Opinion of the court. defeated they brought the contest into court and renewed it there, but unsuccessfully. And they do not now allege that in either of these trials there was anything unfair, or that Cooper, Vail & Co. were guilty of any fraud in maintaining their claim, other than the assertion of its existence, or that they themselves made any mistake, or that they have any other case now than they had and urged before the referee and the District Court. Their only ground of complaint is that the referee and District Court came to a different conclusion from that which they think should have been adopted. The court thought the evidence established the existence of a debt due Cooper, Vail & Co. They are of a different opinion. They think the evidence did not establish the existence of such a debt, and, therefore, they have filed this bill in the Circuit Court to annul the action of the District Court. In effect they are seeking a new trial of a ques tion of fact which has been decided against them, and this without averring anything more than that the District Court drew a wrong conclusion from the evidence. Very plainly they have made no case for equitable interference. There are some bills in equity which are usually called bills for a new trial. They are sustained when they aver some fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute the judg ment obtained, some fact of which the complainant could not have availed himself in the court when the judgment was given against him, if a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself, but was prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own. But a court of equity will never interfere with a judgment obtained in another court, because it is alleged to have been erroneously given, without more. And such is substantially this case. But though the bill is destitute of equity, when considered as an original bill, it is contended that it may be regarded as au application for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court authorized by the second section of the Bankrupt Act. That section declares that "the several Circuit Courts of the United States, within and for the Opinion of the court. districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction. of all cases and questions arising under this act, and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition, or other process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case (as) in a court of equity." The complainants, having proved their debt against the bankrupt, contend that they may be considered parties aggrieved by any order of the District Court allowing the probate of other debts against the same bankrupt, when the assignee refuses to appeal from the order, or allow an appeal to the Circuit Court. It is true their bill was not filed in the Circuit Court until about four months and a half after the order complained of was made. But the act of Congress prescribes no time within which the application for a review must be presented. An appeal is required to be taken within ten days. Not so with a petition or bill for a review. Undoubtedly the application should be made within a reasonable time, in order that the proceedings to settle the bankrupt's estate may not be delayed, but neither the act of Congress nor any rule of this court determines what that time is. At present, therefore, it must be left to depend upon the circumstances of each case. Perhaps, generally, it should be fixed in an-. alogy to the period designated within which appeals must be taken.* It is, however, to be observed that the bill does not charge any fraudulent collusion between the assignee and Cooper, Vail & Co. At most it charges neglect of duty by the assignee in omitting to contest the debt claimed, and in failing to appeal from a decree of the District Court allowing the debt. Whether this presents a proper case for a review under the second section of the Bankrupt Act need not now be decided. For should it be conceded that the complainants had a right to apply to the Circuit Court for a review of the order of the District Court, and conceded also that this bill may be regarded as such an application, the question would still remain whether the court erred in disLittlefield . The Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., Bankrupt Register, vol. iv, p. 77. Opinion of the court. missing it. Had the court, in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction, heard the case and decided it, as the District Court did, the decision would have been final, and no appeal could have been taken to this court.* True, if the court ha I decided that it had no jurisdiction to review, this court might have entertained an appeal, not for the purpose of reviewing, but for the purpose of correcting an erroneous decision respecting the power of the Circuit Court, and enabling the complainants to be heard on their application. But it does not appear that this bill was dismissed because the court thought it had no power to review the action of the District Court at the suit of these complainants. On the contrary, it rather appears the bill was dismissed because it presented no case that called for the exercise of the superintending jurisdiction of the court. The statute, though conferring the power, does not make it obligatory upon the Circuit Court to retry every decision of the District Court which a creditor supposing himself aggrieved may ask the court to retry. And it may well be that when, as in this case, a question of fact has been twice tried, and twice decided in the same way, when it is not averred that there has been any collusion between the assignee and the creditor who has proved a debt, or that the complaining party has any evidence which he has not already submitted, or that he has been hindered by any accident or fraud from presenting his case as fully in the District Court as he can in another tribunal, when the substance of all he alleges is that, in his opinion, the court should have determined the facts differently, it may well be that the Circuit Court, in the exercise of its discretionary power, looking also at the delay of the application, may properly conclude that no sufficient, case is presented calling for a retrial of the facts. We do not perceive, therefore, in the action of the Circuit Court anything that requires correction, and the DECREE IS AFFIRMED. * Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wallace, 65; Tracey v. Altmyer, 46 New York, 598. People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 29 New York, 418. Statement of the case. TWENTY PER CENT. CASES. 1. The Twenty. per Cent. Cases (13 Wallace, 576) affirmed, and the liberal view there taken of the joint resolution of 28th February, 1867, allowing to certain persons in the civil service of the United States at Washington, an additional compensation of twenty per centum upon their respective salaries as fixed by law, or, where no salary is fixed by law, upon their pay respectively, for one year from the 30th of June, 1866, declared to be the true view and applied to other cases essentially like those. 2. But not applied to the case of a person hired at Washington to do service out of Washington, nor to a contractor who contracted to deliver finished work, and who employed another to do it for him. 3. An act passed on the 12th of July, 1870, repealing "all acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all resolutions of either house of Congress granting extra pay," the act to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1870," did not affect the rights given by the joint resolution abovementioned. APPEALS in fourteen cases from the Court of Claims; the case being thus: On the 28th of February, 1867, Congress passed this joint resolution:* "That there shall be allowed and paid . . . to the following described persons, now employed in the civil service of the United States, at Washington, as follows: To civil officers, temporary and all other clerks, messengers, and watchmen, including enlisted men detailed as such, to be computed upon the gross amount of the compensation received by them; and employés, male and female, in the executive mansion, and in any of the following named departments, or any bureau or division thereof, to wit: state, treasury, war, navy, interior, post-office, attorney-general, agricultural, and including civil officers, and temporary and all other clerks and employés, male and female, in the offices of the coast survey, naval observatory, navy yard, arsenal, paymastergeneral, including the division of referred claims, commissarygeneral of prisoners, bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, quartermaster's, capitol and treasury extension, city post-office, and commissioner of public buildings, to the photographer and assistant photographer of the treasury de * 14 Stat. at Large, 569. Statement of the case. partment, to the superintendent of meters, and to lamplighters under the commissioner of public buildings, an additional compensation of twenty per centum on their respective salaries as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon their pay respectively, for one year from and after the 30th day of June, 1866. Provided, That this resolution shall not apply to persons whose salaries, as fixed by law, exceed $3500 per annum." On the 12th of July, 1870,* Congress passed an act in these words: "All acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all resolutions of either house of Congress granting extra compensation or pay, be, and the same are hereby repealed, to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1870." Under the said joint resolution of 28th of February, 1866, fourteen different persons filed at different times-some of them after the passage of the repealing act-claims in the court below for the twenty per cent. given by the statute. The first was employed by the bureau of yards and docks, as a machinist in the navy yard at Washington, upon daily wages at the agreed sum and price of $3.25 per day. The second and third as coppersmiths on the treasury extension, upon daily wages. Under specific appropriations for the construction of the treasury extension, contracts were entered into for finished work, comprehending both materials and labor-materials separately, and labor by the day separately. The services in these two cases were 'rendered under the latter contracts. The fourth and fifth as watchmen upon the capitol extension, at daily wages, their compensation changing during the year. The sixth as a laborer upon monthly wages in the quartermaster's department in the city of Washington. The seventh was employed in the treasury extension as a laborer upon daily wages; working for part of the time at $1.75 per day, and for another part at $2 per day. The eighth by the authority of the surgeon-general of *16 Stat. at Large, 250, 8 4. |