been no such agreement, in that case, entered into between the solicitors and the trustee, as to give the solicitors a lien, and the trustee, who could not at any time have personally made the payment, for he was utterly impecunious, and could not resort to the trust estate because he already had a large sum in his hands which ought to have been applied in payment of the costs. In in re Blundell, of course, the money had been actually applied in discharge of the costs some considerable time anterior to the application. The next question was what circumstances would make a solicitor liable for funds, so received and applied, as a constructive trustee? The judge at once held that a solicitor to a trustee was under no greater liability to account as a constructive trustee than any other stranger to the trust. To make a stranger to the trust liable as a constructive trustee for money received by him from the trustee which he knows to be part of the trust estate, he must have brought home to him facts which show that the fund is being applied in a manner inconsistent with the trust; and to debar a solicitor from accepting payment out of the trust estate, you must bring home to him that at the time of accepting payment the trustee had been guilty of such a breach of trust (e.g. previous sale of part of trust estate for purpose of paying costs, trustee keeping proceeds himself) as to preclude him altogether from resorting to trust estate for payment of any of those costs; and that in fact such an application was a breach of trust.

IN Stewart v. Fletcher, 38 Ch.D., 627, Chitty (J.) settled the form of order for payment of dividends to a married woman entitled during her life to the income of a trust fund for her separate use without power of anticipation and without any gift over. The lady was going to India. "Carry over Reduced Annuities (£818 9s. 3d.). Pay the dividends as they accrue, during the life of Marian Stewart, on annuities carried over until further orders. The said Marian Stewart being restrained from anticipating such dividends during her coverture, they are not to be paid to any attorney, except upon an affidavit or statutory declaration by such attorney that he receives them on behalf and for the use of the said Marian Stewart, and not of any other person to whom she has assigned, or purported to assign them."

IT is to be regretted that the case of Wood v. Earl of Durham, reported 57 L.J.R., Q.B., 547, did not go to the Court of Appeal for an authoritative expression of opinion. With regard to Scott v. Sampson, L.R., 8 Q.B.D., 491, that case, it will be remembered, in effect decided that in an action for libel, evidence of general reputation may be used in mitigation of damages, but must, to be admissible, be pleaded. The decision proceeded on R.S.C., O. xix., rr. 4 & 15; a new rule, viz., O. xxi., r. 4, having been since passed, but O. xix., rr. 4 & 15 remaining unrepealed. The libel for which Wood brought his action stated that he was in the habit of "pulling" horses belonging to a certain stable. The defendant had pleaded a justification, and sought leave to amend his defence by stating plaintiff was commonly reputed to have been in the habit of riding horses (generally, and not those only, of a particular stable) dishonestly to prevent their winning. Leave to amend by adding this plea was refused; but neither Manisty (J.) nor Hawkins (J.) based his decision merely on the wideness of the language of the plea; Manisty (J.) saying that to allow the plea only in a limited form, applying only to the particular stable, would be admitting a new state of things. The Court, however, decided that evidence given under the plea sought to be added would, if admissible, go only to the question of damages, and that the words, "material facts," in O. xix., rr. 4 & 15, mean only such facts as are material to cause of action or the defence. As it is, Scott v. Sampson (ubi supra) remains, though somewhat discredited; and it is well to draw attention to its practical result. An action for libel is an action for loss by damage to reputation, and, if the plaintiff had a bad reputation, where is the loss or damage? This may sound very plausible, but, in fact, with such a state of things, how many plaintiffs would not prefer to leave their characters unvindicated from untruthful defamation than prove its untruth by an action in which the defendant would be at liberty to do them far

more injury by showing all kinds of baseless reports-a mere "hearsay justification," as plaintiff's counsel well described it? It is, of course to be remembered that in Scott v. Sampson (ubi supra) the Court, though holding "general evidence of bad character" would have been admissible if the pleadings had raised the question, were of opinion that evidence of rumours that the plaintiff had done what was charged against him in the libel, or of particular acts of misconduct, would have been inadmissible. even with this limitation, would not the result still be "that a Court of Law would be less dreaded by the worst libellers than by their victims?"

Yet,

Brooking v. Maudslay, Son and Field, 38 Ch. D., 636, disposes of an endeavour to extend the jurisdiction in Equity. The plaintiff admitted that the policy of assurance, which was the subject matter of the action, was not liable to be avoided for fraud or misrepresentation; in which case the jurisdiction of Equity to direct delivery up and cancellation was admitted by the parties and affirmed by the judge; but the plaintiff claimed in the alternative a declaration that the policy was not binding on himself and the other underwriters on whose behalf he sued, and that they were discharged from all liability for loss on the voyage, and an injunction restraining defendants from taking any proceedings on the policy. The defendants were shippers, who had innocently effected a policy of marine insurance on certain machinery on board a ship which, unknown to them, went to sea in an unseaworthy condition; they admitted there was a good legal defence to any action they might bring on the policy; had not threatened legal proceedings, but would not undertake not to bring any; and alleged it was the practice of underwriters, who may have a good legal defence to an action on a policy founded on the vessel's unseaworthiness, to pay insurers who are innocent shippers. Stirling (J.), after saying that the real issue was one for a Court of honour, pointed out that, prior to the Judicature Acts, a plaintiff coming into Equity to restrain proceedings at law, was bound to show some equitable ground for relief, and could not come to a Court of Equity to restrain proceedings at law, if he had a good defence at law; that the sole ground for relief urged by plaintiff was that that defence depended on extrinsic facts, the evidence of which might be lost, for which the appropriate remedy would be an action to perpetuate testimony; and he therefore gave judgment for the defendants, with costs.

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ON Thursday last, Stirling (J.) delivered an important decision on Sections 16, 51 and 54 of the Public Health Act, 1875, in Lewis v. Weston-Super-Mare Local Board of Health. The plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain defendants from carrying a water main through certain freehold lands belonging to him, forming part of the garden of a house. The questions were, whether it was necessary within the meaning of those sections to do so, and, if so, whether the condition precedent, that it must appear to be necessary on the report of the "surveyor," had been satisfied? On the first point, his lordship was of opinion that it was for the surveyor and not the Court to determine the necessity; that he must, if it were called in question, satisfy the Court that he had exercised a bonâ fide judgment in the matter; but that if the Court were satisfied of that it would not interfere. Then the question arose whether P., who had reported to the Board, was the "surveyor" within the provisions of the Act? P. had been assistant surveyor. The surveyor died, and P. was appointed surveyor until a permanent surveyor should be appointed, at a proportionate rate of salary to the late surveyor, but subject to a week's notice; he was a candidate for the permanent office, but was not appointed. P.'s report had been made four days before the election to the post of surveyor was made. Stirling (J.) decided that the 'surveyor" mentioned in Section 16 was the fit and proper person duly appointed to be surveyor within Section 189; and that P., who had been only assistant surveyor, and afterwards appointed to discharge the duties of surveyor necessary or proper to be discharged during a vacancy in the surveyor's office, whatever his personal fitness or capacity might be, did not satisfy that description. Local

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WHERE a Registrar in Bankruptcy has, in the exercise of his discretion, refused to stay, under Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, a petition, on the ground that an appeal is pending from the judgment against the debtor on which the bankruptcy proceedings are based, the Court will not overrule his refusal and go behind the judgment, unless it be shown that the discretion has been wrongly exercised. Fraud, collusion, or miscarriage should

a case be shown to induce the Court to interfere. Such is the effect of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Flatau.

In regard to the vote on the question of fusion of the profession, taken at the Chief Law Society's meeting at Newcastle recently, it is clear that the letter of Mr. C. T. Saunders, of Birmingham, recently published in The Times, in which Mr. Saunders shows that the vote at Newcastle on the question is of no importance whatever, fairly represents the actual position of matters. A professional contemporary in its issue of last Saturday seeks to ridicule Mr. Saunders' opinion upon the point, but the feebleness of the argument is entirely on the other side, because the views of the Incorporated Law Society upon the question of amalgamation, which society consists of several thousands of solicitors, cannot be said to be adequately expressed at a remote provincial meeting of the society when the total vote taken only amounts to sixty-one; and of these sixty-one solicitors, at least twenty, we should say, though members of the Newcastle Law Society, were not members of the Chief Law society. It was a trumpery vote, and of no consequence; the members of the Chief Law Society had no notice that such a motion would be brought forward. If notice of motion had been given, we understand that several London solicitors would have gone to Newcastle to support Mr. Saunders' views.

SKETCHES IN COURT.

NEVER since the impeachment of Warren Hastings has any case afforded such an opportunity for a brilliant display of counsels' resources as the present enquiry before the Royal Commissioners. Of course, the very magnitude of what will probably prove to be one of the most important State Trials on record is such as would naturally deter an experienced advocate from putting forth his best efforts at the earliest stage of what are destined to be very lengthy proceedings.

The Attorney-General's style strangely contrasts with the stirring scenes he is depicting. At one moment he is deep in the dark deeds and bogs of Galway, or assailing the bona fides of that amazonian brigade, the "Ladies' Land League." Then he is in New York, struggling with the intricacies of the Clan-na-Gael, and the peculiar habits and names of those folk. Anon, at the President's request, he returns to Galway and to the thread of his discourse.

Meantime, his colleague, Mr. Murphy, Q.C., is indefatigable in his endeavours to keep his distinguished leader right as to the queer names that occur from time to time. But, strange to say, Mr. Murphy is of little or no avail in suggesting the proper pronunciation of such Celtic jawbreakers as Sir Richard abandons in despair. Even Mr. Atkinson-a silk whom one would have thought was expressly imported from the Irish bar for the special purpose of meeting such emergencies-is strictly relegated to the laborious drudgery of "taking a note" merely. There was something peculiarly pathetic in Sir Richard's appeal to those about him to correct his pronunciation of the sesquipedalian names over which he so persistently and

promise, he eventually adopted the ingenious device of first murdering the pronunciation and then calmly spelling out the letters of each word he had so outraged.

But even an Attorney-General should not be expected to wrestle with either the meaning or the sound of such an atrocity as thiggin thu, yet this feat he accomplished most successfully; and everybody, including Mr. Justice Day, felt that in doing so, and in translating it into the classical phrase, "Do you twig?" he had fully redeemed his honour and reputation for whatever verbal butcheries he had perpetrated previously.

The dreary monotony of the proceedings is sometimes relieved by incidents of this description; but as regards the Bar, the champion entertainer is Mr. Lockwood, Q.C. It is well known that his marvellous talent as a "lightning caricaturist" is only equalled by his professional ability, and the latitude he allows himself in the former capacity is of the most ample scope. Again and again has the whole Bar been convulsed with suppressed laughter at the amusing sketches and caricatures which, like a true artist, he produces with phenomenal rapidity-and that, too, without allowing the operation of drawing them to in any way "interfere with his present occupation."

Next to Sir Henry James, no one appears to more thoroughly appreciate and enjoy the "artistic merit" of King" himself, as he sits exchanging comments, and not these little pictorial brochures than does the "Uncrowned making it his business to allow nothing to escape his infrequently smiles, with Mr. George Lewis, and generally attention. It has been stated that Mr. Parnell has lately become unusually aged and careworn in appearance. little carelessness is certainly noticeable about the trimming of his beard and the unkempt condition of his gradually thinning hair.

A

Why he should affect slovenly attire has recently become a matter of general enquiry. The cut and material of his clothing have certainly not much in common with those of the average Parliamentary masher, and the condition and appearance of his hat may best be gathered from the fact that even Mr. Gladstone himself would hardly have the temerity to wear it in public. But it must not be forgotten that the crowded condition of the small Court in which the Commission sits is anything but conducive to the preservation of hats, especially as the hordes of professional reporters who swarm on all sides, and literally trample each other under foot, are no great respecters of persons, much less of hats. The head-gear of the Uncrowned may therefore have shared the squelched or telescoped fate of many others.

and chide and fight about their seating rights, and when it But when learned members of the Bar actually fall out requires the united efforts of two Ex-Attorney-Generals to pacify them and apportion a limited number of square inches to each, who shall blame the mere reporters? Better behaviour might have been expected from the "gods" in the improvised gallery, for they were truly, for the most part, on the opening day, a distinguished company. But even there signs of mutual discontent were not entirely wanting. In fact, the extensive and ruthless character of the evictions carried out on Monday within the precincts of the Probate Court was strongly suggestive of Woodford itself.

It is said by those who know, that the wife of James Carey, who turned Queen's evidence on the trial of the Phoenix Park murders, and was subsequently shot, will give evidence at the Commission. At any rate, it is known that much of The Times' information came from this source. It is a pity that Carey himself is no longer alive, or we should have had perhaps some startling disclosures.

Subscribers to PUMP COURT will remember our remarks about the Land League accounts, and they will acknowledge our prescience by the light of the first serious struggle which took place before the Commission yesterday, in respect of the inspection of the books of the Hibernian Bank, the National Bank, and the Munster and Leinster Banks, in reference to their accounts with the National

League; and Sir James Hannen at once gave the key-note which we have so long been striking, as to the purposes of the Commission. Sir James said: "We want to get pos

session of these books; we don't want an academical argument on the subject." This in reply to Sir Walter Phillimore, Q.C., who now appears for the Hibernian Bank, while Mr. Wheeler, Q.C., appears for the National Bank.

CASE-LAW

one

In a century which has seen so many fictions rudely relegated to the province of legal history, how is it that the fiction, obvious and acknowledged, that judges only declare existing law, still holds its ground? To investigate fully the causes would be too long a labour reason, however, of the continuance is undoubtedly this, that our judges in many cases do declare the law, though in many others they add to the already heavy mental load of legal learning. The process resembles nothing so much. as accretion, and, of course from a legal point of view, stream-added additions, insensibly increasing day by day the adjacent land, belong also to its proprietor. Nor do Nor do we desire to complain that the law is not in a stationary condition. The wants of a community, not cursed by Chinese civilisation, but steadily progressing, are not the same yesterday and to-day, and we trust will not be the same to-morrow. Varying wants, and perhaps we may say, a higher ethical standard, necessitate continual changes in law. By what instrumentality is it to be brought into harmony with altered and altering conditions? Strongly marked changes with us are, in the main, effected by the instrumentality of an enactment; but the machinery of a statute is too cumbrous for the modifications commonly introduced by "judge-made," or, to borrow Austin's phrase, "judiciary law." Nay more, the lawyer as a rule, whatever the evils of the latter may be, prefers it to statutes distinguished by their length, the bad draughtsmanship of their sections, or the hasty and ill-considered alterations, whereby the original handiwork of the draughtsman. has been marred in committee; evils remediable no doubt, but hardly likely to be remedied. Perhaps it would be better if the de facto legislative power of the judges were exercised directly and avowedly with us, as it was in Rome, and if judiciary law emanated from our Courts openly, in the form of general provisions or principles, rather than in the shape of case-law. On the evils of all judiciary law, however, we do not propose to dwell. They have been pointed out by Austin and later writers, not always, no doubt, in entire accord with his criticisms. But if, as we believe, judiciary law is not to be superseded by statute law, it becomes important to consider how far the evils which mark our own system are inseparable or capable of remedy. As it is, case follows case in quick succession: is every case lucid? is not each voluminous? What is the precise effect of each decision, imbedded in all the peculiar facts by which the case may have been characterised? Is a new principle embodied in it, more or less obscurely; and how long will it remain undiscovered in respect of all or any of its, perhaps, far-reaching consequences? Will it be doubted and followed, or doubted and distinguished, approved and followed, or approved and distinguished, or merely distinguished, and how long will it be before it is distinctly over-ruled and its influence cease? Then how many series of reports have we? Which, save the Law Reports, will be-always and everywhere-accepted as authentic ? We have only indicated a few of the difficulties, and the practical result is well known. solicitors are willing to accept alone the responsibility of giving any important piece of advice. If the occasion is trivial, too trivial for counsel's fee, his expression of opinion is so guarded as to be almost valueless. If the matter be important, a case is laid before counsel to be followed by the studied ambiguity of his opinion. This is not the result exclusively of the state of our case-law, but much of this vagueness and doubt to which we have referred is due to it and to its remediable evils. The bulk of our judiciary law and of the volumes in which it has to be sought, in the words of Dunning's celebrated resolution concerning the power of the Crown-have increased, are increasing, and ought to be diminished. We have text-books to diminish the labour of searching for decisions, but text-books are not always reliable or decisions always easy to find, or follow

Few

the precise effect of, through their medium. Digests we have, useful in their way, but however carefully compiled, and however numerous the cross references may be, they undoubtedly fall far short of what is required. Statute law, to begin with, is not as difficult to quarry in. The Chronological Index to the Statutes in the first place, and the revised edition of them in the second, reduce that labour considerably. Numerous as they are, the volumes containing them are not a hundredth part of the tomes containing decisions not regarded as inauthoritative. Yet a new edition of the Statutes revised will soon be forthcoming; but no step is taken to simplify and systematise the vast concrete bulk of our judiciary law, and extract the rationes decidendi. Private enterprise has done much towards that consummation devoutly to be wished-codification. But it is still afar off. For much of the chaos of our case-law, order, and light might be substituted by the appointment of a commission to ascertain and condense. Such a commission need not have power even to reject anomalies or to choose between irreconcileable decisions. If the law were all known many of the difficulties now felt would vanish, and many instances of "inelegantia " need only to be made clear for amendment to follow. The permanency of such a commission would require consideration. But until some means are employed, the question arises how to reduce the judiciary law of the year to cognoscible bulk, and to impress its results on the minds of those of the profession― perhaps a majority-too busy to do more than hurriedly read the reported cases, even if they have time for that. With that end in view we have given shortly the effect of some of the more important decisions reported in the Law Reports from January to August. The more recent decisions we have dealt with at greater length by way of comment elsewhere in these pages. In re Burdett, Ex parte Byrne, 20 Q. B. D. 310, where a bill of sale is invalidated as to personal chattels comprised in it, by non-compliance with the requirements of the Acts, it remains valid as to other property comprised in it where the security upon the different subject-matter is severable. In Duke of Devonshire v. Pattinson, 20 Q. B. D. 263, we have the language of a conveyance of riparian land which would primâ facie pass the bed of the river neque ad medium filum, explained be acts of user of the grantees and proof of surrounding circumstances, and that presumption rebutted. Crampton and Company v. Ridley and Company, ibid 48, we have an opinion expressed by A. L. Smith (J.), that where there is an agreement to refer to mercantily arbitrators and an umpire, there is an implied contract by the parties referring to pay them reasonable remuneration for their services. In re Gardiner, Ex parte Coulson, ibid. 249, a married woman not trading separately from her husband is not subject to the Bankruptcy Laws, though possessed of separate estate. London Founders' Association Limited v. Clarke, ibid. 576, in a contract for sale of shares on the Stock Exchange; there is no implied undertaking by vendor that Company will register transferee, and if Company refuse to do so, acting under discretion reserved to them by the articles, transferee can't recover the price paid from vendor. Eaton v. Lake, ibid. 378, performances of a musical composition, &c., are contrary to the right of the author, and action maintainable in the absence of any assignment or consent in writing. Friend v. Shaw, ibid. 374 in Sect. 50 of County Courts Act, 1856, "legal notice to quit" means notice to quit required by law, and not that required by the contract between landlord and tenant. As to this see now the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 and 52 Vict., c. 43, s. 138). Reg. v. Buckmaster, ibid. 182, a welsher may be convicted of larceny by trick. Reg. v. Owen, ibid. 829, a prisoner may be convicted of common assault on, or in consequence of evidence received under, Sect. 20 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, on a charge of indecent assault, on which he was acquitted, though such evidence would not be admissible on a charge of common assault alone. Reg. v. Wealand, ibid. 827, a prisoner indicted under Sect. 4 of that Act may be found guilty under Sect. 9 of an indecent assault, though there is no sufficient evidence to support the conviction save a child's unsworn evidence receivable only on charges under Sect. 4, on which prisoner was acquitted. Hammond v. Bussey ibid. 79, costs of an action for breach of warranty brought

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In

by subvendees against their vendors, and reasonably defended by the latter, on notice to the original vendors, who had sold for resale, the warranty on each sale being in the same terms by the vendors and subvendors, and the breach of warranty being discoverable on use only, held to be recoverable as damages within the contemplation of the parties to the original contract at the time of making it, in a subsequent action by the subvendors against the original vendors to recover inter alia such costs. Wennhak v. Morgan, ibid. 635, disclosure of a libel by a husband to his wife is not evidence of publication in an action for such libel against the husband by the party libelled. Merivale v. Carson, ibid. 275, a newspaper criticism on a matter of public interest, eg., a stage play, is actionable, if in the opinion of a jury it exceeds the limits of fair criticism-the case is not one of "privilege," necessitating proof by plaintiff of actual malice. Taylor v. Timson, ibid. 671, action may be brought in the temporal Courts against a churchwarden for forcibly preventing an inhabitant from entering church to attend Divine Service. Marquis of Abergavenny v. Bishop of Llandaff, ibid. 460, by 1 and 2 Vict., c. 106, s. 104, the Bishop of a Welsh diocese can refuse to institute the patron's nominee if ignorant of the Welsh language. Reg. v. Archbishop of York, ibid. 740, madamus will not lie to the Archbishop of York to admit to convocation candidate elected to represent an archdeaconry in the Lower House of Convocation in his province. Pape v. Pape, ibid. 76, discontinuance of weekly payments agreed to be made under an agreement for separation, and non-performance of the agreement in consequence of a non-proven charge of adultery, held not desertion within the Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, 1886 (49 and 50 Vict., c. 52, s. 1). Scott v. Morley, ibid. 120, settles the proper form of judg ment against a married woman under Sect. 1, subsect. 2 of Married Woman's Property Act, 1882. Wilson v. Glossop, ibid. 354, wife's adultery is no defence, if connived at by husband, to an action against him for necessaries supplied to her while living apart from him. Pine v. Barnes, ibid. 221, the penalty imposed by Sect. 9 of the Licensing Act, 1874 (37 and 38 Vict., c. 49), is not incurred by sale and supply, to a bona fide lodger in innkeeper's house, of intoxicating liquors consumed during time at which the premises are directed to be closed, in a private room by lodger and lodger's bonâ fide guests, after a dinner he had given. The Queen v. Farrant, ibid. 58, such a substantial interest, other than pecuniary, in the result of a hearing, as is likely to bias the magistrate, is required to disqualify him from sitting, though a pecuniary interest, however slight, has that effect. The Queen v. Beckley, ibid. 187, Justices of the Peace sitting in and acting for the petty sessional division of a county have jurisdiction to commit for trial on a charge arising in another petty sessional division of the same county. Finlay v. Chirney, ibid. 494, an action for breach of promise of marriage, where no special damage is alleged, does not survive against the personal representatives of the promisor; and such special damage must be to the property, not the person of the promisee, and within the contemplation of both parties at the date of the promise, and action lies for such special damage only. Arrowsmith v. Lickenson, ibid. 252, the children of a woman by a former husband are liable, when she and the second husband become chargeable to a parish, to maintain her and contribute towards her relief, notwithstanding 4 and 5 Wm. IV., c. 76, s. 56, enacts that all relief to a wife shall be considered as given to her husband. Ex parte Alice Woodall, ibid. 832, refusal of Queen's Bench Division to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person committed to prison under Sect. 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870, held given in a criminal matter, so that no appeal would lie to Court of Appeal. Weldon v. Maples and Co., ibid. 331, Court of Maples and Co., ibid. 331, Court of Appeal will order security to be given for costs of an appeal, if primâ facie case, of threatened abuse by appellant of process of the Court be made out. In re Johnson, ibid. 68, abuse and threatening gestures used in precincts of Court to opposing solicitor in relation to, and after, proceedings before a Judge at Chambers, constitute a contempt of Court. In re Smith, Ex parte Brown, ibid. 321, where a judge's order, made by consent, had not been filed, as required by Debtors Act, 1869, sect. 27, and the order was therefore void, save as against the judgment debtor, and a garnishee

paid a debt attached before twenty-one days from making of the unfiled judge's order, and before an act of bankruptcy on which the judgment debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to recover from the judgment creditor the amount paid to him by the garnishee. Shrapnal v. Laing, ibid. 334, is an important decision on the question of taxation of costs where a defendant raises and succeeds on a counter-claim which could not be pleaded by way of set-off, plaintiff succeeding in his claim. In re Pollard, ibid. 656, a solicitor's bill of costs, charging for business not transacted in any Court of Law or Equity can be ordered to be delivered now by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division (though application for an order for delivery should be made in the Chancery Division) and not merely by the Lord Chancellor and Master of the Rolls, as provided by Sect. 37 of the Solicitors Act, 1843. In re Newbould, ibid. 204, vendor's solicitor, employed to conduct business connected with sale of freehold property by public auction, is, where sale completed, only entitled to charge the scale fees prescribed by general order of August, 1882, Schedule 1, Part 1, made under Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881; and where auctioneer's commission is paid by client, nothing more for work done in conducting the sale. Reeve v. Berridge, ibid. 523, entering into agreement for purchase of existing lease does not affect purchaser with constructive notice of all the covenants in it, or, if lease contain onerous and unusual covenants, bind him to complete unless a fair opportunity of ascertaining their terms was afforded to him. In re Armstrong, 21 Q.B.D. 264, trustee of married woman (trading separately from her husband and adjudicated bankrupt) in claiming a life estate in real property reserved to her, for her separate use without restraint on anticipation, by her marriage settlement, is not "interfering with or affecting" the settlement within Sect. 19 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and such estate held to pass to him under Sect. 1, subsect. 5 of that Act. Grand Junction Canal Company v. Petty, ibid. 273, a Company may dedicate land, vested in them for public purposes, for use as a public footpath, provided the user under such dedication would not be incompatible with the purposes for which the locus in quo was vested in them. Butler v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, ibid. 207, where passenger travelling by excursion train lost half of return ticket, but offered to pay full ordinary fare for distance he had travelled, refusing to pay fare from station whence train had started, and was forcibly removed, but without unnecessary violence, from railway carriage by defendants' servants: action for assault maintainable against Company, though contract incorporated conditions requiring plaintiff to produce ticket when required, or pay fare from station from which train started; on ground that contract did not by implication authorize removal on failure to comply with the conditions. Bidder v. Bridges, 37 Chancery Division, 406, where defendant's solicitor got the costs of an action, dismissed with costs, taxed, but without including interest thereon, and received and cashed a cheque for the amount from the plaintiff's solicitor; cheque of plaintiff's solicitor held to be an accord and satisfaction of the whole amount due from plaintiff. Garfitt v. Allen-Allen v. Longstaffe, ibid. 48, back rents of real estate, received by devisee in possession, and his assigns, cannot be recovered by legatees, though estate be charged with payment of their legacies and proves insufficient. Union Bank v. Munster, ibid. 51, mortgagees, selling under Court's direction in foreclosure action, can ensure specific performance against a purchaser at a sale by auction, though a fictitious bidding made, without the vendor's knowledge, after the purchaser had already exceeded the reserve price, caused him to increase his bid. Lucas v. Martin, ibid. 597, where trustee in bankruptcy entered into scheme of arrangement whereby defendants agreed to purchase bankrupt's assets, and creditors, in the resolution accepting it, varied it by adding a clause that defendants should give a bond for payment of the consideration, and the Court approved agreement signed by defendants and annulled the bankruptcy; specific performance of the agree ment held not enforceable, on ground that the creditors having varied defendant's proposal the Court had not approved the scheme. Levy v. Abercorris Slate and Slab Company, ibid. 260, an agreement to issue debentures on capital, stock, goods, chattels, &c., held a debenture and

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house and land in favour of adjacent land, which in effect authorised building on such adjacent land, so as to obstruct lights of lessee, held not to operate as a perpetual right to obstruct access of light to lessee's house, within exception in Sect. 3 of Prescription Act; and that lessee had, more than twenty years having elapsed since grant of lease, a right to an injunction against his light being obstructed. In re Hollingshead-Hollingshead v. Webster, ibid. 651, payment of interest on a simple contract debt of testator by devisee for life, keeps the debt unbarred as against all persons interested in remainder. Porter v. Porter, ibid. 420, next friend of person of unsound mind, not so found, may bring partition action. Grepe v. Loam, Grepe v. Bulteel, ibid. 168, Court of Appeal made an order prohibiting further applications without leave of the Court, where the same parties had repeatedly made frivolous applications for the purpose of impeaching a judgment. In re Clayton Mills Manufacturing Company, ibid. 28, leave to appeal after time, given where notice of appeal had already been given by three directors without knowledge of three others, on the last day for giving notice, all six directors having been ordered to jointly and severally replace certain sums, which three alone had received. Brown v. Burdett, ibid. 207, a judge has power under R. S. C. 1883, O. lxv. r. 11, to disallow costs incurred before those orders came into operation, if not already adjudicated upon, and can exercise that power without request from any of the parties, and notwithstanding the case is one in which, in the ordinary course, the costs would be paid out of a fund; and a mere order directing taxation of costs simpliciter made before 1883, in an administration action, does not prevent the judge finally disposing of such costs from exercising those powers. Liverpool Household Stores Association v. Smith, ibid. 170, injunction to restrain publication of future articles reflecting unfavourably on a Company, refused. Sachs v. Speilman, ibid. 295, a defendant does not waive his right to particulars by delivering his statement of defence. In re Mersey Railway Company, ibid. 610, no priority is obtained by a judgment creditor obtaining a receivership order, under Sect. 4 of the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and a second receivership order ought not to be made while one is in force. In re Haynes-Kemp v. Haynes, ibid. 306, a forfeiture clause on non-residence, attaching to a life estate takes effect on breach, nothwithstanding Sect. 51 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, if no sale has been made. In re Eley, ibid. 40, claim of solicitor to a negotiating fee under Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881, disallowed. In re Johnson v. Weatherall, ibid. 433, where London agents deliver to a country solicitor their bill of agency charges for a year, such charges relating to a number of distinct actions or matters, the Court can, under its general jurisdiction, order taxation of part of bill, and will in a proper case do so, taking care, however, to prevent injustice being done. Macfarlane v. Lister, ibid. 88, London agents of a solicitor held not entitled to a charge for costs under Sect. 28 of Solicitors Act, 1860, on property "recovered or preserved" in redemption action, on ground they were not the solicitors employed by the client; nor to a charge for costs of an arbitration, as not being a proceeding in a Court of Justice. In re Hanson's Trade Mark, ibid. 112, a label must, to be capable of registration, possess a distinctive character independently of its colours. Borthwick v. Evening Post, ibid. 449, issue of a publication with a similar name will not be restrained, unless the plaintiff show not merely that the name is calculated to deceive but that he will probably be injured by such deception. Evans v. Benyon, ibid. 329, trustee distributing a trust fund among strangers at request of a beneficiacy, who covenanted to indemnify, is not entitled, should he afterwards become entitled to a beneficial interest in such fund, to call on the covenantor to make good that interest to him. Preston v. Etherington, ibid. 104, a debtor against whom action was brought for the debt, by the order of compromise admitted, contrary to the fact, that the principal sum in his hands, claimed in the action, amounted to £, was ordered in effect to hold it on trust, &c., paying interest for it, and held by such admission and order to have become a trustee of the money and liable to attachment for nonpayment within Sect. 4, sub-sect. 3 of Debtors Act, 1869, though in fact he had not, at the date of the compromise or since, the money in his hands, and was up to that time a

within saving of Sect. 17 of Bills of Sale Act, 1882. Topham v. Greenside Glazed Fire Brick Company, ibid. 281, articles excluded by Sect. 5 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, from definition of "trade machinery" are not "personal chattels" for any of the purposes of the Act, and an assignment of them need not be registered, even though affixed to the land of a stranger (pursuant to an easement). Holland v. Dickson, ibid. 669, holders of stock and debentures have a right under the Companies Clauses Acts, 1845, sects. 45 and 63, and Companies Clauses Acts, 1863, sect. 28, to inspect the Company's registers, and not merely the names and addresses of holders of stock and debentures, at all reasonable times, without assigning any reason for inspection, and the right is enforceable by injunction restraining interference therewith by Company. Peek v. Derry, ibid. 541, directors held liable for misstatements contained in a prospectus which were a material, but not the only inducement to plaintiff to take shares, such misstatements being made without reasonable ground for believing them measure of damages to be difference between price paid for shares and their real value at allotment, such real value to be ascertained by light of subsequent events, and not to be treated as merely their market value at time. Nanney v. Morgan, ibid. 346, a deed of transfer of shares or stock does not pass the legal interest to the transferee until delivered to secretary of Company pursuant to Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845; and is not "delivered" then if he returns it as not in accordance with requirements of that Act. In re North Brazilian Sugar Factories, ibid. 83, the power of ordering inspection of books and papers of a Company being wound up given by Sect. 156 of Companies Act, 1862, is prima facie for purposes of the winding up, and those interested in it, and not for purpose of enabling individual shareholders to establish claims for their personal benefit against directors or promoters, and applies only to books or papers in Company's possession. In re Land Development Associatian (Kent's case), ibid. 508, a minute of a resolution passed by directors that a debt due from the Company, and purchased by a shareholder, shall be applied in payment of the amount uncalled on his shares is not equivalent to payment in cash within Sect. 25 of Companies Act, 1867. In re Mills' Trusts, ibid. 312, Sect. 45 of Copyhold Act, 1887, repeals entirely Sect. 30 of Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, as regards copyholds; it divests the legal estate in copyholds, which, under Sect. 30 of the latter Act, has, on the death of a sole trustee, before the passing of the Copyhold Act, devolved on his personal representatives, from them and vests it in his customary heir or devisee, but does not affect the validity of any disposition made by the personal representatives before the passing of the Copyhold Act. Natt Walker v. Gammage, ibid. 517, the division of personal estate among descendants of an intestate is always, under the Statute of Distribution, to be per stirpes; children and the issue of children of an intestate are all included in the term "children," and not in term "next of kin " in Sect. 7 of that Statute. In re Boyes Earl of Strathmore v. Vane, ibid. 128, an executor who takes possession of a leasehold of his testator is personally liable as assign of the lease for subsequent rent up to the letting value of the holding. In re Tippett's and Newbould's Contract, ibid. 444, where there is a gift of a fund subject to a particular estate to a married woman absolutely, with restraint on anticipation, such restraint will not, on that ground alone, be confined to continuance of the particular estate. Tennant v. Welch, ibid. 622, married woman selling and conveying with her husband's concurrence her real estate under 3 & 4 Wm. 4, C. 74, and on her separate examination refusing any provision out of the purchase money or otherwise, must be treated as having given to her husband all her interest in such purchase money, both at law and in equity; and it makes no difference that such purchase money or part of it has been left outstanding in trustees as an indemnity fund against charges on the estate. Should she in such case survive and the fund remain outstanding, she cannot as against his estate claim it as a chose in action not reduced into possession by the husband. De Stackpoole v. De Stackpoole, ibid. 139, costs of settlement executed by a female ward of Court, on her marriage with Court's sanction, ordered to be paid out of corpus of settled property. Mitchell v. Cantrill, ibid. 56, reservation in a lease of

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