Constitutional DiplomacyPrinceton University Press, 08 դեկ, 2020 թ. - 384 էջ Challenging those who accept or advocate executive supremacy in American foreign-policy making, Constitutional Diplomacy proposes that we abandon the supine roles often assigned our legislative and judicial branches in that field. This book, by the former Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is the first comprehensive analysis of foreign policy and constitutionalism to appear in over fifteen years. In the interval since the last major work on this theme was published, the War Powers Resolution has ignited a heated controversy, several major treaties have aroused passionate disagreement over the Senate's role, intelligence abuses have been revealed and remedial legislation debated, and the Iran-Contra affair has highlighted anew the extent of disagreement over first principles. Exploring the implications of these and earlier foreign policy disputes, Michael Glennon maintains that the objectives of diplomacy cannot be successfully pursued by discarding constitutional interests. Glennon probes in detail the important foreign-policy responsibilities given to Congress by the Constitution and the duty given to the courts of resolving disputes between Congress and the President concerning the power to make foreign policy. He reviews the scope of the prime tools of diplomacy, the war power and the treaty power, and examines the concept of national security. Throughout the work he considers the intricate weave of two legal systems: American constitutional principles and the international law norms that are part of the U.S. domestic legal system. |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 72–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
... Violate Customary International Law Judicial Authority in the Face of Congressional Silence Functional Capabilities and Constitutional Responsibilities Conclusion 232 248 270 281 283 CHAPTER EIGHT National Security : Congressional ...
... violated international law , traduced the “ good neighbor ” policy we had honored for thirty years , maintained a reactionary military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic , and dashed the confidence and trust generated throughout Latin ...
... violation by the Executive . It is inevitably shortsighted and self - defeating for a government like ours to ... violate the law ourselves , whatever short - term advantage may be gained , we are obviously encouraging others to violate ...
... Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional ? ” ' 80 Northwestern University Law Review 321 ( Nov. 1985 ) ; “ Nicaragua v . United States of America : Constitutionality of U.S. Modification of ICJ ...
... violated the law — the so - called Boland Amendment — which Tambs testified that he had never read.4 The Ambassador said : 1 The Steel Seizure Case , 343 U.S. 579 , 635–38 ( 1952 ) ( Jackson , J. , concurring ) . 2 N.Y. Times , May 30 ...
Բովանդակություն
CHAPTER | 35 |
CHAPTER THREE | 71 |
CHAPTER FOUR | 123 |
CHAPTER FIVE | 164 |
CHAPTER | 192 |
CHAPTER SEVEN | 229 |
CHAPTER EIGHT | 283 |
APPENDIX | 329 |
General Index | 339 |
Index of Cases | 349 |