. Browne, no doubt from his desire to be exhaustive, seems to have failed in arranging his ideas in that order, and in expressing himself with that clearness and point so very essential in a critique of any value. Dr. Browne begins by a defence of Esquirol's system. His argument is that "day by day it becomes more apparent that we shall never accurately make out the molecular changes which correspond with mental aberrations," being "still as far as ever from mounting a delusion in Canada balsam or from detecting despondency in a test tube." "It is clear, therefore, that these changes can furnish no direct assistance in the classification of the insaniæ." A pathological classification is, therefore, an impossibility. The dream of so many patient workers in clinical and pathological fields is a mere chimera. Now, is this position, so confidently stated, a correct inference from facts, or a mere assertion? It lies on the threshold of the main question at issue in the critique; but its examination may help us to understand our critic's mode of reasoning in other places. Let us see what reversing all this would bring us to. "Day by day it becomes more apparent that we shall soon accurately make out the molecular changes which correspond with mental aberrations, being on the eve of mounting a delusion in Canada balsam. It is clear, therefore, that a knowledge of these changes will furnish a direct assistance in the classification of the insania." Am I right in holding this position to be as good as the other, and as near truth? Neither of them are true inferences. They are both speculations taking the form of inductions from facts, but founded simply on the assertions and opinions of their authors. Now, this is a well-known mode of (so-called) reasoning used by the uneducated who can't see its unsoundness, or by the man who, knowing better, reasons with the ignorant. Supposing a critic of that time had said about Louis and Laenec's deductions, "day by day it becomes more apparent that we shall never accurately make out the pathological changes that occur in the lungs and heart which correspond with aberrations of the breathing, being still as far as ever from mounting a cough in a bottle of spirits, or from detecting palpitation in a spitbox. It is clear, therefore, that these changes can furnish no direct assistance in the classification of pulmonary and cardiac affections." What would now be thought of this bit of childish sophistry? Would it not simply be a standing record of the unwisdom of its author? Founding on this inference, Dr. Browne goes on:-" We must be content to seize upon the signs and symbols of insanity, and by a thoughtful analysis and synthesis of these to distinguish, as well as may be, their cerebral starting points. There is no force, therefore, in Dr. Skae's objection to Esquirol's system that it is a classification of symptoms, and not diseases." Is not this arriving at one negative conclusion founded on a mere assertion, making use of it as if it were a positive fact, and then basing another conclusion upon it? Even supposing a pathological classification to be impossible, does that prove that nothing but a symptomatological one is possible? It is noteworthy that it was at that point it began to "dawn on the critic' that Dr. Skae's mind must have been in a state of confusion as to the real significance and relations of symptoms," because Skae had said symptoms were not diseases! |