without necessarily supposing that more insanity is developed in urban than in rural communities.

The great question whether there is, or is not, a greater amount of insanity in urban than in rural communities remains, statistically, unanswered. My own opinion, valeat quantum, is that insanity is more common in towns than in country districts. But this opinion rests rather upon the evidence of greater physical degeneracy and disease, which has been shown to exist among urban than among rural populations, than on any statistical data at present available which bears directly on the question of lunacy. It is scarcely possible to believe that, if physical degeneracy of race and excessive mortality are found to be specially associated with urban life, the most delicate function of mind can be exempt from corresponding deterioration.

Dr. Paterson gives the following account of the rise and progress of the boarding-out system :

The aggregation of a number of special licensed houses in one or two particular localities, which has led so many persons to imagine that the out-door system of providing for lunatics in Scotland was but a reproduction of that of Gheel, has rather been the result of accidental circumstances than of any efforts made in that direction by the Board of Lunacy.

There arose the danger of a divided authority and management, and of an inconveniently large aggregation of cases within a limited area. Under such circumstances, the care and judgment exercised in the selection, both of guardians and of suitable patients, are apt to be less strict and uniform, and the lunatics, instead of being absorbed and lost sight of in the family, have a tendency to become too distinct and prominent an element in the population of the place.

System of Positive Polity; or, Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity. By AUGUSTE COMTE. Second volume, containing Social Statistics, or the Abstract Theory of Human Order.

The second volume of Comte's Positive Polity, translated by Mr. Frederic Harrison, has quickly followed the first volume, to which we directed attention in a recent number of this Journal. Gratifying as it is to find that the philosophy of this great thinker is thus being made accessible to English readers, it is to be feared that, for some time to come, such readers will be a select few. Comte's method is so loose, and his style so diffuse, involved, wordy, and full of repetition, that it is really a hard matter to hold one's attention to his line of thought; and it is not unlikely that some readers will be repelled by the

difficulties of the task. However, there can be no question that those who persevere, and overcome the difficulties which meet them at the outset, will be rewarded for what they may have undergone. They will find this volume, like the former volume, to contain a great deal of suggestive thought, even should they rebel against some of the philosophical views set forth in it. They cannot fail to discover, furthermore, in it the anticipation of much that has taken its place, and is, year by year, taking its place in the thought of the day. No doubt much of what Comte propounded as his philosophy was in existence before he thought and wrote; but we have no sympathy with that petty and carping criticism which finds nothing original in him, except extravagance, at which it takes delight to sneer. It is easy enough to pick out passages from different parts of his works which are inconsistent with one another-and the work is worthy of a narrow and pedantic mind-and easy enough to impale other passages which seem ridiculous enough when separated from their context; but it would be equally easy for a critic, and would show more breadth of mind, and more sincerity and generosity of feeling, to select passages which would convey to his reader a far truer and nobler conception of Comte's wide intellectual grasp, and of the services which he has rendered to philosophy. If we put aside altogether the value of his system of philosophy, it would still be impossible to deny him the honour of having been the founder of sociology. And, surely, great men have not been so many in the world that we can afford to make light of the founder of a new science. Most of those who are ambitious to do greatly in their lifetime, and to be remembered through the ages, would be content with that position.

The first chapter of this volume treats of the general theory of religion, or the positive theory of Human Unity; the second, of the material problem of human life, and the theory of Property; the third, of the theory of the Family; the fourth, of the theory of Language; the fifth, of the theory of Social Organization; the sixth, of the theory of Social Existence; and the seventh, of the limits of Social Variation. In order to follow the doctrines set forth in these chapters, it will be necessary to have previously mastered the leading doctrines elaborated in the first volume; and they should also be judged, eventually, by the light of the historical illustrations of them contained in the third, and the practical application of them contained in the fourth volume. The four volumes, therefore, constitute a whole which will not be understood without

patient and systematic study by readers who bring to it some training in the less complex sciences, especially biology, and the disposition and habits of mind which are recognised as indispensable for the study of them.

It will easily be seen, then, that anything like an adequate review of the contents of the volume is out of the question on this occasion. We shall content ourselves with making a few extracts from it; not for the purpose of showing inconsistencies and errors, but rather with a view to show that there is something to be learnt from it. In reference to the doctrine of the relations of adjustment between an organism and its en vironment, which fills so large a place in modern evolutional philosophy, take the following quotation :—

In the first place, every living being, though it be limited to a mere vegetative existence, is constantly modifying the environment on which it depends, through the substances which it consumes, and the products which it gives off. Besides, it modifies itself in order to accommodate its condition to its situation. This two-fold power of modification increases in the degree that the being rises in the scale of life, and becomes more highly developed. Now it is important to notice that the living being does not produce in the environment this capacity to receive the requisite modification. It confines itself to turning this capacity to account, Unless the environment were previously capable of modification in itself, the reaction arising from a source so feeble as that of the vital power necessarily is, would not succeed in changing the constitution of the medium around it. Again, the changes to which the material world is subject, from the mere conflict of the inorganic forces, are often far greater than all those which come from living beings. The only part, therefore, of these beings is to give to the world without the impulse which sets in operation a property of matter necessary to their very existence. But the only proper use to which this capacity for modification in matter can be devoted is simply to maintain this relation between the material world and living beings. Although we cannot conceive life existing in a sphere which is not capable of modification, we can readily imagine a sphere of such a kind, provided nothing be supposed to be living there, as in some of the uninhabitable planets. The normal capacity for modification which the material world presents is, therefore, intimately connected with the existence of life, though it is not the product of life.

As a result of this relation between the organism and its environment, there grows up in the progress of knowledge a perfect correspondence between man's brain and the world. Our practical wants originate real science, for it is, in the main,

for the purpose of modifying the order of nature that we need a knowledge of its laws. And, although we are in appearance exclusively pursuing material progress,

We are necessarily tending to the true perfection of the intellect, which is to transform our brains into a faithful mirror of the world which controls us.

Some of our modes of scientific precision, especially in astronomy, realise this high state of perfection, when the abstract elaboration of calculation within the human brain, duly prepared by training, comes to results identical with those of direct observation of the phenomena around us. Such harmony between the subjective and objective may be easily explained as a consequence of the natural law by which we are forced to draw from without the original material of our mental creations This admirable combination of fact and thought, as difficult as it is important, becomes certainly one of thec hief general results of human wisdom; nor could it be established until after immense preparation stretching over twenty-five centuries, and rising from the simplest to the most complex facts. We thus obtain order in our conceptions, even in our most spontaneous productions. In fact, the real laws of our moral and mental nature belong essentially to this system of positive science, between which they furnish the chief connecting links.

The chapter on the Theory of Language we have found very instructive, perhaps because we have read it more attentively than the other chapters. One extract must suffice here. After comparing language with religion in its origin and function, pointing out that it arises from feeling, and is perfected by thought, and after showing that its relations are with social life, and that it is transformed by, and along with, society, thus testifying by sure signs to the unselfish character of man's active existence, "( even in the midst of the empire of egoism over society." Comte sums up thus::

Following out these general truths, we may sum up the great analogy between language and religion by this formula: that language is the expression of that essential unity which religion. creates. Failing to seize this, the only point of view which is really universal, philosophers, both of the theological and of the metaphysical schools, have hitherto missed the profoundly social character of this institution. It is so essentially relative to the social, and not to the individual side of man, that mere personal impressions have never obtained any adequate expression, as is seen in the constant difficulty which the sick experience in expressing their sensations. To give the lowest degree of completeness to language, the influence of men in association must always be presupposed; and, indeed, the co-operation

of successive generations is quite as indispensable as that of contemporary individuals. The greatest efforts of the most systematic genius would always fail to construct by themselves any real language. And hus this, the most social of all institutions, places in hopeless contradiction those retrograde philosophers who are bent on limiting their science to the individual point of view. Indeed, the very sophisms by which they blaspheme humanity itself could not be uttered at all, but for a system of expressions which are the work of long generations of men co-operating together,

The work has been well translated by Mr. Frederick Harrison; but there has been a too free use of stops, commas having been inserted in such a lavish way, and not unfrequently in such improper places, as to increase the difficulties of the author's style. The translator has enriched the volume with clear and concise marginal notes, and has added a very complete table of

contents.

Christian Psychology: The Soul and the Body in their Correlation and Contrast. Being a new Translation of Swedenborg's Tractate de Commercio Animæ et Corporis, with Preface and Illustrative Notes. By T. M. GORMAN, M.A. Longmans and Co., 1875.

From Comte to Swedenborg is a considerable leap; and one may easily surmise what the disciples of the one prophet will think of the pretensions of the other. Mr. Gorman has no doubt of the superiority of his prophet to all other prophets; Swedenborg is a Saul among the prophets, taller by a head and shoulders than all the rest of them, "the greatest master in philosophy the world has ever seen," whose writings may be said to stand apart, and to be without parallel in the history of human speculation. To all those whose eyes are not blinded by prejudices, whose feelings are not debased by a malignant envy, and whose judgments are not vitiated by a pitiful selfconceit, it is "plain as way to parish church" that "in breadth and depth of mental group, in comprehensiveness of plan, and in the consistent and continuous development of first principles and truths, these remarkable writings may be said to stand apart, and to be without parallel in the history of human speculation." "These be prave words;" but let no man dare to question them, or he will instantly fall under the furious pelting of the pitiless storm of Mr. Gorman's abusive epithets. For Mr. Gorman swells to a magnificent height of virulence as he broods over the greatness of his subject, and the greatness