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States, which was deemed essential to a more
perfect union by the framers of the Con-
stitution, if, at every stage of the transport-
ation of goods and chattels through the
country, the State, within whose limits a part
of this transportation must be done, could
impose regulations concerning the price, com-
pensation, or taxation, or any other restrict-
ive regulation interfering with and seriously
embarrassing this commerce.
As re-
stricted to a transportation which begins and
ends within the limits of the State, it (the
law of Illinois) may be very just and equitable,
and it certainly is the province of the State
Legislature to determine that question. But
when it is attempted to apply to transportation
through an entire series of States a principle
of this kind, and each one of the States shall
attempt to establish its own rates of transpor-
tation, its own methods to prevent discrimina-
tion in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious
influence upon
the freedom of commerce among
the States, upon the transit of goods through
those States, cannot be overestimated. That
this species of regulation is one which must be,
if established at all, of a general and national
character, and cannot be safely and wisely re-

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mitted to local rules and local regulations, we think is clear, from what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of commerce, as we think we have demonstrated it is, and as the Illinois Court concedes it to be, it must be of that national character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution."

This last decision of the Supreme Court of the United States furnishes the "motive and the cue" for the Inter-State Commerce Act, which was approved on the 4th day of February, 1887, and which was the result of a compromise agreed on by Conference Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.

The power of Congress to pass a measure of this kind arises out of the third subdivision of Sec. 8, Art. I., of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that it shall have power "to REGULATE commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'

The Supreme Court of the United States, as we have shown by reference to the Wabash case, held, that the various States of the Union

+

had no right to regulate the traffic and business of railroads running through their respective boundaries into other jurisdictions, and that such power existed solely in the Congress of the United States.

But it must be remarked, that the language. of Mr. Justice Miller, which is quoted above, so far as the Inter-State Commerce Act is concerned, the provisions of which were not before the Court, should be regarded as obiter dictum, and used only in a most general sense.

When the Act, therefore, creating the InterState Commerce Commission comes before the Supreme Court for interpretation, it will be treated and regarded as a new and original question, to be determined upon general principles, and without a precedent to guide the judges in their decision.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this. work, indeed it would be fruitless to endeavor to attempt, to predict what the result may be when this Act comes before the Federal courts. for interpretation. Our purpose will be subserved in laying before the readers, independently, and without bias, briefly and generally, the main and striking arguments which occur to us in our analysis of the different sections of this important law.

CHAPTER II.

TO WHAT COMMON CARRIERS THE INTER-STATE.

TH

COMMERCE ACT APPLIES.

HE first section of the Inter-State Commerce Act, by the most general and comprehensive language, undertakes to include within its provisions two descriptions of carriers.

Common Carriers Wholly by Railroad.

First: The Act applies to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property, wholly by railroad, from one State or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any

9

place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or in an adjacent foreign country. (Sec. 1.)

Common Carriers Partly by Railroad and Partly by Water.

Second: It also applies to any common, carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under (1) a common control, (2) management, (3) or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment from one State or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation, in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of trans