Constitutional DiplomacyPrinceton University Press, 08 դեկ, 2020 թ. - 384 էջ Challenging those who accept or advocate executive supremacy in American foreign-policy making, Constitutional Diplomacy proposes that we abandon the supine roles often assigned our legislative and judicial branches in that field. This book, by the former Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is the first comprehensive analysis of foreign policy and constitutionalism to appear in over fifteen years. In the interval since the last major work on this theme was published, the War Powers Resolution has ignited a heated controversy, several major treaties have aroused passionate disagreement over the Senate's role, intelligence abuses have been revealed and remedial legislation debated, and the Iran-Contra affair has highlighted anew the extent of disagreement over first principles. Exploring the implications of these and earlier foreign policy disputes, Michael Glennon maintains that the objectives of diplomacy cannot be successfully pursued by discarding constitutional interests. Glennon probes in detail the important foreign-policy responsibilities given to Congress by the Constitution and the duty given to the courts of resolving disputes between Congress and the President concerning the power to make foreign policy. He reviews the scope of the prime tools of diplomacy, the war power and the treaty power, and examines the concept of national security. Throughout the work he considers the intricate weave of two legal systems: American constitutional principles and the international law norms that are part of the U.S. domestic legal system. |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 86–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
... branches is required if this nation's foreign policy is to be measured successfully against the requirements of the Constitution and if the balance intended for our constitutional structure is to be restored . The cause of that ...
... branches in foreign policy - making must be abandoned . Chapters 1 and 2 establish a framework of analysis . Chapter 1 discusses the " big " cases in this area of the law and reveals the inclination of the Supreme Court to give ...
... branches to work out , not one for the courts to decide . 8 Finally , one might respond that the President's independent , express power as commander - in - chief of the armed forces ' permits him and him alone to make the decision ...
... branch immunity from civil suits is not explicitly granted by the Constitution . However , because of the faithful - execution clause , immunity may by impliedly granted by Congress in statutes creating public agencies ; accord Nixon v ...
... branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context . While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty , it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable ...
Բովանդակություն
CHAPTER | 35 |
CHAPTER THREE | 71 |
CHAPTER FOUR | 123 |
CHAPTER FIVE | 164 |
CHAPTER | 192 |
CHAPTER SEVEN | 229 |
CHAPTER EIGHT | 283 |
APPENDIX | 329 |
General Index | 339 |
Index of Cases | 349 |