ness. Ergo, the potential knowledge cannot be in the mind, for it would then be conscious, that is, actual; nor can it be in memory, for memory is a function of mind, which cannot be unconscious either in its essence or function. Here, then, we are brought into a quandary: our potential knowledge is logically nowhere and nothing, though we still cannot but think that in nature it is somewhere and something. This comes of disquisitions in which vague words do duty for facts, and of a so-called philosophy in which it is not insisted that thoughts shall be in definite accordance with facts, and that words shall exactly define thoughts. The vagueness and unreality of the three propositions which we have quoted as a sample of the rest, might be exposed over and over again by bringing them to the test of facts. We will give one more illustration. All existing things are or are not conscious; consciousness and knowledge are identical; therefore all existing things that have consciousness have knowledge. Is that true? Apparently not: the author himself admits that there are beings low down in the animal scale which possess sensation, and, therefore, he says consciousness, but which have neither knowledge nor memory. And yet he leaves his fundamental propositions unaltered, and goes on his way rejoicing, to elaborate a system of philosophy founded upon them! Were he to supplement his interrogation of consciousness by a sincere and competent interrogation of nature, we doubt not that he would discover the necessity of making other qualifications of his propositions. The argument which he uses to prove that the seat of perception is not in the brain, but in the "unknown essence, mind," may be quoted to show how far he is from sounding the depths of his subject. It is this: "Neither is it situated within the body; for this is contradicted by the direct testimony of consciousness, which represents it as differently placed with regard to the body. It follows that both it and the body, as perceived in consciousness, are situated in the mind." Certainly it is a new discovery that consciousness informs us, by its direct testimony, how its states are placed with regard to the body, or how the brain is placed with regard to the body. Does it in fact give any information at all concerning the whereabouts of mind and brain in relation to body? So far as we understand the author's vague and somewhat obscure statement, it is that consciousness tells us that the perception is differently placed (differently from what?-the brain, we presume) with regard to the body, and that it follows that it is in the mind. But it is an indisputable fact that consciousness tells us nothing about the brain; and that, were we dependent upon its testimony alone, we should not know that we have brains. What possible warrant is there then for declaring that consciousness tells us what is or is not in the brain? Perception may or may not be in the brain, but whether it be or be not, it is certain that so long as consciousness knows nothing of the existence of a brain and of the changes that take place in it during mental function, we cannot appeal to its authority to decide what the functions of the brain are, and what is their limit. Assuredly it would be absurd to assert that what consciousness does not make known to us cannot have any existence. This, however, is what is virtually done; an entirely unwarrantable conclusion as to the impossibility of perception by the brain is founded on the incompetence of consciousness; and thereupon an extraordinary sequitur is made which is no sequitur at all-namely, that it must be "differently placed with regard to the body," and be situated in the mind. Whether perception be situated in the mind or brain is a question concerning which, it has always seemed to us, disputation will cease so soon as men have come to a clear and definite understanding of what they mean by the words they use. Mind, including consciousness, is a function of brain, say the so-called materialists; whether perception is in the brain or mind is a quarrel over words rather than over things, being really a part of the question whether it is ever right to say that the function is in the organ. The function is unquestionably potential in the organ, but when it becomes actual in consequence of material changes in the latter, can we any longer describe it correctly as being in the organ? If we can, then perception is in the brain; but if not-if the function is an energy which has gone forth from the organ and is not any longer part of it-then perception is properly part of the function, mind, and may be said to be in the mind; mind being the abstract term in which we include all the mental functions of the brain. We know nothing of the organ and its changes by consciousness; the knowledge which we do get through its revelations is confined to function; wherefore it is so far true that we only know mental states in consciousness. But it is a long and gratuitous leap thence to the unnecessary hypothesis of an "unknown essence, mind," which is something distinct both from function and organ. It is a larger leap still which the author makes, when he attains to the notion of the mind as "a void or hollow sphere, outside and in immediate contact with which is the material brain, and beyond this again the person and things of the material world, with which the brain is connected by nerves distributed throughout the body. Of the nature of this sphere we know nothing: all our knowledge is confined to its contents; and these are the conscious being itself-the psyche, and the various phenomena of which it is conscious. Comprehending, so to speak, these phenomena, the mind does not comprehend itself: it exists outside the sphere of consciousness, of which, in fact, it forms the limitation." Such is philosophy which has undergone a thirty years' gestation! How the author reached it, as he professes to have done, through the analysis of his facts of his consciousness, passes our comprehension. Certainly his consciousness must be an extraordinary one, if it has really revealed these things unto him through self-analysis. He claims for the hypothesis that, among other merits which it has, it reconciles the realist and the idealist, and that it is a bulwark against materialism with all its desolating consequences; and he demands that, if unsound, it shall be refuted rather than ridiculed, for "ridicule is not refutation." Will he forgive us for saying that there are some hypotheses which are too ridiculous for serious refutation ? In the foregoing criticism we have been concerned entirely with the author's philosophical theories, which we believe to be neither so sound nor so important as he imagines; in taking leave of his book, we may express our agreement with many of the moral reflections which occupy a great part of it, are expressed in a clear and attractive style, and may be read and appreciated without reference to his philosophical theories. System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology, instituting the Religion of Humanity. By AUGUSTE COMTE. First Volume. We have been pleased to see the announcement of the forthcoming publication in English of Comte's works, and gladly welcome this first instalment, excellently well translated by Dr. Bridges, Inspector of the Local Government Board. Other translations are to follow by others of the small but distinguished band of Comtists in this country -Mr. Congreve, Mr. Beesly, and Mr. Frederic Harrison. When the series is completed, the result can hardly fail to be to convince Englishmen that Comte was not the crack-brained fanatic which so many of them imagine him to have been. We say 66 so many of them," but in truth the so many who know anything at all about him are very few; and it is probable that if his name were mentioned in the hearing of the brewers, shipowners, bankers, gin distillers, and all kinds of rich people, who constitute so large an element in that body, which, with insular and vulgar arrogance, fluent penny-aliners, and even some members of it whose imaginations reach no higher than the penny-a-lining level, declare to be "the first assembly of gentlemen in Europe," they would be moved to exclaim-Who was the fellow? And if it were answered unto them, that he was a philosopher, who thought it a nobler aim of life to pursue wisdom than to accumulate vast wealth by brewing beer, distilling gin, or sending unseaworthy ships to sea, it is not to be doubted that his character would be clean gone in their minds, and that he would be deemed no better than a visionary fool. The sober-minded Englishman who reads the remarkable dedication of this volume, is not unlikely to be frightened from proceeding farther in its perusal. It is-"To the sacred memory of my eternal friend Madame Clotilde de Vaux, who died in my presence the 5th of April, 1846, at the beginning of her thirty-second year. Gratitude, regret, resignation, who is addressed as "Noble, tender hearted victim." it concludes with the following paragraph: And Farewell, changeless friend! farewell, my saint Clotilda, thou who wert to me in the stead of wife, of sister, and of child! farewell, loved pupil, true fellow-worker! Thy angel influence will govern what remains to me of life, whether public or private, ever urging me onwards towards perfection; purifying feeling, enlarging thought, ennobling conduct! May this solemn incorporation into my whole life reveal at last to the world thy hidden worth! Thus only can thy benefits now be recognised, by rendering my own performance of the mighty task before me more complete. As the highest personal reward for the noble work that yet remains to be done under thy lofty inspiration, it will be granted perhaps that thy name shall remain ever joined with mine in the most distant memories of grateful humanity. La pierre du cercueil est ton premier autel. He laments that the sacred union of their hearts was only for a year, "our sacred year of happiness." Perhaps the brevity of the felicity was not altogether a misfortune; had it lasted for ten years, it may well be doubted whether he would have written of her in such a strain of what we cannot help calling infatuation. Familiarity, as its habit is, might have bred a weariness if not a contempt in one who through life shewed little of the spirit of self-renunciation. The samples of her literary productions which are given in the appendix to this volume do not seem to warrant the extravagance of reverence and gratitude which Comte expresses for her. And we must confess that, notwithstanding our admiration of Comte's services to philosophy, there is to us something nauseating in the idea that in the most distant future ages Clotilde de Vaux shall be worshipped as a saint in the religion of humanity. It was hardly worth while to dethrone the Virgin Mary in order to enthrone Madame Clotilde de Vaux. Let not the reader, however, be too swift to judge the character of the treatise from its dedication. Comte may have been mad at one period of his life-was indeed confined for a time as a lunatic-and may have been infatuated unto the end of his days, but no one who is qualified to give an opinion can question the important services which he has rendered to the intellectual progress of mankind, or doubt that his reputation will grow greater in the time to come. We are too near him yet to judge him fairly; and as we must get some distance away from a mountain in order to perceive its height, so it will be necessary that he should recede some distance into the past before his height in relation to his contemporaries and to the great men of preceding ages can be justly estimated. It is impossible to open this volume at random, and to read five consecutive pages, without acknowledging the wide and powerful grasp of thought displayed in it, and without feeling that we have to do, not with a transitory work of barren criticism and attenuated exposition, but with a profound work of philosophical construction which, whether right or wrong in its doctrines, will live long after the men of this generation shall be "green in death, and festering in their shrouds." Assuredly Comte's treatises are now an essential and important part of the history of philosophy, and ought to be carefully studied. We are glad, therefore, that his disciples in this country have resolved to make them more accessible to English readers. The task was almost incumbent on them as an act of justice to their great master, who has not |