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Opinion of the court.

We are satisfied that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is one which, under the customs, laws, and decisions of the courts of the Territory, and the act of Congress, should be recognized and protected.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

ERRATUM.

The reader will please to consider what is below as inserted on page 591, after the last clause of the syllabus of Murdock v. City of Memphis, and as paragraph 9 thereof; and also to consider the same thing as inserted in the Index, on page 698, as a paragraph between the paragraphs 2 and 3 of the title "Jurisdiction," now there.

Where an act of Congress calls into operative effect a provision in a deed, in virtue of which provision thus called into effect, a party claims title and right in such a way that, confessedly, but for the act, no suit would lie, the party so claiming claims a "title" and "right" "under" a statute of the United States within the meaning of the act of February 5th, 1867; and if the decision is against the title and right thus set up and claimed, jurisdiction exists here to re-examine.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACT. See Contract, 4.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See Equity, 4.

ACTION. See Assumpsit; Equity; Quantum Valebat; Release of Action.
ADJUSTERS OF AVERAGE. See Bottomry Bond.

ADMIRALTY. See Collision; Practice, 6, 7; Proceeding in rem.

1. Where claims on the proceeds in the registry of a vessel sold are not

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maritime liens, the District Court cannot distribute those proceeds in

payment of the claims if the owners of the vessel oppose such distri-
bution. The Lottamanna, 201.

2. A creditor by judgment in a State court, of the owners of the vessel,
even though he have a decree in personam also in the admiralty against
them, cannot seize, or attach, on execution, proceeds of the vessel in
the registry of the admiralty. Ib.

3. Advances made in a foreign port to equip a vessel, and to procure for
her a cargo to a port of destination, are prima facie presumed to be
made on the credit of the vessel. They aro a lien on the vessel and
constitute an insurable interest. Insurance Company v. Baring, 159.
ADVANCES TO VESSEL. See Admiralty, 8.

AGENT. See Evidence, 1; Insurance, 4, 5.

The Supreme Court will not, except in a case of clear mistake, reverse a
consentaneous decree of the District and Circuit Courts on question
of fact. The S. B. Wheeler, 385.

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When in a proceeding in rem an appeal is taken to the Circuit Court from
a decree of the District Court, the res or its proceeds follows the cause
into the former court. The Lottawanna, 201.

APPEARANCE.

The effect of a general appearance by an attorney, and of his withdrawal
of appearance afterwards; these matters considered and effect given
to a general appearance for a defendant, and afterwards withdrawn
"without prejudice to the plaintiff." Creighton v. Kerr, 8.

ARMY CONTRACT. See Subsistence Stores.

(687)

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

A judgment affirmed for want of such an assignment of errors as is re-
quired by the twenty-first rule; there being in the record no plain
error not assigned, and such as the court thought fit to be noticed by
it without a proper assignment. Treat v. Jemison, 652.

ASSUMPSIT. See Quantum Valebat.

Where one, fraudulently exhibiting to another a sealed instrument recit-
ing that the person exhibiting it has a claim for a sum of money on
a third party (he having no claim whatsoever), fraudulently induced
that other to buy it from him, and such ́other buying it, paid him in
money for it, and took an assignment under seal on the back of the
instrument, the person thus defrauded may recover his money in as-
sumpsit, on a declaration containing besides the cominon counts spe-
cial counts setting out the instrument as inducement, and averring
the utter falsity of its recitations, and the fraud of the whole transac-
tion. Burton v. Driggs, 125.

ATTORNEY AT LAW.

Effect of a general appearance by him in a case for the defendant, and his
subsequent withdrawal " without prejudice to the plaintiff." Creighton
v. Kerr, 8..

ATTORNEY IN FACT. See Insurance, 4, 5. 1

AVERAGE, ADJUSTERS OF. See Bottomry Bond.

BANK. See National Bank.

Where the charter makes stockholders liable "respectively for its debts"
in proportion to their stock therein, they cannot, in a case where
there are numerous debts, be proceeded against at law. Relief must
be sought for in equity. Pollard v. Bailey, 520.

BANKRUPT ACT,

1. A landlord's claim for rent is, in Pennsylvania, and under its law, paid
out of a bankrupt's goods liable to distress on demised premises, be-
fore making a dividend of their proceeds among creditors generally.
Longstreth v. Pennock, 575.

2. After an assignee in bankruptcy, aided by a creditor, has twice con-
tested before the District Court or its referee the claim of a person
who has been allowed to prove his claim, and, after all the evidence
which could then or afterwards be produced, it has been twice decided
that the claim was a valid one, no bill lies in the Circuit Court against
either the assignee or the person who has been allowed to prove his
claim, to have the order allowing it reversed. Such a bill may be
demurred to for want of equity. Bank v. Cooper, 171.

8. The lien of a valid mortgage is not divested by the mere fact of the
holder of it subsequently taking a transfer of the equity of redemption
made to him with a view of giving to him a preference, and in vio-
lation of the Bankrupt Act The transfer of the equity of redemp-
tion is itself void. Avery v. Hackley, 407.

4. A debt due to the United States, though it be by one who owes it as a

BANKRUPT ACT (continued).

surety only, is not barred by the debtor's discharge with certificate,
under the Bankrupt Act of 1867. United States v. Herron, 251.
5. To authorize the assignee of a bankrupt to recover the money or prop-
erty under the thirty-ninth section of the Bankrupt Act, it is necessary
not only that he should establish the act of the bankrupt, of which
he complains, but also that it was done with a view to give a prefer-
ence over other creditors, and that the other party to the transaction
had reasonable cause to believe that such person was insolvent. Wil-
son v. City Bank (17 Wallace, 473), affirmed. Mays v. Fritton, 414.
6. Where the consideration of a question is prima facie within the juris-
diction and control of a State court-such as determining to whom
the surplus of a fund raised by the foreclosure of a mortgage belongs
-if the person who gave the mortgage becomes bankrupt and his
assignee goes into the State court, submits to its jurisdiction, and
nowhere asserts, in any way, the rights of the Federal courts in the
matter he cannot, after taking his chance for a decision'in his favor,
and getting one against him, raise in this court the point of want of
jurisdiction in the State court. Ib.

7. Where, on a feigned issue between a bankrupt's assignee and a creditor
preferred, directed to a jury to settle the questions whether a party in-
solvent have made a payment to the preferred creditor with a view to
give him a preference over other creditors, and whether une party re-
ceiving payment had reasonable cause to believe that the person pay-
ing him was insolvent, both of the facts abovementioned have been
found against the assignee, and this court has not the evidence before
it, it must assume that the verdict of the jury is right. Ib.

BOND ON APPEAL. See Pleading, 1.

BOTTOMRY BOND.

1. Where adjusters of average, under directions from a mortgagee of a
vessel in possession, and with the consent of her owners, undertake to
adjust the business of the vessel and, proceeding in their office, collect
the freights, general average, and insurance, and pay a bottomry bond
having it assigned to themselves, and make the necessary disburse
ments of the vessel, it will not be inferred that they meant to extin-
guish as against themselves the bottomry lien. Belle of the Sea, 421.
2. Nor will a representation in the nature of a mere opinion by them as
to what will be the result of the whole adjustment, prevent them from
enforcing their bottomry lien, if the freight, insurances, &c., do not
discharge it, against a purchaser of the vessel who has relied on the
representation. Ib..

CHARGE.

If there be no evidence to support facts, assumed in a prayer for a charge,
to have been supported by a greater or less weight of evidence, it is
the duty of the court to reject the prayer. It would be error to leave
a question to a jury in respect to which there was no evidence. In-
surance Company v. Baring, 159:

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CITY ATTORNEY. See Contract, 4.

COLLISION. See Practice, 6, 7.

Whether the absence of a lookout at the bow of a sailing vessel, though

at night, was or was not a contributing fault to a collision, is a ques-
tion of fact, and where on a libel for a collision both the District and
the Circuit Courts have held that the lookout was not necessary, the
general rule of admiralty practice prevails, and this court will not
reverse unless there has been clear error. The S. B. Wheeler, 385.
CONFISCATION ACTS, THE.

1. Of July 17th, 1862, as not repealed by the President's proclamations
of amnesty in 1868. The act interpreted. What sort of information
under it is to be held sufficient, after final judgment of condemnation.
The essential character of an “information" not changed into a pro-
ceeding on admiralty side of the court, by being entitled a "libel " of
information, and the warrant and citation being called "a monition."
What constitutes service under the act; and when the property con-
demned will be presumed to have belonged to a rebel. The Confisca-
tion Cases, 92.

2. Holders of liens against real estate sold under the act should not be
permitted to intervene in any proceedings for the confiscation. Their
liens will not, in any event, be divested. Claims of Marcuard et al., 114.
8. When, under the act, an information has been filed in the District Court
and a decree of condemnation and sale of the land seized been made,
and the money has been paid into the court, and on error to the Circuit
Court, that court, reversing the decree, has dismissed the information
but confirmed the sale, and ordered the proceeds to be paid to the
owner of the land-if on error by the United States to this court, this
court reverse the decree of the Circuit Court, and affirm the decree
of the District Court, that reversal will leave nothing on which a writ
of error by the owner can act. The judgment having been reversed,
the confirmation of the sale and order to pay the proceeds fall. The
only judgment can be reversal again. Conrad's Lots, 115.

4. An informer does not acquire a right to a moiety under the Confisca-
tion Act of August 6th, 1861, in regard to land informed against, after
a complete title to the property has been acquired by conquest.
v. United States, 475.

Titus

5. By what facts the government not estopped from denying an informer's
claim to a moiety in such a case. 1b.

6. Case of an informer stands on a different footing, and is to be judged of
by different principles of estoppel, from that of a purchaser of the land,
who has paid his money to the United States in consequence of their
offer to sell under the act. Ib.

CONQUEST, RIGHTS OF. See Public Law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Estoppel ; Internal Revenue, 3; Naviga-
ble Waters of the United States; Removal of Causes, 3; Taxation, 8;
Tonnage Tax.

1. A statute which authorizes towns to contract debts or other obligations
pay able in money, implies the duty to levy taxes to pay them, unless

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