AMENDED RULE.

Supreme Court of the United States.

OCTOBER TERM, 1892.

Ordered, That Rule 32 of this Court be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to read as follows:

Cases brought to this Court by writ of error or appeal, under the Act of February 25, 1889, Chapter 236, or under Section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891, Chapter 517, where the only question in issue is the question of the jurisdiction of the court below, will be advanced on motion, and heard under the rules prescribed by Rule 6, in regard to motions to dismiss writs of error and appeals.

(Promulgated November 28, 1892.)

APPENDIX IV.

Supreme Court of the United States.

ALLOTMENT ORDER.

It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this court among the circuits, agreeably to the Act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz:

For the first circuit,

Horace Gray, associate justice.

Samuel Blatchford, "

George Shiras, jr.,

66

66

"eighth

66 ninth 66

Lucius Q. C. Lamar, associate justice.
Henry B. Brown,

66

Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice.
David J. Brewer, associate justice.
Stephen J. Field,

(Promulgated December 19, 1892.)

66

APPENDIX V.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

In Memoriam.

Mr. Attorney General Miller addressed the court as follows:

It is my painful duty to announce to the court the death of Rutherrord B. Hayes, ex-President of the United States. At his home in Fremont, Ohio, after a brief illness, at the ripe age of three score years and ten, this eminent public servant last night passed from the life that now is into the life hereafter. This is not the time for eulogy, yet I am constrained to say that in his death the country has lost one who was a good citizen, a good soldier, a good President, and above all a good man.

The Chief Justice responded:

The Court receives the announcement of the death of ex-President Hayes with the sensibility due to his eminent public services and his private virtues; and as a mark of respect to his memory will now adjourn until to-morrow at the usual hour.

Adjourned until to-morrow at 12 o'clock. (January 18, 1893.)

1146

TO THE

FOUR VOLUMES CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK,

143, 144, 145, 146.

OCTOBER TERMS, 1891, 1892.

ABANDONED

PROPERTY.

AND

CAPTURED 4. It is not a good defense to a trespass upon
the complainant's property-rights in a copy-
is a married woman, that her husband was the
righted book sold to him by the authoress, who

514

Under the Captured and Abandoned Prop-
erty Act of March, 1863, providing for the
capture and sale of property in the insur-owner of the book by virtue of his marital
rectionary territory, where a claim is made by rights, where all the parties acquiesced in her
ownership. Belford v. Scribner,
the owner for the proceeds of such property so
taken and sold, and Congress has given the
Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and decide
his claim, on condition that the court should
find that he was loyal and was the owner of the
property, after the loyalty and ownership of
the claimant are established the only question
is the amount of proceeds of such captured
property to be recovered by him. Briggs v.
United States,
180

ABDUCTION.

5. An infringer of a patent cannot set up
the right of the assignee in bankruptcy of
the patentee to the patent, as against a title to the
patent from the bankrupt, acquired with the
consent of such assignee. Sessions v. Romadka,

609

6. The circuit court has power to order sev-
eral actions by one plaintiff against different
defendants to be consolidated for trial, when
they are of like nature and relative to the same
question, and unnecessary cost and delay will
be thereby avoided. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v.

The forcible abduction of a person from an-
other State, and conveyance within the juris-Hillmon,
diction of the court holding him, is no objec-
tion to his detention and trial for an offense
charged. Cook v. Hart,
934

706

7. A warrant of removal which directs the
marshal to remove the offender to another dis-
trict, "to be tried in said district upon such
counts in the indictment now pending in said
district as he can be legally tried upon," is suffi-
cient. Horner v. United States,
126

8. A complaint of intervention must be filed,
under Dak. Code, § 90, by leave of the court;
and the right to intervene ought to be claimed
within a reasonable time, and may be properly
refused where the action has been pending two
years and is about to be tried. Smith v. Gale,

521

9. The interest mentioned in the Dakota
Code, which entitles a person to intervene in a
suit between other parties, must be that created
by a claim to or lien upon the property, or some
part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.

ld.

1. A suit to enforce a mechanics' lien by the
vendor against the vendee of personal property
is an election to treat the title to the property
as in the vendee. Van Winkle v. Crowell, 880
2. In the District of Columbia a chose in ADMIRALTY.
action is not assignable so as to authorize the 1. The district court has no power to enter-
assignee to sue at law in his own name. This tain a libel in rem for damages incurred by
is the rule of the common law. Glenn v. Mar- loss of life, where by the local law a right of
bury,
790 action survives to the administrator or relatives
of the deceased, but no lien is expressly created
by the Act. Barton v. Brown,

3. The immunity or privilege of an assignee
in bankruptcy from being cited in proceedings
in a state court can only be set up by the as-
signee himself or by a person claiming under
him, and not by a person claiming under a
conveyance from the bankrupt before the bank-
ruptcy. Ludeling v. Chaffe,
313

3. Under the admiralty rules the ship and
the owner cannot be joined in the same libel,
except in possessory suits. Brown v. Brown, 727
4. The District Court of Alaska has jurisdic-
tion in admiralty to forfeit vessels for violation
of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1956, by the killing of
seals on any of the navigable waters within the
dominion of the United States acquired by the
treaty with Russia of March 30, 1867. Er
parte Cooper,
232

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. In Illinois a person in possession of land
under claim and color of title for seven suc
cessive years, who pays all taxes during that
time, is held to be the legal owner of such
land. Lewis v. Barnhart,
621

2. A sheriff's deed for land sold for taxes,
regular on its face and made to one who was
under no obligation to pay the taxes, will, as
between the grantee and the taxpayer, consti-
tute, without proof of a judgment for the
taxes, such color of title as will meet the re-
quirement of the Illinois Statute of Limita-
tions.
Id.
3. Where there has been an entry on land
under color of title by deed, if there is no ad-
verse possession the law construes the entry
to be coextensive with the grant to the party.
Smith v. Gale,
521

4. The possession which will bar the right of
the former owner to real property must be
open, visible, continuous, and exclusive, with
a claim of ownership such as will notify par-
ties that the premises are held adversely to all
titles and all claimants. Sharon v. Tucker,
532

5. In the District of Columbia one can base
his title to land, therein situated, on his adverse
possession of twenty years, as fully as if he had
always held the undisputed title of record. Id.

ALABAMA CLAIMS.

1. An Alabama claim and its proceeds in the
hands of the claimant's attorney in the State
where the claimant resides and where an as-
signee in insolvency has been appointed for all
his estate become assets in that jurisdiction;
and the attorney cannot defeat the assignee's
right thereto by taking them out of the State
and attempting to transfer the jurisdiction
thereof to the District of Columbia. Butler v.
Goreley,
981

2. A claim decided by the Court of Commis-
sioners of Alabama Claims to be a valid claim
against the United States is property which
passes to the assignee of an insolvent, under
an assignment made prior to the decision of

that court.

ALIENS. See also COURTS, 22.

Id.

1. The prohibition by 23 U. S. Stat. at L.
chap. 164, of the importation of aliens under
contract to perform labor, does not make it an
offense for a religious society in New York to
contract with an alien residing in England to
remove to New York City and enter into its
service as rector and pastor. Church of the
Iloly Trinity v. United States,

3. The words "who shall be about to come
to the United States," in the Chinese Restriction
Act, 6, should be limited to those who are
about to come to the United States for the first
time.
Id.

4. Section 6 of the Chinese Restriction Act
of May 6, 1882, as amended by the Act of
July 5, 1884, prescribing the certificate to be
produced by a Chinese person other than a
laborer as the only evidence permissible to es-
States, does not apply to Chinese merchants
tablish his right of re-entry into the United
already domiciled in the United States, who,
having left the country for temporary purposes
animo revertendi, seek to re-enter it on their
return to their business and their homes. ld.

Naturalization.

6. Admission of a State on an equal footing
with the original States, in all respects what
ever, involves the adoption as citizens of the
United States of those whom Congress makes
members of the political community, and who
are recognized as such in the formation of the
new State with the consent of Congress. ld.

7. Upon the admission of Nebraska into the
nal States in all respects whatsoever," the citi-
Union, "upon an equal footing with the origi-
zens of what had been the Territory, including
those who had declared their intention to be-
come citizens, became by the Act of Congress
citizens of the United States and of the State.

ld.

8. A son whose father declared his inten-
tion in Ohio to become a citizen of the United
States while the son was a minor, and who re-
moved to the Territory of Nebraska, and there
held office, and took the oath required by law
in entering upon the duties of such office, to
support the Constitution of the United States
and the provisions of the organic Act under
which the Territory of Nebraska was created,
and for many years enjoyed all the rights and
and of the Territory, was, within the intent and
privileges of a citizen of the United States
meaning, effect and operation, of the Acts of
Congress in relation to citizens of the Terri
tory, a citizen of that Territory, and was made
a citizen of the United States and of the State
of Nebraska under the organic and enabling
Acts and the Act of admission.
ld.

9. Where no record of naturalization can
be produced, evidence that a person having
the requisite qualification to become a citizen
did in fact and for a long time vote and hold
office and exercise rights belonging to citizens
is sufficient to warrant a jury in inferring that
he had been duly naturalized as a citizen. Id.
226 ALLOTMENTS. See APPENDICES, II., IV.

APPEAL AND ERROR.

I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

the decree is not final. McGourkey v. Toledo
& O. C. R. Co.
1079
9. If an account not asked for in the bill be

II. PARTIES; TRANSFER OF CAUSE; REC- ordered taken simply in execution of the de-

ORD.

III. OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
IV. DISMISSALS.

V. HEARING AND DETERMINATION.
VI. JUDGMENT; SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
See also CERTIORARI, 1.

I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
In general.

1. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States in cases dependent upon di-
verse citizenship was taken away by the Act
of Congress of March 3, 1891, and the Joint
Resolution of the same date, except in pending
cases and cases wherein the writ of error or
appeal should be sued out or taken before
July 1, 1891. Cincinnati Safe & L. Co. v.
Grand Rapids Safety Deposit Co.

885

cree, and such decree be final as to all matters
within the pleadings, it will still be final. Id.

10. A decree which directs the surrender of
rolling-stock, but does not pass upon the title
to the same, and refers the case to a master,
in accordance with the prayer of the bill, to
take an account, not only of rents and profits
and of damage, but of all questions and mat-
ters of difference between the receiver and the
petitioner, is not final.
ld.

11. If the finality of the decree is a question
of doubt, and it was treated by the court below
as not final, and it is only in the Supreme Court
of the United States that the finality of the de-
cree is claimed, that doubt will be resolved
against its finality.

Id.

12. A judgment of reversal by which the
cause is remanded for further proceedings is
not a final judgment, and cannot be reviewed
by the Supreme Court of the United States on
writ of error. Rice v. Sanger, 403; Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. v. Osborne,

1002

13. An order of the circuit court remanding
a cause to the state court is not a final judg
ment or decree from which an appeal will lie
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Joy v. Adelbert College,

2. Under the Act of Congress of March 3,
1891, the judgments of the United States cir-
cuit court of appeals are final in cases arising
under the revenue laws, except where the writ
of error or appeal was sued out or taken be-
fore July 1, 1891. Hubbard v. Soby, 886
3. Except in cases arising under patent laws,
revenue laws, criminal laws, and in admiralty
cases, the decisions of the circuit court of ap-
peals are reviewable in the supreme court, under
14. A judgment of the court of appeals of a
the Act of 1891, if the suit arose under a law of State, reversing the judgment of the lower
the United States and the matter in controver-state court and remanding the cause for further
sy exceeds $1,000 besides costs. Northern P.
Ř. Co. v. Amato,

506

1003

proceedings, is not a final judgment which can
be reviewed in the Supreme Court of the
United States on writ of error. Brown v.
Marion Nat. Bank,
1106

4. A question as to the jurisdiction of the
United States circuit court raised first in the
circuit court of appeals will not defeat the juris-order which overruled a demurrer, is not a
15. A judgment affirming, with costs, an
diction of the supreme court on writ of error final judgment reviewable by the Supreme
to the circuit court of appeals, on the ground Court of the United States. Meagher v. Min-
that defendant should have brought the case
directly from the circuit court.
nesota Thresher Mfg. Co.
ld.
Amount in dispute.

Criminal cases.

5. The Judiciary Act of 1891 does not confer
upon the United States the right to sue out a
writ of error in a criminal case. United States
v. Sanges,
445
6. The Supreme Court of the United States
has no general authority to review, on error or
appeal, the judgments of the circuit courts of
the United States or of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia or of the Territories
in cases within their criminal jurisdiction.
Cross v. United States,
821

7. The judgments of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia in criminal cases were
not embraced in the provisions of the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1891, providing that ap-
peals and writs of error might be taken "from
the district courts or from the existing circuit
courts" directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States "in cases of conviction of a capi-
tal or otherwise infamous crime." Re Heath, 358
Finality of judgment.

8. A decree fixing the rights and liabilities
of the parties, and referring the case to a mas-
ter for a ministerial purpose only, is final;
but if it refer the case to him for a judicial
purpose, and a further decree is to be entered,

834

16. When the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States depends upon the
amount in controversy, it is determined by the
amount involved in the particular case, and
not by any contingent loss either one of the
parties may sustain by the probative effect of
the judgment, however certain it may be that
such loss will occur. New England Mortg. S.
Co. v. Gay,

646

17. The matter in dispute to determine the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States in a suit brought in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia for an in-
junction against prosecutions to enforce cer-
tain license taxes is the amount of the particu-
lar taxes attacked; and unaccrued or unspecified
taxes for preceding years cannot be included
to make up the requisite amount. Washington
& G. R. Co. v. District of Columbia,

951