duty to telegraph last night, as I told you I would, to my Government, and I added to them, "I told Lord Granville that I was of the same mind."

It was painful to me beyond expression to have to do this-a grave thing to have to believe that the result of all the labor and care which led to the making of the Treaty of Washington-the end of all the hopes which it had inspired for the future of our two countries, and for the cause of civilization and the nations-was to be but failure, disappointment, and estrangement, instead of success, close and lasting friendship, and peace. I have not slept well on that conclusion to our interview.

If this be the end, then I am well aware that each Government will, in one form or another, present its explanation to the world, all the States and peoples of which, it is no exaggeration to say, are waiting the issue of our attempts to come to a good understanding; and each party will naturally seek to justify itself and to throw the blame on the other.

This must be my excuse, at the risk of too much repetition, for one more effort, which must now, in this pressure of time, be hastily and imperfectly made, to present the views and position of my Government in relation to the points on which we so unfortunately differ.

The difficulty has its root entirely in the opposing interpretations given to the Treaty by the two Governments.

The United States understand that it was the intention of that instrument to provide a mode for the settlement, wiping away, and blotting out forever of all claims against Great Britain growing out of the acts of the Alabama and other such cruisers; and they claim therefore to put forward, and have put forward, in their Case before the Arbitrators, the whole of their demands for damages, direct and indirect. This they insist they may rightfully do; and that they are entitled to ask and expect of the Arbitrators a decision as to each class of claims, as to its admissibility before the Tribunal for consideration in the first instance, and if adjudged admissible, then such award as that High International Court constituted by the Treaty may think it just within the scope of their powers to make. But the United States have not desired or expected any award of compensation from Great Britain for the indirect damages. They have even been free to admit in advance that it would be better for their future advantage and the interest of nations generally that the judgment of the Arbitrators should be adverse to that class of claims. What they contend for is the right under the Treaty to submit them for consideration, as a known part of their demands against Great Britain; and that it is important to both countries and in the interest of peace and good feeling that every question in regard to such claims should be solemnly considered and passed upon, so that they may disappear forever.

Great Britain maintains that it is not within the meaning and intention of the Treaty that such claims should be placed before the Tribunal, or that they come within the province of the Arbitrators to consider and decide upon.

The long argumentative discussion of this point has ended unfortunately in neither party being able to convince the other of the soundness of its interpretation. Each is bound to admit good faith and fair intention in the other.

Both nations desire mutual and cordial friendship.

Both are earnestly and sincerely desirous to maintain the Treaty.

Some other way out of the difficulty, therefore, must be found if these objects are to be attained.

Anticipating this irreconcilable disagreement on the point of interpretation, various expedients were suggested as probable means for escape from the dilemma, even before the conclusion of the discussion had been reached; but none of these suggestions were adopted or acted on, and it is now unnecessary to revive or refer to them.

At the last, in consequence of a conversation between himself and the British Minister at Washington, Mr. Fish was led to believe that Her Majesty's Government might make a proposal to the effect that they would engage that in the future, should Great Britain be a belligerent and the United States neutral, and should there be any failure on the part of the United States to observe their neutral obligations, Great Britain will make or advance no claims against the United States by reason or on account of any indirect, remote, or consequential results of such failure, and that, in consideration of such stipulation, the United States shall not press for a pecuniary award of damages before the Geneva Tribunal on account of the claims, respecting which Great Britain has expressed the opinion that they are not included in the submission, viz, the transfer of the American shipping, increased insurance, and the prolongation of the war. If such a proposal should be made by the British Governinent they were informed that the President would assent to it. But it was to be understood that there was no withdrawal of any part of the Case of the United States, but an agreement not to demand damages on account of those particular claims, leaving the Tribunal to make such expression of opinion as it might think proper on that question. A communication to this effect was made to the British Government, and a form of a note was given me containing in some sort a proposal of this kind to be submitted to my Government, but it was found to be in so many essential particulars different from the suggestion which was understood to have been made by Sir Edward Thornton, and

which had commended itself to Mr. Fish, that it was not assented to by the President. A modification of this note was subsequently made, and it was submitted in an amended form.

The modified note omitted or changed some portion of what was objectionable in the first proposal, but was still so far short of what is consistent with the views and position of the United States that it could not be accepted.

The grounds of objection to the proposal as framed and presented by this note I will hereafter state.

There was then a suggestion made to Her Majesty's Government that their proposal might be submitted in the shape of a new article to be added to the Treaty of Washington. This would effectually bind both nations for the future to the observance of the rule which they might agree on, and would remove, if properly and carefully framed, all objections made to an interchange of notes as a secure and effective mode of reaching the object in view.

But Her Majesty's Government, it is understood, altogether decline, or have thus far declined, to open any negotiation to define by treaty the extent or limit of the responsi bility of a neutral to a belligerent for indirect or consequential damages. I deeply regret this, and my Government regrets it; and I will proceed to explain presently wherein it is thought a treaty stipulation has an advantage over any other form of agreement, and ought to be desired by both parties.

But to return to the difficulty-nay, the impossibility--of adjusting the disagreement by an interchange of notes, if we must adopt the form and substance of the proposal offered in that shape by the British Government. In the first place, that proposal, as Great Britain appears to be only willing to present it, either directly stipulates for, or implies, a withdrawal or abandonment on the part of the United States of the indirect claims; that is, to regard and treat them as eliminated from the case presented to the Arbitrators, and not to be in any way considered or adjudged as the subject of award by the Tribunal. The British Government holds-notwithstanding the principle that every tribunal must necessarily, by its very creation, possess an inherent right and power to decide questions relating to its own jurisdiction, considering inevitably and at the very threshold whether a matter brought before it is or is not one of which it can take cognizance-the British Government holds that the Arbitrators cannot look at the indirect claims even for the purpose of determining that they are inadmissible. This is not overstating their position, extravagant as it may seem, when they maintain that under the Treaty the United States had no right to put such claims forward in their Case. But the United States not only maintains that the mentioning and putting forward of these claims is rightful, with a view to obtaining a judgment as to their admissibility, but also hold that it was the intent and meaning of the Treaty that they should be submitted for whatever they may be worth, even if this has to be done only with a view to get rid of them as a cause of difference and complaint between the two countries.

Now, the President of the United States, acting through his Agent at Geneva, can put forward, withhold, or withdraw such portion of the claims as he may think proper. That is not denied. But if any of these claims are contemplated and intended by the Treaty itself for submission, such withholding or withdrawing of them by the President alone is not an extinguishment of them. The power of the President of the United States is limited by the Constitution. He cannot of himself make a treaty; nor can he alter, abridge, or depart from the spirit or intention of a treaty. To do that requires the assent, advice, and concurrence of the Senate. If the Treaty submits these claims, as he is of opinion it clearly does, to the consideration of the Tribunal, then his putting them into the Case, or his taking them out of the Case, does not dispose of them. If they are withdrawn by him, they are only laid away, preserved perhaps to be a future plague, unsettled; kept as a possible source of irritation and complaint. They can be extinguished only by some judgment of the prescribed Tribunal appointed for their consideration, or by being given up through the action of the whole treaty-making power exercising its constitutional functions in behalf of the nation.

Thus you should clearly see the reason why the President may be able to agree not to press for a money-award on claims which he regards as now before the Tribunal, but to leave them to be disposed of or commented on by the Arbitrators, while he refuses to withdraw them as not being properly a subject for their consideration.

There is objection, too, to the substance of the proposal made in the British note. The engagement, to be of value in the future, should be reciprocal. The note professes to make it so; but how? The offer of Her Majesty's Government is to agree that the view which they have heretofore presented of such indirect claims shall be their principle of future action and conduct; and that at any time when the United States may be a neutral, and Great Britain a belligerent, she will not advance any claims inconsistent with that principle.

This is vague; and yet it is limited and narrow.

It is a vague undertaking to promise generally to adhere to a "view" or a "principle," when there must be a search to ascertain what that view is, or principle is; and it is a narrow undertaking which confines itself to an abnegation of the right to pur

sue certain specific classes of damages, when the particular kinds of injury out of which those damages may arise are only to be determined by comparison. There should be general words of description, and a clear enunciation of principle, in any rule that is to serve as a law of action, instead of a reference only to special cases that have before occurred; because no two cases can ever be exactly similar. A rule depending for its application only on tests of comparison would breed disputes instead of removing them.

A treaty stipulation might be made free of all these objections.

In the first place there could be no question about its mutually binding force; and in the next place, being the joint concurrent declaration of the two parties to it, reduced to a single form of expression, it would have a precision not likely to be found in a collation or comparison of the several notes embraced in a diplomatic correspondence.

Great Britain has not merely denied the right of the United States to put forward the indirect claims because she denies that the Treaty admits of any construction which will authorize their being considered by the Tribunal. She has also taken the alternative view, that if, by reason of any ambiguity in the Treaty, or any possible interpretation of it, such claims could be brought forward by the United States, it is not to be supposed for a moment that she ever intended to agree to submit to arbitration demands upon her of such character and nature that they might be dangerous to the very existence of any nation, and make the condition of a neutral possibly worse than that of a belligerent.

To insist that the Treaty is so clear in its terms as in no sense to admit of the American interpretation, is only going back to and begging the question which has been fruitlessly discussed. But if it be so clear in the meaning, then Great Britain, by such a treaty stipulation, yielding nothing, giving no consideration, would secure immunity for the future against a class of claims which she asserts to be always dangerous and improper to be made.

But, on the other hand, if the Treaty does admit of the American interpretation, Great Britain would obtain that immunity for the future not only without cost or sacrifice, but with the additional advantage of escaping from an obligation into which, she avers, in that case, she was unwittingly drawn, and which she regards as so dangerous that, if it does exist, she would rather repudiate a solemn treaty than abide by what she has done.

What, then, is it that Great Britain will gain if a new article prescribing a rule against claims for indirect damages be added to the Treaty? She will have the Treaty with all its benefits to her, as it now stands, remain intact. She will be relieved from the responsibility on the one hand of answering to any award against her which may be made by the Arbitrators in case the American interpretation is sustained, and on the other from the deplorable alternative of abrogating her own solemn act. And she will obtain formal and certain security for the future that she is never to be held to answer for damages of a kind which she asserts are so dangerous and uncertain that they ought to be resisted.

Is she prepared to hold back from an invitation to offer or concur in what must bring such results?

What will be the gain to the United States? The settlement of a safe rule for the future, and the saving of the advantages to their interests, which are to be found in the friendly adjustment which was thought to have been made of all the questions likely to disturb the relations of the two countries, at the cost of giving up that portion of their demands for past injuries which they have been pressing, not with a view to obtaining pecuniary compensation, but only in the assertion of their right to have such an award from the Tribunal at Geneva as will make the Treaty of Washington what it was really intended to be, a means for wiping away forever from between these kindred nations all differences and complaints as well as all claims.

[From British Blue Book "North America," No. 9, (1872,) p. 19.]

No. 50.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.1

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1872. (Received May 26.) MY LORD: I have the honor to inform your Lordship that, during a conversation which I had late last night with Mr. Fish, he said that the public was extremely anxious and intensely curious as to what had lately

passed between the two Governments on the subject of the indirect claims, and that he thought it would be admirable to take some measure to allay this impatience. He suggested that it would be well either to send to Congress in open session, or to publish, the four notes which passed between your Lordship and General Schenck on the subject of claims for indirect damages, two telegrams relative to the presentation of the British Counter Case, and a dispatch from General Schenck to Mr. Fish, which the latter read to me. To the publication of the three latter there did not seem to be the slightest objection, nor, as I thought, to that of the four notes. But Mr. Fish did not seem satisfied with my opinion, and said that, as he did not wish to do anything which might at all embar rass Her Majesty's Government, he would rather that I would telegraph your Lordship upon the subject, in the hope that you would give your assent to the publication of the above-mentioned documents.

I have, &c.,

EDWD. THORNTON.

[From British Blue Book "North America," No. 9, (1872,) p. 20.]

No. 51.

Earl Granville to Sir E. Thornton.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1872.

SIR: I asked General Schenck to-day whether it would not be desir able to draught the identic note, to be addressed by the British and United States Agents to the Arbitrators, communicating to them the Treaty Article if it should be concluded.

General Schenck assented to this suggestion.
I am, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

[From British Blue Book "North America," No. 9, (1872,) p. 20.]

No. 52.

Earl Granville to Sir E. Thornton.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 16, 1872.

SIR: As you have informed me by telegraph that the correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Govern ment of the United States, respecting the claims for indirect losses put forward in the Case presented on the part of the United States to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, has been presented to open Congress by Mr. Fish, I have to state to you that the correspondence will also be published in a supplement to the London Gazette of to-morrow, together with the dispatch which I addressed to you on the 13th instant, commenting, for your information, on some of the historical parts of Mr. Fish's last dispatch.

I mentioned to General Schenck that this would probably be done. You have been informed of the substance of this dispatch by tele graph.

I am, &c.,

GRANVILLE.

[From British Blue Book "North America," No. 9, (1872,) p. 20.]

No. 53.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.1

[Extract.]

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1872. (Received May 28.) I have the honor to inclose a copy of the New York Herald of the 15th instant, in which are published copies of the President's Message to the Senate in secret session, and of the documents which accompanied it. It is supposed that copies of these documents must, by some surreptitious means, have been abstracted from the Senate, and it is said that the whole of them were telegraphed to New York during the night of the 14th instant, at the expense of the New York Herald, which published them on the morning of the 15th instant.

Mr. Fish was informed by telegraph during that day that certain documents had been published, but could not discover whether the whole of them had appeared. He, however, at once forwarded to Congress in open session the four notes which have passed between your Lordship and General Schenck on the subject of the claims for indirect damages. On the arrival here of the New York Herald, it was found that all the documents sent to the Senate on the 13th instant, with the exception of the memorandum inclosed in your Lordship's note of the 20th of March last, had been published. Mr. Fish told me yesterday that, in consequence of this publication, it was the opinion of the President and of himself, that it would be expedient to relieve the Senate of the injunction of secrecy with regard to these documents, so that they might become officially public; but that they were indisposed to do so if I thought Her Majesty's Government would object to it. I replied that, as the documents had been made public, and as it was evident that they were really copies of those which had been sent to the Senate, I could see no objection to their being officially published, in accordance with the President's wish; nor did I think it worth while to beg Mr. Fish to wait until I should have telegraphed to your Lordship and received an answer. But I at the same time strongly expressed my opinion that the discussion with regard to the Draft Treaty Article should not be held in open session, in favor of which a motion had been made on the 13th instant, but defeated. Mr. Fish entirely agreed with me that a public discussion would be most inexpedient.

With reference to the copy of Mr. Fish's telegram to General Schenck of the 27th ultimo, there is no doubt that, on that day, it was he who suggested that your Lordship should, in answer to his dispatch to General Schenck, make a proposal of the nature described in my telegram forwarded on the same day. The utmost that I did was, on his urging me to give my private opinion upon the suggestion, to say that I thought it might, with some modifications, be taken as the basis of an arrange

The substance of this dispatch was received by telegraph on the 17th of May.