Constitutional DiplomacyPrinceton University Press, 08 դեկ, 2020 թ. - 384 էջ Challenging those who accept or advocate executive supremacy in American foreign-policy making, Constitutional Diplomacy proposes that we abandon the supine roles often assigned our legislative and judicial branches in that field. This book, by the former Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is the first comprehensive analysis of foreign policy and constitutionalism to appear in over fifteen years. In the interval since the last major work on this theme was published, the War Powers Resolution has ignited a heated controversy, several major treaties have aroused passionate disagreement over the Senate's role, intelligence abuses have been revealed and remedial legislation debated, and the Iran-Contra affair has highlighted anew the extent of disagreement over first principles. Exploring the implications of these and earlier foreign policy disputes, Michael Glennon maintains that the objectives of diplomacy cannot be successfully pursued by discarding constitutional interests. Glennon probes in detail the important foreign-policy responsibilities given to Congress by the Constitution and the duty given to the courts of resolving disputes between Congress and the President concerning the power to make foreign policy. He reviews the scope of the prime tools of diplomacy, the war power and the treaty power, and examines the concept of national security. Throughout the work he considers the intricate weave of two legal systems: American constitutional principles and the international law norms that are part of the U.S. domestic legal system. |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 85–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
... clearly vested in Congress the power to decide the question of war . And although the experience of a century and a half ... clear to me at the time , an extraordinary progression had in fact occurred in Executive - Legislative relations ...
... clear that it has the power to do so . Nixon , 457 U.S. at 748. See generally Glennon , Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power : Little v . Barreme or Curtiss - Wright ? 13 Yale J. Int'l L. 5 , 8 n.30 ( 1988 ) . have provided ...
... clear that the President of the United States , whose high duty it is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed , ” and who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States , might not , without any special ...
... clearly understood that as a result of that legislation the only recourse for preventing a shutdown in any basic industry , after failure of mediation , was Congress . Authorization for seizure as an available remedy for potential ...
... clear . It is not clear for policy reasons , Justice Rehnquist later explained ; 91 as discussed in Chapter 6 , policy reasons seem to militate for , not against , applying the delegation doctrine to foreignaffairs legislation ...
Բովանդակություն
CHAPTER | 35 |
CHAPTER THREE | 71 |
CHAPTER FOUR | 123 |
CHAPTER FIVE | 164 |
CHAPTER | 192 |
CHAPTER SEVEN | 229 |
CHAPTER EIGHT | 283 |
APPENDIX | 329 |
General Index | 339 |
Index of Cases | 349 |