The Constitution of 1870 repealed all existing charters or grants of special privileges to corporations, which were not accepted within ten days after the new constitution took effect. Hinze v. People, 92 Ill. 406.
There was no acceptance of any additional corporate powers under the Lake Front Act within the time limited by the constitution. Corporate meetings cannot be held outside of the State.
Any acts or contracts, attempted to be executed while thus met, are ultra vires and absolutely void.
|(6:23); People v. New York & 8. I. Ferry Co.
63 N. Y. 71; Parker v. Cutler M. Co. 20 Me.
353.
Whatever wharfing rights and franchises
may have passed by the act of 1869 were re-
called by its repeal.
Christ Church v. Philadelphia County, 65 U.
S. 24 How. 800 (16: 602); East Saginaw Salt
Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 80 U.
S. 13 Wall. 373 (20: 611).
A license not acted upon is revocable.
Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 Ill. 459; Wood-
ward v. Seely, 11 Ill. 157; Forbes v. Balenseifer,
74 Ill. 183; Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552.
Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:
Field, Priv. Corp. § 243; Wood's Field, Priv. Corp. 216; Wood, Railway Law, § 139; Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 517, 46 Am. Dec. 619; Ormsby v. Vermont Copper Min. Co. 56 N. Y. 623; Aspinwall v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 20 Ind. This suit was commenced on the 1st of 492, 83 Am. Dec. 329; Reichwald v. Commer-March, 1883, in a circuit court of Illinois, cial Hotel Co. 106 Ill. 440; Freeman v. Machias by an information or bill in equity, filed by Water Power & M. R. Co. 38 Me. 343; Wood H. the Attorney General of the State, in the H. Min. Co. v. King, 45 Ga. 34; Hilles v. Par- name of its people, against the Illinois Cenrish, 14 N. J. Eq. 380; Angell & Ames, Priv. tral Railroad Company, a corporation created Corp. 498; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Allerton, 85 under its laws, and against the city of ChiU. S. 18 Wall. 233 (21: 902). cago. The United States were also named as a party defendant, but they never appeared in the suit, and it was impossible to bring them in as a party without their consent. The alleged grievances arose solely from the acts and claims of the railroad company, but the city of Chicago was made a defendant because of its interest in the subject of the litigation. The railroad company filed its answer in the state court at the first term after the commencement of the suit, and
Under the Constitution of 1848 it was not competent for the General Assembly to grant to the Illinois Central Company the title to the land in question by a mere legislative act, without the approval of the Governor.
The territory within the dock line is completely under the control of the State.
Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S 679 (27: 442); Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 245 (7: 412); United States v. Duluth, 1 Dill. 469; Parkers-upon its petition the case was removed to burg & v. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburgh, 107 U. S. 691 (27: 584); St. Louis, J. & C. R. Co. v. Trustees, 43 Ill. 303; Mills, Em. Dom. § 46. The act of 1869 by its confirmatory clause conferred zo new right. Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. 50 U. S. 9 How. 172 (13: 92); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452.
The right to construct wharves and piers in the navigable waters of a public harbor does not pass with a grant of the submerged land. The authority of the city to develop the harbor by piers has not been taken away, nor has it been deprived of its riparian rights as owner of the public ground in front of the harbor.
Phear, Water, 52; Dickens v. Shaw, Hall, Sea Shores, App. XLV. p. 283; People v. New York & S. 1. Ferry Co. 68 N. Y. 71; Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 144; Bowman v. Wathen, 2 McLean, 376; Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q B. 31; Wiswell v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313, 3 L. ed. 168.
The proviso to the act does not give the right to wharf and construct piers in the harbor nor deprive the city of its power to extend streets as piers, nor take away the riparian rights of the shore owners.
Mills v. St. Clair County, 7 Ill. 198; Stourbridge Canal Proprs. v. Wheeley, 2 Barn. & Ad. 792; Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. 50 U. S. 9 How. 172 (13: 92).
The State could not grant exclusive ownership of the submerged lands held by the State in trust for the public.
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10:997); Den v. The Jersey Co. 56 U. S. 15 How. 426 (14: 757); Arnold v. Mundy, 6N. J. L. 1; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1
the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Northern District of Illinois. In May
following the city appeared to the suit and
filed its answer, admitting all the allegations
of fact in the bill. A subsequent motion by
the complainant to remand the case to the
state court was denied. Illinois v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 881. The plead-
ings were afterwards altered in various par-
ticulars. An amended information or bill
was filed by the Attorney General, and the
city filed a cross bill for affirmative relief
against the State and the company. The lat
ter appeared to the cross bill and answered
it, as did the Attorney General for the State.
Each party has prosecuted a separate appeal.
The object of the suit is to obtain a judi-
cial determination of the title of certain
lands on the east or lake front of the city of
Chicago, situated between the Chicago river
and Sixteenth street, which have been re-
claimed from the waters of the lake, and are
occupied by the tracks, depots, warehouses,
piers, and other structures used by the rail-
road company in its business; and also of
the title claimed by the company to the
submerged lands, constituting the bed of the
lake, lying east of its tracks, within the
corporate limits of the city, for the distance
of a mile, and between the south line of the
south pier near Chicago river extended east-
wardly, and a line extended, in the same
direction, from the south line of lot 21 near
the company's round house and machine
shops. The determination of the title of the
company will involve a consideration of its
right to construct, for its own business, as
well as for public convenience, wharves,
piers, and docks in the harbor.
We agree with the court below that, to a
clear understanding of the numerous ques-
tions presented in this case, it was necessary
to trace the history of the title to the several
parcels of land claimed by the company.
And the court, in its elaborate_opinion,
Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep.
730, for that purpose referred to the legisla-istence of tide waters was deemed essential
tion of the United States and of the State, and
to ordinances of the city and proceedings
thereunder, and stated, with great minute-
ness of detail, every material provision of
law and every step taken. We have with
great care gone over the history detailed and
are satisfied with its entire accuracy. It
would, therefore, serve no useful purpose to
repeat what is, in our opinion, clearly and
fully narrated. In what we may say of the
rights of the railroad compary, of the State,
and of the city, remaining after the legisla
tion and proceedings taken, we shall assume
the correctness of that history. 3
The State of Illinois was admitted into the Union in 1818 on an equal footing with the original states in all respects. Such was one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia of the territory northwest of the Ohio river, out of which the State was formed. But the equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There can be no distinction between the several states of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits. The boundaries of the State were prescribed by Congress and accepted by the State in its original constitution. They are given in the bill. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that they include within their eastern line all that portion of Lake Michigan lying east of the main land of the State and the middle of the lake south of latitude forty-two degrees and thirty minutes.
and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the
tide. In other respects they are inland seas.
and there is no reason or principle for the
assertion of dominion and sovereignty over
and ownership by the State of lands covered
by tide waters that is not equally appli
cable to its ownership of and dominion and
sovereignty over lands covered by the fresh
waters of these lakes. At one time the ex-
in determining the admiralty jurisdiction of
courts in England. That doctrine is now
repudiated in this country as wholly inap
plicable to our condition. In England the
ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal
test of the navigability of waters. There
no waters are navigable in fact, at least to
any great extent, which are not subject to
the tide. There, as said in the case of The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How.
143, 455 [13: 1058, 1063], "tide water and
navigable water are synonymous terms, and
tide water, with a few small and unimpor
tant exceptions, meant nothing more than
public rivers, as contradistinguished from
private ones;" and writers on the subject of
admiralty jurisdiction "took the ebb and
flow of the tide as the test, because it was
a convenient one, and more easily deter
mined the character of the river. Hence the
established doctrine in England, that the ad-
miralty jurisdiction is confined to the ebb
and flow of the tide. In other words, it is
confined to public navigable waters."
But in this country the case is different.
Some of our rivers are navigable for great
distances above the flow of the tide; indeed,
for hundreds of miles, by the largest ves-
sels used in commerce. As said in the case
cited: "There is certainly nothing in the
ebb and flow of the tide that makes the
waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jur-
isdiction, nor anything in the absence of a
tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public
navigable water, on which commerce is car-
ried on between different states or nations,
the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely
the same. And if a distinction is made on
that account, it is merely arbitrary, with-
out any foundation in reason; and, indeed,
would seem to be inconsistent with it."
It is the settled law of this country that
the ownership of and dominion and sover-
eignty over lands covered by tide waters,
within the limits of the several states, be-
long to the respective states within which The Great Lakes are not in any appreci
they are found with the consequent right to able respect affected by the tide, and yet
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when on their waters, as said above, a large com-
that can be done without substantial impair-merce is carried on, exceeding in many in-
ment of the interest of the public in the wat-stances the entire commerce of states on the
ers, and subject always to the paramount borders of the sea. When the reason of the
right of Congress to control their navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation
of commerce with foreign nations and among
the states. This doctrine has been often an-
nounced by this court, and is not ques-
tioned by counsel of any of the parties. Pol-
lard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3 How. 212 [11:
565]; Weber v. Board of State Harbor Comrs.
85 U. S. 18 Wall. 57 [21: 798].
The same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different states and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters,
limitation of admiralty jurisdiction in Eng-
land was found inapplicable to the condition
of navigable waters in this country, the
limitation and all its incidents were dis-
carded. So also, by the common law, the
doctrine of the dominion over and ownership
by the crown of lands within the realm un-
der tide waters is not founded upon the ex-
istence of the tide over the lands, but upon
the fact that the waters are navigable, tide
waters and navigable waters, as already said,
being used as synonymous terms in England.
The public being interested in the use of
such waters, the possession by private indi-
viduals of lands under them could not be
permitted except by license of the crown,
which could alone exercise such dominion | which has been enclosed as mentioned, by
over the waters as would insure freedom in which a portion is devoted as a harbor of
their use so far as consistent with the public refuge where ships may ride at anchor with
interest. The doctrine is founded upon the security and within protecting walls, and
necessity of preserving to the public the use another portion of such enclosure nearer the
of navigable waters from private interruption shore of the lake may be devoted to wharves
and encroachment, a reason as applicable to and piers, alongside of which ships may
navigable fresh waters as to waters moved load and unload and upon which warehouses
by the tide. We hold, therefore, that the may be constructed and other structures erect-
same doctrine as to the dominion and sover-ed for the convenience of lake commerce.
eignty over and ownership of lands under The case proceeds upon the theory and al-
the navigable waters of the Great Lakes ap-legation that the defendant, the Illinois Cen-
plies, which obtains at the common law as tral Railroad Company, has, without lawful
to the dominion and sovereignty over and authority, encroached, and continues to en-
ownership of lands under tide waters on the croach, upon the domain of the State, and
borders of the sea, and that the lands are held its original ownership and control of the
by the same right in the one case as in the waters of the harbor end of the lands there-
other, and subject to the same trusts and under, upon a claim of rights acquired under
limitations. Upon that theory we shall ex- a grant from the State and ordinance of the
amine how far such dominion, sovereignty, city to enter the city and appropriate land
and proprietary right have been encroached and water two hundred feet wide in order to
upon by the railroad company, and how far construct a track for a railway, and to erect
that company had, at the time, the assent of thereon warehouses, piers, and other struct-
the State to such encroachment, and also the ures in front of the city, and upon a claim
validity of the claim which the company as- of riparian rights acquired by virtue of
serts of a right to make further encroachments ownership of lands orginally bordering on
thereon by virtue of a grant from the State the lake in front of the city. It also proceeds
in April, 1869.
against the claim asserted by the railroad
company of a grant by the State, in 1869,
of its right and title to the submerged lands,
constituting the bed of Lake Michigan lying
east of the tracks and breakwater of the
company, for the distance of one mile, and
between the south line of the south pier ex-
tended eastwardly and a line extended in the
same direction from the south line of lot
shops and round-house of the company; and
of a right thereby to construct at its pleasure
in the harbor wharves, piers, and other works
for its use.
The city of Chicago is situated upon the
southwestern shore of Lake Michigan, and
includes, with other territory, fractional
sections 10 and 15, in township 39 north,
range 14 east of the third principal meridian,
bordering on the lake, which forms their
eastern boundary. For a long time after the
organization of the city its harbor was the
Chicago river, a small, narrow stream open-twenty-one south of and near the machine
ing into the lake near the center of the east
and west line of section 10, and in it the
shipping arriving from other ports of the
lake and navigable waters was moored or
anchored, and along it were docks and
The State prays a decree establishing and
wharves. The growth of the city in subse- confirming its title to the bed of Lake Mich.
quent years in population, business, and igan and exclusive right to develop and im-
commerce required a larger and more con- prove the harbor of Chicago by the construc-
venient harbor, and the United States, in tion of docks, wharves, piers, and other
view of such expansion and growth, com- improvements, against the claim of the rail-
menced the construction of a system of break-road company, that it has an absolute title
waters and other harbor protections in the to such submerged lands by the Act of 1869,
waters of the lake in front of the fractional and the right, subject only to the paramount
sections mentioned. In the prosecution of authority of the United States in the regula-
this work there was constructed a line of tion of commerce, to fill all the bed of the
breakwaters or cribs of wood and stone, cover-lake within the limits above stated, for the
ing the front of the city between the Chicago
river and Twelfth street, with openings in
the piers or lines of cribs for the entrance
and departure of vessels, thus enclosing a
large part of the lake for the uses of ship-
ping and commerce, and creating an outer
harbor for Chicago. It comprises a space
about one mile and one half in length from
north to south and is of a width from east to
west varying from one thousand to four
thousand feet. As commerce and shipping
expand, the harbor will be further extended And first as to lands in the harbor of Chi-
towards the south, and, as alleged by the cago possessed and used by the railroad com-
amended bill, it is expected that the necessi-pany under the Act of Congress of Septem-
ties of commerce will soon require its enlarge- ber 20, 1850, (9 Stat. at L. 466, chap. 61)
ment so as to include a great part of the en-
tire lake front of the city. It is stated, and
not denied, that the authorities of the United
States have in a general way indicated a plan
for the improvement and use of the harbor
purpose of its business; and the right, by
the construction and maintenance of wharves,
docks, and piers, to improve the shore of the
lake for the promotion generally of commerce
and navigation. And the State, insisting
that the company has, without right, erected
and proposes to continue to erect wharves
and piers upon its domain, asks that such
alleged unlawful structures may be ordered
to be removed, and the company be enjoined
from erecting further structures of any kind.
and the ordinance of the city of June 14,
1852. By that Act Congress granted to the
State of Illinois a right of way, not exceed-
ing one hundred feet in width, on each side
of its length, through the public lands, for
the construction of a railroad from the south- | mission to the company to lay down, con-
ern terminus of the Illinois & Michigan struct, and maintain within the limits of the
Canal to a point at or near the junction of the city, and along the margin of the lake with-
Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with a branch in and adjacent to the same, a railroad, with
to Chicago and another via the town of Gal- one or more tracks, and to operate the same
ena to a point opposite Dubuque in the State with locomotive engines, and cars, under
of Iowa, with the right to take the neces- such rules and regulations, with reference to
sary materials for its construction. And, to speed of trains, the receipt, safe keeping,
aid in the construction of the railroad and and delivery of freight, and arrangements
branches, by the same Act it granted to the for the accommodation and conveyance of
State six alternate sections of land, desig- passengers, not inconsistent with the public
nated by even numbers, on each side of the safety, as the company might from time to
road and branches, with the usual reserva- time establish, and to have the right of way
tion of any portion found to be sold by the and all powers incident to and necessary
United States, or to which the right of pre- therefor in the manner and upon the follow-
emption had attached at the time the route ing terms and conditions, namely, that the
of the road and branches was definitely fixed, road should enter the city at or near the inter-
in which case provision was made for the section of its then southern boundary with
selection of equivalent lands in contiguous Lake Michigan, and follow the shore on or
sections.
near the margin of the lake northerly to the
southern bounds of the open space known as
Lake Park, in front of canal section fifteen,
and continue northerly across the open space
The lands granted were made subject to the
disposition of the Legislature of the State;
and it was declared that the railroad and its
branches should be and remain a public high-in front of that section to such grounds as
way for the use of the government of the the company might acquire between the
United States, free from toll or other charge north line of Randolph street and the Chicago
upon the transportation of their property or river, in the Fort Dearborn addition, upon
troops.
which grounds should be located the depot
The act was formally accepted by the Leg-of the railroad company within the city, and
islature of the State February 17, 1851.
Laws of 1851, 192, 193. A few days before,
and on the 10th of that month, the Illinois
Central Railroad Company was incorporated.
It was invested generally with the powers,
privileges, immunities, and franchises of cor-
porations and specifically with the power
of acquiring by purchase or otherwise, and
of holding and conveying real and personal
estate which might be needful to carry into
effect fully the purposes of the act.
such other buildings, slips, or apparatus as
might be necessary and convenient for its
business. But it was understood that the
city did not undertake to obtain for the com-
pany any right of way, or other right, priv-
ilege, or easement, not then in its power
to grant, or to assume any liability or re-
sponsibility for the acts of the company. It
also declared that the company might enter
upon and use in perpetuity for its line of
road and other works necessary to protect the
It was also authorized to survey, locate, same from the lake, a width of three hundred
construct, and operate a railroad, with one feet from the southern boundary of the pub-
or more tracks or lines of rails, between the lic ground near Twelfth street, to the north-
points designated and the branches men- ern line of Randolph street, the inner or
tioned. And it was declared that the com- west line of the ground to be not less than
pany should have a right of way upon, and four hundred feet east from the west line of
might appropriate to its sole use and con- Michigan avenue, and parallel thereto; and
trol, for the purposes contemplated, land it was authorized to extend its works and
not exceeding two hundred feet in width fill out into the lake to a point in the south-
throughout its entire length; and might en-ern pier not less than four hundred feet west
ter upon and take possession of and use
any lands, streams, and materials, and of
every kind, for the location of depots and
stopping stages, for the purpose of construct-
ing bridges, dams, embankments, engine-
houses, shops, and other buildings necessary
for completing, maintaining, and operating
the road. All such lands, waters, materials,
and privileges belonging to the State were
granted to the corporation for that purpose;
and it was provided that, when owned by or
belonging to any person, company, or cor-
poration, and they could not be obtained by
voluntary grant or release, the same might
be taken and paid for by proceedings for constructing its tracks, and secure persons and
demnation as prescribed by law.
It was also enacted that nothing in the Act should authorize the corporation to make a location of its road within any city without the consent of its common council. This consent was given by an ordinance of the common council of Chicago, adopted June 14, 1852. By its first section it granted per
from the then east end of the same, thence [442]
parallel with Michigan avenue to the north
side of Randolph street extended; but it was
stated that the common council did not grant
any right or privilege beyond the limits
above specified, nor beyond the line that
might be actually occupied by the works of
the company.
By the ordinance the company was required
to erect and maintain on the western or inner
line of the ground pointed out for its main
tracks on the lake shore such suitable walls,
fences, or other sufficient works as would
prevent animals from straying upon or ob-
property from danger; and to construct such
suitable gates at proper places at the ends of
the streets, which were then or might there-
after be laid out, as required by the common
council, to afford safe access to the lake;
and provided that, in the case of the con-
struction of an outside harbor, streets might
be laid out to approach the same in the man-
railroad company has been filled with earth
under the direction of the city and is now
solid ground.
After the tracks were constructed the com
ner provided by law. The company was
also required to erect and complete within
three years after it should have accepted the
ordinance, and forever thereafter maintain,
a continuous wall or structure of stone ma-pany erected a breakwater east of its road-
sonry, pier-work, or other sufficient material, way upon a line parallel with the west line
of regular and sightly appearance, and not of Michigan avenue, and afterwards filled
to exceed in height the general level of up the space between the breakwater and its
Michigan avenue, opposite thereto, from the tracks with earth and stone.
north side of Randolph street to the southern We do not deem it material, for the deter-
bound of Lake Park, at a distance of not more mination of any questions presented in this
than three hundred feet east from and par- case, to describe in detail the extensive works
allel with the western or inner line of the of the railroad company under the permis-
company, and continue the works to the sion given to locate its road within the city
southern boundary of the city, at such dis- by the ordinance. It is sufficient to say that
tance outside of the track of the road as when this suit was commenced it had re-
might be expedient; which structure and claimed from the waters of the lake a tract,
works should be of suflicient strength and two hundred feet in width, for the whole
magnitude to protect the entire front of the distance allowed for its entry within the city,
city, between the north line of Randolph and constructed thereon the tracks needed for
street and its southern boundary from fur- its railway, with all the guards against
ther damage or injury from the action of the danger in its approach and crossings as spec-
waters of Lake Michigan; and that that part ified in the ordinance, and erected the des
of the structure south of Lake Park should ignated breakwater beyond its tracks on the
be commenced and prosecuted with reason- east, and the necessary works for the protec-
able dispatch after acceptance of the or- tion of the shore on the west. Its works in
dinance. It was also enacted that the com- no respect interfered with any useful freedom
pany should "not in any manner, nor for in the use of the waters of the lake for com-
any purpose whatever, occupy, use, or in- merce, foreign, interstate, or domestic. They
trude upon the open ground known as 'Lake were constructed under the authority of the
Park,' belonging to the city of Chicago ly-law by the requirement of the city as a con-
ing between Michigan avenue and the west-dition of its consent that the company might
ern or inner line before mentioned, except
so far as the common council may consent,
for the convenience of said company, while
constructing or repairing the works in front
of said ground." And it was declared that
the company should "erect no buildings be-
tween the north line of Randolph street and
the south side of the said Lake Park, nor
occupy nor use the works proposed to be
constructed between these points, except for
the passage of or for making up or distribut-
ing their trains, nor place upon any part of
their works between said points any obstruc-
tion to the view of the lake from the shore,
nor suffer their locomotives, cars or other
articles to remain upon their tracks, but only
erect such works as are proper for the con-
struction of their necessary tracks and pro-
tection of the same."
locate its road within its limits, and cannot
be regarded as such an encroachment upon
the domain of the State as to require the in-
terposition of the court for their removal or
for any restraint in their use.
The railroad company never acquired by
the reclamation from the waters of the lake
of the land upon which its tracks are laid,
or by the construction of the road and works
connected therewith, an absolute fee in the
tract reclaimed, with a consequent right to
dispose of the same to other parties, or to use
it for any other purpose than the one desig-
nated-the construction and operation of a
railroad thereon with one or more tracks and
works in connection with the road or in aid
thereof. The act incorporating the company
only granted to it a right of way over the
public lands for its use and control, for the
purpose contemplated, which was to enable
it to survey, locate, and construct and oper-
ate a railroad. All lands, waters, materials,
and privileges belonging to the State were
granted solely for that purpose. It did not
contemplate, much less authorize, any diver-
sion of the property to any other purpose.
The use of it was restricted to the purpose
expressed. Whilst the grant to it included
waters of streams in the line of the right of
way belonging to the State, it was accom-
Under the authority of this ordinance the panied with a declaration that it should not
railroad company located its tracks within be so construed as to authorize the corpo-
the corporate limits of the city. Those run- ration to interrupt the navigation of the
ning northward from Twelfth street were laid streams. If the waters of the lake may be
upon piling in the waters of the lake. The deemed to be included in the designation of
shore line of the lake was, at that time, at streams, then their use would be held equally
Park Row, about four hundred feet from the restricted. The prohibition upon the com-
west line of Michigan avenue, and at Ran-pany to make a location of its road within
dolph street about one hundred and twelve
and a half feet. Since then the space be-
tween the shore line and the tracks of the
The company was allowed ninety days to accept this ordinance, and it was provided that upon such acceptance a contract embodying its provisions should be executed and delivered between the city and the company, and that the rights and privileges conferred upon the company should depend upon the performance on its part of the requirement made. The ordinance was accepted and the required agreement drawn and executed on the 28th of March, 1853.
any city, without the consent of its common
council, necessarily empowered that body to
prescribe the conditions of the entry so far
|