The Inter-State Commerce Act. 31 gress, January, 1887.) It will, accordingly, not be regarded as remarkable, if the courts should find it impossible to interpret language which apparently presented no definite meaning to the minds of the legislators who framed and passed the Act. III. "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer dis There are two distinct inhibitions in this section: first, the carrier is prohibited from charging a GREATER compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul; and, second, then the Act goes on to declare that it shall not be construed as authorizing the carrier to charge "AS GREAT compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance." The Act says to the carrier: "You shall not charge a greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul under substantially similar circumstances, etc.-nay, you shall not even charge as great a compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance—whether the same circumstances exist or not." The meaning is badly expressed, but it seems to us that this is the only interpretation that can be put upon this branch of the section. IV. Considered together, the language of the entire section presents the same difficulty; and it may absolutely fail for indefiniteness or want of meaning. "It shall be unlawful to charge .. any greater compensation transportation under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance.” This is a prohibition to the carrier that he shall not charge a greater compensation in the aggregate for a shorter haul made under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. Here is a qualification. Suppose the qualification does not exist? Suppose the "shorter haul" to be made under substantially dis-similar circumstances and conditions? Can the carrier charge or receive a greater compensation for the "shorter haul"? It would seem not; for the remaining language of the paragraph says most emphatically: "but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this Act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance." And this subsequent language seems to wipe out the preceding qualification altogether. If this view be correct, the remedy of the carrier is to apply to the Inter-State Commerce Commission for a suspension of the prohibition. But, as we have said, the language is faulty, ambiguous, and perhaps so confused as to be incapable of interpretation. V. But assuming that the clause of this section (which contains the words, "but this shall not be construed as authorizing carrier to charge any 1 Remarks of Hon. Shelby M. Cullom in the Senate of the United States, on the tenth day of January, 1887. Mr. Cullom addressed the Senate in favor of the conference report, confining his remarks principally to the fourth section as to the long and short haul. The bill, he said, had stood remarkably well the test of the general and particular scrutiny to which it had been 1 the meaning of the words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, over the same line, in the same direction, the subjected. Its general provisions had, for the most part, met with approval, while the feature most strongly objected to (the fourth section) was misunderstood if not misrepresented. He said: "The objection made to this section as it now stands, which, if it were well founded, I should regard as the most serious, is that it is indefinite and ambiguous, that it is open to more than one construction. Of course, we cannot undertake to say positively what construction will be put upon the language used by the courts if they shall be called upon to determine the meaning of the section. It seems to me, however, that but one construction can be reasonably and properly placed upon this section, especially when it is considered, as it must be, in connection with the other provisions of the bill, and that its meaning is perfectly clear. But in view of the erroneous construction that seems to have been put upon. this section in some quarters, I deem it proper to state that there seems to be no difference of opinion as to its meaning among the conferrees on the part of the Senate. I think the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Platt) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Harris) understand the section as I do, and I think I am justified in saying that we would not approve it if we supposed or believed it to mean what some complain that it does mean or may be made to mean. The short-haul section simply undertakes to lay down in specific terms a rule or principle which, as I have always contended, is already in effect contained in other provisions of the bill. The first requirement of the bill on the subject of rates is found in the first section, and is that all rates shall be 'reasonable and just.' This is in effect a declaration that, under similar circumstances and conditions, a greater sum shall not be charged for a shorter than a longer distance, because under such circumstances it would not be 'reasonable and just' to make such a charge. The next requirement of the bill that affects this question is found in the first part of the third section, which (quoting the first part of the third section) forbids giving an undue or unreasonable preference or shorter being included within the longer distance.' This is language of the most general and advantage to any particular locality. This is likewise a declaration that a greater sum shall not be charged for a shorter than for a longer haul under similar circumstances and conditions, because such a charge would be the making or giving of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage' to one particular 'locality,' or would subject some other particular 'locality' to an 'undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.'" Mr. Cullom then recited section four, and said : "As I understand it, this section, as it now stands, simply prohibits a railroad corporation from charging a greater aggregate sum -not a higher rate-for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, when the shorter is included within the longer distance. There is no other prohibition made in positive terms. The declaration, that this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance,' does not in terms prohibit the charging as much for a shorter as for a longer distance, but simply withholds the legislative sanction from the making of such a charge. This qualifying clause negatives the inference that might possibly be drawn from the language of the section without these words, namely, that an equal charge for a shorter distance is authorized by inference, because only a greater charge is prohibited. This qualification, therefore, leaves the question of whether an equal amount can be charged for the shorter distance to be determined by the provisions of the bill to which I have already referred, requiring all charges to be reasonable, and forbidding the giving of an unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular locality. . . . The requirement of the fourth section, then, is that as between shipments of the same kind, in the same direction, over the same line, and made under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, a greater sum shall not be charged for a shorter than for a longer haul when the shorter comprises part of the longer haul |