[26]

said by that court, it is to be regarded as an
Organic Act, intended to dispose of the whole
question of a government for this District. It
is, as it were, a constitution for the District.
It is declared by its title to be an Act to pro-
vide a permanent form of government for the
District.' The word "permanent" is suggestive.
It implies that prior systems had been tempo-
rary and provisional. As permanent it is com-
plefe in itself. It is the system of government.
The powers which are conferred are organic
powers. We look to the Act itself for their
extent and limitations. It is not one Act in a
series of legislation, and to be made to fit into
the provisions of the prior legislation, but is a
single complete Act, the outcome of previous
experiments, and the final judgment of Con-
gress as to the system of government which
should obtain. It is the Constitution of the
District, and its grants of power are to be
taken as new and independent grants, and ex-
pressing in themselves both their extent and
limitations. Such was the view taken by the
court below; and such we believe is the true
view to be taken of the statute." 135 U. S.
243, 244 [34: 121, 122].

were growing old, and were becoming less
able physically to perform all the duties of a
member of the police force. Under those con-
ditions, it is entirely consistent with the policy
of Congress to hold that they intended to abol-
h the qualificational standard originating in
the Act of 1867. That standard of qualifica-
tion was for the benefit, as we have said, of
those who had served in the war; and to carry
it along indefinitely would make it apply to
those who had enlisted and been discharged in
time of peace, as well as to those for whose
benefit it was originally intended. As was
said by the court below, "it is not likely that
Congress intended to discriminate between the
citizen and the soldier or sailor of a peace
establishment."

We are not unmindful of the rule that re-
peals by implication are not favored. But
there is another rule of construction equally
sound and well settled which we think applies to
this case. Stated in the language of this court
in United States v. Tynen, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 88,
92 [20: 153, 154], it is this: "When there are
two acts on the same subject, the rule is to
give effect to both if possible. But if the two
are repugnant in any of their provisions, the
latter Act, without any repealing clause, oper-

of the first; and even where two acts are not
in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter
Act covers the whole subject of the first, and
embraces new provisions, plainly showing that
it was intended as a substitute for the first
Act, it will operate as a repeal of that Act."
See also Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 20
Wall. 590, 617 [22: 429, 437]; Tracy v. Tuffly,
134 U. S. 206, 223 [33: 879, 884]; Fisk v. Hen-
arie, 142 U. S. 459 [35:1080].

Under this view of the object and purposes
of the Act of 1878, we think the court below
was correct in holding that that Act super-ates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal
seded and repealed by implication § 354 of the
Revised Statutes relating to the District of
Columbia. It is true there are no express
words of repeal in the Act of 1878 applied to
said § 354 But the whole tenor of the Act
shows that it was intended to supersede pre-
vious laws relating to the same subject matter,
and to provide a system of government for the
District complete in itself, in all respects. The
language of the sixth section of the Act of
1878, that the commissioners "shall have au- It is contended, however, that by the Act of
thority to employ such officers and agents, and January 31, 1883 (22 Stat. at L. 412; Sup. to
to adopt such provisions as may be necessary Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 397), Congress recognized
to carry into execution the powers and duties said $ 354 as a still subsisting law, and that
devolved upon them by this Act," clearly im that consideration should compel a reversal of
plies, we think, that, in the employment of the judgment below. We are not impressed
officers over whom they are given control, with this contention. The object of the Act
they may select such persons, under appropri- just referred to was to abolish the detective
ate regulations, as they may deem suitable and force established by § 340 of the Revised Stat-
competent for the discharge of the duties per-utes relating to the District of Columbia, and
taining to such offices, without regard to their
possessing the qualifications prescribed by said
§ 354.

Moreover, we think, the reasons actuating
Congress in 1867 and in the 43d Congress, for
requiring that a member of the district police
should be an honorably discharged soldier or
sailor, did not exist, at least in the same de-
gree, in 1878.
When this qualificational pro-
vision was first enacted, the war had not been
long ended, and it was but in harmony with
the general liberal policy of the government
of the United States towards those who had
fought in its army and navy during that con-
flict, that a discrimination should be made in
their favor, in the matter of appointments to
various places of trust in the Nation's capital.
Their appointment on the police force would
serve also to imbue that force with at least
some of the precision and attention to duty
found in all well regulated military companies
that have seen actual service. But in 1878
the war had been over a number of years, and
those who had participated in its struggles

to increase the police force in certain respects.
The fourth section, which is the one relied on
as sustaining the view contended for, is as
follows:

"That the commissioners may, and they are
hereby, authorized to appoint not more than
six privates, to be members of the police force,
from among citizens of the United States who
have or have not served in the army and navy
of the United States, but who shall possess all
the other qualifications prescribed by section
three hundred and fifty-four of the Revised
Statutes of the United States relating to the
District of Columbia.”

It is manifest, however, from an inspection of this section, that there was no recognition in it by Congress that said § 354 was still subsisting law. But even if Congress had supposed that that section was still the law, when, as a matter of fact, it had been repealed, it would make no difference in this consideration. Postmaster-General v. Early, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 136, 148 [6: 577, 582]; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. Š. 260, 270 ̊[24: 154, 158];

[2

281

United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, 548 [24:
1082, 1083]. The question is, Was said & 354
repealed by the Act of 1878? That is a judicial
question, to be determined by the courts,
upon a proper construction of that section and
subsequent legislation upon the same subject-
matter, and is not for the legislative branch
of the government to determine. Authorities
last cited. The Act of January 31, 1883, did
not profess to re-enact the provisions of § 354,
and we do not think there is anything in that
Act running counter to the view we have
taken in this case of the repeal of that section
by the Act of 1878.

version of freights collected from consignees
of cargoes shipped upon defendant's vessels.
Affirmed.

See same case below, 80 Fed. Rep. 802; and
formerly in this court, 108 U. S. 118 (27: 87).

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:

This was an action at law originally begun in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, by the plaintiff Tugman, to recover of the National Steamship Company, defendant, for the conversion of freights alleged to have been wrongfully and fraudulently collected from the consignees of certain cargoes shipped by the plaintiff upon the defendant's vessels. Upon entering its appear for the removal of the action to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, upon the ground of the citizenship of the plaintiff and its own alienage. The removal was denied by the State court, the case tried and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the general term, and again by the Court of Appeals. A writ of error was thereupon sued out from this court, and the case reversed with $108.34 costs, upon the ground that the state court lost its jurisdiction by the petition and bond for removal. The case was remanded to the state court with direction to accept the bond and "proceed no further in the cause." 106 U. S. 118 [27: 87].

It is further argued that if said § 354 be con-
sidered repealed by the Act of 1878, then cer-
tain other named sections of the Revised Stat-ance the defendant filed a petition and bond
utes relating to the District of Columbia must
also be held to be repealed, and that certain
evil consequences will flow from such ruling
with respect to those specified sections. That,
however, is a consideration not properly in-
volved in this case. Whether those specified
sections or any others of said Revised Statutes
were repealed by the Act of 1878 we do not
now decide. Our decision and judgment have
reference solely to section 354. It will be time
enough to consider other questions when they
are properly before us.
Judgment affirmed.

Staying proceedings, when matter of discretion
-immaterial evidence-copy of affidavit as
evidence.

1. Where a case was remanded by this court to the
state court with direction to proceed no further
therein, upon the ground that the case had been
removed to the Circuit Court, it is a matter of
discretion in the court below to stay proceedings
until defendant's costs in the state court had been
paid.

2. This court will not reverse a judgment upon the
ground that evidence which was clearly imma-
terial was excluded in the court below.

8. Where defendant served a copy of an affidavit
upon the plaintiff with a notice of motion, and
made use of the affidavit to obtain an order, such
copy is admissible in evidence on the trial in be-
half of plaintiff as an admission by defendant
that the facts stated in it were true.
[No. 150.]

Argued Jan. 11, 1892.

Decided Feb. 1, 1892.

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Eastern District of New York, to review a judgment for plaintiff for the con

As to removal of causes, under Act of 1875; citizen- | ship; see note to Meyer v. Delaware R. Const. Co. 25: 593.

As to removal by one or two or more defendants; separable controversies, see note to Sloane v. Anderson, 29: 899.

As to removal of causes to United States courts for

A

On filing the mandate of this court in the Supreme Court of New York, the defendant Steamship Company had its costs taxed at $1,206.33, including an extra allowance of $500 ordered by the court, and a judgment was entered in that court for this sum. transcript having been filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, and the case coming on for trial, the defendant moved for a stay of proceeding until its costs were paid, and the court ordered a stay until the payment of the costs, $108.34, in this court only. 30 Fed. Rep. 802. Defendant declined to receive this amount, whereupon the stay was vacated, the case went to trial, and plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment under the direction of the court for $7,549.59. To reverse this judgment the defendant sued out a writ of error from this court.

Mr. John Chetwood for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Vanderpoel, Green & Cuming and Delos McCurdy for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

(1) The first assignment of error of the Steamship Company is to the refusal of the court to stay proceedings on the part of the plaintiff until the payment of the costs in the state courts, as taxed. We do not deem necessary to express an opinion whether, in

local prejudice, see notes to Gaines v. Fuentes.[23:-
524, and note to Jefferson v. Driver, 29: 897.

As to removal of causes from state to federal courts
where United States Constitution, Act of Congress or
Treaty comes in question, see note to Little York
Gold Wash, & W. Co. v. Keyes, 24: 656.

[29]

[30]

[31]

view of our mandate to accept the bond for re- | His_testimony was also corroborated by that
moval and proceed no further in the case, the of his managing clerk, who also swore that it
state court had jurisdiction to enter up a judg. was in the handwriting of one of the clerks in
ment for costs against the plaintiff in that the office, and that he had no doubt it was a
court, since the propriety of staying proceed- copy of the affidavit which was served with
ings until payment of these costs, whether evi- the order to show cause. The fact that the
denced by a judgment or by a simple taxation, paper offered in evidence was served as a copy
was purely a matter of discretion in the court of the affidavit with the order to show cause in
below. There were certain reasons why, in this same suit was sufficient evidence of its
the exercise of a sound discretion, that court authenticity to enable it to be read against the
might refuse such stay. The plaintiff had ob- defendant, who made use of it to obtain the
tained a judgment in the state court which order. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Newton, 89
had been affirmed by the general term and U. S. 22 Wall. 32 [22: 793]; Richelieu & O.
the Court of Appeals. Such judgment it is Nav. Co. v. Boston M. Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 408
true, had been reversed by this court, not by [34: 398].
reason of any want of merits however, but for
the failure of that court to recognize a removal
of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United
States. Under such circumstances, and in
view of the apparent inability of the plaintiff
to pay these costs, it was perfectly competent
for the court to permit him to go on with the
case upon the assumption that, if he succeeded
in obtaining a judgment, the right, if it had any,
of defendant to such costs could be secured by
deducting them from such judgment. The re-
sult of the trial having been again adverse to the
defendant, it certainly has no right to complain
of that which could work it no possible injury.
(2) Upon the examination of the plaintiff,
who was his own witness, he was asked several
questions with the apparent design of showing
that he had had transactions with the defend-
ant in New York, upon which he was indebt-
ed to it, and that there was a judgment pend-
ing against him in favor of the defendant.
This was clearly immaterial. The fact that he
was indebted to the defendant in other trans-
actions had no tendency to show that he had
not a valid claim against it in this one. If of-
fered for the purpose of showing a conspiracy
between plaintiff and defendant's agent, Car-
hart, to defraud the defendant, it is sufficient
to say that this would constitute an independ-
ent defense, and one which was not set up in
the answer, and was not admissible under a
general denial.

Nor were the answers to these questions admissible to show his interest in the suit, since being himself the plaintiff, that was already clearly manifest.

The affidavit, which was made by the sole managing agent of the defendant company, stated that "the ocean rate having risen, defendants collected the excess on the other side and refused to account for it in any way to plaintiff, with whom they supposed they had no contract and to whom they supposed they were under no liability." Having been made in this same suit, and having been used by the defendant to obtain the order for leave to amend its answer, it was competent evidence in behalf of the plaintiff as an admission by the defendant that the facts stated in it were true. Having affirmed that it was credible when used for one purpose defendant will not be permitted to repudiate it when offered for another purpose.

Various other exceptions were taken to the admission of testimony, but we flud no error in respect to any of them. The instruction of the court to find in favor of the plaintiff was clearly correct, and the judgment will be affirmed.

THE SIOUX CITY & IOWA FALLS
TOWN LOT AND LAND COMPANY,
Piff. in Err.

D.

THOMAS L. GRIFFEY ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 32-41.)

Act of May 15, 1856, granting lands to Iowa for railroads-pre-emption right to landbona fides of government patent.

1. Under the Act of May 15, 1856, granting lands to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of certain railroads, the title of the railroad company to the land attached at the time of the filing of the map of definite location of the railroad.

2.

3.

Where a homestead right had attached to land

before the title thereto had passed to the State under a railroad grant, it was excepted out of the grant as much as if it had been excluded therefrom by metes and bounds.

(3) There was no error in admitting the affi-
davit of Hurst. It seems that on the trial in
the state court before a referee an order was
obtained by the defendant upon the plaintiff to
show cause why the answer should not be
amended by setting up a conspiracy between
plaintiff and defendant's agent; that the affi-
davit of Hurst was made in support of this or-
der; and that a copy of said order was served
upon plaintiff with the copy of this affidavit,
which was the copy offered in evidence. Its
admissibility being objected to upon the ground
that it had not been properly proved, the plain-
tiff called as his own witness Mr. Chetwood,
the attorney for defendant, who testified that
he was unable to produce the original of the
affidavit, because it was upon the files of the
state court; that he thought the copy was in
the handwriting of a clerk who was in the of-
fice at the time; and that he presumed that the
paper offered in evidence was the copy served
on the other side with the order to show cause. 28: 794.

Where the government has issued its patent for public land to one having a pre-emption right NOTE.-As to pre-emption rights, see note to United States v. Fitzgerald, 10:785.

That patents for land may he set aside for fraud, see note to Miller v. Kerr, 5: 381.

As to errors in surveys and descriptions in patents

for lands; how construed, see note to Watts v. Lindsey, 5: 4:23.

As to land grants to railroads, see note to Kan

sas Pac. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.

.33!

which has attached thereto, and has received
payment therefor, no one but the government
can inquire into the bona fides of the transaction.
[No. 157.]
Argued Jan. 15, 1892. Decided Feb. 1, 1892.

IN

out a line upon the surface of the ground
along the land in controversy, which by such
survey was within the limits of the grant. On
the 19th of July, 1856, Griffey entered upon
this land, filed his declaratory statement, and
on the 5th of September located it with a mili-
tary bounty land warrant, and received his
certificate of location.

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, to review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the Dis trict Court of Woodbury County, Iowa, in favor of the defendants, Thomas L. Griffey et al., dismissing a suit in equity brought against them by the Sioux City & Iowa Falls Town Lot and Land Company, to quiet the title to land and confirming the title of defend ants as against plaintiff and all persons claim-form has never been before this court, yet the ing under it.

Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Wm. L. Joy and W. C. Goudy
for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. S. S. Burdett and O. C. Tredway for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The first and principal question is at what
time the title of the railroad company attached,
whether at the time the map of definite loca-
tion was filed in the General Land Office at
Washington, or when, prior thereto, its line
was surveyed and staked out on the surface of
the ground. While the question in this precise

question as to the time at which the title
attaches, under grants similar to this, has been
often presented, and the uniform ruling has
been that it attaches at the time of the filing of
the map of definite location. Grinnell v. Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 103 U. S. 739 [26: 456];
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, 366
[27: 201, 203]; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Dun-
meyer, 113 U. S. 629, 634 [28: 1122, 1123]:
Walden v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373 [29: 167]
United States v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co.141 U.
S. 358 [35: 766].

On May 15, 1856, Congress passed an Act granting lands to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of certain railroads. (11 Stat. at L. 9.) The grant was a grant in præsenti, and In Van Wyck v. Knevals, where the question of alternate sections, with the familiar provis-arose between Knevals, the grantee of the ion: "But in case it shall appear that the railroad company, and Van Wyck, who had United States have, when the lines or routes of entered the lands at the local land office after said roads are definitely fixed, sold any sec- the filing of the map of definite location with tions, or any parts thereof, granted as afore- the land department, but before notice theresaid, or that the right of pre-emption has of had been received at such local land office, attached to the same, then it shall be lawful this court said: "The route must be considfor any agent or agents, to be appointed by the ered as definitely fixed' when it has ceased governor of said State, to select, subject to the to be the subject of change at the volition of approval of the Secretary of the Interior, from the company. Until the map is filed with the the lands of the United States nearest to the Secretary of the Interior the company ts at tiers of sections above specified, so much land, liberty to adopt such a route as it may deem in alternate sections, or parts of sections, as best, after an examination of the ground has shall be equal to such lands as the United States disclosed the feasibility and advantages of difhave sold or otherwise appropriated, or to ferent lines. But when a route is adopted by which the rights of pre-emption have attached the company, and a map designating it is filed as aforesaid." with the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by that officer, the route is established; it is, in the language of the Act, 'definitely fixed,' and cannot be the subject of future change, so as to affect the grant, except upon legislative consent." And in Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Dunmeyer, it is also said: "We are of opinion, that under this grant, as under many other grants containing the same words, or words to the same purport, the act which fixes the time of definite location is the act of filing the map or plat of this line in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The necessity of having certainty in the act fixing this time is obvious. Up to that time the right of the company to no definite section, or part of section, is fixed. Until then many rights to the land along which the road finally runs may attach, which will be paramount to that of the company building the road. After this no such rights can attach, because the right of the company becomes by that act vested. It is important, therefore, that this act fixing these rights shall be one which is open to inspection. At the same time it is an act to be done by the company. The company makes its own preliminary and final surveys by its own officers It selects for itself the precise line on which

Dy an Act of the General Assembly of Iowa, of date July 14, 1856, the Dubuque & Pacific Railway Company was made one of the beneficiaries of this grant. By section 6 it was provided: "The lines and routes of the several roads above described shall be definitely fixed and located on or before the first day of April next after the passage of this Act, and maps or plats showing such lines or routes shall be filed in the office of the governor of the State of Iowa and also in the office of the secretary of the State of Iowa. It shall be the duty of the governor, after affixing his official signature, to file such map in the department having the control of the public lands in Washington, such location to be considered final only so far as to fix the limits and boundary in which said lands may be selected." The map of the definite location thus provided for was not received by the officers of the State until after September 27, 1856, and was filed at the General Land Office in Washington on October 13, 1856. Prior, however, to the 14th day of July, and the passage of the Act making it the beneficiary of the congressional grant, the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company had commenced the survey of its line, and had surveyed and staked

[34]

[39]

[40]

[41]

We see no error in the rulings of the Supreme
Court of Iowa, and its judgment is affirmed.

the road is to be built, and it is by law bound | into the court of equity with clean bands, and is
to report its action by filing its map with the entitled to no relief; and that, therefore, there
Commissioner, or rather in his office. The was error in entering a decree in favor of the de-
line is then fixed. The company cannot alter fendants upon the cross-petition. But as we
it so as to affect the rights of any other party." have seen, Griffey did make a settlement, file his
The reasoning of these opinions is applicable declaratory statement, and thus initiate a pre-
here. The fact that the company has surveyed emption right. By these means such pre-emp
and staked a line upon the ground does not tion right had, in the language of the statute,
conclude it. It may survey and stake many, attached. The land, therefore, did not pass un-
and finally determine the line upon which it der the railroad grant. It was no matter of in-
will build by a comparison of the cost and terest to the company what became of the title.
advantages of each; and only when by filing The government, the owner of the land, was sat-
its map it has communicated to the govern- isfied with what Griffey had done, took from
ment knowledge of its selected line, is it con- him its land warrant as payment and patented
cluded by its action. Then, so far as the the land. Into the bona fides of this transac-
purposes of the land grant are concerned, is its tion, no one but the government can inquire.
line definitely fixed; and it cannot thereafter, As the title was beyond challenge on the part
without the consent of the government, change of the railroad company, it had no right to
that line so as to affect titles accruing there- cast a cloud thereupon, and having done so by
under. In accordance with these decisions it accepting a patent from the State of Iowa, un-
must, therefore, be held that the line was not der the pretense that the land was a part of the
definitely fixed until the 13th of October, 1856. grant made to that State, and having affirmed
Inasmuch as Griffey's pre-emption right had the validity of the title conveyed by such pat-
attached to this land prior to such time, it did not ent, it does not lie in its mouth, or with those
pass to the railroad company under the grant; claiming under it, to now object to a decree
and it was a matter of no moment to the com- removing all cloud cast by such patent.
pany what thereafter became of the title. This
is settled by the case of Kansas Pac. R. Co. v.
Dunmeyer, in which it was said: "It is not
conceivable that Congress intended to place
these parties as contestants for the land, with
the right in each to require proof from the
other of complete performance of its obligation.
Least of all is to be supposed that it was intend-
ed to raise up, in antagonism to all the actual
settlers on the soil, whom it had invited to its oc-
cupation, this great corporation, with an inter-
est to defeat their claims, and to come between
them and the government as to the performance
of their obligations." And, again: "Of all the
words in the English language, this word at-
tached was probably the best that could have
been used. It did not mean mere settlement,
residence, or cultivation of the land, but it
meant a proceeding in the proper land office,
by which the inchoate right to the land was
initiated. It meant that by such a proceeding
a right of homestead had fastened to that land,
which could ripen into a perfect title by future
residence and cultivation. With the perform-
ance of these conditions the company had
nothing to do. The right of the homestead
having attached to the land it was excepted out
of the grant as much as if in a deed it had been
excluded from the conveyance by metes and
bounds." See also Hastings & D. R. Co. v.
Whitney, 132 U. S. 357 [33:363], in which was
a similar ruling.

10

The only other question we deem important is this: On July 5, 1871, the State of Iowa issued a patent, under which plaintiff in error claims, and on June 30, 1882, the United States issued a patent to Griffey, which is the basis of defendants' title. The defendants filed, as was authorized under the Iowa statute, a crosspetition, praying to quiet their title, and the decree entered was one dismissing the plaintiff's bill and quieting defendants' title.

Now it is claimed that Griffey never complied with the pre-emption laws; that he never made a bona fide settlement; that he secured his pre-emption rights by false representations and a pretended settlement; that he does not come

THE NEW ORLEANS PACIFIC RAIL-
WAY COMPANY ET AL. Appts.,

v.

JOHN D. PARKER ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 42-60.)

Jurisdiction as to amount—railroad mortgage,
construction of-land grant does not pass by
-decree on foreclosure of a railroad mortgage.

1.

2.

Where several plaintiffs claim under the same
title, and the determination of the cause neces-
sarily involved the validity of that title, this
court has jurisdiction as to all such plaintiffs,
though the individual claims of none of them
exceed five thousand dollars.

The mortgage given by the New Orleans, Baton
Rouge & Vicksburg Railroad Company, 1870, can-
not be construed to cover a land grant made by
Congress the following year to said company, in
aid of the construction of its road.

3. A land grant is not necessary to the operation of
a railroad nor appurtenant to the road within the
meaning of a clause of a mortgage on the rail-
road which covers after acquired property which
shall be appurtenant to or necessary for the
operation of the railroad.

4. A single bondholder has no right to a decree for

his exclusive benefit on the foreclosure of a
mortgage on a railroad, but is bound to act for
all standing in a similar position; and not only to
permit other bondholders to intervene, but also
to see that their rights are protected in the final
decree.

NOTE. As to land grants to railroads, see note to

Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.
28: 794.

[42]