Nomination of George Bush to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Niney-fourth Congress, First Session ... December 15 and 16, 1975U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 - 94 էջ |
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activities agree Ambassador Bush Angola answer appointment Armed Services Committee believe Bush's candidate Central Intelligence Agency certainly CHAIRMAN Chief CIA Director confirmation Congress consider covert operations decision Defense Intelligence Agency Democratic Director of Central disclosure elected fact feel files gence George Bush going Government hearings HEISLER hope integrity intelligence community intelligence estimates involved judgment kind Larry O'Brien matter ment mittee National Security Council nomination oversight partisan politics Peter Camejo position Presidential problem public confidence question recommendations Republican National Committee responsibility Rockefeller Commission Secretary of Defense Senator CHURCH Senator Goldwater Senator HART Senator JACKSON Senator LEAHY Senator MCINTYRE Senator SCOTT Senator SYMINGTON Senator THURMOND Senator Tower sensitive serve Socialist Workers Party Soviet statement talking Thank things tion U.S. SENATE understand United Nations Vice President vote White House yesterday
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Էջ 5 - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States...
Էջ 52 - Mr. Dean, any attempt to involve the Agency in the stifling of this affair would be a disaster. It would destroy the credibility of the Agency with the Congress, with the Nation. It would be a grave disservice to the President. I will not be a party to it and I am prepared to resign before I do anything that would implicate the Agency in this matter.
Էջ 5 - That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure...
Էջ 49 - But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central...
Էջ 5 - The Director of Central Intelligence is given special discretionary power to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States".
Էջ 23 - ... coordination job for a department. Dr. FINUCANE. I would be very happy to spend as much time on the job as possible, but there is quite a lot of detail involved in this, and I personally feel that it is a full-time job to accomplish it*. Mr. RHODES. Do not misunderstand me, Doctor. As the chairman has said, I am not trying to tell you how to run your business at all. I wonder if you are not either misstating the position title that you need for this individual, or perhaps you have your sights...
Էջ 17 - Huntington, asserts that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: "a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society.
Էջ 21 - To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the "missile-gap
Էջ 67 - Peking and served for more than a year as Chief of the US Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China, a sensitive and complex assignment during a time of deepening hostility between the PRC and the Soviet Union.
Էջ 44 - Commission concluded that the proper functioning of the Agency must depend in large part on the character of the Director of Central Intelligence. The best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appointment to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and independence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether from the White House, within the Agency, or elsewhere.