[26] collective capacity, but through such political agencies as are duly constituted and established. The legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State, and the sovereignty of the people is exercised through their representatives in the legislature, unless by the fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed. The Constitution of the United States frequently refers to the State as a political community, and also in terms to the people of the several states and the citizens of each State. What is forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or required of the legislative power under state constitutions as they exist. The clause under consideration does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint, but that “each State shall;" and if the words "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct" had been omitted, it would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the leg islative power, cannot be held to operate as a limitation on that power itself. If the legislature possesses plenary authority to direct the manner of appointment, and might itself exercise the appointing power by joint ballot or concurrence of the two houses, or according to such mode as designated, it is difficult to perceive why, if the legislature prescribes as a method of appointment choice by vote, it must necessarily be by general ticket and not by districts. In other words, the act of appointment is none the less the act of the State in its entirety because arrived at by districts, for the act is the act of political agencies duly authorized to speak for the State, and the combined result is the expression of the voice of the State, a result reached by direction of the legislature, to whom the whole subject is committed. By the first paragraph of section two, article I. it is provided: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shail have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature;" and by the third paragraph, "when vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies." Section four reads: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." Although it is thus declared that the people of the several states shall choose the members of Congress (language which induced the State of New York to insert a salvo as to the power to divide into districts in its resolutions of ratification), the state legislatures, prior to 1842, in prescribing the times, places and manner of holding elections for representatives, had usually apportioned the State into districts and assigned to each a representative; and by ac of Congress of June 25, 1842 (carried forward as § 23 of the Revised Statutes), it was provided that where a State was entitled to more than one representative the election should be by districts. It has never been doubted that representatives in Congress thus chosen represented the entire people of the State acting in their sovereign capacity. By original clause three of section one of article n. and by the 12th Amendment which superseded that clause, in case of a failure in the election of President by the people, the House of Representatives is to choose the President; and "the vote shall be taken by states, the representation from each State having one vote." The State acts as a unit, and its vote is given as a unit, but that vote is arrived at through the votes of its representatives in Congress elected by districts. The State also acts individually through its electoral college, although, by reason of the power of its legislature over the manner of appointment, the vote of its electors may be divided. The Constitution does not provide that the appointment of electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a general ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose the electors. It recognizes that the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object. The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text; but where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are entitled to the greatest weight. Certainly, plaintiffs in error cannot reasonably assert that the clause of the Constitution uuder consideration so plainly sustains their position as to entitle them to object that contemporaneous history and practical construction are not to be allowed their legitimate force, and, conceding that their argument inspires a doubt sufficient to justify resort to the aids of interpretation thus afforded, we are of opinion that such doubt is thereby resolved against them, the contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution being too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 299, 309 [2:115, 118]. It has been said that the word "appoint" is not the most appropriate word to describe the result of a popular election. Perhaps not; but it is sufficiently comprehensive to cover that mode, and was manifestly used as conveying the broadest power of determination. It was used in article v. of the Articles of Confederation, which provided that "delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each State shall direct;" and in the resolution of Congress of February 21, 1787, which declared it expedient that "a convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several states," should be held. The appointment of delegates was, in fact, made by the legislatures directly, but that in [27] [28] [29] " volved no denial of authority to direct some | 513), provided for the election of electors on The Journal of the Convention discloses 4 Therefore, on reference to contemporaneous and subsequent action under the clause, we should expect to find, as we do, that various modes of choosing the electors were pursued, as, by the legislature itself on joint ballot; by the legislature through a concurrent vote of the two houses; by vote of the people for a general ticket; by vote of the people in districts; by choice partly by the people voting in districts and partly by the legislature; by choice by the legislature from candidates voted for by the people in districts; and in other ways, as, notably, by North Carolina in 1792 and Tennessee in 1796 and 1800. No question was raised as to the power of the State to appoint in any mode its legislature saw fit to adopt, and none that a single method, applicable without exception, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the Constitution. The district system was largely considered the most equitable, and Madison wrote that it was that system which was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, although it was soon seen that its adoption by some states might place them at a disadvantage by a division of their strength, and that a uniform rule was preferable. compelled, that the vote of the State might not Fifteen states participated in the second [32] into districts for the election of electors in 1796, | and 1824; and in Maine in 1820, 1824, and 1828. Massachusetts used the general ticket In the fourth presidential election, Virginia, under the advice of Mr. Jefferson, adopted the general ticket, at least "until some uniform mode of choosing a President and Vice President of the United States shall be prescribed by an amendment to the Constitution." Laws Va. 1799, 1800, p. 3. Massachusetts passed a resolution providing that the electors of that State should be appointed by joint ballot of the senate and house. Mass. Resolves, June, 1800, p. 13. Penusylvania appointed by the Legislature, and upon a contest between the senate and house, the latter was forced to yield to the senate in agreeing to an arrangement which resulted in dividing the vote of the electors. 26 Niles Reg. 17. Six states, however, chose electors by popular vote, Rhode Island supplying the place of Pennsylvania, which had theretofore fol. lowed that course. Tennessee, by Act of October 26, 1799, designated persons by name to choose its three electors as under the Act of 1796. Laws Tenn. 1794-1803, p. 211; Acts 2d Sess. 2d Gen. Assembly Tenn. chap. XLVI. Without pursuing the subject further, it is sufficient to observe that, while most of the states adopted the general ticket system, the district method obtained in Kentucky until 1824, in Tennessee and Maryland until 1832, in Indiana in 1824 and 1828; in Illinois in 1820 Gen. that instrument, after stating that "in some Such an amendment was urged at the time * See Stanwood on Presidential Elections (3d Hist. U. S. 201: 4 Adams' Hist. U. S. 285: 6 Adams' [33] [34] [35] up again in Congress in December, 1813, but the resolution for submitting the amendment failed to be carried. The amendment was renewed in the House of Representatives in December, 1816, and a provision for the division of the states into single districts for the choice of electors received a majority vote, but not two thirds. Like amendments were offered in the Senate by Messrs. Sanford of New York, Dickerson of New Jersey and Macon of North Carolina. December 11, 1823, Senator Benton introduced an amendment providing that each legislature should divide its State into electoral districts, and that the voters of each district "should vote, in their own proper persons," for President and Vice President, but it was not acted upon. December 16, and December 24, 1823, amendments were introduced in the Senate by Messrs. Dickerson of New Jersey and Van Buren of New York, requiring the choice of electors to be by districts, but these and others failed of adoption, although there was favorable action in that direction by the Senate in 1818, 1819 and 1822. December 22, 1823, an amendment was introduced in the House by Mr. McDuffie of South Carolina, providing that electors should be chosen by districts assigned by the legislatures but action was not taken.* The subject was again brought forward in 1835, 1844, and subsequently, but need not be further dwelt upon, except that it may be added that, on the 28th of May, 1874, a report was made by Senator Morton, chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, recommending an amendment dividing the states into electoral districts, and that the majority of the popular vote of each district should give the candidate one presidential vote, but this also failed to obtain action. In this report it was said: "The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly with the legislatures of the several states. They may be chosen by the legislature, or the legislature may provide that they shall be elected by the people of the State at large, or in districts, as are members of Congress, which was the case formerly in many states; and it is no doubt competent for the legislature to authorize the governor, or the supreme court of the State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these electors. This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the states by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their state constitutions any more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated." Senate Rep. 1st Sess. 43d Cong. No. 395. From this review, in which we have been assisted by the laborious research of counsel, and which might have been greatly expanded, it is seen that from the formation of the government until now the practical construction of the clause has conceded plenary power to 1 Benton's Thirty Years View. 37: 5 Bent. Cong Deb. 110, 677; 7 Bent. Cong. Deb. 472-74, 600; 3 Niles Reg. 240, 334: 11 Niles Reg. 258, 274, 293, 349; Annals Cong. (1812–13), 847. the state legislatures in the matter of the ap pointment of electors. Even in the heated controversy of 1876-'77 the electoral vote of Colorado cast by electors chosen by the legislature passed unchallenged; and our attention has not been drawn to any to any previous attempt to submit to the courts the determination of the constitutionality of state action. In short, the appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the states under the Constitution of the United States. They are, as remarked by Mr. Justice Gray in Re Green, 134 U. S. 377, 379 [33: 951, 952] "no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the state legis. latures when acting as electors of Federal senators, or the people of the states when act ing as the electors of representatives in Congress." Congress is empowered to determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on which they are to give their votes, which is required to be the same day throughout the United States, but otherwise the power and jurisdiction of the State is exclusive, with the exception of the provisions as to the number of electors and the ineligibility of certain persons, so framed that congressional and Federa! influence might be excluded. The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and while public opinion had gradually brought all the states as matter of fact to the pursuit of a uniform system of popular election by general ticket, that fact does not tend to weaken the force of contemporaneous and long continued previous practice when and as different views of expediency prevailed. The prescriptlon of the written law cannot be overthrown because the states have latterly exercised in a particular way a power which they might have exercised in some other way. The construction to which we have referred has prevailed too long and been too uniform to justify us in interpreting the language of the Constitution as conveying any other meaning than has heretofore been ascribed, and must be treated as decisive. It is argued that the district mode of choosing electors, while not obnoxious to constitutional objection, if the operation of the electoral system had conformed to its original object and purpose, had become so in view of the practical working of that system. Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of the Chief Executive, but experience soon demonstrated that, whether chosen by the legislatures or by popular suffrage on general ticket or in districts, they were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect of a particular candidate. In relation, then, to the independence of the electors the original expectation may be said to bave been frustrated. Miller, Const. Law, 149; Rawle, Const. 55; Story, Const. § 1473, The Federalist, No. 68. But we can perceive no reason for holding that the power confided to the states by the Constitu tion has ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not fully realized the hopes of those by whom it was created. Still less can we recognize the doctrine, that because the Constitution has been found in the march [36] [37] [38] of time sufficiently comprehensive to be appli- | 8. 21 Wall. 162 [22: 627], that the right of Nor are we able to discover any conflict between this act and the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution. The 14th Amendment provides: "SEC. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "SEC. 2. Representatives shall be appor tioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." The first section of the 15th Amendment reads: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The 15th Amendment exempted citizens of the United States from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The right to vote in the states comes from the states, but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, but the last has been. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 [23: 588]; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 [23: 563]. The If because it happened, at the time of the In Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 36, We decided in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. citizens, but not to radically change the whole The inhibition that no State shall deprive [39] |